Prescriptive Analysis: Untangling the Puzzle
During the two decades preceding the 1975 civil war, many Western scholars referred to Lebanon as the "most stable democracy" in the Arab world; however, the political system, at times, falls far short of being democratic. The Lebanese system represents a political structure that is trying to do too many things at once, and is suffering in the process. Governed by the confessionism, Lebanon is locked into a system of representation that perpetuates reinforcing cleavages of religion, rather than diffusing them. While many would argue that the current system is the only way for religious minorities to be guaranteed a voice in politics, it is worth noting here that, since 1943, political confessionism has been considered as a temporary arrangement that should be expunged as soon as possible, but it has continued to predominate. In Lebanon, transforming the provisional decisions into permanent ones has become a tradition, reaffirmed most recently with the Taif Agreement.
There is currently talk in Lebanon of adopting a proportional representation system to replace the current “winner-take-all” confessionism for the 2013 elections. Many in the government are fighting the reform, claiming that Lebanon is not ready for such a change, and that the system is too delicate; but with a recent survey showing that 59 percent of Lebanese favor proportional representation over the current winner-takes-all system, and another showing 81.7% of Lebanese prefer that there be a separation between religious activities and economic and social life, the writing appears to be on the wall. A proportional system would allow for the creation of catch-all parties to enter and compete in the political system. These national parties, free from the limiting stigmas of confessionism, would create cross-cutting cleavages, providing more opportunities for members of various religious faiths to find common ground and express themselves politically; unlike many of the current religious parties. To assuage the fears of minority groups, a low quota would allow smaller parties of any type to win more seats in the legislature. The beauty here, lies in the fact that these smaller groups could then band together to form new coalitions or larger parties without worrying about appealing to the Maronite and Druze voter in the same district.
I recognize that changing an unstable democracy’s electoral system overnight is both impossible and highly irresponsible. Further research must be done on the subject, but from popular sentiment, it seems that this change is inevitable. There are however smaller, institutional changes that could be made immediately that will help ease Lebanon’s corruption woes. The first is institutionalizing a uniform, national ballot. Under the current system, parties use specially printed or doctored ballots to instruct voters whom to vote for. They also use these ballots as they count the votes to track who voted the way they wanted and who did not. Regulating voting with a uniform paper or electronic ballot will restore anonymity to the voting process and break a crucial link in the chain that allows parties to spy on voters.
Finally, giving more power to the judiciary would certainly help clean up electoral politics. As it stands now, the foxes guard the henhouse, as the Constitutional Council can only investigate electoral fraud, but since parties’ manipulative practices are not explicitly illegal, the council is powerless to stop them. If however the council were more empowered, precedents could be set that would allow Lebanon to develop into a freer, more democratic society.
Conclusion
Solving the political problems faced by Lebanon is no easy task. With deep, internal conflicts that date far back and are still tied to a political system imposed by a colonial power, Lebanon’s democracy is delicate to say the least. Besieged constantly by foreign influences and powers, (France, Syria, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, just to name a few) Lebanon’s sovereignty has never been fully stable, preventing the country from developing and adopting a political system based around its preferences, not the preferences of others.
As the 2013 election draw near, we can only hope that the people will mobilize and elect a government that will work for the best interests of the country. Based on surveys explored in this paper, it seems there is the political will for change, and given the inspiration of this year’s Arab Spring, the people of Lebanon may very well succeed. As Syria retreats inward to deal with its own upheaval and the rest of the Arab World is preoccupied with the unprecedented political change that swept through the region, 2013 may be Lebanon’s first step toward regaining the stability and grandeur that today seems like a distant memory.
References
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1.) Salibi, Kamal S. "The Imagined Principality." A House of Many Mansions the History of Lebanon Reconsidered. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1988. 108-130. Print.
2.) Ibid
3.) Ibid
4.) Ibid
5.) Lapidus, Ira M. A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge [u.a.: Cambridge Univ.,] 2007. 147. Print.
6.) Ibid
7.) Salibi, Kamal S. "Ottoman Lebanon: How Unique." A House of Many Mansions the History of Lebanon Reconsidered. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1988. 151-166. Print.
8.) Ibid
9.) Hitti, Philip Khuri. A Short History of Lebanon. London: Macmillan, 1965. Print.
10.) Ibid
11.) Ibid
12.) Ibid
13.) Ibid
14.) Ibid
15.) Salibi, Kamal S. "Ottoman Lebanon: How Unique." A House of Many Mansions the History of Lebanon Reconsidered. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1988. 151-166. Print.
16.) Longrigg, Stephen H. Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
17.) Ibid
18.) Ibid
19.) Lebanese Constitution
20.) Longrigg, Stephen H. Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
21.) Krayem, Hassan. "AUB: The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement." Digital Documentation Center - AUB. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. Retrieved from: http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.
22.) Ibid
23.) Hitti, Philip Khuri. A Short History of Lebanon. London: Macmillan, 1965. Print.
24.) Ibid
25.) Ibid
26.) Ibid
27.) Salem. 1992b. "Watheeqat al-Wifaq al-Watani Bayn Bayrut wa Dimashk wa alTa'if' [National Reconciliation Document Between Beirut, Damascus, and al-Taif ] al-Safir Wednesday August 12, p. 13.
28.) Younis, 1. 1985. Silsilat al-Watha'iq al-Siyasiyya Lil-azma al-Lubnaniyya [Basic Documents of the Lebanese Crisis]. Vol 5. Beirut.
29.) Krayem, Hassan. "AUB: The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement." Digital Documentation Center - AUB. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. Retrieved from: http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.
30.) Ibid
31.) Ibid
32.) Ibid
33.) Ibid
34.) Ibid
35.) Ibid
36.) Ibid
37.) Ibid
38.) Ibid
39.) Ibid
40.) Ibid
41.) Blanford, Nicholas. Killing Mr Lebanon: the Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Print.
42.) Ibid
43.) Ibid
44.) "Syria: The power in Lebanon". BBC News. April 16, 2001. Retrieved April 2, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1280579.stm
45.) Ibid
46.) Ibid
47.) “The Limits of Loyalty” Al-Aharam weekly.com, retrieved at April 2, 2007. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/707/re1.htm from
48.) Blanford, Nicholas. Killing Mr Lebanon: the Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Print.
49.) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2006-03-29). "LEBANON:The many hands and faces of Hezbollah". Retrieved 2006-08-17.
50.) Fadlallah, Muhammad. "Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l- Mustad'afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam" al-Safir. Beirut. 1985 Retrieved from: http://findalismonkeyinthemiddle.blogspot.com/2009/05/hezbollah-army-of-god.html
51.) "Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis — week one". BBC News Online. 19 July 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5179434.stm
52.) The Godfather. Dir. Francis Ford Coppola. Perf. Marlon Brando, Al Pacino, James Caan, Richard Castellano, Robert Duvall, Sterling Hayden, John Marley, Richard Conte, and Diane Keaton. Paramount Pictures, 1972.
53.) Lebanon’s Electoral System – 2009 http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/lebanon2009/2009/06/200962114819360431.html
54.) Krayem, Hassan. "AUB: The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement." Digital Documentation Center - AUB. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. Retrieved from: http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.
55.) Lebanes Constitution
56.) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Lebanon. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 4 July 2009.
57.) Ibid
58.) Ibid
59.) Lebanese Interior Ministry – 2009 Election Results. http://www.elections.gov.lb/Parliamentary/Elections-Results/2009-Real-time-Results/نتايج-الانتخابات-لكافة-الاقضية.aspx
60.) See Appendix C for detailed breakdown of the 2009 election
61.) Slackman, Michael (2009-06-09). "U.S.-Backed Alliance Wins Election in Lebanon". New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/world/middleeast/09lebanon.html?hp
62.) Langenbacher, Eric. CPS Lecture. Georgetown University. Washington, DC. November 9, 2011.
63.) Lebanese Interior Ministry – District Information. http://www.elections.gov.lb/Parliamentary/Elections-Results/2009-Real-time-Results/نتايج-الانتخابات-لكافة-الاقضية/Baabda.aspx
64.) Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale Univ., 1999. Print.
65.) European Union Election Observation Mission. Lebanon – Final Report Parliamentary Elections June 7 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.eueomlebanon.org/en/files/doc/1253861855_Rapport%2520final%2520EN%2520OK.pdf
66.) Corstange, Daniel. "Dominant Parties, Dueling Machines, and Vote Trafficking: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon." Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Lecture Series. Georgetown University. Washington, DC. November 11, 2011.
67.) Langenbacher, Eric. CPS Lecture. Georgetown University. Washington, DC. November 9, 2011.
68.) Krayem, Hassan. "AUB: The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement." Digital Documentation Center - AUB. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. Retrieved from: http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.
69.) Maurice Duverger, "Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System," in Party Politics and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), pp. 23-32. http://janda.org/c24/Readings/Duverger/Duverger.htm
70.) Parliamentary Distribution Retrieved from: http://blacksmithsoflebanon.blogspot.com/2008/05/2009-electoral-districts.html
71.) Corstange, Daniel. "Dominant Parties, Dueling Machines, and Vote Trafficking: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon." Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Lecture Series. Georgetown University. Washington, DC. November 11, 2011.
72.) Ibid
73.) Ibid
74.) Ibid
75.) Ibid
76.) Blanford, Nicholas. Killing Mr Lebanon: the Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Print.
77.) Transparency International Retrieved from: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results
78.) LEBANON REPORT. ARAB BAROMETER SURVEY PROJECT. Retrieved from: http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/countryreports/lebanonreport.pdf
79.) Ibid
80.) Corstange, Daniel. "Dominant Parties, Dueling Machines, and Vote Trafficking: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon." Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Lecture Series. Georgetown University. Washington, DC. November 11, 2011.
81.) Ibid
82.) Worth, Robert F. "Foreign Money Seeks to Buy Lebanese Votes - NYTimes.com." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 22 Apr. 2009. Web. Nov. 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/middleeast/23lebanon.html?_r=1.
83.) Corstange, Daniel. "Dominant Parties, Dueling Machines, and Vote Trafficking: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon." Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Lecture Series. Georgetown University. Washington, DC. November 11, 2011.
84.) Krayem, Hassan. "AUB: The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement." Digital Documentation Center - AUB. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. Retrieved from: http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html.
85.) Ibid
86.) Ibid
87.) Khraiche, Dana. "59 Percent of Lebanese Favor System of Proportional Representation”THE DAILY STAR :: Breaking News, Lebanon News, Middle East News & World News. 20 Oct. 2011. Web. Retrieved from: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Oct-20/151794-59-percent-of-lebanese-favor-system-of-proportional-representation.ashx.
88.) LEBANON REPORT. ARAB BAROMETER SURVEY PROJECT. Retrieved from: http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/countryreports/lebanonreport.pdf
89.) Corstange, Daniel. "Dominant Parties, Dueling Machines, and Vote Trafficking: Theory and Evidence from Lebanon." Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Lecture Series. Georgetown University. Washington, DC. November 11, 2011.
90.) Ibid
91.) The Lebanese Electoral System 2009. International Foundation for Electoral Systems. March 2009. Retrieved from: http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:kTy7V71mxk4J:www.ifes.org/publication/56c0cdaa64aa2cad85b3f5996e37cb4c/IFES_Lebanon_ESB_Paper030209.pdf
92.) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Lebanon. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 4 July 2009.
Appendix A – Confessional Map of Lebanon
Appendix B – Before / After Taif
Source: Krayem, Hassan. "AUB: The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement." Digital Documentation Center - AUB. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. .
Appendix C – 2009 Detailed Results
| Election Results for each Alliance |
Total |
% 14M |
14 March |
% 8M |
8 March |
| Beirut 19 |
Beirut 1 |
5 |
52.1% |
5 |
47.9% |
0 |
| Beirut 2 |
4 |
50.5% |
2 |
49.5% |
2 |
| Beirut 3 |
10 |
69.6% |
10 |
31.4% |
0 |
| Bekaa 23 |
Baalbek +Hermel |
10 |
21.6% |
0 |
78.4% |
10 |
| Zahleh |
7 |
52.7% |
7 |
47.3% |
0 |
| Rashaya +West Bekaa |
6 |
53.3% |
6 |
46.7% |
0 |
| Mount Lebanon 35 |
Jbeil |
3 |
39.6% |
0 |
60.4% |
3 |
| Kisrawan |
5 |
44.9% |
0 |
55.1% |
5 |
| North Metn |
8 |
48.4% |
2 |
51.6% |
6 |
| Baabda |
6 |
43.8% |
0 |
56.2% |
6 |
| Aley |
5 |
61.2% |
4 |
38.8% |
1 |
| Chouf |
8 |
75.6% |
8 |
24.4% |
0 |
| North Lebanon 28 |
Akkar |
7 |
63.1% |
7 |
36.9% |
0 |
| Dinniyeh +Minnieh |
3 |
70.9% |
3 |
29.1% |
0 |
| Bsharreh |
2 |
73.4% |
2 |
26.6% |
0 |
| Tripoli |
8 |
63.5% |
8 |
36.5% |
0 |
| Zgharta |
3 |
44.2% |
0 |
55.8% |
3 |
| Koura |
3 |
51.1% |
3 |
48.9% |
0 |
| Batrun |
2 |
52.2% |
2 |
47.8% |
0 |
| South Lebanon 23 |
Saida |
2 |
63.9% |
2 |
36.1% |
0 |
| Tyre |
4 |
06.8% |
0 |
93.2% |
4 |
| Zahrani |
3 |
10.0% |
0 |
90.0% |
3 |
| Hasbaya +Marjeyoun |
5 |
21.4% |
0 |
78.6% |
5 |
| Nabatiyeh |
3 |
11.6% |
0 |
88.4% |
3 |
| Bint Jbeil |
3 |
05.8% |
0 |
94.2% |
3 |
| Jezzine |
3 |
25.5% |
0 |
74.5% |
3 |
| Total 128 |
128 |
44.5% |
71 |
55.5% |
57 |
Source: Lebanese Interior Ministry – 2009 Election Results. http://www.elections.gov.lb/Parliamentary/Elections-Results/2009-Real-time-Results/نتايج-الانتخابات-لكافة-الاقضية.aspx
Appendix D – 2009 Least Squares Calculations
| |
Parties |
Votes % |
Seats |
Seats % |
%S - %V |
(%S - %V)^2 |
| Mar - 14 |
Future Movement |
|
26 |
|
|
|
| |
PSP |
|
11 |
|
|
|
| |
IM |
|
13 |
|
|
|
| |
LF |
|
8 |
|
|
|
| |
LSDP |
|
5 |
|
|
|
| |
SDHP |
|
3 |
|
|
|
| |
JAI |
|
1 |
|
|
|
| |
ADP |
|
2 |
|
|
|
| |
DLM |
|
1 |
|
|
|
| |
NLP |
|
1 |
|
|
|
| |
|
44.5 |
71 |
55.47 |
10.97 |
120.3409 |
| Mar - 8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
FPM |
|
18 |
|
|
|
| |
Armal |
|
13 |
|
|
|
| |
Hezbollah |
|
12 |
|
|
|
| |
LDP |
|
4 |
|
|
|
| |
MM |
|
3 |
|
|
|
| |
ARF |
|
2 |
|
|
|
| |
SSNP |
|
2 |
|
|
|
| |
ASBP |
|
2 |
|
|
|
| |
SP |
|
1 |
|
|
|
| |
|
55.5 |
57 |
44.53 |
-10.97 |
120.3409 |
| Totals |
|
100 |
128 |
100 |
|
240.6818 |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
LSq |
10.97 |
Source: Lebanese Interior Ministry – 2009 Election Results. http://www.elections.gov.lb/Parliamentary/Elections-Results/2009-Real-time-Results/نتايج-الانتخابات-لكافة-الاقضية.aspx
Appendix E – Volatility Calculations (All Parties From 1962 – Present)
| Parties |
2011 |
2009 |
2005 |
2000 |
1996 |
1992 |
1972 |
1968 |
1964 |
| Future Movement |
0.203125 |
0.203125 |
0.28125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| PSP |
0.0546875 |
0.0859375 |
0.125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| IM |
0.0859375 |
0.1015625 |
0.015625 |
0.671875 |
0.765625 |
0.109375 |
0.161616161616162 |
0.141414141414141 |
0.0808080808080808 |
| LF |
0.0625 |
0.0625 |
0.046875 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| LSDP |
0.0390625 |
0.0390625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| SDHP |
0.015625 |
0.0234375 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| JAI |
0.0078125 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| ADP |
0.0078125 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0.03125 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| DLM |
0.0078125 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| NLP |
0.0078125 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| FPM |
0.1484375 |
0.140625 |
0.1171875 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Armal |
0.1015625 |
0.1015625 |
0.109375 |
0.078125 |
0.0625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Hezbollah |
0.09375 |
0.09375 |
0.109375 |
0.078125 |
0.0546875 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| LDP |
0.03125 |
0.03125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| MM |
0.0234375 |
0.0234375 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| ARF |
0.015625 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0.015625 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| SSNP |
0.015625 |
0.015625 |
0.015625 |
0.03125 |
0.0390625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| ASBP |
0.015625 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| SP |
0.0078125 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| GM |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Other |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0.0390625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| QSG |
0 |
0 |
0.046875 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Tripoli Ind. |
0 |
0 |
0.0234375 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| DR |
0 |
0 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| DL |
0 |
0 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| SB |
0 |
0 |
0.0390625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| BP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0234375 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| KP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| LNB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| SDHP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0234375 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| PNO |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0078125 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| TL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| IG |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0078125 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| PP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| AA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Northern Bloc |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.1640625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| NSB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.1484375 |
0.0808080808080808 |
0.0707070707070707 |
0.0909090909090909 |
| LRB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.09375 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| WJB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.09375 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| F&C |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.078125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Armenian Bloc |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.046875 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| SPP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.046875 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| BSB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.03125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| SBZ |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.03125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| ZB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0234375 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| JB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0234375 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| FBB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0234375 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| IB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0234375 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| AB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| MMB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| NP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| PF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.015625 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| NLP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.111111111111111 |
0.131313131313131 |
0.0909090909090909 |
| T |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0606060606060606 |
0.0404040404040404 |
0.0404040404040404 |
| K |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0707070707070707 |
0.0909090909090909 |
0.0404040404040404 |
| CG |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.292929292929293 |
0 |
0 |
| PDF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0707070707070707 |
0.272727272727273 |
0.383838383838384 |
| AB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0404040404040404 |
0.0606060606060606 |
0.101010101010101 |
| HB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0505050505050505 |
0 |
0 |
| NB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0404040404040404 |
0.0606060606060606 |
0.0303030303030303 |
| N |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0101010101010101 |
0.0101010101010101 |
0.0101010101010101 |
| B |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0101010101010101 |
0.0606060606060606 |
0.0404040404040404 |
| EAB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0606060606060606 |
0.0909090909090909 |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Totals |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Volatility |
0.0469 |
0.3047 |
0.8125 |
0.1250 |
0.8906 |
0.8098 |
0.3939 |
0.2023 |
- |
Source: IPU Paraline Database – Lebanon http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2179_A.htm