The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict Management and Strategies for Success in the Horn's Future

 Before a successful central government can be established, the region must develop inter-communal trust and shared understanding via political discussion amongst vying parties. The fundamental distrust between faction leaders is not conducive to peaceful arbitration. If talks are held that focus on developing shared understanding between the groups, and not on establishing one group over the other, distrust can be lessened and competing groups can establish successful management internally amongst one another with the political space to disagree without necessitating violent disapproval.  Equal power-sharing should not be encouraged, because the resultant peace is tenuous at best and often erupts into more volatile conflict when a party feels rebuffed, undermined, or lied to. Also, no entity has established an ability to lead the nation as a whole, and central government remains ineffective.

Important to the retention of each actor’s legitimacy is the opportunity to disagree without revolt. In many of these conflicts, political opposition has been dramatically stifled, all political interests besides that of the dominant leadership have been forbidden, and the resultant backlash was supported by violence.  Again, the establishment of political space would lend more credibility to the leaders of the management process. Those disagreeing with the leadership could do so without destroying the proposition of peace.

A similar option should be implemented between the Ethiopians and Eritreans. A peaceful forum comprised of community leaders between the nations should be created so that the general population can demand accountability of their leadership. They can do this through their communities; religious leaders, women’s and youth organizations, and figures of academia can help lead the nations through meaningful conflict management. Eventual resolution can occur through community assessment of the past, present, and potential futures of the nations and their respective parties. Additionally, these communities must encourage a cultural shift away from the acceptance of the militarized option in diplomatic negotiation.

What we find is that the environment in the Horn has thus far not facilitated democratic mentalities, although it has claimed to do so. Power, when held, is held by few and there is little public accountability or option to peacefully disagree. Open debate will ensure that formal grievances are being addressed without a call to arms.

These solutions clearly advocate democracy. However, Western nations have attempted to apply a one-size-fits-all democracy modeled after their own governments. This has put too much effort on implementing Western institutional structures while attempting to reconcile conflicts. This has minimized the effectiveness of international mediation. Howard Wolpe, former United States congressman, envoy to Africa during the Clinton administration, and current diplomat within the U.S. State Department, agrees. He has been deeply involved in African conflict management for over twenty years in such places as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and East Timor. Wolpe’s 2009 testimony to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa also urges democratic influences to be “less focused on imposing Western institutional structures than in assisting nationals in divided societies develop a recognition of their interdependence,” further insisting that “initiatives should be directed at changing the winner take all, zero-game conflict paradigm.”

The international community must patiently watch and offer only their good offices to allow the conflicting parties to talk but not to forcibly agree. Somali leaders of various factions should be given equal opportunity to cooperate in a national agenda, through recognized representation, whether they represent a formidable militia, tribe, or clan. Voting upon the representation will likely not occur for some time, if at all. There, reputation is often enough to catapult someone into a position of authority. In this regard, the democratic community cannot be too critical of the voting process, assuming that the representative leaders offer the actual sentiments of their region while allowing others to agree and disagree peacefully. Additionally, some of these leaders may not hold the same legitimacy as others do, but blatant exclusion will only continue rule by force and undermine the representative process, as seen in earlier example.

In conclusion, conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa cannot be resolved, or even managed, until political space is established, dialogue between parties is opened, and international intervention is offered only as a last resort without goals to further the aims of a particular nation, party, group, or person. The region must take responsibility for resolution. The people must stand together and refuse war as the only option, stand together against the “no discussion before victory” mentality, and stand together against the belief that one can shoot their way into power and dominance.

References

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Sources for Additional Research

Anderson, D, & McCauley, R. (2009). Ideology or Pragmatism: U.S. Economic Aid, Military Assistance, and Foreign Military Sales 1950-2007. Center for Contemporary Conflict, 8(3).

Arnold, Guy. (2005). Africa A Modern History. London: Atlantic Books.

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CNN. (Dec 27, 2006). Ethiopia Seizes Key Somali Town. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/12/27/somalia.ethiopia/index.html

De Maio, Jennifer. (2004). Managing Civil Wars: An Evaluation of Conflict Prevention Strategies in Africa. University of California. Prepared for American Political Science Association.

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McClure, Jason. (June 2009). The Troubled Horn of Africa. Vol 3-6. Global Researcher.

Menkhaus, K. (2000). Somalia: A Situation Analysis. UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research.

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