The Burden of Disarmament: UN Peacekeeping Operations & Illicit Weapons

From the above one would gather that Peacekeeping is realistically infeasible, however it is practically applicable. In an age where global threats are light years ahead of global preparedness to meet them, this statement can be rather disturbing. Let aside the political variables in the build up to any peacekeeping mission, too many sensitive issues hinder operational success, and in many instances post-operational unrest occurs. (Fig. B. Appendix). One of these operational issues is the cost of peacekeeping itself. (Fig C. Appendix)

“States shall not authorize International transfers of arms or ammunition where they will be used or are likely to be used for violations of international law, which include Breaches of the UN Charter and customary law rules relating to the use of force, gross violations of International human rights law, serious violations of international humanitarian law, Acts of genocide or crimes against humanity.” (Amnesty International 2007:4)

For some reason or another these principals do not explicitly require states to not authorize the transfer of arms during peacekeeping operations. In fact it appears as though only the international criminal court has taken into consideration some form of accountability that might be applied during peacekeeping operations, when it states that a war crime includes:

“Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict” (ICRC 2007:20)

But for some reason it fails to make any reference to the parties involved in the transfer of the weapons (which in most cases are SALWs) used to facilitate a war crime. Moreover, the majority of SALWs producers have not ratified the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court. Some of these countries include: the United States, Israel (both which signed and later unsigned in 2002) and Russia. In 1996, the Disarmament Commission adopted Guidelines for international arms transfers, which in summary included numerous principles; one of which requires member states to “ensure that the level of armaments is commensurate with their legitimate self-defense and security requirements, including their ability to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations” (UNGA 2008: A63/334).

While acknowledging the legal challenges mentioned above, we also need to pay considerable attention to operational challenges Peacekeeping forces experience on the ground. That being said, logistics and funding are serious issues when it comes to carrying out any peace keeping mission. Systemic success and failure can thus be defined in operational terms according to the UN’s ability to find the personnel and resources to fulfill its operational needs, but the system is not simply an operational matter: meeting its requirements is a political business that involves three categories of states interacting through a ‘hierarchical relationship of supply and demand, both in terms of manpower and money’ (Gowan 2006:458). One could only imagine the burden of such a task.

Irrespective of the Blue Flag the DPKO operates under, local populations often find themselves having to take orders from “out-siders” and even though these peacekeepers come with noble intentions they face overwhelming social challenges. If we were to consider “cross-cultural communication” the key to operational success, one must then wonder how many nationals are employed under the jurisdiction of DPKO while operating in any “post-conflict” situation. The answer is: not so many. The logic behind this is that one could not peacefully intervene amongst parties in conflict by hiring individuals from these same conflicting parties to craft the peace; indeed a catch 22. With this taken into consideration, it becomes clearer that not only is the process of financing an operation, securing the necessary equipment, and receiving proper cultural training an issue, but rather hiring “the right people” is an issue as vital as well. This absence of local recruits hinders the process of gathering crucial intelligence, and as a result this usually leads to one of two unyielding end outcomes: marginal success or complete failure.

Following the international debacles in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, peacekeeping encountered widespread criticism: extremists advocated abandoning the tool altogether; minimalists argued for limited deployment and a resumption of traditionally characterized missions; optimists defended peacekeeping, yet subjected it to lengthy discussions on how to strengthen it through serious reform measures (Duffey 2000:142)

V. Disarmament Under the Context of Peacekeeping

“The world organization debates disarmament in one room and, in the next room, moves the knights and pawns that make national arms imperative”
- E. B. White, American writer 1899-1985

With respect to the "reduction" measures, an important recommendation introduced by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms - December 12, 1995 - was for the development of guidelines to assist peace negotiators and peacekeeping missions in planning and carrying out the disarmament of former combatants, the collection and destruction of weapons and so forth. This recommendation stemmed from the realization that the lack of clear guidelines in peace agreements and the mandates of peacekeeping missions often resulted in the aggravation of the situation in post-conflict regions - Paragraph 79-d (Donowaki 2000:49)

The debate of disarmament and destruction centers around one remarkable question and that is whether or not funds should be designated for destroying weapons seized by UN peacekeepers during\post conflict or whether these same funds should be used in post conflict reconstruction and long term development? And while this question has fascinated academics and policy makers alike, the cost benefit analysis of storage and maintenance versus destruction has been a prominent issue as well. However, when considering the costs of destruction over the costs associated with safe long-term storage and maintenance, destruction tends to be economically advantageous. (UNSC S/2008/258) Furthermore it is quite important to remember that disarmament (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) in its most basic form consists of a combination of legal reforms to regulate civilian firearms licensing and ownership and technical interventions to collect and destroy retrieved or surplus weapons. Hence disarmament is more than a simple plan of retrieving weapons (Small Arms Survey website). The success of such operations hinders upon the fact that they need to be measured, accounted for, and that the effort needs to be a “one way process”, unfortunately that is not the case at all.

There is an overwhelming absence of evidence to account for success or its lack thereof and when the evidence is usually made available, it is hardly reassuring. For example, the estimate of the total number of small arms and light weapons in the RoC when fighting ended lies between 67,000 and 80,000. By 2003, collection programs had recovered about 28 per cent of the total (Small Arms Survey 2003:8). In fact, even the UN Security Council Reports seem to recognize this challenge, for example, the report on The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (S/2000/101) notes:  “Even if full disarmament and demilitarization prove unachievable, a credible programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration may nonetheless make a key contribution to strengthening confidence between former factions and enhancing the momentum toward stability.” (UNSC S/2000/101).