The Burden of Disarmament: UN Peacekeeping Operations & Illicit Weapons

VI. Revisiting Previous Challenges

Despite efforts to control arms, two peacekeeping missions — the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) — have been mandated by the Council to assist in monitoring the arms embargoes in their respective areas… in its September 2007 report, the Group expressed the view that the monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo was still not very effective (S/2007/611). Historically, 13 United Nations arms embargoes imposed in the last decade have been systematically violated (Control Arms 2006). There are constantly changing conditions on the ground that hamper progress, in Côte d’Ivoire for example, rebel leader Guillaume Soro made clear that his fighters would only hand in their guns if they were satisfied that the 2005 elections would be free and fair (UNOCHA 2004). It is an attitude that is difficult to contest, especially in light of the fact that UN Peacekeepers are discouraged from using force. DDR requires consent, which at the end of the day is a concession hardly attainable in conflict plagued regions worldwide, it also comes at the enormous costs of both lives and funds (please see Fig D Appendix).

Logistically, Peacekeeping operations have always faced problems as well. For example, State and UN officials indicated that member states had committed to fill some of the requirements, particularly for the operation in Darfur, but as of November 2008, the troops were not in place nor was it known when they all would be, UN officials and reports also note that the lack of needed troops, police, and civilians has hindered some operations from executing their mandates (USGAO 2008:4)

Of course combatants are the primary target in DDR programs, however the realities posed by armed civilians, militias and civil defense groups/forces also need to be acknowledged more consistently. Whilst the blurred line between civilians and combatants is generally accepted, in DDR programs the distinction is largely maintained, insufficiently addressing the challenges that armed civilians pose for effective weapons control (Buchanan 2006:2). The public is hardly ever incorporated within the DDR framework, hence the result is indeed a disarmament of combatants, but the availability of weapons overall persists, and the potential for future conflict remains. The threat of persistent arms circulation goes beyond simply posing a national security threat where it exists; if these arms were not collected and destroyed following a peace settlement, they might end up in another part of the world fuelling conflict and crime (Garcia 2006:67).

All this being said, one must note that it seems clear that whether in the framework of crime prevention or peace-building, practical disarmament by itself can do little to remedy the problems of weapons proliferation and misuse in a society (Faltas et al. 2001:8); a grander global effort is needed, one that creates a high standard accountable system of monitoring and transfer of weapons that could curb their availability and as a result reduce violence worldwide. Any attempt at curbing corruption is a favorable one; according to the NGO Transparency International, of all industries ranked in its 1999 Bribe Payers Index, the arms industry was considered the second most likely to involve bribes (Small Arms Survey et al. 2004:8) Perhaps the best way forward is to adopt a treaty that addresses the corruption involved in this industry in a more vigorous manner.

VII. An Alternative to the ATT?

“If you are a gun manufacturer, the product you make is not subject to safety regulation by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. Toy guns are subject to safety regulation; water pistols are, but not real guns.”
- Michael D. Barnes, President Brady Campaign gun control organization from 2000 through 2006.

Despite the majority of leading “arms producing” nations refusing to succumb to a global arms treaty, 153 states voted in favor of the ATT Resolution and over 90 states affirmed the feasibility of an ATT in their views submitted to the Secretary-General during the consultation process that took place in 2007, it is clear that there is considerable support among states for the adoption of common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional weapons (Parker 2008:2).

In addition to succumbing to a stalemate, this treaty has yet to yield any consensus, let alone universal impact. It goes without saying that a treaty of this magnitude requires global consensus, and this crucial component appears to be far fetched. An interesting alternative approach would perhaps be a treaty that collectively applies to all “buyer states”. One that would set a standard of purchase amongst these states which eventually will allow for more realistic monitoring mechanisms to be put in place to control the expected standards that “producer states” must abide by; whether the largest producers are on board or not becomes irrelevant under these circumstances as they would have to answer to their customers’ demands (after all these products must be sold as they generate enormous economical rewards), which in this case would be an application of an international treaty (verifications of product, licenses, traceability from origin to destination, etc) that may serve as an alternative to an ATT and even the CCW for that matter. Like the ATT this alternative will would also require that effective national arms transfer control mechanisms should include provisions regulating the import, export, transit, transshipment and brokering of weapons as well as an effective customs and enforcement capacity that is backed up by clear legal penalties (Saferworld 2008:3). Such an approach would serve in the interests of peacekeepers as well, as most of the weapons would be traceable, hence making it easier to apprehend criminals, etc. However one must wonder, without a good mechanism of governance and agonizing corruption existing in most “customer states”, how effective would this alternative be?

VIII. Where to From Here?

“We used to wonder where war lived, what it was that made it so vile. And now we realize that we know where it lives...inside ourselves.”
- Albert Camus, Nobel Prize for Literature 1957

Although there is little to attribute to peacekeeping under this section, it closely relates to its necessity in the future given current global indicators. Less than a decade ago, 25 African countries were engaged in armed conflict or were experiencing severe political crises and turbulence; within the last six years, this dire state has dramatically improved, today, only about 3 African countries can be considered to be in a situation of violent conflict and few countries are facing deep political crises (UNOSAA 2006:7). While theorists may debate the realist and liberal standpoints, it is difficult to see how the issue of global anarchy will ever be resolved. The need for UN Peacekeepers will mostly likely remain necessary in the wake of the 21^st century and well into the turn of the century that follows. Despite global efforts to attain peace and pursue global treaties that are expected to keep arms and wars at bay, the risk of war will always remain, we only try to minimize it.

IX. Concluding Thoughts

"Every gun, every warship, every tank and every military aircraft built is, in the final analysis, a theft from those who are hungry and are not fed, from those who are naked and are not clothed."
Dwight D Eisenhower, General Commander Allied Forces, World War 2 and US President 1952-1960 (from Peace New's Nonviolent Action Issue 22 June 2001) 

So in the turn of this new century we reflect upon the fact that in 1994 the United Nations put forth an estimate that affirmed that in order to achieve universal coverage of the basic necessitates of life and human sustainability, the international community would have to allocate these investments to these sectors respectively: Primary Schooling = 3 Billion; Water and Sanitation = 5 Billion; Basic Health and Nutrition = 11 Billion (Figures are in USD). The UN went on to highlight that during the time these figures were put in place the world was already spending 816 Billion USD on its military budget (UNDP 1994) … The dilemma with “Disarmament” is that it adds to the latter budget as opposed to those allocated for more immediate human security threats.

On the note of the feasibility of peacekeeping operations, the current Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki Moon has called for a restructuring initiative that aims at splitting the current Department of Peacekeeping Operations –DPKO- into a Department of Peace Operations and a Department of Field Support, both headed by an Under-Secretary-General, the managerial level of the current DPKO chief. (UNNC 2007) However, we have yet to learn of the impact such an initiative will have on the effectiveness of DDR under the context of Peacekeeping.