Human Rights and Radical Social Change: Liberalism, Marxism and Progressive Populism in Venezuela

Clark, Tillman

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Human Rights and Radical Social Change: Liberalism, Marxism and Progressive Populism in Venezuela

By Tillman Clark
2010, Vol. 2 No. 03 | pg. 6/13 | « »

Keywords: Human Rights Venezuela Hugo Chavez Marxism Populism Liberalism Ideology Social Change Radical Social Change

Populism is ultimately always sustained by ordinary people’s frustrated exasperation, by a cry of “I don’t know what’s going on, I just know I’ve had enough of it! It can’t go on! It must stop!” -- an impatient outburst, a refusal to understand, exasperation at complexity, and the ensuing conviction that there must be somebody responsible for all the mess, which is why an agent who is behind the scenes and explains it all is required.31

Zizek goes further, contrasting the populist discourse to the Marxist one:

[F]or a populist, the cause of the troubles is ultimately never the system as such but the intruder who corrupted it (ﬁnancial manipulators, not necessarily capitalists, and so on); not a fatal ﬂaw inscribed into the structure as such but an element that doesn’t play its role within the structure properly. For a Marxist, on the contrary [...] the pathological (deviating misbehavior of some elements) is the symptom of the normal, an indicator of what is wrong in the very structure that is threatened with “pathological” outbursts. For Marx, economic crises are the key to understanding the “normal” functioning of capitalism [...]32

It follows that a theory of populism is not as so much an idealistic economic/political enacting of policies, an unrealistic relationship between demands and conditions, ideological “interpellation” or solely marked by the will of political charisma. Instead, these characteristics arise from the original lack of systemic analysis that utilizes a logic and rhetoric of "alien" elements infecting the unified and potentially balanced social whole. The solution is thus to find and destroy the problem-causing invaders, rather than seeing society as a society always-already divided by antagonisms with there being no "natural" or "harmonized" state to return to or advocate for. Thus, inconsistent references to the “financial manipulator,” “international capitalists,” “oligarchy,” or the effects of imperialism are used in an effort to externalize the congenial contradictions of the nation. The main issue with this approach is that its ambiguity is the starting point for undemocratic and authoritarian politics, which is arguably worse than if a rigid, well defined Marxist position on a certain necessary, temporary authoritarianism is taken.

It may be simply that populism is best embodied by Zizek’s point about the “agent behind the scenes”; populism in this sense is nothing more than a refusal to confront the complexity of the situation with a systemic analysis and thus is the underlying flaw of populism and is the catalyst for its further limitations and shortcomings. This is the true point of departure for which some regimes are characterized populist and others are not. As pointed out above, the liberal position plays the game within the parameters of capitalism and there is no radical change necessary. Obversely, as opposed to the progressive populism we are addressing here, the radical emancipatory project such as Marxism also differs. Zizek again elaborates upon this point:

[T]he ultimate difference between true radical-emancipatory politics and populist politics is that authentic radical politics is active, imposing, enforcing its vision, while populism is fundamentally reactive, a reaction to a disturbing intruder.33

It is with this understanding--that populism is a refusal of systemic analysis and its subsequent political and economic prescriptions and instead an almost ‘shoot-from-the-hip” social and ideological movement--that we can proceed to looking at its limitations.

Limitations of Populism

Progressive populism’s strength lies in how it often ushers in a new mass democracy that transcends the old, traditional, and oligarchical politics, providing a new sense of dignity and self-respect for lower class sectors of society, who are encouraged to recognize that they possess both social and political rights. Populist leaders are often wildly popular and capable of winning any free and open democratic contest. Because populists have no single doctrine (drawing from existing sociopolitical models such as socialism, corporatism or democratic capitalism) their ideas remain inconsistent and their ideas change frequently over time. The flexibility of these ideas allows them to appeal to the largest amount of voters at any given time.34 The electoral victories of populist leaders show a clearly expressed public discontent with the way things were and a desire for major political change. They give hope to the democratic principle that an alternation in power could bring about a change in policies and government and that had failed to articulate popular demands in the past and were viewed largely as corrupt. But once in office they unfortunately tend to exhibit tendencies that show little respect for the rule of law, political pluralism, and democratic checks and balances. In this sense, they follow the ideology of Marxism in so far as the traditional system no longer holds legitimacy because it is being replaced with a new socio-economic model thus making it no longer necessary to follow its rules.

By definition, populist leaders are elected with large electoral majorities from unorganized masses and thus tend to view themselves, and are often viewed, as the embodiment of “the people” and the manifestation of the popular will. The image of the leader who had emerged from “the people” and would return power to them, displacing corrupt and elitist incumbents who had hijacked democracy for self-serving interests (alien elements) is reinforced through this process. As “anti-establishment” or “revolutionary” political outsiders, they characterize the restrictions posed by existing institutions--such as an independent judiciary and congressional opposition--that limit their political autonomy, force them to make concessions with opponents, or constrict their efforts to implement the popular will, as unnecessary and in need of replacement or transcendence in the name of political change and/or a new socio-economic model. Populist leaders often view institutionalized structures as constraints on their political autonomy and vestiges of the traditional past, and see little need for such structures when they can communicate with the public and mobilize electoral support through the media.

Popular referendums are often used to justify institutional changes, allowing populist leaders to claim a democratic mandate. But when the underlying rules-of-the-game are so fluid that they can be rewritten at the whim of temporary and contingent electoral majorities, then there emerges a certain threatening pressure:

[T]here is in populism always something violent, threatening, for the liberal view: an open of latent pressure, a warning that, if elections are manipulated, the “will of the people” will have to find another way to impose itself; even if electoral legitimization of power is respected, it i made clear that elections play a secondary role, that they serve only to confirm a political process whose substantial weight lies elsewhere [...] This is what gives the thrill to populist regimes: the democratic rules are never fully endorsed, there is always an uncertainty that pertains to them, a possibility always looms that they will be redefined, “unfairly” changed in the middle of the game.35Continued on Next Page »

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

1.) See; Against The Double Blackmail by Slavoj Zizek (1999); http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-against-the-double-blackmail.html

2.) Human Rights and Its Discontents by Slavoj Zizek, (1999); http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-human-rights-and-its-discontents.html

3.) “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty by Isaih Berlin (1958, Oxford).

4.) From Kosovo to Kabul by David Chandler (2002, London) pg. 114-115

5.) [5] Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism by Steven B. Smith (1989, Chicago) pg. 99

6.) Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism pg. 69

7.) Political Liberalism by John Rawls (1993, New York) pg. 151 n16

8.) The Parallax View by Slavoj Zizek (2006, London) pg. 339

9.) On The Jewish Question by Karl Marx (2009); http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/

10.) Critique of the Gotha Program by Karl Marx, Section I (1999); http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/index.htm

11.) Ibid

12.) See, for instance, Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1967) or Leon Trotsky’s Their Morals and Ours (1938)

13.) The State and Revolution by Vladimir Lenin (1999), quoted in the chapter The Transition from Capitalism to Communism; http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/index.htm

14.) Terrorism and Communism by Leon Trotsky, Chapter 2 (2006); http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1920/terrcomm/ch02.htm

15.) It should be duly noted that when out of power, as a resistance movement or political opposition, Marxism has a dutiful history of working for human rights and claiming them in the face of repression. One needs only to look at the history of resistance to Fascism to see Marxism take such a leading role. Additionally, it would not be hard to argue that without a strong labor movement, largely influenced by Marxist theory, the rights that citizens enjoy in Western countries would not exist.

16.) The key difference between this viewpoint and that of Marxism is that Marxism sees the state not just as a dictatorship but as a class dictatorship. For more on this, see The General Will: Rousseau, Marx, Communism by Andrew Levine (1993); specifically Chapter 5, “The last state.”

17.) For an extended look at a history of Latin American populism, see; Populism in Latin America edited by Michael Conniff (1999 London)

18.) This term is largely problematic because of the implications associated with a certain, rigid conception of what economic “discipline” is. For neoliberals and institutions like the IMF it is considered following certain guidelines of what they deem necessary economic policies that may be uncomfortable for broad ranges of the population but necessary to gather revenue to pay off debt; hence the term “discipline.”

19.) Another problematic term. Who decides what “fiscal responsibility” means? Is it “responsible” to cut off social programs to pay off debt, as the IMF sees it, or are some seemingly unsustainable policies necessary for socioeconomic stability with the real fiscal issues laying in other areas, hidden to the ideology of the IMF? Recent history should point to the strength of the latter proposition.

20.) For an in depth look at the crisis and the role of neoliberalism, see Rise and Collapse of Neoliberalism in Argentina by Miguel Teubal (2004). Found here: http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Rise_and_Collapse_of_Neoliberalism_in_Argentina__The_Role_of_Economic_Groups.pdf

21.) For brief looks at the policies of Perón and Vargas, see, again, Conniff pgs. 22-43 and 43-63, respectively.

22.) While this declaration may seem controversial, there is hardly any doubt that the policies put into place by the first populist leaders were largely unsustainable--especially in the case of Perón--despite their good intentions or origins. While the original pretenses for these policies (their necessity, effectivity etc.) are up for debate, there is little controversy that they largely failed in their intentions and paved the way for the debt crisis of the 80s.

23.) For a look at this type of traditional academia, see; The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America by Dornbusch and Edwards (1991 Chicago). Dornbusch and Edwards see populism largely in economic terms such as redistribution, popular consumption, fiscal expansion all at the expense of macroeconomic stability.

24.) Conniff pgs. 4-7 (1999 London)

25.) From here forward, when speaking of populism it will be in the sense that it is “progressive” populism--a populism that is associated with electoral democracy and progressive economic policy.

26.) Populism and reform in Latin America by Tortuato Di Tella in Obstacles to Change in Latin America (1970) pgs. 47-74

27.) Ibid pg. 49

28.) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory by Ernesto Laclau (1977 London), pgs. 143-198

29.) Ibid pgs. 172-173

30.) In Defense of Lost Causes by Slavoj Zizek (2008 London) pg. 277

31.) Ibid pg. 282

32.) Against the Populist Temptation by Slavoj Zizek (2006) pg. 5 http://www.lacan.com/zizpopulism.htm

33.) In Defense of Lost Causes pg. 304

34.) For instance, Perón’s “Justicialismo” was a slogan that simply stood for “economic growth and social justice.” Who is against economic growth and social justice? (Conniff pg. 5)

35.) In Defense of Lost Causes pg. 265

36.) Perón, for instance, was notorious for appointing loyalists to important positions of government, including but not limited to his appointment of a supporter to a previously independent position of party secretary of the largest Argentinean Union in May 1946. (Conniff pgs. 33-35)

37.) One of the most telling example of this coming in the form of the military coup in Brazil against Vargas in August 1954, leading to his suicide. (Conniff pg. 51)

38.) For a more specific look at the history and policies of the Chávez presidency up until 2007-2008, see Changing Venezuela by Taking Power by Gregory Wilpert (London, 2007) and Rethinking Venezuelan Politics by Steve Ellner (London 2008).

39.) Changing Venezuela by Taking Power pgs. 16-17

40.) “Additional measures approximating neoliberalism included austere fiscal policies, overvaluation of the local currency, and the retention of the neoliberal-inspired value added tax with the aim of avoiding inflation and shoring up international reserves.” Ellner pg. 112

41.) Ellner pg. 119

42.) Ellner pg. 121

43.) For instance, in the book Democracy and Revolution (London 2006), D.L. Raby states; “The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela is still very much a dynamic and unfinished project, but already we can see in Chavez’ discourse the emergence of a coherent ‘foundational project,’ the ‘Socialism of the twenty-first century.” She goes on to write that populism can be revolutionary, but only if it’s social base is an “autonomous movement of the dominated classes and where its leader is a true representative of the movement.” pg. 256. It seems, from this perspective, that the conditions for revolutionary populism are “autonomy” and “true leadership”--two highly ambiguous qualifiers that can be interpreted a number of ways.

44.) Ellner pg. 128

45.) Without changing the logic of the system the oligarchy, the elites and the influences of imperialism will remain. The “oligarchs,” “imperialists” and “elites” are not functioning as evil outsiders intent on destroying Venezuela but instead are simply following the logical coordinates of a capitalist system. To identify them as “negative elements” that need to be purged from the purity of the whole is to exactly employ a populist discourse that, as we will see further on, leads to authoritarian tendencies that employ the use of Marxism’s theory of human rights but without a similar systemic analysis of change to back it up.

46.) “The emphasis [of endogenous development] is on agriculture (50%) and industrial production (30%), paying particular attention to achieving elf-sufficiency with regard to the production of food, clothes and shoes.” Wilpert pg. 79

47.) Ellner pg. 128

48.) Against the Populist Temptation (2006) pg. 7 n4

49.) Wipert pg. 193

“Much of the government’s spending has, in recent years, been carried out directly from PDVSA, the state oil company. For example, in the first three quarters of 2008 (January through September) PDVSA had $13.9 billion, or 6.1 percent of GDP in public expenditures.”

The Chávez Administrationat10Years:TheEconomyandSocialIndicatorsby MarkWeisbrot,RebeccaRayandLuisSandoval (Center for Economic and Policy Research, February 2009) pg. 17

50.) Wilpert pg. 82 (How these “ethical responsibilities” are to be monitored has not been detailed, but one can assume it will be through certain state regulations and inspections that would most likely employ highly ambiguous points of reference on ethical standards thus opening up the possibility of corruption.)

51.) Chávez Threatens to Jail Price Control Violators by Simon Romero, February 2007 in The New York Times; http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/17/world/americas/17venezuela.html?pagewanted=print

(The institution of price controls is largely populist because of its refusal to address the systemic nature of the problem. A populist in effect shoots the messenger when instituting price controls because its logic emerges out of a rationality that does not know why prices are so high and thus blames the agent of the last step of the production process, distribution and pricing, for corruption and criminal negligence. In effect, the populist says; “We don’t know why rice prices are so high, but they are and you are selling them higher than we told you to. Either fix the problem or we fine/nationalize you.”)

52.) Wilpert pg. 201

53.) Wilpert pg. 203 (Wilpert goes on to describe how Chávez has called ministers in the middle of the night to perform tasks and that, when faced with criticism, Chávez responds sometimes with “I remind you, you are speaking to the president.”)

54.) This is most notably highlighted by the infamous “Tascon List” which was essentially a blacklisting of opposition members from government industries and jobs following the coup and strike. (Wilpert pg. 205)

55.) Ellner pg. 147

56.) Wilpert pg. 49

57.) “Of the 61 ministers that have served in the Chávez government between 1999 and 2004, 16 (or 26%) were military officers. Also, Chávez supported the election of retired officers to numerous governor’s and mayor’s posts. Following the 2004 regional elections, of the country’s 24 governors, 22 belonged to the Chávez camp. Of these, nine (41%) have a military background.” (Wilpert pg. 49)

58.) Wilpert pg. 40

59.) During my trip to Venezuela, one of the most constant voices of concern was found in relation to the upcoming vote that would eliminate term limits for the presidency and other heads of local governments. The complaint was that leading up to the vote, the amount of propaganda related to campaigning distracted from other legitimate problems. People were told to wait until the end of the vote to voice their concerns and to focus on winning the “voting battle.” Additionally, many people I encountered sympathetic to Chávez mentioned that while they might be opposed to indefinite re-election, they could see no real alternative to Chávez and thus felt obligated to vote for the passage of the new law.

60.) Ellner pg. 111

61.) Wilpert pg. 21

62.) A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela by Human Rights Watch (September 18, 2008); http://www.hrw.org/en/node/64174/section/1

63.) Ibid pg. 2

64.) Ibid pg. 134

65.) Ibid pg. 137

66.) Ibid pg. 38-64

67.) This should not be read as the original intention of Marx in any sense. I use the term Marxist here to refer to, as discussed earlier, the historical record of Marxists when they have taken power with the Soviet Union obviously in the forefront of such a record.

68.) Smoke and Mirrors: An Analysis of Human Rights Watch’s Report on Venezuela by Gregory Wilpert (October 17th, 2008); http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3882#_ftnref

69.) Ibid

70.) A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela pg. 15

71.) Ibid pg. 99

72.) Venezuela mulls tough media law, BBC news (July 31, 2009); http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8177862.stm

73.) A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela pg. 134-197

74.) Changing Venezuela by Taking Power pgs. 53-64

75.) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory pgs. 196-197

76.) Against the Populist Temptation pg. 17

77.) In Defense of Lost Causes pg. 304

Tillman Clark graduated in 2009 with a concentration in Political Economics from The Evergreen State College in Olympia, WA.

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