The Taiwan Strait: From Civil War to Status Quo

In 2005, during a period of heightened tensions between China and Taiwan and with the United States deeply embroiled in two major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the leading authority on East Asian security within the National Security Council nevertheless made the point that “one of the greatest dangers to international security” was the “possibility of a military confrontation between China and Taiwan that leads to a war between China and the United States” (Lieberthal, 2005). Analysts and media pundits have often alluded to this doomsday scenario in which Taiwan becomes a catalyst for a major international war; as recently as January 2010, an article in the New York Times referred to Taiwan as “the most sensitive diplomatic issue” between China and the United States (Cooper).

On the other hand, as economic, cultural, and political ties between China, Taiwan, and the U.S. have grown deeper, especially in the last decade, it becomes apparent that a military conflict would carry with it significant downsides, not least of which would be a disruption of trade between two of the world’s three biggest economies. The international relations theory of ‘complex interdependence’ suggests that as this trend of increasing exchange continues, the likelihood of confrontation should decrease.

In consideration of this hypothesis, this paper addresses one main question: Today, how relevant is the threat presented by the situation in the Taiwan Strait?

In addressing this question, this paper will consider destabilizing factors—such as the prevalence of Chinese nationalism, its role in the development of the Chinese state, and its influence on the Chinese political apparatus—and factors such as increasing economic ties that are acting to stabilize the relationship between China, Taiwan, and the United States. These factors will then be viewed through two competing theories of international relations.

I. Putting Taiwan in Context

The relationship between mainland China, the island province of Taiwan, and the United States is the product of a long and tumultuous history. In the 20^th century alone, there has been civil war, revolution, and international war that has often pitched these players against one another, yet at times also brought them together. These historical events are vital to understanding the tensions and attitudes that permeate contemporary cross-strait relations.

The Chinese Mainland and the Island of Taiwan: An Overview

Relations between mainland China and Taiwan have a particularly conflicted past. Though for centuries Taiwan was loosely integrated into the Chinese Empire (Shepherd, 2007: 108), mainland China has not exercised full control over Taiwan since 1895, when the island was ceded to Japan after a Chinese military defeat (Roberts, 1999: 192). Taiwan bore the chains of Japanese colonialism through 1945, after which point it was once again relinquished to China; overall, Taiwan has remained the subject of “foreign threat or outside domination” since the Opium Wars of the mid-19^th century (Lamley, 2007: 202).

Nevertheless, Taiwan retained some degree of autonomy from the mainland. After 1945, Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Party (KMT)—then still the party in power, under the banner of the Republic of China (ROC)—took control from the Japanese and “attempted to solidify their control over the island” (Phillips, 2007: 276). It is important to draw distinction between the local Taiwanese population and the Nationalist government, which at the time was dominated by mainlanders and viewed by the local population as another invading force (Rubinstein, xiv). As Phillips writes, “Reintegration [with the Chinese state] became, to many, recolonization,” and the process itself was accompanied by “massacring thousands of the island’s inhabitants” (Phillips, 2007: 277). The result was a tense relationship between the government and the population, which at times led to further violent clashes (with most of the violence being committed against the local population). This, along with other factors, later helped fuel mainland rhetoric insisting on the “liberation” of Taiwan.

Meanwhile, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were waging a Civil War with Chiang’s regime. When Mao ultimately won the war and control of mainland China in 1949, establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chiang’s Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan while maintaining the banner of the ROC.

After retreating to Taiwan, Chiang sought to revitalize his party and insure its dominance over Taiwan by establishing a state of martial law. Under this system, which stayed in place until the 1980s, “the people could not form any new political parties or publish any new newspapers,” while the government security forces became “notorious for [their] motley character and abuse of privilege” (Wang, 2007: 323). Furthermore, in the early stages of ROC control throughout the 1950s, “Taiwan was isolated more completely from the mainland than at any time under Japanese rule” (Phillips, 2007: 277). Isolated as it was from the mainland, Taiwan’s relationship with the United States flourished in this period and became the primary wedge between the U.S. and China, generating great discontent both within the Chinese leadership and its population.