Human Rights in Chile: Remeberance and Reckoning

Equally significant in the Pinochet case is a new promise for international human rights and adherence to international human rights law:

Surfacing in the Pinochet case have been documents related to international agencies and secretive operations that have existed for years. Included among these are operation Condor and the actions of the DINA, a form of international police. These organizations both operated in a number of countries. One source states:

"Officially, Condor arose as a defense against Communist-inspired terrorism, but its victims included government officials ousted in United States-supported military coups, trade unionists, rights Advocates, and suspected socialists. By 1978 investigators were tying Condor to the killing of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean foreign minister, and Ronni Moffitt, and American colleague, in 1976 when the car in which they were riding exploded in Washington." (http://www.remember-chile.org.uk/)

As individual cases are being pursued and tried in Chile and in other countries, the power of international agencies and those individuals who work for them are becoming increasingly called into question. This is a huge step within human rights of the post-Cold War era, and will undoubtedly force the public to review the history of the Cold War.

Ideology, Economics, and the Cold War

With particular concern for prevention of future human rights abuses, it is useful to look at the causes leading up to the sociopolitical conflict in Chile that led to the eventual coup in 1973. The ousted government of the Popular Unity, under the leadership of Salvador Allende, was on the left of the Chilean political spectrum. Allende was the Western Hemisphere’s first democratically-elected Marxist president. The political orientation of Allende’s government and supporters has become incredibly significant in human rights cases related to the Chilean dictatorship. During the case against Pinochet in London, one accusation of the Spanish government was of genocide whose definition under Spanish law includes the elimination of political groups. Britain “did not retain this accusation.” (“The Pinochet Precedent”)[3] The tension of Cold War politics— fears and political passions on both sides— has been widely identified as a primary cause of the conflict leading to military take-over in 1973. Although Cold War policy is often ultimately explained by economic realities and systems, in the Chilean case this is perhaps difficult to decipher among many conflicting facts, statistics, personal accounts, and economic reports.

For example, widely cited recently on the internet, as well as in recent publications, is what many have concluded to be the fallacy of the “Chilean economic miracle”. This was a term frequently heard in the ‘80s and ‘90s, and according to one source, promoted by Pinochet organizations itself. (O’Shaunghnessy) Under the military dictatorship, Pinochet was known internationally to have promoted a free market economy. This essentially reversed reforms that had been occurring under the democratic government in Chile during the nine years previous to the coup. Economic reforms under Allende (1970-73) included such measures as nationalizing foreign-owned businesses and redistribution of land under land reform. It was such measures that caused the IMF and World Bank to withdraw support for Chile during the Allende government, in addition to causing an international stir that led to CIA action in support of the right wing. (“Chile: the laborartory test”) These destabilizing measures created the atmosphere leading to the military coup.

Soon after the overthrow of the Allende government, Chile confronted a situation of high inflation. The crisis was dealt with by a group of the economists that have been come to be known as “the Chicago boys”:

"The Chicago boys were a group of 30 Chileans who had studied economics at the University of Chicago between 1955 and 1963. During the course of their postgraduate studies they had become disciples of Milton Friedman, and had returned to Chile completely indoctrinated in free market theory. By the end of 1974, they had risen to positions of power in the Pinochet regime, controlling most of its offices for economic planning." (“Chile: the laboratory test”)

One reason Chile’s unregulated economy came to be known as an economic miracle was a period of increased economic growth— 6.6% a year during 1978-81. (“Chile: the laboratory test”) These accounts have been recently balanced out, however, with other statistics, such as a fall in GNP per capita of 6.4% between 1972 and 1987. In summary of the results of Pinochet’s economic policies and anti-labor economy, one article states: