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SOFT POWER DEPLOYMENT


COLONIAL LEGACIES

PROLONGED CONFLICT

STRATEGIC COOPERATION

FIGHTING FASCISM

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT



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Now in its seventh year, the Cornell International Affairs Review has solidified its position on Cornell's campus by bringing together students and professors to engage in conversations about the issues and events that shape our world. As our time with CIAR draws to a close and we look back, we are impressed by how much this organization has grown since we first joined and by the accomplishments of its staff and leaders. CIAR plays an active role in fostering cooperation and dialogue both on Cornell's campus and beyond.

CIAR continues to grow in many ways. Our new and returning members are truly some of the best and brightest at Cornell, and their presence makes our weekly meetings a place for thoughtful discussion and insightful analysis. In order to capture the dialogue of our meetings and reach out to a wider audience, CIAR has begun to produce a bi-weekly "News Roundup" that we make publicly available on the Diplomatist.

The events hosted by CIAR over the past few months attest to the reach of the organization, drawing a wide cross-section of students and professors. We began in September with a panel discussion featuring David Patel from the Department of Government as well as Michael Dorf and Chantal Thomas from the Cornell Law School. The panel addressed the politics of intervention and the crisis in Syria. Later in the semester, we turned our focus to Russia and China and held an event on the changing nature of their relationships with the United States. CIAR has also worked to build connections with other organizations at Cornell and, with the help of the Cornell Public Affairs Society's International Affairs Forum, brought together professors, graduate students, and undergraduates to analyze the factors that will shape post-2014 Afghanistan. Professor Richard Maas, Professor Ronald Herring, and CIPA Fellow Rafiullah Sherzad led the incredibly thought provoking discussion. We end this semester, as always, with our Gala Dinner. The Fall 2013 Gala will feature a keynote address from the Director of International Affairs at the American Society for Microbiology, Dr. Jason Rao, on "Science, Foreign Policy, and Opportunities Lost."

In closing, we would like to thank Fred Logevall, Heike Michelsen, and the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies more generally for their invaluable support to our organization. We would also like to thank the rest of our Executive Board – Lucius, Ryan, Ale, Max, and Nick – as well as Sam and Jacob for their hard work and guidance. It has been a privilege to work with such a wonderful team. As we prepare to say goodbye to CIAR, we look forward to seeing a new set of leaders take the reigns and are confident that the organization will serve as a hub for global affairs discourse in the years to come.

As my tenure as Editor-in-chief grinds to a halt and I semi-reluctantly pass on the reigns to a younger and more sprightly disciple, I have the distinct pleasure of looking back over the last year. Not only have I more the chance to interact with Cornell's finest minds, in our team of graduate editors, but I have spoken with and read the essays of hundreds of young, aspiring academics, and in doing so have grown immensely as a student of international affairs. Because, truth be told, before I joined CIAR, I really knew very little about goings on abroad, because, and this is my best-kept secret, I'm actually an English Literature and Art History major. However, through editing this journal, and our online blog *The Diplomatist*, I have learnt a lot, and that is a testament to this organization.

Although I normally finish reading these articles with more questions than I started with, I can attest that reading through these submissions has shown me how important it is to remain engaged in the international arena. The following articles all stood out, and I hope you will find them as interesting and informative as I did.

In our first article, Oleksandr Shykov examines the prospects for soft-power deployment in the Korean peninsula. The DPRK is the "boogeyman" of the international arena, and Shykov's article illustrates the problems that both the ROK and China have when dealing with their troublesome neighbor.

Next, Caroline Cohn examines the differing trajectories of two ex-British colonies, India and Nigeria, and attributes India's relative success in part to their ability to create a society that despite enormous diversity of language, race, religion, political ideology and wealth remains united on many issues.

Heading west, we have Nina Assadi's article examining Sierra Leone's protracted civil war in the 1990s. Instead of attributing the brutal conflict to a weak central government or to ethnic diversity and division, Assadi proposes that Sierra Leone's wealth of natural resources was the principal cause for the brutality.

Our next two articles concern themselves with European politics. First, Thomas Armstrong looks at the options facing the EU in the wake of the US "pivot to Asia", and questions how much the EU really needs to do in response. Next, Mary Shiraef examines the rise of Golden Dawn in Greece and shines an elucidating light on why it is that a country that has so many times been oppressed by Fascist regimes should constantly turn back to them in times of strife.

Finally, Mariam Azhar examines the divergent histories of capital punishment in Iran and Turkey, exploring the impact of religion and societal values on the penal codes of these countries.

I would like to thank our graduate and junior editors for all their help in compiling this issue, and for putting up with my various meanderings. I also want to thank the Einaudi center and the SAFC, along with all the writers, without whom none of this would be possible. I also want to thank Becca Bobrow, to whom all the credit for the layout of the journal is due, and who put up with my bizarre autocratic decrees as to where lines should end for far too long. Finally, I would like to dedicate this issue to my Mum and Dad, without whose love and support I'd never have made it so far from home.

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South Korea, also known as the Republic of Korea (ROK), is a remarkable country in many ways. It survived the Korean War, supported by American military assistance. It successfully transitioned to democracy after nearly 40 years of authoritarian government. South Korea now boasts a strong economy that joined the trillion-dollar club of world economies in 2004.<sup>1</sup> The South Korean wave (*hullyah*) looks unstoppable with its success in Asia and around the globe. But in spite of its impressive résumé, the ROK has been criticized for its handling of diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), after its northern neighbor's nuclear tests caused a shutdown of the Kaesong economic zone in April 2013. Debates about an appropriate solution to the diplomatic impasse became a common topic in academia and the media. Many pundits pointed to the ROK's soft power as a potential response to Northern aggression, while ignoring the full possibilities and operational mechanisms of this soft power.

This paper argues that South Korea has failed to effectively exercise its soft power capability on the North Korean territory due to the DPRK's profoundly isolationist nature, manifested in the regime's draconian political and economic policies. It claims that the ROK's ability to exercise its soft power in dealing with North Korea is undercut by China, because of

the DPRK's central geopolitical significance for Beijing. The paper is structured in five sections. The first section briefly discusses soft power as a concept and presents the theoretical framework for the analysis. The second section discusses the ROK's soft power resources. The third and fourth sections discuss the ROK's approaches with regard to North Korea, and explain why soft power failed to effectively handle the North Korean threat. Finally, the paper concludes that a soft power approach will not contain the North Korean threat due to the ROK's failure to penetrate the DPRK's isolated system, and because of its geostrategic importance to China as a buffer zone.

#### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Harvard academic Joseph Nye coined the term of soft power in his book *Bound to Lead* in 1990. While the concept has generated extensive academic discussions, it has also resulted in the misuse and misinterpretation of the term. Establishing a solid framework for the concept of soft power and its operational mechanisms is crucial for this paper's argument. Nye defined soft power as an "ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes".<sup>1</sup> Before Nye elaborated his concept, E.H. Carr

STATES ATTAIN SOFT POWER  
RESOURCES BY PROJECTING BEAUTY,  
BENIGNITY, AND BRILLIANCE

discussed a similar idea – power over opinion - in his distinguished work *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. He states that power over opinion is “not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power”.<sup>2</sup> This can be seen as an initial version of the concept of soft power, later advanced and brought to academia’s attention by Joseph Nye.<sup>ii</sup> Conversely, other scholars see it as simple marketing, or worse, propaganda. For example, Christopher Layne claims that “soft power is a means of marketing” a certain state’s brand, which can be measured by opinion polls.<sup>3</sup> The term has been misused and misinterpreted to the extent that it has started to be used to refer even to culture and humanitarian aid. Critics claimed that “soft power now seems to mean everything,” as it can refer to concepts as disparate as multilateralism, democratic values, and markets.<sup>4</sup> However, such a simplistic definition overlooks soft power’s significance and mechanisms. Nye addresses this criticism by stating that the authors confuse “the actions of a state seeking to achieve desired outcomes with the resources used to produce those outcomes”.<sup>5</sup> Nye suggests, for example, that attractive culture and democratic values increase soft power resources, but the fact that a certain state’s culture and values are appealing does not mean the state automatically projects its soft power. Furthermore, Nye states that “whether one or another type of resource produces power

in the sense of desired behavior depends upon the context”.<sup>6</sup> Both context and actions matter: the failure to make a judicious decision with regard to the Vietnam War resulted in a military disaster for the United States that damaged the American economy and harmed the nation’s image abroad.

It is important to remember that soft power is an important option in the foreign policy toolkit that should be utilized when the context is appropriate. Nye admits that “soft power is not the solution to all problems”.<sup>7</sup> Other forms of power are hard and economic power. Hard power refers to the use or threat of military force. Hard power resources are relatively easy to estimate by calculating the size of a country’s conventional military forces. It can operate through inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”).<sup>8</sup> Specific examples of the exercise of hard power include: conducting military operations, backing up coercive threats, protecting allies, conducting peacekeeping missions, or providing different forms of assistance, such as training military personnel in other countries.<sup>9</sup> Economic power, on the other hand, is more complicated and intricate because it can function as both hard and soft power. In the simplest terms, it means rewarding states with economic benefits for good behavior, and punishing them with sanctions for not complying. When economic sanctions undermine the livelihoods of



people on the receiving end, they can be considered an exercise of hard power. Yet economic success that attracts other states to a particular type of economic model may boost that state or states' soft power. For example, the European Union model of economic integration has attracted states from the former Eastern Bloc to change their domestic policies and structures in order to join the union.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the context for the deployment of a certain type of power must be carefully examined. In Libya, for example, diplomatic resources and economic sanctions had only limited results. Gaddafi's 40-year-old regime was not eliminated and replaced with the Transnational National Council until NATO executed an air campaign in 2011.<sup>iii</sup> Failure to understand the context and to act accordingly using the appropriate tools can result in a strategic fiasco.

This paper defines soft power as the ability of state A to persuade state B through projecting "three B's" (benignity, beauty, and brilliance) to do something, dependent on successful execution during transmission and reception stages. I will use Alexander Vuving's and Kondo Seichi's conceptual frameworks in order to illustrate the necessary features for successful soft power deployment. According to Kondo Seichi, the deployment of soft power consists of four stages: resources, transmission, reception, and outcome. He compares these stages of deployment to those of missiles: one needs to first possess missiles (resources) with the appropriate delivery mechanism (transmission), able to penetrate an enemy's territory (reception), and destroy targets on the enemy's terrain (outcome).<sup>11</sup> In addition, Kondo states that, "With malfunction at any stage, power cannot determine the outcome".<sup>12</sup> In other words, in order for soft power to work, every stage, particularly transmission and reception, should be executed with caution and foresight.

Alexander Vuving further explains that "softness" is attained by the three "power currencies" of "beauty, benignity and brilliance".<sup>13</sup> Benignity describes an unselfish non-threatening

behavior to other actors which "produces gratitude and sympathy" in response.<sup>14</sup> Switzerland is a classic example: much of its soft power resources derive from its diplomacy's emphasis on neutrality, rather than alliance building. Brilliance, in turn, produces admiration due to high performance and one's success.<sup>15</sup> China's economic miracle, for example, has been one of the biggest sources of its soft power.<sup>iv</sup> Many states strive to emulate Chinese economic success by following the "Beijing Consensus" model.<sup>v</sup> Beauty refers to the "resonance that is evoked when you represent ideals, values, causes, or visions".<sup>16</sup> For instance, the European Union's commitment to peace and democratic values has made it one of the biggest soft power "heavyweights." In sum, states attain soft power resources by projecting beauty, benignity, and brilliance. Once these resources are attained, soft power can be projected following Kondo's stages of transmission and reception, with the outcome dependent on the success or failure of these stages.<sup>17</sup>

#### ROK'S SOFT POWER RESOURCES

South Korea's miraculous economic development and rapid democratization gave it crucial soft power resources. Indeed, this economic and democratic success has given the ROK the ability to attract other states through Vuving's concept of brilliance. Embracing democracy and democratic values secured it respect and prestige from like-minded states. Culturally, the Korean wave has influenced dozens of countries from Asia to South America. In many respects, Gangnam Style "infiltration" into western markets brought K-pop to light and boosted its popularity. South Korean dramas and movies have swept the globe, and have given South Korea an upper hand in its soft power rivalry with Japan and China despite its late start.<sup>vi</sup> Two crucial features that contribute to the Korean wave's attractiveness and potential expansion is its cultural proximity to China and Japan and, more importantly, the fact

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SOFT POWER RESOURCES

that Korean products are free from historical antagonism.<sup>vii</sup> ROK's assistance to Haiti in 2010 further demonstrated how the combination of military and economic resources can increase a state's soft power and international prestige.<sup>viii</sup> In addition, by 2010 ROK had established 35 King Sejong Institutes for Korean language and culture, and has plans to increase their number to 150 worldwide by 2015.<sup>ix</sup> Co-hosting the 2002 World Cup with Japan and reaching the semi-finals reinforced South Korea's position in the world.<sup>x</sup>

It is important, however, to keep in mind that the above activities and attributes only cultivate soft power resources; they cannot by themselves deliver desired outcomes. Having many resources does not necessarily mean that a state can proceed to the further stages in Kondo's sequence of soft power deployment – namely, transmission and reception to produce a desired outcome. Moreover, having an abundance of soft power resources does not make its usage necessary. Policymakers need to calculate whether the 'deployment' of soft power can bring the desired results in a specific context.

DEPLOYING SOFT POWER IN NORTH  
KOREA

From the onset of the Korean War until the election in 1988 of the first civilian presi-

dent, Roh Tae-woo, the ROK's foreign policy was influenced by Cold War logic. The United States supported South Korea militarily and economically while Soviet Union propped the North Korean regime. In 1988, Roh Tae-Woo articulated *Nordpolitik* policies that had important domestic and international implications. The policy included warming relations with eastern-bloc states, China, and the Soviet Union while easing tensions with North Korea. As a result of these policies, China became one of South Korea's most important trade partners. It



FORMER SOUTH KOREAN  
PRESIDENT, LEE MYUNG-BAK,  
SUCCEEDED BY PARK GUEN-HYE  
IN FEBRUARY



SEOUL, THE POLITICAL AND  
CULTURAL CENTER OF SOUTH  
KOREA'S SOFT POWER

is noteworthy that, although *Nordpolitik* was framed as a foreign policy initiative to improve relations with North Korea and move towards reunification, it also enormously boosted the legitimacy and popularity of the new, democratically elected president.

Economically, President Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998) undertook a series of labor and *chaebol* reforms, and other financial reforms that significantly improved the economy.<sup>xi</sup> By 1993, the South Korea's economic miracle was fast being realized through development and industrialization.<sup>xii</sup> Subsequently, President Kim Dae-jung articulated the Sunshine policy in 1998 that lasted until the 2008 election of conservative President Lee Myung-bak. Under the Sunshine policy, the ROK shifted its approach from a hostile hardline policy to reconciliation and cooperation with the North.<sup>xiii</sup> Although the initiative was successful in securing a Nobel Peace Prize for Kim in 2000, and getting North Korea to the negotiation table during the Korean summit meeting in Pyongyang in 2000, it failed to achieve the desired concrete result – North Korea's rejoining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>xiv</sup>

Many experts have voiced critical views about the manner in which South Korea utilized its soft power. For example, Sarah K. Yun, the Director of Public Affairs and Regional Issues for the Korea Economic Institute, claims

that “in order to effectively employ soft power, Korea should specify its goals and desired outcome”. Similarly, Geun Lee states that “[South] Korea's soft power capacity is still very limited, [...], because Korea has not been interested in developing and applying soft resources to produce influence in the region and on the global stage”.<sup>18</sup> Such criticisms, however, ignore the mechanism of soft power influence. A country can specify its goals for soft power, but it does not mean that it can project it. The American goal during the Vietnam War was clearly stated and specified: winning the war against communist North Vietnam. However, this did not make the projection of soft power more effective. South Korea should indeed deploy soft power in dealing with the North, but it cannot simply transmit it to Pyongyang. The DPRK's dedication to isolating itself from the world impairs the transmission and reception phases of soft power, making the effective exercise of a soft power approach improbable. The issue is not that South Korea does not have enough soft power resources (it has them in abundance); rather, it is the transmission phase that remains a stumbling block. The ROK has been active and aware in enlarging its soft power resources, and employing them wherever possible. However, the DPRK's regime has sought to seal its borders from possible penetration of K-pop and Korean dramas that would reveal the ROK's

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economic and political success. Consider the fact that possession of a tunable radio has been a crime in North Korea since the late 1950's. All legally sold radios must be purchased from authorities and tuned to the official channels.<sup>19</sup> The right to use the Internet—a distorted and tightly controlled official version—is reserved for elites and is unavailable to average citizens. The biggest deterrence mechanism for possession of any forbidden materials is the sentencing to labor in gulags, a Stalinist relic that the DPRK has preserved in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

For better or worse, non-state actors and individuals can also seek to exercise soft power. Non-state actors' involvement had destabilizing effects on the Korean Peninsula in 2012, when South Korean activists launched "balloon attacks" on the North. These balloons contained propaganda messages, as well as more tangible items like socks, cash, and medicine. Despite these South Korean activists' expressed desire to help their semi-compatriots, and to reveal the lavish lifestyles of North Korea's elite, their attempts to project soft power with balloons have ultimately been counterproductive. President Lee Myung-bak sent police forces to prevent the unauthorized soft power projection. At the same time, another group of activists criticized the balloon campaign for instigating conflict between the Koreas.<sup>xv</sup> In response, the DPRK launched a counterattack with its propaganda.

But North Korea also took it one step further and threatened to substitute bombs for the leaflets in the future.<sup>xvi</sup> Such soft power deployment by non-state actors highlights the significance of the hostile territory and the context in which it is exercised.

The unwillingness of North Korean leaders to reform the economy, even on a limited scale, demonstrates the nature of the regime's commitment to isolate itself and prevent information leakages that undermine the ROK's ability to transmit soft power. For the DPRK's leadership, the main concern remains its political survival rather than liberalizing its economy or relaxing its laws. Therefore, economic cooperation projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the rule of law are primarily political tools, and only secondarily economic and judicial. Kaesong was designed under the Sunshine policy to foster cooperation and decrease tensions between the two Koreas. Therefore, not only did it provide economic incentives for both states, but for South Koreans it also contained an optimistic political aspiration of future reunification.<sup>xvii</sup> However, the DPRK government closed the complex in April 2013 amid an atmosphere of high political tension, and only reopened it on September 16, 2013. At the time the Kaesong complex was shut down, it hosted 123 South Korean firms and employed nearly 53,000 people, mostly from North Korea.

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*ROK SOLDIERS WATCH THE KOREAN  
BORDER AT PANMUMJEOM*

Currently, only 70 percent of factories have resumed their production.<sup>xviii</sup> Kaesong, for many pundits, represents a hope for a gradual transformation and economic integration of DPRK in the region. Naturally, the pecuniary side of the project has benefited both parties, but North Korea was the main beneficiary since the project provides it with scarce foreign currency. Total output reached \$470 million in 2012; before the shutdown the project as a whole generated an estimated \$2 billion in trade.<sup>xix</sup> Sang-Young Rhyu describes Kaesong as an “experiment, testing whether North-South economic cooperation can contribute to the enhancement of political and military peace on the Korean Peninsula”.<sup>20</sup> If Kaesong serves as an experiment, then North Korea has sought to demonstrate that they will be in charge of it. When the DPRK refused an early negotiation offer from the South about reopening Kaesong, this expressed that the North would dictate the conditions to suit their economic and--more importantly--political interests.<sup>xx</sup> The recent Kaesong affair portrayed new leader Kim Jong-un as a powerful man who indeed ruled the country. Formally nullifying the 1953 armistice on March 10, 2013 and intensifying North Korean rhetoric were already alarming, but closing down the Kaesong project gave the words substance:

North Korea’s commitment to political and economic isolation undermines the ROK’s

ability to employ soft power, especially during the transmission and reception stages. Closure of the Kaesong project demonstrated that the cash-starved DPRK regime is willing to lose one of its most significant sources of hard currency in order to give its threats credibility. North Korea’s agreement to establish the Kaesong zone can be viewed as an effort to break away from isolation; however, a five-month abeyance of the project reveals the DPRK will maintain economic relations with the ROK only as long as they serve the regime’s objectives. And when they do not, the regime is quick to react. Similarly, the DPRK’s inconsistent legal framework and rejection of the rule of law reveal its priority of regime power over economic development. The Sinuiju Economic zone is governed by the Basic Law of the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region. Nonetheless, the whole legal structure of the zone is sabotaged by Article 4 that declares, “The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly will interpret this law”.<sup>21</sup> The regime applies the same jurisdictional power to Kaesong complex – the DPRK will close and open the project when it pleases. Darren Zook notes, however, that the DPRK’s failure to establish a cohesive legal framework undermines regime stability and its ability to improve the state’s economy. Consequently, South Korea’s soft power cannot break into such a tightly controlled environment during the transmission

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phase.

Many scholars voice their frustration about the efficiency of soft power with regard to South Korea's failure to resolve the security threat from the North. For example, Shin Wha-Lee argues that, in order to achieve desired outcomes in dealing with North Korea, Seoul needs to be firm "in demanding greater openness and reciprocity from Pyongyang".<sup>22</sup> However, such openness and reciprocity from the DPRK is unlikely, judging from its past behavior. Even when the now-defunct Six-Party talks (between the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan) addressing nuclear disarmament were active, the majority of the observers agree that the DPRK failed to honor its promises. Even after the other states provided food and energy, albeit in a delayed manner, North Korea still refused to join the NPT and allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observers back into the country.

Nevertheless, some scholars and policy-makers believe that South Korea should continue its efforts to influence the North using soft power. For example, Andrei Lankov suggests that South Korea should initiate student exchange programs and spread information about prosperous lifestyles in South Korea through radio channels, documentaries, and Korean dramas drawing a parallel with the American Cold War approach towards the USSR.<sup>23</sup> However,

comparing the DPRK to the Soviet Union and attempting to apply similar educational and informational solutions ignores and misrepresents the realities of the two states. Socioeconomic conditions and the state's ability to influence people's mentality through propaganda are incomparable. In 2008, a survey of refugees living in Seoul concluded that 75 percent of North Korean defectors do not express negative sentiment for Kim Jong-il. Another set of interviews revealed that only 9 percent of North Korean refugees mention political reasons for fleeing the country, while 55 percent explain that their decision to leave the DPRK was due to a lack of sustenance.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, the North Korean ability to influence citizens' mentality appears far greater than that of the former USSR.

THE CHINA FACTOR AND ROK'S SOFT  
POWER

Another major obstacle to South Korea's successful soft power projection is North Korea's geostrategic significance to China as a buffer zone. For China, North Korea presents a difficult strategic challenge: Beijing needs to fulfill its promises of being a "responsible regional player" and enforcing international sanctions on the DPRK while also maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. David Shambaugh argues that "preventing collapse [of North Korea]

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INSTABILITY

is Beijing's bottom line because collapse would have enormous tangible human and economic consequences for China, not to mention the intangible political impact of another failed Communist state".<sup>25</sup> North Korea provides a necessary buffer from the U.S. military presence in South Korea. Moreover, the refugees that would cross the border into China should North Korea collapse would damage Chinese internal stability. China thus finds itself in a complicated position where its policymakers need to balance the Chinese image of a responsible world player against buttressing the Kim dynasty.

The PRC is at a challenging crossroads when it comes to dealing with its unstable neighbor. For example, China refused to censure North Korea after it sank the South Korean warship *Cheonan* in 2010 leaving 46 sailors dead. In spite of overwhelming evidence that a North Korean torpedo caused the sinking, China stood by the DPRK amidst escalating international criticism.<sup>xxi</sup> However, in the wake of North Korea's threats to attack the ROK and United States in 2013, China distanced itself from its communist ally and joined the international community in passing economic sanctions on the DPRK.<sup>xxii</sup> To back up its rhetoric, the Bank of China closed down the North Korean credit line until it begins engaging the region as a "responsible stakeholder."<sup>xxiii</sup> China's seemingly contradictory policy moves demonstrate the

difficult tightrope it must walk when it comes to North Korea.

The China-DPRK relationship underscores the point that even economic power is an insufficient persuasion tool because of the DPRK's commitment to political survival. For North Korea, China remains an indispensable ally and economic partner. In addition to Chinese aid, the DPRK's dependence on bilateral economic relations has grown steadily: Sino-DPRK trade increased by an estimated 62.5 percent totaling \$5.63 billion in 2011.<sup>26</sup> This raises the question of whether China has gained greater leverage through North Korean economic dependence to promote one of its main goals: stability on the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, the DPRK has on many occasions contradicted China's interests and enraged decision-makers in Beijing. For example, North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006 escalated tensions in Asia and drew worldwide condemnation as China was preparing for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Although the test did not target China per se, it undermined China's image as an emerging leader and destabilized the region. Despite China's clear irritation and concerns over its neighboring troublemaker, it only occasionally shows its frustration with the North Korean regime and punishes it only when the DPRK provokes regional instability. For example, after North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006, China vehement-

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SHIELD

ly criticized its ally, using language it usually reserves for outright enemies. Rhetorical attacks were accompanied by economic sanctions targeting the imports of luxury goods.<sup>27</sup> But Pyongyang, in turn, exploits China's strategic calculus and the DPRK's position in it. It knows that having China as a powerful patron further narrows any room for South Korean influence on North Korea through soft power.

Therefore, South Korea's soft power is trumped because of the serious consequences that the DPRK's sudden collapse would create for China. Disintegration of the Kim dynasty would result in: (1) short-term destabilization of the region which could lead to a Chinese economic slowdown with potentially long-lasting effects;<sup>xxiv</sup> (2) loss of a buffer zone and the possibility of yet another democratic regime allied with the United States on the Chinese border;<sup>xxv</sup> and (3) an instantaneous stream of North Korean refugees to China which would also destabilize internal stability.<sup>xxvi</sup> Because of these repercussions, abandoning or destabilizing the Kim regime remains a nonstarter for policymakers in Beijing. China's influence remains constrained to attempting to get the DPRK back to the negotiating table. For example, after China cut off oil supplies to Pyongyang in response to the nuclear crisis in August 2003, DPRK's negotiators agreed to participate in three-party talks along with the United States. However, the talks

did not pass the talking level, demonstrating also the limits of China's influence over North Korea.

In summary, this section of the paper has argued that China's bottom line is saving the North Korean regime and its foreign policy options towards the DPRK remain limited. Maintaining stability on the peninsula, which in effect means perpetuation of the status quo, prevails as the *modus operandi* for Beijing. Consequently, China's geostrategic calculations dramatically shrink any room for the exercise of South Korean soft power. Combined with the limits the DPRK's isolationist nature places on the ROK's ability to transmit its soft power, current prospects for this strategy remain bleak. North Korea has successfully built a shield from South Korean soft power with its self-containment and Chinese support.

#### CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that South Korea's soft power is inadequate to counter the North Korean threat due to the DPRK's isolated regime and its geopolitical significance to China. As a result, South Korea's soft power has been unable to penetrate the North Korean shield during the transmission and reception phases. This situation is analogous to North Korea having nuclear weapons but without a reli-



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able ballistic system to carry out a long-range attack. Ironically, North and South Korea have been struggling with the same transmission phase for their hard and soft power projection respectively. While South Korea has accumulated significant soft power resources, it continues to lack a functioning delivery system for its soft power to penetrate hostile terrain.

However, this failure should not be regarded as a failure of soft power per se; rather, it is the essence of the objective and the regional context that makes soft power an ineffective solution. Gianni Riotta, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, rightly points out “soft power is like aspirin, great for headaches, less effective against a gunshot wound”. To extend Riotta’s analogy, South Korea is faced with a “gunshot wound” type problem represented by the DPRK’s nuclear threat, but Seoul continues to prescribe “aspirin.” This ill-judged diagnosis by the ROK’s policymakers –and just as importantly, their inability to deliver effective treatment— results in a neglect of priorities and context on behalf of the ROK’s policymakers. Specifically, South Korea’s top objective is to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and reduce hostilities, with future reunification also a goal for many. While nuclear non-proliferation is also a goal for China, maintaining the political status quo in North Korea is an indispensable part of China’s foreign policy strategy. China’s position

and North Korea’s isolation together result in the inapplicability of a soft power approach. A solution to the North Korean challenge has not been found yet, but acknowledging policies and operational tools that do not work would be a step in the right direction.

The nations of Nigeria and India both have exceptionally diverse populations, endured the deliberate divide-and-rule strategies executed by British colonizers who sought thereby to exacerbate existing differences, and experienced peaceful transfers from colonial rule to independence. Despite these key similarities in certain aspects of their colonial and decolonization experiences, India and Nigeria have had very different levels of success in their efforts to create and maintain politically stable nation-states. Today, India is distinguished from other post-colonial independent nations for its political stability, demonstrated by its “set of stable political and legal institutions that has now remained more or less intact for over five decades” and a parliamentary democracy that has “remained more or less unchanged since India’s independence and continues to function in an orderly fashion”.<sup>1</sup> Nigeria, on the other hand, is an exemplar of third world political *instability*, characterized as “highly nondemocratic and prone to using force” and plagued by recurrent coups and violent ethno-religious conflicts.<sup>2</sup> In this paper, I identify crucial differences between each country’s pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial experiences that have contributed to such divergent political conditions today. Specifically, this paper surveys the types and structuring of diversity in each country; their experiences under British colonialism (including how their boundaries were determined, what

political and economic policies were implemented, and how they gained independence); and finally the important aspects that have colored their experiences since colonialism—including significant historical events, the geographic distribution of natural resources, and particular economic and political policies pursued.<sup>1</sup>

I argue that the source of India and Nigeria’s divergent outcomes lies primarily in the structuring of their demographic diversity. India has had success in achieving political stability due to its diversity existing as “cross-cutting cleavages,” a characteristic of society that is associated with political stability.<sup>ii</sup> A society with cross-cutting cleavages is a society in which political, ideological, ethnic, racial, religious, socioeconomic, or linguistic divisions cut across one another “such that individuals on opposite sides of one divisive issue are often allies on another issue”.<sup>3</sup> And India, “with [its] multiple cleavages of religion, caste, tribe, region, and language slicing across each other,” is indeed commonly considered to be “an outstanding example” of such a society.<sup>4</sup> To give a concrete example, it is not the case that all Hindus in India speak the same language, are of the same socio-economic class, and live in the same region. Additionally, having a common ancestral history and traditions, experiencing a unifying and nationalistic independence movement, and pursuing political and economic policies (both under colonial rule

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and afterward) that had the effect of uniting the population has helped India.

In contrast, Nigeria's "overlapping cleavages"<sup>iii</sup>—being comprised of a population whose linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences overlap on top of one another and coincide with regional boundaries—have compromised its political stability. As scholar Okechukwu Iheduru describes, Nigeria's "250 ethnic groups, with their distinct (and mostly unintelligible) languages and cultural characteristics, are geographically separated".<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Nigeria's lack of common national history, unequal natural resource distribution, and promotion of regionalism over a strong central government via specific political and economic policies (both under colonialism and after gaining its independence) have helped produce a Nigeria whose stability continues to be undermined by regional competition and violence.

I conclude this paper by looking at the political approach taken by several Southeast Asian countries. It is true that several Southeast Asian countries have had success in achieving national political stability via a type of governance that emphasizes central planning under an authoritarian government. However, I propose that several preexisting characteristics of India and Nigeria, as well as some features of their current political structure, are such that this Southeast Asian "model" (as some have described it) would not necessarily be adaptable to or useful for

improving these nations' political stabilities.

HIGHLY DIVERSE NATIONAL  
POPULATIONS

*Quantitatively Comparable Diversity:*

Certain key similarities exist between India and Nigeria; not least significant in terms of national political stability is the tremendous amount of diversity that has been and remains present within each nation. One source of diversity in India is race, as the country is divided between an "Aryan" race in the north and a "Dravidian" race in its southern regions.<sup>6</sup> Nigeria's ethnic diversity is significantly more varied. It has an ethnic makeup of 250 tribal groups, and about two-thirds of the population falls into one of three major ones (the Hausa-Falani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo), each of which is concentrated in its own distinct geographic region.<sup>7</sup> While Nigeria is characterized by considerable ethnic diversity, India exhibits comparable linguistic diversity. Over 200 languages are spoken throughout the country—many of which are mutually unintelligible—and this serves as the basis for India's linguistically determined regions. For their part, Nigerians also "speak more than 250 mutually unintelligible languages" that are also regionally concentrated.<sup>8</sup> Each country also has religion as a source of diversity: in India, there coexists a Hindu majority, a substantial Muslim minority, as well as Buddhists, Sikhs,

MEMBERS OF NIGERIA'S IGBO  
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and Christians.<sup>9</sup> The Nigerian population is divided between a Muslim-dominated north and a primarily Christian population in the south. An additional, distinct source of diversity within India is caste (or *jati*): Indian society distinguishes between Brahmins, warriors, merchants, artisans/peasants, and untouchables as separate social castes. These distinctions were considerably more socially and politically significant during India's colonial past but retain a degree of political and social significance.<sup>10</sup>

*Qualitatively Distinctive Diversity:*

Despite the similarity that both nations are immensely diverse, a key difference for political stability lies in the geographic distribution of these differences. Though Indian states are organized around linguistic identities, in each state and city one can still find members of different religions and castes. This feature of differences being cross-cutting (and particularly that of cutting across geographic boundaries) prevents serious secessionist threats, which have had obvious implications in terms of promoting political stability.<sup>ix</sup> Nigeria, on the other hand, is comprised of a population whose cleavages overlap with each other and coincide with regional boundaries. Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups—almost each of which is associated with a distinct language and distinct cultural characteristics—are geographically separated.<sup>11</sup>

Such “overlapping” cleavages present problems for nations trying to maintain political stability because they promote identity-based politics, are a barrier to cooperation, present potential secessionist threats, and promote regional rivalries that often (particularly in Nigeria's case) grow into more violent conflicts. The nature of each nation's cleavages has thus been a crucial determinant of its subsequent political stability.<sup>12</sup>

BRITISH COLONIAL LEGACIES

*Ostensibly Similar British Colonial Legacies:* Another key similarity between the two nations is a colonial legacy of British rule, specifically one that intentionally used a “divide-and-rule” strategy to highlight and reinforce each nation's preexisting cleavages and diffuse nationalism among the native population.<sup>13</sup> The use of the “divide-and-rule” tactic via direct rule has to be qualified in the case of both countries. However, the common outcome is that it served to politicize differences, which is the outcome that has had the most lasting political significance as it relates to stability of each country.

The case of British direct rule in India must be qualified because British influence in India actually began rather passively before it transitioned first to indirect rule in 1757 (after and due to the Battle of Plassey) and then became direct rule in 1857 (after and due to the Sepoy

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Rebellion).<sup>14</sup> The particular timing of Britain's adoption of direct rule in India also influenced the character it took on, and it was a character that further encouraged the reinforcement of differences. Britain transitioned from indirect to direct rule as it was moving increasingly further away from feudalism and toward industrialization. The politicization of identities in colonial India thus took on the Enlightenment skew of placing heightened attention on measurement and identification, particularly in the context of gathering information via censuses of demographics, regions, and populations. This served to reinforce identities that previously had not necessarily existed—or at least were not yet politically significant—in India. In particular, Britain played up the racial differences between the North and South and also emphasized religious differences between Hindus and Muslims.<sup>15</sup>

The assertion that Nigeria experienced direct colonial rule by Britain also merits further explanation. Direct rule only applied to the southern regions of the country, while the northern region was controlled via indirect rule and was largely left to “native authorities,” often Hausa-Faulani landlords.<sup>16</sup> The politically salient feature and consequence of direct rule for the purposes of this paper, however, is that of reinforcing and politicizing cleavages. I will argue that, despite allowing some indirect rule (which tends to be less divisive), these regionally differing forms of

colonial rule in Nigeria reinforced the cleavages as much as or even more so than if direct rule had been universally applied.<sup>17</sup>

Cleavages within both India and Nigeria were not necessarily sources of conflict prior to them being intensified and politicized, which for these nations was a direct consequence of British colonial rule and its particular strategies. Indeed, the long “period of relatively peaceful coexistence between Hindus and Muslims” before Indian colonization is strong evidence that “the relationship between the two groups is not inherently a conflictual one”.<sup>18</sup> Similar patterns can be witnessed in African countries that have now become paradigms for ethnic and religious violence, such as Rwanda and the Congo. However, it is because they are crosscutting that these cleavages have not seriously impacted the stability of present-day India, whereas their overlapping nature in Nigeria has greatly undermined its stability.

*Crucial Differences between Colonial Experiences: Drawing Boundaries - Predating independence, a major difference in the way each nation's national boundaries were initially formed has had lasting implications on their relative successes in creating politically stable nation-states. Unlike Nigeria, India had a stronger foundation for a national consciousness due to the existence of a common civilization that had been*



*THE SANSAD BHAVAN, THE INDIAN HOUSE OF PARLIAMNET, A TRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTH OF THE INDIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT*

forged prior to its colonization. Indians can look to a shared, ancient history of dynasties that stretched across much of the subcontinent. These dynasties also helped to spread Hindu beliefs and practices with them, thereby establishing an early prevalence of Hinduism and making the caste structure and Hindu traditions universally recognizable.<sup>v</sup> These widespread traditions and shared history were immensely useful in providing Indian nationalist leaders with a foundation from which to draw a common national myth to unite the country during the subsequent independence movement.<sup>vi</sup>

This common myth stands in stark contrast to the complete lack of shared, unifying history in Nigeria, whose national boundaries are utterly artificial and whose diverse population was arbitrarily united, providing little ostensible rationale for nationhood. Nigeria's national boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by European powers during the 1885 Berlin Conference with a blatant disregard for the existing tribes, demography, or geography of the area, which has been a major source of the turmoil Nigeria experiences today.<sup>19</sup> The Berlin Conference set up two adjacent British protectorates in the area that now comprises Nigeria, one southern and one northern. 1914 saw another arbitrary regional unification, as these two ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse protectorates were formally amalgamated into one colony. Two differing systems of colonial political control (one direct,

the other indirect) served to further exacerbate existing differences.<sup>20</sup>

The effects of this colonial legacy on Nigeria's present political unity are manifest. The South continues to have more secular laws while the North still retains some Sharia laws, and two models of suffrage are still preserved within each region, with the South allowing universal suffrage and the North only giving men the vote. The North-South divide is further evidenced by the fact that the regions received self-government at vastly different times, almost two years apart: the eastern and western regions (compositely the southern region) were granted self-government in 1957, while the northern region declined the offer until 1959.<sup>21</sup> These political differences are both an indicator and source of the political instability Nigeria currently experiences. Indeed, the amalgamation is still referred to as the "mistake of 1914" for the persistent problems it created.<sup>22</sup>

**Political and Economic Policies** - Specific political and economic policies implemented in each nation prior to independence have also had lasting implications on present political relations and stabilities. For example, prior to British influence in the region, the Mogul Empire (1526-1750s) set up a "federal" system of tribute in India. This federal system served to set up a central-regional political system that "contributed to the expansion of administrative bureaucracies as well as closer economic and political ties among the

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THE PRESIDENT OF  
NIGERIA, WHOSE  
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BY STRONGER REGIONAL  
GOVERNMENTS



diverse regions of the subcontinent,” while still establishing the center as dominant in center-periphery relations. The legacy of this policy has aided in creating the political stability India now enjoys by promoting ties among regions as well as upholding the strength of the central government.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, British colonizers introduced the civil service to India and established “national and regional assemblies.” These “provide[d] an institutional basis for parliamentary democracy in postcolonial India,” as well as “systematized division of labor between central and provincial administrations, providing a bridge from the tributary system...to the institutions of modern day Indian federalism” that have served India so well since independence.<sup>24</sup>

Nigeria, on the other hand, underwent a series of administrative political reforms under Britain’s direction prior to its independence that had the effect of reorganizing the nation into three regions corresponding to the North, West, and East. This reorganization merely reinforced and further politicized regional differences by laying the “foundation for the creation of new geographic identities” to overlay the preexisting primordial ones. Such politicization and overlaying of differences has largely contributed to the political competition along regional lines and the weakening of the central government that are such a major source of Nigeria’s current political instability.<sup>25</sup> In 1951, Britain established a federal system in

Nigeria, which, unlike India’s system that allowed for a structurally and administratively stronger central government, had the opposite effect of giving its regions more autonomy. This regional control also applied to control of resources, which has had particularly dire consequences to be explained in more depth further on.

In neither India’s nor Nigeria’s case was a lack of agency or strong leadership a chief cause of political instability. However, the incentive for strong *central* leadership has been and continues to be compromised by Nigeria’s political structure. Effective leaders have been deterred from taking charge of the nation as a whole—which could encourage stability—preferring instead to seek control over the regional governments that are relatively stronger than the central one. For example, the leader and founder of one of Nigeria’s major parties, Ahmadu Bello of the National People’s Congress (NPC), declined the role of being Nigeria’s first post-independence Prime Minister to instead become Premier of the northern region. Bello’s decision is a testament to the relative importance and political power of Nigeria’s regions, over and above the country at large.

The central government’s weakness continues to pose major problems in Nigeria;<sup>26</sup> however, even the creation of central governmental institutions in Nigeria has had the effect of politicizing differences and reinforcing ethnic

NARENDRA  
MODI AT A  
FLAG RAISING  
CEREMONY  
DURING INDIA'S  
INDEPENDENCE  
DAY  
CELEBRATIONS  
IN BHUJ



cleavages. For example, after national parliaments gained importance as places where distribution of resources and money was decided, extreme ethnic mobilization ensued, evidenced by the fact that the emergent political parties were completely organized along ethnic lines.<sup>vii</sup> Furthermore, these divisive forms of “ethnic identity mobilization,” in the words of Iheduru, have “spilled over into economic and social life...igniting often a more vicious interethnic competition, stereotypes, and mutual suspicion that persists to this day”<sup>27</sup>

Paths to Independence - Nigeria and India similarly experienced peaceful transfers of power from British colonial rule to independence and both adopted Western-style constitutions and established parliamentary governments upon gaining independence. However, the fact that India struggled through an independence movement to gain this independence, while Nigeria was simply granted it, has had important repercussions on their respective relative political stabilities.

The independence movement in India was an important nationalizing and unifying force, with lasting implications on India’s present political stability, because it gave Indians another common source of national pride to look back to and draw upon. Indians were required to form a united front against their common colonial enemy, and the particular way in which this was done—largely due to the methods employed by Gandhi—helped to further unify the country. Gandhi, as

leader of the Indian National Congress (INC) that led India to independence, used a strategy of grassroots mobilization and organization. This method connected peasants with the members of the educated elite who led the movement. Indeed, in India’s case, a source of initial divisions paradoxically became fuel for India’s nationalist movement. The British, in their attempt to divide and rule, elevated Hindu Brahmins to key administrative posts, which required that they be educated; however, in one of colonialism’s familiar ironies, these native educated elites became the new political leaders of the Indian independence movement.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, Gandhi’s “syncretist” method drew upon and combined universal Enlightenment ideals with nationalistic Hindu spiritualism. Gandhi drew upon Indians’ shared histories and emphasized its universal elements, thereby creating a nationalistic movement that had widespread appeal for the entire nation.<sup>29</sup> It was helpful that India also had ancient history and traditions from which to draw a common national myth.

During India’s independence movement, Britain’s calculated efforts to exploit Muslim-Hindu tensions by calling for the Partition of Bengal in 1905 ironically backfired and instead had the effect of fueling greater resentment against the British for what was recognized as a deliberate divide-and-rule tactic. Indeed, rather than driving Indians apart, it “spur[red] greater activism across



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India and [gave] more impetus to the budding independence movement”—even if it would later become a source of division and ultimately lead to the secession of Bangladesh.<sup>30</sup> The Bengali example is a testament to the strength of the Indian independence movement as a unifying and nationalizing force because it was able to overpower, for a time, such a strong cleavage.

This independence story stands in stark contrast to Nigeria’s narrative. Nigeria experienced no similar independence movement, and therefore did not experience an equivalent unification or overcoming of cleavages. Instead, Nigeria was anticlimactically granted independence from and by Britain in the year 1960, making it one of fourteen African colonies to gain its independence in that year. Thus, Nigeria seemingly gained independence at a time when the international climate was conducive to it, rather than as a direct result of its own agitations. Nigeria was therefore never forced to unify and form a common national identity in the way that India was, and differences were merely swept under the rug, only to later resurface in highly destabilizing ways.

#### EXPERIENCES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

*Formative Events Upon Gaining Independence:* Almost immediately upon gaining independence, India experienced a major threat to national unity and stability. The country

prepared to divide along the borders of two of its rare overlapping cleavages to create a separate Pakistani nation with a Muslim majority (one in the west corresponding to the borders of present-day Pakistan and one in the east corresponding to present-day Bangladesh).<sup>31</sup> Though one might view India’s Partition—particularly when considering the massive violence between Hindus and Muslims that accompanied it—as a mark of extreme political instability, interestingly, the partition has seemingly effectively dealt with India’s overlapping cleavages. Indeed, the cleavages that remain are essentially cross-cutting (with the exception of Kashmir), rendering a relatively stable contemporary Indian nation.

Similarly, as a direct result of the same Hindu-Muslim riots that accompanied independence and generated “fears of destabilizing secessionist movements,” Indian leaders felt compelled to give precedence to “the preservation of national unity” over states’ rights. This fact is evidenced by the resultant Indian constitution that was “explicit in asserting the unity and primacy of the central government.”<sup>32</sup> This central government’s empowerment even prevented future secessionist threats by promoting participation *within* the framework of Indian federalism to accomplish regionally specific goals. For example, rather than continue to press for autonomy, the party that initially called for an autonomous state of “Dravidstan” in southern India decided

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instead to focus on capturing a block of seats in the national Parliament to achieve its aims. In other words, party members chose to act from within and through India's federalist system.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, the partition not only dealt with two of India's cross-cutting religious cleavages, but it also promoted political stability by leading to a greater empowerment of the central government. Indeed, India has enjoyed relatively peaceful political relations and stability since then, whereas most of Nigeria's political instability both historically and today stems from its intense regional competition (often over resources), which might not exist had Nigeria similarly experienced partitions or secessions of particular regions. However, in Nigeria, partly due to unequal resource division, secession of any of the regions is highly unlikely. 1967 did see the *attempted* secession of Nigeria's Eastern Region, an attempt that "ballooned into a 30-month civil war... that caused more than two million Biafran deaths—mostly children".<sup>34</sup> This bloody conflict serves as further evidence of the instability and violence that is all too prevalent in Nigeria and of which ethno-regional competition is a direct cause.

*Natural Resources:* Paradoxically, Nigeria's heavy endowment with natural resources is the very reason secession, which is typically a very destabilizing event, is unlikely in Nigeria—yet, the existence of these natural resources is

concurrently the chief source of its political instability. Nigeria is one of many in the ranks of those countries suffering from a "resource curse"—for Nigeria, it is primarily oil, referred to as "the curse of black gold".<sup>35</sup> Indeed, Nigeria possesses over six times the oil reserves that India possesses (U.S. EIA). In relative terms, Nigeria's sizeable oil resources are even more marked considering that India is over seven times as populous and over three and a half times as large geographically as Nigeria is.

Because India has never possessed a comparably abundant, coveted natural resource, its leaders have long been invested in its population being productive. Indeed, as Sil summarizes, "India's GDP growth has come from all sectors, ranging from agriculture and manufacturing to services and information technology".<sup>36</sup> Reliance on service sectors has also led the government to invest in its population's education, a trend not paralleled in Nigeria. Nigeria's leaders, on the other hand, have not needed to concern themselves with having a productive population. The result has been that strong relationships have not been promoted among leaders and the population at large because the population is often "bought off" using oil wealth in return for stability. Early Nigerian ruler Ibrahim Babangida, for example, was known for "buy[ing] off opposition... with state largesse and outright bribery," a practice that came to be known as "settlement" and that



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became so ubiquitous as to be “turned into a national pastime by subsequent regimes”.<sup>37</sup> Unsurprisingly, this practice of buying off opponents and disgruntled populations has led to instability in many cases when oil prices have fallen and oil wealth could not be used in such a way.

Despite abundant experience with domestic instability, Nigeria’s leaders have not developed effective ways of dealing with restive populations and instead have resorted to—and continue to resort to—repression and violence.<sup>38</sup> Oil has been a further source of increased instability because oil resources are concentrated in the South. This further polarizes and reinforces ethno-regional identities and drives regional competition. Even though the natural resources that India possesses are also for the most part regionally concentrated (for example, its oil, natural gas, and uranium), this fact has not become a source of regional competition in India largely due to its strong central government that controls the allocation of its resources and the allocation of revenues from its resources.

Contrastingly, in Nigeria oil has contributed to unrest and instability revolving both around the high level of environmental destruction oil production creates and the way that the resulting revenue and resources are distributed. Often, this unrest arises among the smaller minority groups from whose land the oil is taken. Because of the

structuring of Nigeria’s diversity, with ethno-religious differences coinciding with regional boundaries, it is often the case that just one or a few tribes are affected by the oil extraction. These minority groups experience the worst ills of the associated environmental degradation but often share in little of the resultant economic rewards. One well-known example is the 1993 Ogoni uprising that led to the hanging by the Nigerian government of environmental activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues. This minority group’s uprising was precipitated by a combination of political marginalization by the government and environmental degradation by oil companies.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, there has been recent attention paid to the “ongoing political and social strife in Nigeria’s delta region” revolving around the Royal Dutch Shell companies’ oil extraction in the region.<sup>40</sup>

*Political and Economic Policies:* Each nation’s political and economic policies undertaken upon decolonization have had lasting implications on their subsequent stabilities as well. Once independence was gained, India adopted a “third way” identity and mentality as Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first prime minister, set out to build the nation-state. This identity was nationalistic in character, celebrating India’s identity as a leader of the non-aligned Third World in the Cold War.<sup>41</sup> India’s essentially independent

foreign policy and “conscious efforts to balance elements of capitalism and socialism” provided Indians with “a sense of identity and pride within the international order during the years of the Cold War,” a crucial period of India’s national development.<sup>42</sup> Nehru’s “third way” was also characterized by the state sector owning all heavy industry. Thus, unlike Nigeria, India’s federalist system led to a strong center with control of the country’s resources and, significantly, with the right to intervene in state affairs.<sup>43</sup>

Also significantly, Nehru’s vision of the new Indian nation was characterized by secularism. Importantly, in the context of India, secularism implies opposition to communalism. As Sil writes, “Aside from the formal equality of all citizens before the law, secularism in India implies that politics should revolve around the interests of individuals rather than of groups identified by the communal ties of caste, region, or religion”.<sup>44</sup> Thus, India’s secularism has served to further deemphasize potentially divisive group identities in favor of more nationalistic principles centered on individuals.<sup>viii</sup> Also significant for the purposes of this paper, India’s understanding of secularism has led to its institution of a “reservations” system, a formal system aimed at leveling the playing field for minorities and previously disadvantaged groups; Sil describes this system as “India’s version of affirmative action”.<sup>45</sup> This policy has thereby allowed India to accommodate in important ways its Muslim and other minority religious populations as well as members of its lowest castes. There is no comparable “reservations” system in Nigeria, for the protection or privileging of minority and disadvantaged groups, which perhaps partially explains the commonness of the extralegal actions taken by minority tribes (e.g., the aforementioned Ogoni uprising).

The particular importance of India’s universal secularism becomes clearer when contrasted against Nigeria’s legal framework. Within Nigeria, it is still a source of tension and confusion whether the state itself is secular or not,<sup>46</sup> and conflicts between secular and Shariah laws continue to create instability. Shariah law

was introduced to Nigeria’s nine northern states in 2000 and 2001, and another three states have since instituted Shariah law for Muslims wishing to use them. Nigeria’s other twenty-five states remain governed by secular law.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, these regionally differing legal systems are yet a further indication of the extreme primacy afforded to regionalism and of the lack of Nigerian national unity. They are also a source of instability, since the two law systems clash at times. This was observed quite recently, in July 2013, in a highly charged parliamentary debate over a constitutional amendment intended to set the age at which Nigerians can renounce their citizenship. This proposed amendment had wider implications because several Muslim representatives were concerned about conflicts with Shariah law, which decrees that a woman is of age when she gets married.<sup>48</sup> The debate sparked protests in the country due to its connection with child-marriage and age-of-consent laws—which have been a recurring source of tension, predating this particular parliamentary debate.<sup>49</sup>

In contrast, upon gaining independence Nigeria pursued a course that merely continued to build upon colonial legacies. Primordial identities and the dominance of local strong men were reinforced as regions retained and continue to retain their immense political power relative to the center. Nigeria has also retained its ethno-regional political parties and separate models of suffrage for the North and South. Even in its attempts to economically “minimize the vestiges of neocolonialism and the country’s dependency” on foreign corporations through such measures as the Nigerian Indigenization Policy, the “most enduring consequence” of such policies has instead been “the politicization of Nigerian capitalism, in that one section of the country, the Yoruba, benefitted the most...and the worst hit were the Igbos.” Furthermore, the mixed-economy policy only “became a conduit for capital accumulation by the political elite”.<sup>50</sup> Thus, preexisting differences have merely been exacerbated by Nigeria’s economic policies, which have layered socioeconomic disparities atop them.

As mentioned, Nigeria continues to lack

THE PRACTICE OF  
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DEMONSTRATES  
THE ETHNIC-  
MISTRUST EMBEDDED  
IN NIGERIA’S  
PLURALISM

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN  
THE REGION HAS KILLED  
THOUSANDS IN THE PAST  
DECADE

a strong central government, and acts made by the central government often generate discontent from significant proportions of the population. Hostility largely stems from mistrust of government leaders belonging to a different ethno-regional group, and this frequently lead to coups and violence. The persisting importance of ethno-regional parties is evidenced by the unofficial “zoning” agreement that has been adopted in Nigeria, providing for a rotation of the presidency every two terms between the North and the South. This practice demonstrates the “ethnic mistrust” embedded in Nigeria’s pluralism that has “informed the need to assure every major group of a turn at the presidency and other top posts”.<sup>51</sup> Today, local tribes are even more visible and active, especially in conflicts over oil (e.g., again, the aforementioned Ogoni uprising).

There has also been recurrent religious violence, including a sharp rise in Muslim extremism, which has been deeply troubling to national stability. For example, over 500 people—mostly civilians—were massacred in March 2010, in the region that lay at the crossroads of Nigeria’s Muslim north and predominantly Christian south. Sectarian violence in the region has killed thousands in the past decade.<sup>52</sup> The radical Muslim sect known as Boko Haram, an extremist group that represents Nigeria’s biggest security threat and that is gaining in prominence, also recently

bombed UN headquarters in Nigeria, in August 2011.<sup>53</sup> And, as recently as May 2013, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in a vast area of northeast Nigeria. He admitted in a nationally televised speech that “the nation had lost control of some villages and towns to extremist fighters,” who had already killed more than 1,600 in the region in 2010 alone.<sup>54</sup> This speech was followed up less than a month later with thirteen more killings by Islamic extremists in the region.<sup>55</sup>

FINAL THOUGHTS: APPLYING THE  
“EAST ASIAN MODEL” TO INDIA AND  
NIGERIA?

Recently, several East Asian countries have undergone rapid economic growth and have experienced remarkable political stability throughout the process. The achievements of these nations—most prominently the “Asian Tigers” of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong—have garnered attention, prompting discussion as to whether their practices may provide a generalizable model” that could be adopted and implemented by struggling developing nations elsewhere in the world.<sup>ix</sup> Notably, in the context of this paper, they have also experienced colonialism and are plagued by its common legacies—indeed, Singapore and Hong Kong even share with Nigeria and India a history of *British* colonization. (Alternatively,

*THE INHERENT AND EXTREME  
DIVERSITY OF NIGERIA'S AND INDIA'S  
POPULATIONS PRESENTS A POTENTIALLY  
INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO  
SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTING THE EAST  
ASIAN MODEL.*

Korea experienced Japanese colonization, and Taiwan had a number of colonizers, of which England was not one.) However, I assert that it is highly doubtful whether these nations could offer a model that could successfully be applied to Nigeria or India, given certain inherent features of these nations and certain structural features that now exist.

Firstly, the inherent and extreme diversity of Nigeria's and India's populations presents a potentially insurmountable obstacle to successfully implementing the East Asian model. Part of the reason the model—which is characterized by central planning under authoritarian rule—works well in East Asian countries is because it is functioning in a homogenous society, which makes trust of leaders less problematic and makes having unified goals (two essential prerequisites in order for this model to function) much easier. Furthermore, in India, which already has a functioning and relatively stable democracy based on coalition politics, one might question whether a move toward the East Asian model would even be an improvement. Rather, it seems regressive—at least from a traditional Western viewpoint—to move away from the current functioning democracy towards authoritarianism. Given India's diversity, coalition politics is both healthy and promotes stability. More authoritarian rule could be potentially destabilizing, leading certain groups to feel marginalized and minority voices to

be overshadowed.

Nigeria, which shares with India the difficulties posed by heterogeneity in terms of its ability to effectively or constructively adopt the East Asian model, would have increased difficulty adopting this model because its diversity is organized regionally and is deeply competitive. This structure renders Nigeria's goals even less unified, and its overlapping cleavages further hinder trust of leaders.<sup>x</sup> Thus, while Nigeria could benefit from at least a slightly stronger central government (which adoption of the East Asian model would certainly provide) to ameliorate some of the problems that arise from its extreme regionalism, a lack of unified goals and a lack of trust would decrease the likelihood of the East Asian model's chances of success. It appears Nigeria must find a more uniquely tailored solution to its present economic and political shortcomings, lest its population continue to suffer the array of woes to which they continue to be too frequently subjected.<sup>xi</sup>

# NATURAL RESOURCES AND PROLONGED CONFLICT

THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE

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Why did Sierra Leone experience such a protracted civil war between 1991 and 2002? Sierra Leone has been beset with challenges since achieving independence from Britain in 1961, in particular its brutal civil war that resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and the displacement of almost a third of the total population. Yet Sierra Leone is now one of the more stable countries in West Africa due to its recently re-established democratic government and increasingly transparent, peaceful, and credible elections since 1996 following a series of turbulent regime transitions. This has finally resulted in the representation of multiple ethnic groups and political parties within the national government. Economically, however, Sierra Leone remains an extremely poor nation with tremendous income inequality despite its substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources. As a nation heavily reliant on primary commodity exports (*see graph on page 38*), Sierra Leone continues to depend on alluvial diamond mining as its major source of hard currency earnings, accounting for nearly half of all exports (CIA World Factbook). Since diamonds are not prone to sudden depreciations in value, they are therefore a more stable form of currency than the Leone). In addition to its abundance in highly valuable natural resources, Sierra Leone boasts an ethnically diverse population with multiple prominent ethnic groups, each predominantly occupying a particular region and possessing a

unique cultural history and language.

The dependent variable examined in this paper is civil war. In particular, it seeks to investigate what factors led to the brutal eleven-year civil war in Sierra Leone. The lengthy duration of conflict in Sierra Leone is an atypical case as it exceeds the average nine-year duration of armed conflict for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1945 and 1999.<sup>1</sup> However, the causes for this inconsistency are not readily apparent, because Sierra Leone—like its Sub-Saharan African neighbors—also possesses significant ethnic diversity and has experienced repeated regime transitions (*see graph on page 38 for estimated ethnic group population shares*). During the course of the eleven-year civil war, Sierra Leone underwent multiple regime transitions among different forms of authoritarian rule, from one-party systems to military regimes, before the ultimate emergence of a democratic administration.

This paper argues that Sierra Leone's protracted civil war during the 1990s cannot be accounted for by common explanations regarding the causes of protracted civil wars, such as ethnic diversity or a weak government during a period of regime transition. Instead, the prolonged nature of the civil war can be attributed to the presence of highly valuable natural resources and Sierra Leone's heavy dependence on these primary export commodities. Natural resources are therefore the main independent variable in

*SIERRA LEONE REMAINS AN EXTREMELY POOR NATION WITH TREMENDOUS INCOME INEQUALITY DESPITE ITS SUBSTANTIAL MINERAL, AGRICULTURE, AND FISHERY RESOURCES*

*THE AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN COMMODITIES THAT ARE EITHER HIGHLY VALUED OR GEOGRAPHICALLY CONCENTRATED, SUCH AS DIAMONDS, CREATES OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREDATION BY REBELS*

this paper, in particular, the presence of easily extractable natural resources. These resources led to a prolonged civil war because they provided the rebel movement, comprised of Liberian and Sierra Leonean insurgents substantially supported by Liberian President Charles Taylor, with easily lootable assets and convenient sources of funding for sustaining the conflict.<sup>2</sup> The availability of certain commodities that are either highly valued or geographically concentrated, such as diamonds in the case of Sierra Leone, creates opportunities for predation by rebels. Rebels are able to use force to loot and tax such commodities, thereby enabling rebel movements to acquire a source of sustainable financing that can be used to perpetuate conflict.<sup>3</sup>

EXISTING EXPLANATIONS

Some scholars hypothesize that the presence of a weak government during a period of regime transition may prolong civil war because insurgents are better able to thrive if the government and military to which they are opposed are relatively weak.<sup>4</sup> A weak government is defined as one that is badly financed, organizationally incompetent, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed at the local level.<sup>5</sup> However, this explanation does not sufficiently explain Sierra Leone's prolonged civil war between 1991 and 2002, because Sierra Leone did not experience civil war between 1978 and 1990 despite multiple regime transitions and

a series of weak governments during that period. Surprisingly, Sierra Leone has today become relatively stable due to its recently re-established democratic government and increasingly transparent, peaceful, and credible elections—implemented since 1996 during the height of the civil war conflict.

Moreover, despite multiple regime transitions throughout the eleven-year conflict, Sierra Leone's governments and military opposing the rebel movement cannot be considered particularly weak in terms of either corruption or organizational incompetence. This fact is exemplified by the Ernest Bai Koroma administration's multi-faceted efforts since 1997 to implement more transparent leadership in Sierra Leone. First, the administration sought to fight and prevent corruption by establishing an anti-corruption commission to investigate and prosecute suspect government officials. In addition, it initiated a wide-scale public sector reform program to reduce and prevent wasteful government spending. Since government administrations during the civil war had recognized and sought to tackle corruption and organizational incompetence while strengthening their capacity to impose regulations, Sierra Leone's prolonged civil war cannot be explained by the presence of a weak government during a period of regime transition.

Other scholars hypothesize that an ethnically diverse population may prolong



SIERRA LEONE'S  
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DURING A PERIOD OF  
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civil war because ethnic wars, defined as wars among communities in conflict over the power relationship existing between them and the state, appear to last longer than non-ethnic wars.<sup>6</sup> The logic underlying this argument is that opposing communities in ethnic civil conflicts are believed to hold irreconcilable visions regarding the state's identity, borders, and citizenship. For this reason, opposing ethnic communities do not seek to control a state in which all ethnic groups accept the existing identity of the state, but rather seek to redefine—often through violent means—the very identity of the state itself. This, however, is not the case in Sierra Leone, a country in which none of the major ethnic groups, including Temne, Mende, Limba, or Kono, have sought to monopolize the identity of the state itself. Instead, these groups' political aim was to obtain equal political representation within the national government, a goal that has now largely been achieved.

Scholars also hypothesize that the protection of ethnic identity is much more closely associated with protecting political rights and supporting democracy than it is with economic gain. Therefore ethnic grievances are most likely to be exacerbated by a lack of political and civil rights, coupled with the state's inability to nurture diverse ethnic identities within its cultural and political system.<sup>7</sup>

But this explanation also fails to explain the cause of prolonged civil war in Sierra Leone,

since multiple ethnic groups have been represented in national government since independence, and different ethnic groups are accorded equal political and civil rights.

Finally, ethnic diversity is believed to be especially problematic for domestic stability if a single ethnic group accounts for forty to sixty percent of the overall population and is able to dominate the others. In such polarized societies, it is theoretically easier for insurgents to sustain a rebellion.<sup>8</sup> However, ethnic polarization was not a factor during the Sierra Leone civil war, as no single ethnic group accounted for forty to sixty percent of the overall population (*see graph on page 38*). In summary, explanations based on ethnic diversity are insufficient to explain the prolonged nature of the civil war in Sierra Leone.

#### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Since financing is an important determinant of a rebel movement's viability, this paper hypothesizes that African countries that are highly dependent upon exports of a few primary commodities are more likely to experience prolonged civil war. This is because the availability of such commodities creates opportunities for predation by rebels. Specifically, rebels can use force to loot and then informally tax these commodities, generating funds that can be used to sustain rebel movements and ultimately prolong

*THE RUF DESTROYED SCHOOLS LIKE THIS ONE IN THEIR CAMPAIGN TO “RESTORE POWER AND WEALTH TO THE PEOPLE”*



conflict.<sup>9</sup> The presence of natural resources affects the length of civil war because it determines the rebels' ability to continue waging war and thereby prolong the duration of conflict. In particular, prolonged internal conflict is most likely to occur when rebels are able to tax resources that are immobile and geographically concentrated, such as minerals.<sup>10</sup>

In addition, the availability of certain commodities that can be easily looted because they are highly valued or geographically concentrated creates further opportunities for rebel predation. Countries that possess valuable commodities like diamonds or gold are therefore at higher risk of experiencing prolonged conflict, because the opportunity to loot and tax such commodities not only enables but encourages rebels to sustain conflict.

Enclave economies, defined as countries in which more than seventy-five percent exports consist of minerals, timber, or agricultural products, may uniquely enable rebels to continue fighting if they can control and obtain revenue from these exports.<sup>11</sup> Prolonged civil war may be especially likely if rebels control enclave production, because their relative monopoly on funds earned enables them to acquire and maintain the labor force and equipment necessary to survive against government forces.<sup>12</sup>

Lengthy civil wars can only occur when rebel groups are able to sustain large organizations

by securing the financial resources necessary to continue waging war—particularly through control of natural resources.

#### EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

The mechanisms through which natural resources affect the likelihood of prolonged civil war are illustrated in Sierra Leone's civil war. Because prolonged conflict is often motivated and enabled by predation of natural resource exports and valuable commodities, Sierra Leone is an ideal case to test this hypothesis due to its abundance of easily extractable natural resources, particularly diamonds.<sup>13</sup> The availability of certain commodities that may be easily looted as a result of their value and geographic concentration creates opportunities for rebels to forcefully seize and subsequently tax them to fund continued insurgency.

The causal mechanism linking natural resources to prolonged civil war is the costs of sustaining a rebel movement—especially labor and armaments—against government forces. In essence, this requires the rebellion itself to generate revenue.<sup>14</sup> The circumstances determining a rebel movement's financial viability are thus incredibly important, since prolonged civil wars can only occur when rebel groups can sustain their large organizations.<sup>15</sup> This is evident in the case of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone,

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the central rebel movement that opposed the government throughout the eleven-year conflict. It was only able to do so by profiting through trade in conflict diamonds, defined as diamonds originating from areas controlled by rebel forces opposed to a country's internationally recognized government. The Revolutionary United Front rebel movement



*ALLUVIAL MINING REMAINS A MAJOR  
SOURCE OF HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS  
IN SIERRA LEONE*

in Sierra Leone initially coalesced in opposition to the elite and corrupt government, claiming that it sought to restore power and wealth to the people. But the prolonged civil war that resulted from the rebels' insurgency would not have been possible without the revenue it acquired by looting alluvial diamond mines throughout the country and placing high informal taxes on the revenue generated.<sup>16</sup>

The claim that enclave production is particularly likely to cause prolonged civil war appears true in the case of Sierra Leone. The country's many easily extractable natural resources, most notably alluvial diamonds, allowed the rebel movement to continue funding its operations and thereby sustaining the conflict.<sup>17</sup> The Eastern and Southern regions of Sierra Leone are abundant in these diamonds, which are accessible to anyone with a shovel and sieve. The Revolutionary United Front was thus able to fund its military action through illicit trade in conflict diamonds. Specifically, the Revolutionary United Front used funds from alluvial diamond mines to purchase weapons and ammunition from neighboring countries such as Guinea and Liberia.<sup>18</sup> The fact that trade in conflict diamonds prolonged the civil war in Sierra Leone is reflected by International Criminal Court's recent conviction of Liberian president Charles Taylor for his role in sustaining the conflict by trading weapons and military training for diamonds, thereby enabling the Revolutionary United Front to sustain its brutal



*PRESIDENT ERNEST BAI KOROMA WITH US PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF SIERRA LEONE'S ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS*

campaign.

Certain primary commodity exports, such as minerals, provide an ideal source of rebel financing because rebels can potentially enjoy huge profits by seizing control of geographically concentrated resources.<sup>19</sup> This is certainly true in the case of Sierra Leone, an enclave economy in which minerals account for approximately eighty percent of total exports. Revolutionary United Front rebels were able to reap sizeable profits after capturing and holding diamond mines in the Southern and Eastern regions of the country. Prolonged civil wars are more likely to occur in countries that have enclave economies because rebels are able to continue fighting as long as they can obtain revenue from the enclaves under their control. Enclave predation is most likely when there is high asset specificity, geographic concentration of resources, and high-value products.<sup>20</sup>

It is therefore no coincidence that the civil war in Sierra Leone began in the Eastern town of Koidu, where most of the county's diamonds are concentrated and a major traditional site of alluvial mining. During the latter half of the civil war, Koidu was controlled almost exclusively by Revolutionary United Front rebels who used brutal force to seize and tax diamonds extracted there.<sup>21</sup> The presence of easily extractable diamonds provided a powerful incentive for the continuation of civil war violence, and the rebels maintained control of important mining districts such as Kono

and Koidu by expelling thousands of civilians through brutally violent means.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to providing rebel movements with a source of continued funding, increasing evidence indicates that natural resources also prolong civil war by increasing levels of rebel violence. Some scholars argue this is because the resource base under rebel control affects the type of soldiers who are recruited.<sup>23</sup> Rebels fighting in a resource-poor area tend to attract committed soldiers, whereas rebels fighting in natural-resource-rich-areas tend to attract opportunist soldiers who are less disciplined and use more indiscriminate violence.<sup>24</sup> This holds true in the case of Sierra Leone, where the Revolutionary United Front rebels brutally amputated the hands, arms, and legs of tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans with machetes throughout the conflict. The Revolutionary United Front indicated that a major reason for these actions was to prevent victims from mining alluvial diamonds, which rebels feared could have been used to support government forces and defeat their rebel movement.<sup>25</sup>

Sierra Leone's civil war provides abundant evidence about how rebel organizations generate revenue through the informal taxation of the rents on primary commodity exports, thereby enabling prolonged civil war to occur due to heavy economic dependence on natural resource exports.<sup>26</sup> In Sierra Leone, the availability of

*THIS CONCLUSION SUGGESTS THAT IF GOVERNMENTS ARE ABLE TO PREVENT REBELS FROM HOLDING AND TAXING EXPORT ENCLAVES, MOST OF THE MOTIVATION AND NECESSARY FUNDING FOR REBEL GROUPS WOULD DISAPPEAR*


natural resources provided insurgents with easily lootable assets to seize and a source of income for sustaining the rebel movement.<sup>27</sup> The prolonged nature of the civil war in Sierra Leone can be specifically attributed to the presence of alluvial diamonds; illicit trade in these diamonds gave the rebel movement the resources it needed to sustain the conflict for an extended period of time.<sup>28</sup>

#### CONCLUSION


Sierra Leone's lengthy civil war between 1991 and 2002 presents two important findings for African politics. First, it demonstrates how the presence of natural resources prolongs conflict by providing easily lootable assets for rebel movements to seize and use to fund continued operations. Second, it suggests that the presence of natural resources affects the type of soldiers recruited and causes higher levels of violence likely to prolong civil conflict. These findings have important implications for African politics, especially given many African economies' dependence on natural resources. Contrary to existing explanations of ethnic diversity and the presence of weak governments during periods of regime transition, this paper argues that some of Africa's prolonged civil wars may be best explained by economic factors such as heavy dependence on export enclaves, which are vulnerable to rebel control and predation.<sup>29</sup> Rebel organizations may be able to

generate the revenue they need to sustain conflict through informal taxation of the rents on primary commodity exports, such as diamonds.<sup>30</sup> This conclusion suggests that if governments are able to prevent rebels from holding and taxing export enclaves, most of the motivation and necessary funding for rebel groups would disappear, and disaffected groups may be unlikely to attempt such rebel movements in the first.<sup>31</sup> Instead, isolated pockets of disorder might exist throughout a country, but they would be financially unable to sustain rebellion for long periods of time.<sup>32</sup>

## ESTIMATED POPULATION SHARES FOR SALIENT ETHNIC GROUPS IN SIERRA LEONE



## ESTIMATED VALUE OF SIERRA LEONE'S PRIMARY COMMODITY EXPORTS 2000 - 2004



# THE EFFECTS OF THE US PIVOT TO ASIA ON EUROPEAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION

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The current state of European strategic cooperation is optimistically described as “splintered” and pessimistically labeled as “nonexistent” by politicians and pundits alike. A potential retreat of the EU to staunch intergovernmentalism frustrates those who hoped Europe could reach its supranational potential to address global strategic challenges. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its subsidiary Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the European Defense Agency (EDA), and the European External Action Service (EEAS) were all designed to address modern strategic challenges, which can no longer be described as “state-versus-state.” Terrorists, who operate globally and without national affiliation, pose a significant threat to national and regional security. Cyber warfare also presents a strategic challenge for those who shaped the original European institutions. The age of interstate conflict in Europe is over, but Europeans have struggled to adapt to a shifting security paradigm. Recently, spying scandals, misguided austerity, and loudening right-wing nationalism have further slowed down European strategic development.

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been the “white knight” of the European strategic community. From aiding Western Europe while under German oppression in consecutive world wars to smaller-scale operational assistance in the Western Balkans, the US has neutralized European strategic

shortcomings. Moreover, the very framework of European strategy and European cooperation was molded by the US. From founding NATO as a deterrent to the rearmament of West Germany to pushing for European integration post-Cold War to stabilize Eastern Europe and nurturing the European monetary union to further integrate transatlantic trade relationships, the US has had a hand in the pocket of European affairs.<sup>1</sup> However, that era may be coming to a close. The Obama administration has indicated that the US will adopt a “lead from behind” mentality in the ‘European Neighborhood’ as it rebalances its strategic objectives to the Pacific.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the US has ordered the withdrawal of thousands of troops from Europe.<sup>3</sup> The impact of the “pivot”, the withdrawal of the troops, and what these buzzwords truly mean, will be the focus of this article.

Ostensibly, Europe has only two options in the wake of a potential US “abandonment”: unite in the security vacuum left by America’s withdrawal or fail to achieve European strategic cooperation and witness the potential collapse of the EU. However, both options are sensational and unlikely. This article will suggest a third, more probable outcome: a fledgling EU security nexus held afloat by continued American support. This article will begin by unpacking the perceived US abandonment of Europe, then will turn to an analysis of Europe’s three options, and finish with a discussion of the future of Europe and the US.

SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD  
WAR, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN  
THE “WHITE KNIGHT” OF THE EUROPEAN  
STRATEGIC COMMUNITY

THE MYTH OF “U.S. ABANDONMENT”

The US withdrawal of troops from Europe is more symbolically significant than operationally relevant. The nature of this withdrawal requires further dissection. To begin, it must be underscored that with the exception of a slight spike in the 1980s, the US has been withdrawing scores of troops from Europe consistently over the last half century (from 438,859 in 1957 to 98,087 in 2005).<sup>4</sup> Second, the reduction of American soldiers is not equivalent to a reduced military presence in Europe. In fact, the US has increased its missile-defense capabilities in Europe over the past few years during this supposed “pivot.” In February 2012, the US Navy announced that several guided-missile destroyers would be stationed at a base in Rota, Spain, as part of a new joint US-NATO European missile defense shield that is currently under construction. Additionally, existing US military units in Germany and Italy are being “modernized, reorganized and given newer equipment.”<sup>5</sup> US military involvement in Europe is not disappearing, as reported in the press; it is being remodeled with continued investment in military technology upstaging troop withdrawals.

Further, despite decades of continued US troop withdrawal in Europe, transatlantic cooperation has rarely been called into question. US troops have effectively assisted European strategic actions in warring nations such as

Kosovo and Libya, despite their ever dwindling numbers. However, as British Defense Secretary John Nott warned in 1982 in the wake of US troop reductions from Europe during the Cold War, “It is well to remember that it is not only numbers, but the perception of change, that is important. Any reduction which was perceived to cast doubt on the strength of the American commitment to Europe would serve only to weaken deterrence.”<sup>6</sup> Although Europe is no longer under constant threat of a Soviet nuclear attack, the Secretary’s warning is still relevant. The perception of a US abandonment of Europe is disturbing to Europeans unsure of how to cooperate in the absence of the US, and how to maintain security and defense dominance without US support. Even though US abandonment is a myth, there is a real threat that Europe will—in the words of Henry Kissinger—“analyze themselves into self-fulfilling prophecies.”<sup>7</sup> Even the perception of a Europe without American support could be enough to destabilize the continent.

The US “pivot to Asia,” a term coined by the Obama administration that has caused severe anxiety for European politicians and academics, may be no more than a public relations move by the administration in response to a rising China. China’s military budget has eclipsed the \$100 billion mark (according to China’s state media), allowing for developments in cyber technology and weapons capabilities, including a new fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile



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DEFENSE SHIELD OVER EUROPE*



submarines.<sup>8</sup> America's security hegemony in the Pacific is waning. The well-publicized "pivot" may be designed to reassure those anxious about a US decline and to send a strong message to China's new administration.

Recently, President Obama reassured Europe that "our relationship with our European allies and partners is the cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and a catalyst for global cooperation. In no other region does the United States have such a close alignment of values, interests, capabilities, and goals."<sup>9</sup> Regardless, the message is clear: America no longer desires to mediate European strategic cooperation. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Georgetown University Professor Charles Kupchan said, "the drawdown of U.S. troop levels in Europe and the prospect of a 'pivot' to Asia should help convince Europeans that 'free-riding in perpetuity' is not an option."<sup>10</sup> Even if the "pivot" never develops beyond the hypothetical, the message to Europe is clear: "pool it or lose it."<sup>11</sup>

#### EUROPE'S FIRST OPTION: RENEWED STRATEGIC COOPERATION

Europe's first option is what many Europeans and Americans have been advocating for decades: the creation of a strategically united Europe, effective without constant supervision and intervention from the US. One short-term

fix to US "abandonment" is an infusion of money by EU members. The EU possesses a sophisticated Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) and military potential second to none.<sup>12</sup> However, their potential will never be realized at current defense spending levels. The EU spends an average of 1.67% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense, compared to 4.9% in the US, and the CFSP is woefully underfunded.<sup>13</sup> Unfortunately, the prospect of member states increasing their defense budget is growing ever more unlikely. The Eurozone financial crisis is unrelenting, sapping funds from foreign security and defense to domestic crises. Further, a growing voice of right-wing nationalism prevents the member states to committing more money to a supranational network.<sup>14</sup>

Winston Churchill's quote is appropriate: "Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think."<sup>15</sup> Without the infusion of money, the EU must think its way into cooperation, a far more durable, yet difficult, approach. However, this is unlikely for two reasons. The first is the debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Intergovernmentalists, representing the majority of EU heads of state today, believe that security and defense is fundamentally a national enterprise. A core principle of sovereignty is national security defense—a government is entrusted with ensuring the protection of their people and their people's interests. While the

*THE US AND EUROPE HAVE A "CLOSE ALIGNMENT OF VALUES, INTERESTS, CAPABILITIES, AND GOALS."*

*EUROPE IS AMERICA'S DEPUTY SHERIFF.  
WHY FIRE THE DEPUTY SHERIFF FOR A  
POTENTIALLY THREATENING PARTNER IN ASIA?*

definition of 'protection' and 'people's interests' is unclear, the reluctance of EU member states to relinquish this core principle in favor of supranational control may be reasonable. The French nuclear program is a useful example. The French boast an estimated 300 nuclear weapons, which they have publicized to the world. Although they, like supranationalists, ardently push for a strong EU CSDP and recommitted to NATO under President Sarkozy, the French refuse to share their weapons, believing national ownership is their right.<sup>16</sup> In the security domain, individual state interests reign supreme.

The second reason greater cooperation is unlikely is because Article V of the NATO Treaty—"an attack on one is an attack on all"—thwarts EU member state participation in CSDP.<sup>17</sup> This too is understandable—why spend the money and effort to build up defense capabilities if NATO guarantees national security? Critics argue that this 'lazy' mindset is potentially harmful to the future of Europe—and they may be correct—but the mindset of the states is nevertheless rational. Because of the NATO/US safety net, European states are unlikely to increase defense spending and wholeheartedly push for strategic cooperation.

EUROPE'S SECOND OPTION:  
COLLAPSE OF CFSP

The prospect of a strategically united Europe is fading; intergovernmentalists might argue

the very possibility was a pipe dream all along. Could the withdrawal of US troops be the knockout punch for supranational ambitions of EU cooperation? This is not likely for one simple reason: the US will not allow the collapse of the European project. From an economic perspective, abandonment is senseless. Since the Marshall Plan and several other post-war US investments, the US has spent a great deal of money both reconstructing and creating a Europe that suits American strategic interests. Further, in 2011, US direct investment in Europe accounted for more than half (or \$2.3 trillion) of their global sum.<sup>18</sup> To withdraw completely—while that investment is still yielding returns—would be a waste.

Moreover, Europe is—and will remain—America's closest ally for a variety of reasons. As Obama mentioned in the NATO Summit of 2010, the US and Europe have a "close alignment of values, interests, capabilities, and goals."<sup>19</sup> Europe is America's deputy sheriff. Why fire the deputy sheriff for a potentially threatening partner in Asia? The positive returns of an exclusive relationship between the US and Asian partners would have to greatly outweigh the potential damages caused by an ineffective Europe. For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that such a union will come into existence.

A THIRD OPTION: LESS GLORIFIED  
SURVIVAL



*LE TERRIBLE (S 916) OF THE FRENCH NAVY. THE FRENCH MAINTAIN THEIR OWN NUCLEAR DETERRENT, DEMONSTRATING THE RESERVATION OF EU MEMBER STATES TO RELINQUISH NATIONAL SECURITY TO SUPRANATIONAL CONTROL.*

The third option for Europe, although the least salutary, is the disintegration of the EU security regime, leaving the entire continent reliant on US support. Europe will not increase strategic cooperation because of a lack of domestic will and money, a hesitancy to relinquish intergovernmentalist control in the domain of security and defense, and the security blanket of America, despite the so-called “pivot to Asia.” Europe will not fail entirely because the US will not allow the devolvement of national strategic interests. Consequently, the likely scenario for the foreseeable future is a stalemate of inefficiency.

#### FUTURE FOR EUROPE

The future for European strategic cooperation will likely be limited. The EU will struggle to maintain any joint operational capabilities due to a lack of efficiency and cooperation, rather than equipment and personnel. The US will be forced to supply greater security assistance in order to preserve transatlantic interests. The future of European strategic cooperation will likely mirror the EU’s response to the 2011 Libya crisis. In the Libya crisis, a cluster of member states (including the UK and France) proposed a joint action while others (including Denmark and Germany) opposed it. Despite EU fragmentation, the mission was carried out successfully and the US indeed “led from behind.”<sup>20</sup> Future cooperation

may be in splintered form, but it will function via alliances of subgroups of member states with largely logistical help from the US.

Eventually, the financial crisis in Europe will recede. In a best case scenario, increasing GDPs and fewer domestic concerns will propel European countries to refocus on strategic cooperation. However, it is far more likely that Europe will continue to stumble along and be guided and protected by the US. The greatest fear for Europe and the world is not the collapse of the European security union (because of the NATO safety net), but rather the collapse of the economic union, which would have grave effects on the global economy. Europeans have shown a greater propensity to cooperate with one another in economic matters, but intergovernmentalist attitudes in the security sector will certainly strain intra-European relations.

#### FUTURE FOR THE U.S.

The future for the US under option three is not bright. America is likely to grow even more overextended in the face of the “pivot” to Asia, which will likely correspond to greater economic and military involvement in the Pacific, and further maintenance of the European project. Growing nationalism and isolationism brewing at home threaten America’s strategic agenda. According to a recent Rasmussen poll, “51 percent of voters surveyed said they wanted all US troops out of Europe, now. Only 29 percent

*GROWING  
NATIONALISM AND  
ISOLATIONISM BREWING  
AT HOME THREATEN  
AMERICA'S STRATEGIC  
AGENDA.*

*CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF  
STAFF GEN MARTIN DEMPSEY DISCUSSES  
REGIONAL SECURITY IN ASIA.*



avored keeping the troops where they are.”<sup>21</sup> As established earlier, US troop levels in Europe do not necessarily impact military presence on the continent. However, the isolationist attitude of an ever-growing majority of Americans is telling. Opinions, such as the following written by famous conservative Patrick J. Buchanan are widely shared: “As for Europe, the Red Army went home decades ago. Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics are free. As President Eisenhower urged JFK 50 years ago, we should bring U.S. troops home and let Europe man up to its own defense. No one threatens Europe today, and we could sell them all the missiles, tanks, ships, guns, and planes they need to defend themselves.”<sup>22</sup> Many Americans do not want to be involved strategically with Europe any longer, despite the benefits of a European partnership. It is unclear how the US government will be able to convey to the US public that a continued strategic relationship with Europe is essential, and if the American people will listen.

Additionally, the US faces a shrinking defense budget. American historian Michael Auslin recently described the US budget crisis: “Pivot funding is in danger from sequestration—forced budget cuts resulting from larger budget politicking in Washington—that, if allowed to proceed, will cut another \$500 billion from a defense budget already reduced by \$900 billion since 2009.”<sup>23</sup> If the US can barely pay for “pivot funding”, how will they pay for global strategic objectives, specifically in Europe? The rebuttal:

“but, the US has survived thus far” is myopic. US strategic overextension under such budget stresses is unsustainable. Either a restructuring of the US budget, such as the reallocation of funds from Social Security to defense, an abandonment of a geostrategic program, greater European responsibility in NATO, or another cut will have to occur to keep the US fiscally afloat.

#### CONCLUSION

The US will not abandon European security in the wake of failed European security cooperation. They will maintain a robust military presence in Europe, honor NATO agreements, and continue to treat the EU as its key global ally. However, continued US military support may have grave consequences for the wellbeing of American domestic politics, and a failed CFSP may endanger the European Union as a whole.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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# FROM FIGHTING NAZIS TO ELECTING NAZIS

THE RISE OF GOLDEN DAWN IN GREECE

MARY SHIRAEF  
Emory University

In Greece's parliamentary elections of June 2012, a far-right neo-fascist party called Golden Dawn gained eighteen seats, making them the third most popular political party in parliament. An opinion poll published in October by KAPA Research Center reports that since then, their popularity has grown from 7.5 percent of the population to 10.4 percent<sup>1</sup>. Considering Greece's long and bloody relationship with fascism, the ascent of Golden Dawn into parliament has deeply puzzled many people, including Greeks. Golden Dawn's close resemblance to Nazism is particularly concerning.<sup>2</sup> The party argues that only those with Greek blood are truly Greek, a statement that moves Golden Dawn beyond the nationalistic character of Italian fascism and closer to the biological racism of the National Socialist party of Nazi Germany. Citing Isokrates' Panegyricus, Golden Dawn seek to deprive foreigners from learning Greek, and further assume an obligation on the part of the Greek people to immerse themselves in Greek culture.<sup>3</sup> They say his definition, that 'people are called Greeks because they share in our education (paideusis) rather than in our birth',<sup>4</sup> was meant to be exclusive rather than inclusive, stating intently in a recent blog post, "They are misinterpreting Isocrates to grant citizenship to migrants!"<sup>5</sup> Anthropologist Michael Herzfeld warned in a recent talk that Golden Dawn is "much more than a Fascist party. It's not even a Neo-Nazi party. It's straight Nazi".<sup>6</sup>

One of Golden Dawn's regular chants is "Foreigners out!" and like the Nazis, Golden Dawn is more than willing to implement violence to realize this aim. Beating of foreign workers and vows to "rid the land of filth" have proliferated among Golden Dawn members;<sup>7</sup> a Human Rights Watch report (2012) cautions that xenophobic violence has increased significantly since the rise of Golden Dawn. Notably, in January 2013, members of Golden Dawn repeatedly stabbed a Pakistani immigrant, leading to his death.<sup>8</sup> While Golden Dawn's primary targets are illegal immigrants, the party ideology also incorporates the typical fascist scapegoats, such as Jews,<sup>9</sup> Roma, LGBT persons, leftists, local minorities, non-Christians, and human rights defenders.<sup>10</sup> Regarding Roma gypsies, who face tremendous marginalization in Greece, Golden Dawn MP Illias Koukoutsis is reported to have said, "We won't regard them as equal citizens until they stop their involvement in delinquency," adding that this was impossible since "gypsies are delinquent in their DNA".<sup>11</sup>

Golden Dawn's strategies have incorporated Nazi tactics, such as the infiltration of secondary schools<sup>12</sup> and the targeting of immigrant ghettos. Perhaps the most disconcerting information regarding Golden Dawn is that they have global aims. They have expanded their agenda to open party cells in Germany, Australia, Canada, and even America,<sup>13</sup> although their propaganda has met

*HOW COULD A COUNTRY PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED BY NAZI GERMANY, THEN RULED TYRANNICALLY BY A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP ELECT INTO PARLIAMENT A NEO-FASCIST PARTY THAT OPENLY PRAISES HITLER?*



*A GOLDEN DAWN DEMONSTRATION IN KOMOTINI, DECEMBER, 2010*

a firm resistance in the U.S.<sup>14</sup> Because of the remarkable similarity to the tactics and ideology of the Nazi party, Golden Dawn poses a serious challenge to Greece and the EU. Seeking to understand how Golden Dawn became popular in order to counteract its political strategy is an essential task. How could a country previously occupied by Nazi Germany (1941 to 1944), then ruled tyrannically by a military dictatorship (1967 to 1974) elect into parliament a neo-fascist party that openly praises Hitler?

The simplistic explanation for a rise in extremism in Greece is the country's severe economic crisis, which intensified in 2010 and is ongoing today. Many Greeks, like others in times of extreme crises, have resorted to extremist solutions. However, a closer observation of Golden Dawn's strategic responses to the major issues plaguing Greece provides a more in-depth explanation for Golden Dawn's rise in political influence. The rise in attraction to Golden Dawn among Greeks can be specifically attributed to five factors. These include: Golden Dawn's conspicuous fulfillment of Greece's poorly run state services, their newly formed anti-austerity political platform, the way in which Golden Dawn's immigration policy provides an all-inclusive cause/solution for Greece's problems, the ability Golden Dawn provides the Greek government to enact and expand its power, and perhaps the key factor, Golden Dawn's simultaneous public disavowal of ties to neo-Nazism and promotion of an ideology

that appeals to Greece's relatively high level of ethnocentrism.

Firstly, Golden Dawn has attracted supporters by conspicuously filling state roles that are traditionally plagued by ineffectiveness and corruption in Greece, such as unemployment services, healthcare, education and security. For example, while Greece's unemployment programs are overwhelmed by the country's 26.8% unemployment rate, Golden Dawn campaigned with a promise to cancel household debt for unemployed and low-wage earners<sup>15</sup> and have since launched programs that support Greeks looking for work.<sup>16</sup> Although certainly an empty claim, they addressed the rampant corruption in Greece by promising to arrest all corrupt politicians.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, Golden Dawn has exploited Greece's inadequate education system by launching politically motivated educational initiatives. These have been described as incorporating the "historical fascist model of infiltration" and are aimed at inculcating children with national pride and Golden Dawn's ideology.<sup>18</sup> In one of these so-called "national awakening" sessions, Golden Dawn's official website posted a picture of well-dressed six to ten-year-old children who were taught about the Olympian gods, the ancient Greek pantheon and the Christian faith.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, for Greece's first day of Lent,<sup>20</sup> Golden Dawn organized a traditional kite-making event, albeit with kites sporting Golden Dawn's swastika-like

UNIFORMED GOLDEN DAWN ACTIVISTS  
IMPLEMENT THEIR IDEA OF  
VIGILANTE JUSTICE BY KNOCKING  
OVER IMMIGRANTS' STANDS UNLESS  
THEY CAN PRODUCE PROPER SELLING  
LICENSES

GOLDEN DAWN IMPLEMENTS  
A NAZI AGENDA WITH  
HEZBOLLAH TACTICS

symbol.<sup>21</sup> When accused in parliament of using propaganda methods similar to those used in Nazi Germany, Golden Dawn MP Dimitris Koukoutsis responded angrily, “You’re bothered by us teaching Greek history? We’re going to write it too!”<sup>22</sup>

The most striking example of Golden Dawn’s exploitation of Greece’s poorly run state services has been its infiltration of Greece’s security apparatus. Anthropologists Antonis Vradis and Dimitris Dalakoglou and many news articles have reported that members in the police force conspicuously disregard or even cooperate with Golden Dawn when they attack immigrants.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, support for Golden Dawn is significantly higher in the police force than among the general population;<sup>24</sup> in some districts one in two police officers voted for Golden Dawn.<sup>25</sup> Akin to Mussolini’s blackshirts, Golden Dawn’s para-state organizations police the streets in all black attire and offer escort services in immigrant-heavy areas.<sup>26</sup> Uniformed Golden Dawn activists implement their idea of vigilante justice by knocking over immigrants’ stands unless they can produce proper selling licenses.<sup>27</sup> Unlike the state, Golden Dawn implements effective measures against illegal immigration and provides additional and personalized security services, which is attractive to Greeks concerned about increasing crime rates in Greece.

Additionally, Golden Dawn has addressed Greece’s unreliable healthcare system

and nonexistent homeless services with regular blood drives and food drives, although Greek identification must be produced to receive any benefits.<sup>28</sup> Basically, Golden Dawn implements a Nazi agenda with Hezbollah tactics.<sup>29</sup> They offer social welfare where the state has clearly failed, which for some makes them more attractive than the neo-liberal platform, which maintains that welfare should decrease. Golden Dawn’s political move of filling otherwise ineffective citizen services partially explains why some Greeks have accepted them as a politically viable option.

The second response of Golden Dawn that helps explain its increase in popularity is its newly formed anti-austerity platform in direct opposition to the EU’s harsh austerity packages imposed in 2012. Greek Socialists recognized this political move: “Golden Dawn clearly understood that allowing the left to monopolize the anti-austerity movement would give it a huge advantage in the battles for hearts and minds”.<sup>30</sup> The Greek party PASOK (Panhellenistic Socialist Movement), which developed in the 1970s out of the previous anti-dictatorship group, lost much of its credibility due to being in power when the economic crisis escalated. Further, PASOK is accused of adopting more centrist values in order to receive loans from the EU.<sup>31</sup> Golden Dawn exploited the public resentment toward PASOK and established their party platform as opposed to any foreign sanctions, which aligns with



*GOLDEN DAWN DEMONSTRATION  
IN ATHENS JUNE 27, 2012.  
THE SIGN READS 'WATCH ME  
DIE FOR GREECE'*

Golden Dawn's nationalistic framework (i.e. "Greece for the Greeks!"). This was a strategic move of the party, which proved attractive for many Greeks discontented with Europe's harsh austerity measures.

Thirdly, Golden Dawn is attractive to some because their immigration policy describes a simplistic and easily understandable solution to Greece's problems. What is the source of Greece's problems? – The immigrants. What should Greece do? – Get them out. As Golden Dawn's MP Ilias Panagiotaros put it, "There are no legal migrants in Greece, not even one".<sup>32</sup> Similar to Hitler's explanation that the main cause of Germany's decline was the Jews,<sup>33</sup> Golden Dawn's perspective is that foreign invasion has caused all of Greece's problems. Golden Dawn gained electoral support by campaigning in areas with high levels of immigrant problems asking the question, "Whose fault is it that there is such extreme poverty, unemployment, criminality, and no hope for the future?"<sup>34</sup> Their propagandist answer is the immigrants, which becomes believable for those living in impoverished areas now abundant with loitering immigrants.

Even for those not drawn to simplistic solutions, Golden Dawn provides an answer. They have addressed one of the country's major issues with a realizable plan, which although racist and harsh, is proactive and more coherent than the Left's idealistic plan of regularizing any and all immigrants. Immigration to Greece has

increased at an unmanageable rate in the past decade due to factors that include increasing unrest in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa; ease of entry through the Greek islands; and poor border security. As a recently turned Golden Dawn supporter put it:

"A lot of us vote for Golden Dawn. I did [...] and I will probably [...] again, because of what the problems are in Greece. Nobody is tackling these problems. Europe is not doing anything about it; the Greek government is trying its best, but not coming up with any real solutions to our problems. So yes, we are actually turning to Golden Dawn for help".<sup>35</sup>

Although Golden Dawn's suggestions are extreme – such as placing land mines along the border between Greece and Turkey – their policy is attractive because it is clear: we will prevent any further illegal immigration into Greece. The increasing level of immigration presents the country with a formidable challenge,<sup>36</sup> and Golden Dawn has offered the first proactive solution, one that leads Greeks of all educational and economic backgrounds to vote for Golden Dawn's racist agenda.

Fourthly, Golden Dawn is attractive to some in the Greek government itself because Golden Dawn's votes increase the government's capacity to suppress the bothersome Left and



THE RIOT  
POLICE  
IN ATHENS  
BLOCK ALL  
ROADS TO  
PARLIAMENT  
DURING  
PROTESTS IN  
2012



expand parliament's power. Golden Dawn's anti-immigration policies lure lawmakers because Golden Dawn supports proactive policies, which assist lawmakers in taking action and implementing their power. Anthropologist Dimitris Dalakoglou explains that Golden Dawn attracts some Greek politicians for dealing with Leftists, who are frequently making problems for the government with strikes and protests. Dalakoglou says to call Golden Dawn extremist is not entirely accurate because its party interests align in many respects with those of the increasingly authoritarian and reactionary government. Speakers at a conference at the University of Athens argued that there is a "systemic use" of Golden Dawn for the Greek government, which is to carry out their dirty work.<sup>37</sup> With the growing distrust of the parties in office during the economic crisis, the government can regain its power by using Golden Dawn to attract votes from those who would not vote for the left. Indeed, the only reason New Democracy managed to form a ruling coalition in the last election was through appealing to the fear of a Golden Dawn takeover. New Democracy absorbed many members of LAOS, the Popular Orthodox Party, the most conservative party in Greece before Golden Dawn, through this tactic.

Illustrating the party politics involved with Golden Dawn's rise, two of Greece's main newspapers recently produced articles on the same day arguing that Golden Dawn provides a

solution to Greece's sharp political divide. The articles label the "two extremes" anarchism and radical Leftism but fail to mention that Golden Dawn itself is extreme.<sup>38</sup> The increasing bias of Greek news venues is telling of the growing authoritarian government in Greece.<sup>39</sup>

Golden Dawn provides the non-liberals a chance to suppress the Left. The extra votes from Golden Dawn MPs give the Greek government the capacity to attack anti-authoritarian groups and to effectively address Greece's undesirable immigrant situation. For example, soon after Golden Dawn became a presence in parliament, the government launched a "fundamentally racist" and "pogrom-styled" police operation for dealing with migrants.<sup>40</sup> Ironically called "Xenios Zeus" after the ancient Greek god of hospitality, the operation has overseen the arrests of 60,000 so-called "invaders"<sup>41</sup> since its inception in August 2012. Despite a public statement from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) addressing Greece's inhumane detention centers for migrants,<sup>42</sup> authorities in Greece continue to hold them in appalling conditions.<sup>43</sup>

Additionally, in January 2013, a transportation strike was suppressed using an emergency law only meant to be used in wartime.<sup>44</sup> Further, as a result of coercive intimidation methods aimed at witnesses and attendees, the government acquitted Golden Dawn MPs in the trials brought against them for the use of violence. In one of his trials, MP

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THAT SYMBOLIZE THE STRENGTH OF  
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*GOLDEN DAWN'S IDEOLOGY  
NEEDS TO BE FUNDAMENTALLY  
COMBATTED, BUT THIS  
PROCESS TAKES TIME, WHICH  
GREECE DOES NOT HAVE*

Kasidiaris made the statement, “We are powerful and soon we’ll be dominant”.<sup>45</sup> Golden Dawn’s proactive policies are an attractive option for those looking to flex Greece’s muscles and sidestep EU mandates for treatment of minorities.<sup>46</sup>

In piecing together how Golden Dawn got into parliament in the first place, it is important to distinguish between their symbolic actions in support of maintaining a Greek identity and their concrete actions taken against foreigners, which have been explicitly racist and violent. It is a fair assessment to say that most Greeks would appreciate the idea of national unity Golden Dawn supports, while being repulsed by their violent methods. Greeks are generally in favor of preserving the essence of “Greekness,” but do not openly embrace Golden Dawn’s systematic and violent campaign against immigrants. However, the question remains: how does Golden Dawn’s popularity continue to grow?

The fifth factor, the real genius of Golden Dawn, has been to disassociate themselves publicly from Neo-Nazism and the open use of violence, which would have been political suicide, and simultaneously to promote an ideology that appeals to Greece’s relatively high level of ethnocentrism. Golden Dawn has emphasized policies that symbolize the strength of the Greek state and downplayed their overtly violent and racist immigration agenda, all the while pushing it forward. For instance, in

response to a recent shooting of foreign workers requesting their wages, Golden Dawn publicly denounced the use of violence, then followed its statement with: “We also condemn those who illegally employ illegal immigrants, taking the bread away from thousands of Greek families” and “All illegal immigrants must be immediately deported”.<sup>47</sup>

Golden Dawn denies that their symbol was taken from the Nazi swastika; rather, they say that their symbol is the ancient Greek meander, which pre-dates Nazism and was used by the Nazis to express their appreciation for ancient Greece. They also say the Nazi one arm salute, which the party has purportedly used several times,<sup>48</sup> was originally an ancient Greek greeting.<sup>49</sup> These explanations are satisfactory to many Greeks, who have been inculcated by the mainstream school curriculum’s glorification of Greece’s past.<sup>50</sup> With these methods, Golden Dawn denies connections between the party and Nazism, although it was discovered in the recent raids on Golden Dawn MP’s homes that their houses are littered with Nazi relics and propaganda.<sup>51</sup>

By implementing policies that appeal to Greece’s ethnocentrism – such as educating children in Greece’s rich history, maintaining Greece’s independence by opposing austerity measures, opposing corruption in the government linked to foreign powers, improving and expanding social welfare programs, applying more stringent immigration policies, etc. – they

have gained the wherewithal to push forward their xenophobic agenda. They have gained support by covering their blatant racism with a “Let’s save Greece” guise. For instance, in April 2013, Golden Dawn members led by MP Koukoutsis entered hospitals under the pretense of goodwill missions, which in reality were forceful raids to check the papers of foreign nurses (“hospital raid”). New supporters of Golden Dawn are not all racist supporters of the use of violence; rather, some accept their claimed disassociation from Nazism and see Golden Dawn as the country’s last hope. Greek lawmaker Stathis Boukouros explains, “If some kid decides to wear a Golden Dawn T-shirt and beat up a Pakistani, that’s not our fault. We didn’t order him to do it”.<sup>52</sup> The Greek nation is threatened, and some are willing to disregard the less than desirable actions associated with a political party if the party appears to be their only lifeline.

These are the causes for Golden Dawn’s rise in political influence in Greece. In short, Golden Dawn conspicuously fills inefficient state-run services; they ran on an anti-austerity platform during a time of unforgiving European intervention; they provide a simplistic and accessible answer for the cause and solution to Greece’s complex problems; their votes provide increased power for Greek lawmakers; and they appeal to Greece’s ethnocentric tendencies while strategically disassociating themselves from open acts of violence. For these reasons among others, Golden Dawn has gained popularity in Greece and continues to expand its influence.

While the root of Golden Dawn’s appeal is in their Greek-centered ideology, it is the specific tactics used to spread this ideology that facilitates their success. Golden Dawn’s ideology certainly needs to be fundamentally combated, but this process takes time, something Greece does not have. The economic and social situation in Greece is dire and will worsen if Golden Dawn implements its racist agenda further. It is essential that the opposing parties to Golden Dawn respond directly to the tactics Golden Dawn has used to gain power. Alongside the overarching aim of working toward economic recovery, in order to defeat Golden Dawn, a

party or coalition of parties in Greece should be aimed at the following: making Greece’s state services more effective, directly addressing the issue of corruption in the government, seeking less stringent austerity measures for the Greek people and most importantly, developing a coherent, more humane plan for dealing with immigration. A party focused on these actions will demonstrate that its primary aim is to preserve the Greek people and thus will cut off Golden Dawn’s political lifeline. Rather than simply denouncing Golden Dawn’s actions, thus far their opposition’s only strategy, they need to take action themselves. Without a swift response to Golden Dawn’s political strategies Greece and the European Union face the grave threat that Golden Dawn’s ultra-nationalist, neo-fascist ideology will continue to permeate Greeks’ minds and hearts, and as we have seen, their votes.

*Editor’s Note: In August 2013, after completion of this essay, a Golden Dawn member was charged with the fatal stabbing of prominent leftist rapper, Pavlos Fyssas. Fyssas’s death prompted a crackdown on the party from the Greek government, which included the arrest of Golden Dawn founder and leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos on grounds of being the head of a criminal gang. 15 other Golden Dawn members, including 5 members of Parliament, were arrested, the party was excluded from state funding, and investigations sought to expose police collaboration with the party. That it took the public murder of a Greek celebrity to inspire the government into action illuminates the unsettling political landscape of the Greek state in crisis.*

# POWER, RELIGION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN  
ABOLITIONIST TURKEY & RETENTIONIST IRAN

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Turkey and Iran are both predominately Muslim-populated countries with a history of powerful political leaders who have shaped their societal values and perceptions towards capital punishment. Until the 1920s both countries employed a fairly punitive policy with regards to capital punishment. However, with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Ataturk Mustafa Kemal finally achieved Turkish independence, which started Turkey on the road towards Westernization and secularism. Similarly in 1926, Reza Khan deposed an age old monarchy in Iran and followed the Kemalist ideology to lay the foundations for a modern Westernized state. This parallel existence continued until 1979 when the Iranian Revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, toppled Reza Khan's dynasty and the efforts for modernization were turned towards more conservative ideals derived from Islamic Sharia law. Despite the divergence, powerful political leaders utilized the same tools of religion and social control to achieve Westernization and secularism in Turkey, and Islamization and the adoption of Sharia law in Iran. Due to these differing paths, Turkey has been able to abolish the death penalty in its attempt to gain acceptance as a "civil" member of the Western world, while Iran's Islamic regime continues to have the world's second largest number of annual executions in the name of religion, which go unchallenged by a controlled society. This comparison allows us to see the impact of the relationship between

religion and society on the process of state formation and explains how two predominately Muslim countries constructed such different perceptions and policies of capital punishment. There are two different lenses through which capital punishment is viewed: as a technology of power for the state and as a reflection of the state's morality with an emphasis on particular religious and secular values. Ultimately the present paper seeks to examine how political leaders' technologies of power impacted the social ideology and culture of a country that in turn influenced their participation, or lack thereof, in capital punishment. In order to understand the base from whence these technologies operated, it is important to first outline the relevant histories of both countries.

Upon achieving victory in the Turkish War of Independence in 1923, Ataturk Mustafa Kemal established a secular Turkish Republic and sought to enforce a model for modernity derived directly from the West. Ultimately, he "abolished the caliphate, banned *sufi* orders, nationalized religious endowments, closed down Islamic courts and incorporated the Italian Penal Code".<sup>1</sup> One essential parameter of Westernization was abolishing the death penalty, which was last used in 1984, but not officially abolished until 2004. Turkey had a keen interest in the official abolition of the death penalty because it was one of the requirements for countries seeking membership in the European Union. Consequently, Turkey, along with Alba-

HOW DID POLITICAL LEADERS' TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER IMPACT THE SOCIAL IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE OF A COUNTRY THAT IN TURN INFLUENCED THEIR PARTICIPATION, OR LACK THEREOF, IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?



MUSTAFA KEMAL (FACING) AND ABDULLAH I OF JORDAN IN 1937

nia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, is one of the few Muslim countries in the Council of Europe able to abolish capital punishment despite a history of civil strife and extrajudicial violence.<sup>2</sup>

Prior to abolition and contrary to the Iranian emphasis on Sharia law, capital punishment in Turkey historically targeted political leaders deposed by military intervention. Duly, whenever the Turkish military felt that “stability or principles of Kemalism [were] threatened...it stepped into the political process to restore order and uphold the constitution”.<sup>3</sup> Following military coups, Turkish regimes used capital punishment to systematically eliminate members of the opposition. Turkey experienced three such major military interventions and executed

the central political actors in each one. After the 1960 coup d'état, former-Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and former-Minister of Labor and Finance Hasan Polatkan were executed; after the 1971 coup d'état, student leaders Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan; and after the 1980 coup d'état, a total of 50 men were killed, 27 of whom were politicians. Despite Turkish governments' willingness to use capital punishment as a direct response to military takeovers, the civil regime parliament became increasingly reluctant to carry out capital punishment during the 1962-2000 period.<sup>4</sup> There was a general decline in executions beginning in the 1940s, and the decline “might have gone further if the first coup d'état [in 1960], which resulted in a *de facto* regime, had not occurred”.<sup>5</sup> A total of 112 prisoners were executed between 1962-2000, but executions clustered around changes of regime with no executions performed during 28 of those 39 years. The 1920 Kemalist ideology thus created secularism and a push for Westernization, which was followed by a decline in executions and eventually led to official abolishment of capital punishment in 2004.

Iran followed Turkey in a similar path towards Westernization when Reza Khan became Shah in 1926 and took control of the country in the wake of World War I. Reza Shah modeled his policies after those of Atatürk Kemal, and used the “New Order” of Benito Mussolini to rationalize his belief that the nation had to be led by a powerful leader in order to



REZA KHAN (LEFT) IN 1962 WITH JFK AND ROBERT MCNAMARA

WITHOUT THE 1979  
REVOLUTION'S INTERRUPTION  
OF SECULARIZATION IRAN  
WOULD HAVE FACED THE SAME  
INCENTIVES FOR ABOLITION AS  
TURKEY AND LIKELY REACHED A  
SIMILAR OUTCOME



PROTESTERS HOLD UP IMAGES OF AYATOLLAH  
KHOMEINI DURING THE 1979 REVOLUTION

achieve “national consolidation, economic development and Westernization”.<sup>6</sup> He advocated the rejection of Islam in representing nationalist ideology, which was a more difficult task in Iran since the *ulama*<sup>7</sup> were involved “in a broader range of activities...and more interwoven with the rest of society” than their counterparts in Turkey.<sup>8</sup> Subsequently, Reza Shah tried to dismantle the practice of Sharia law and instead “introduce the French civil code and the Italian penal code”.<sup>9</sup> As a result he faced strong opposition, which eventually led to the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 where Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came into power and established an Islamic republic state based on Sharia law. Although the early stages of Westernization in Iran did not immediately reduce capital punishment, without the 1979 revolution’s interruption of secularization the country would have faced the same incentives for abolition as Turkey and likely reached a similar outcome.

Following the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini “constantly underline[d] the need to scarp Western-inspired legislation and return to Islamic laws”, which were officially enacted to the penal code in 1982. “Sharia courts [took] over most criminal cases...with a *mullah*<sup>10</sup> to each bench”,<sup>11</sup> and decisions made in these Sharia courts were final and not subject to appeal.<sup>12</sup> Capital punishment became increasingly prominent after the revolution as the “new government of the Islamic Republic, whose leaders had previously sided with criticisms of the

Shah’s human rights record, launched a wave of executions”.<sup>13</sup> Although political prisoners had been executed in the hundreds between 1971 and 1979, more than 7,900 were executed between 1981 and 1985. A total of 2,616 executions were performed in 1981 alone, including a significant number of juveniles and women.<sup>14</sup> Islamic criminal law was used “as a tool to establish an Islamic regime and to suppress all opposition to it” through appointment of *mullahs* instead of legal experts. The creation of Islamic revolutionary courts produced speedy rulings and harsh public executions.<sup>15</sup> Today, capital crimes in Iran include the following: armed robbery, treason, murder, drug trafficking, rape, pedophilia, sodomy, kidnapping, and terrorism.<sup>16</sup> Emile Durkheim posited that crimes are a reaffirmation of social values because crimes are defined in accordance to the collective conscious,<sup>17</sup> and Iran’s penal code after the Revolution, with religiously prohibited activities now considered capital crimes, is an illustration of that.

For example, sodomy, if consensual, would not be considered a heinous crime in a Western secular country because it does not cause harm to others. However, in Iran a different relationship between religion and society persists and sodomy is consequently considered a *fasaad di al-ardh*<sup>18</sup> crime under Islam, punishable by death. The continued use of capital punishment to reinforce religious values is illustrated by Iran’s September 2011 execution

BY CONSTRUCTING THE DEATH  
PENALTY AS A PRACTICE ALLOWED  
BY ISLAM, ANYONE WHO QUES-  
TIONS ITS VALIDITY WOULD BE  
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GION AS A WHOLE

THE CREATION OF  
ISLAMIC  
REVOLUTIONARY  
COURTS PRODUCED  
SPEEDY RULINGS AND  
HARSH PUBLIC  
EXECUTIONS



IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER AMIR  
ABBAS HOVEYDA, EXECUTED APRIL  
7, 1979

of three men found guilty of charges related to homosexuality.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast, a Durkheimian interpretation of Turkey's penal code reveals the influence of Kemalist thought in its inclination towards secularism and Westernization. While Iran expressed religious values in their tailored use and execution of capital sentences, Turkey embodied secular and westernized ideals which created a new nationalist identity that did not condone the use of capital punishment. This new Turkish identity was reflected in the work of sociologist and poet Memet Ziya. Ziya played an essential role in the Kemalist movement, intentionally crafting an ideology capable of replacing religion. Ziya's work stressed that organic integrity, 'the cultural and intellectual unity of Turkish so-

ciety',<sup>20</sup> would "successfully repudiate all external connection and disposes of Ottamanism and pan-Turkism, as well as of pan-Islam".<sup>21</sup> This unified nationalist culture successfully created a new, non-religious foundation for Turkish patriotism and facilitated Turkey's move away from capital punishment.

On the other hand, Iran maintained a penal code inseparable from religious values and a positive view of capital punishment's utility. Iran's use of the death penalty is justified by its interpretation of a Quran verse: "The only reward of those who make war upon God and His messenger and strive after corruption in the land will be killed or crucified..." (5:33). By constructing the death penalty as a practice allowed by Islam, anyone who questions its validity would be seen as questioning the religion as a whole. Because citizens do not want to be seen as the outlier in a country that defines its identity by religion, the state's justification of the death penalty is rarely challenged. Generally when Islamic political organizations come to power, modification of the criminal system is the primary step taken to maintain power.<sup>22</sup> These political organizations have an interest in continuing and expanding capital punishment because the severity of the punishment forces compliance with rules they incorporate into the criminal justice system – whether it is suppressing homosexuality or drug trafficking.

The path toward abolition began in Turkey through state formation processes under

*AYATOLLAH KHOMENI ... BUILT A  
RETENTIONIST COUNTRY THAT IS ABLE TO USE  
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF ITS UN-  
QUESTIONABLE RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATION*

*WHEN ISLAMIC POLITICAL  
ORGANIZATIONS COME TO POWER,  
MODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL  
SYSTEM IS THE PRIMARY STEP  
TAKEN TO MAINTAIN POWER*

Ataturk Mustafa Kemal that involved an emphasis on secularism and Westernization. Even when Turkey had the death penalty before 2004, it was predominately used for military purposes as opposed to civil crimes. The Kemalist devotion to creating a new Turkish national identity modeled after Western civilization further confirms that religion was not a primary driving force for state rule. Due to Mustafa Kemal's efforts in the early 1920s, subsequent political leaders reinforced a Western culture in Turkey, thereby creating a snowball effect towards further Westernization. This campaign ultimately led to the abolition of capital punishment as Turkey sought acceptance into the secular organizations of Western Europe. In contrast, Ayatollah Khomeini's movement towards Islamiza-

tion of the state built a retentionist country that is able to use capital punishment because of its unquestionable religious justification. This analysis of the divergent historical paths towards abolition of the death penalty in Turkey and its retention in Iran indicates the powerful effect strong political leaders have on a country's cultural norms, and how those norms are expressed in the penal code, especially in the perception of capital crimes. Thus, decisions made during periods of state formation about social ideologies and the role of religion in society shape cultural ideals that reaffirm or delegitimize the country's existing penal system., and ultimately influence states' use of capital punishment.



*THE TOPPLING  
OF THE  
MONARCHY IN  
1979 LEFT IRAN  
VULNERABLE  
TO THE  
IMPLEMENTATION  
OF CAPITAL  
PUNISHMENT,  
JUSTIFIED  
UNDER SHARIA  
LAW*



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<sup>6</sup>Nye, Future 52

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<sup>11</sup>Kondo 193

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<sup>13</sup>Vuving 8

<sup>14</sup>Vuving 9

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<sup>18</sup>Lee 216  
<sup>19</sup>Lankov 84  
<sup>20</sup>Rhyu 160  
<sup>21</sup>Zook 173  
<sup>22</sup>Wha-Lee 20  
<sup>23</sup>Lankov 90-91  
<sup>24</sup>Cha 443, 187  
<sup>25</sup>Shambaugh 45  
<sup>26</sup>Snyder 28  
<sup>27</sup>Snyder 24

## Endnotes

<sup>i</sup> CIA World Factbook. Korea, South

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>

<sup>ii</sup> For a brief discussion of the term, and clarifications, see, Joseph. S. Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy* 1 Feb. 2006.

<sup>iii</sup> “Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya.” *New York Times*

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<sup>iv</sup> For more description of the concepts, see Vuving, A. “How Soft Power Works,” pp. 9-12

<sup>v</sup> For a thorough description of China’s economic success and appeal to other states, see Chapter 5 in *Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World* By Joshua Kurlantzick.

<sup>vi</sup> For K-pop popularity in Latin American, see “K-pop craze boosts Korea’s public diplomacy” by Shin Hyon-hee. <http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20130128-398379.html>

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<sup>vii</sup> “A rising Korean wave: If Seoul sells it, China craves it.” *New York Times* by Norimitsu Onishi

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<http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/02/22/south-korea%E2%80%99s-haiti-soft-power/>

<sup>ix</sup> For more interesting data about economic spending on public diplomacy in Asia, see “The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional Competition” in *Asian Security* by Ian Hall and Frank Smith.

<sup>x</sup> For a detailed discussion of the popularity of the Korean wave, see “The Korean Wave: The Transnational Cultural Flows in Northeast Asia” by Jung-Sun Park in *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*. Eds. Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman Samuel Kim, and Stephen Kotkin.

<sup>xi</sup> The Chaebols are the large conglomerate firms, usually family-controlled, with strong ties to the government. The chaebol companies are characterized by vast bureaucracies and hierarchies, influenced by Confucian culture.

<sup>xii</sup> See pp. 7-11 in “Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture” by Young Whan Kihl

- <sup>xiii</sup> See page 94 in “The Two Koreas in Northeast Asia: linkages between domestic, inter-Korean, and regional politics” by Yong-Pyo Hong in *Regional Cooperation and its Enemies in Northeast Asia: The Impact of Domestic Forces*.
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- <sup>xxiii</sup> “Bank of China closes account of key North Korean bank” in *Reuters* <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-korea-north-china-bank-idUSBRE9460CX20130507>
- <sup>xxiv</sup> See “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing For the Long Term.” in *The Washington Quarterly* by David Shambaugh.
- <sup>xxv</sup> See Jae Ho Chung “Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States” pp. 53-54
- <sup>xxvi</sup> See “The China-North Korea Relationship” in *Council on Foreign Relations* by Jayshree Bajoria. October 7, 2010

## INDIA AND NIGERIA

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<sup>3</sup>Paris, 170-71

<sup>4</sup>Chandra, 239

<sup>5</sup>Iheduru, 542

<sup>6</sup>Sil, 369

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<sup>8</sup>Iheduru, 536

<sup>9</sup>Sil, 372

<sup>10</sup>Sil, 371

<sup>11</sup>Iheduru, 542

<sup>12</sup>Iheduru, 538

<sup>13</sup>Sil, 374; Iheduru, 539

<sup>14</sup>Sil, 373

<sup>15</sup>Sil, 369

<sup>16</sup>Iheduru, 537

<sup>17</sup>Iheduru, 539

<sup>18</sup> Sil 372

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<sup>20</sup>Iheduru, 536

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- <sup>24</sup>Sil, 372  
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<sup>28</sup>Sil, 376  
<sup>29</sup>Sil, 376-67  
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<sup>38</sup>Iheduru, 550  
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<sup>42</sup>Sil, 379  
<sup>43</sup>Sil, 388  
<sup>44</sup>Sil, 355  
<sup>45</sup>ibid.  
<sup>46</sup>Moses  
<sup>47</sup>Faul  
<sup>48</sup>Faul  
<sup>49</sup>Faul  
<sup>50</sup>Iheduru, 551-3  
<sup>51</sup>Iheduru, 559  
<sup>52</sup>Smith  
<sup>53</sup>moneycontrol.com  
<sup>54</sup>Maiduguri  
<sup>55</sup>Maiduguri

## Endnotes

<sup>i</sup> In so doing, I rely heavily on two comparable assessments of India and Nigeria, written for the same Cambridge textbook: Rudra Sil's study "India" and Okechukwu Iheduru's "Nigeria" in *Comparative Politics*, edited by J. Kapstein and M. Lichbach, published by the Cambridge University Press, 2008.

<sup>ii</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset is the standard reference for the term "cross-cutting cleavages" in the political science context. See Lipset's *Political Man* for an in-depth discussion of the relationship between cross-cutting cleavages and political stability.

<sup>iii</sup> This "overlapping" cleavages structure has also been described in the literature as "reinforcing cleavages" (see, for example, Newton and van Deth, 181) and "cumulative cleavages" (see Paris, 171).

<sup>iv</sup> Kashmir is an exception, because the regional, linguistic, and religious boundaries do indeed overlap: the region of Kashmir is comprised of a majority-Muslim population speaking Kashmiri. Kashmir does indeed pose a secessionist threat (Tremblay, 924-950); still, this possibility does not pose a serious threat to the overall stability of the nation at large.

<sup>v</sup> Scholar Rudra Sil explains how early "periods of dynastic rule contributed to the flowering of a recognizable Hindu culture throughout much of the Indian subcontinent." Similarly, "the formation

of progressively larger empires from the fourth century B.C. onward” led to “an increasingly recognizable set of religious beliefs and practices... across the Indian subcontinent” (Sil, 370).

<sup>v</sup>Indeed, Sil notes that “the centuries-old civilization that had evolved and spread through most of the Indian subcontinent well before the establishment of British colonial rule...[gave] India’s future leaders more of a foundation for building a modern nation-state” (Sil, 372-73).

<sup>vii</sup>Three major parties emerged, each representing one of the three major tribal groups: the Northern People’s Congress was largely Hasau-Falani, the Action Group was Yoruba, and the National Council represented Ibo interests. Minority groups also formed separate political parties. (Iheduru, 543-4).

<sup>viii</sup>Secularism has endured in India since its independence. This has remained true even despite the formidable presence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party whose roots extend all the way to the post-independence period (though it was not formally known as such at that time) and that was strongest in the 1990s (Sil, 374, 376). For, even at its height in the 1990s, the BJP’s share of the vote never exceeded the total share held by India’s Congress Party and other parties committed to secularism (Sil 376).

<sup>ix</sup>See, for example, the article by Jinyong Lee, et. al, “Korean Economic Growth and Marketing Practice Progress: A Role Model for Economic Growth of Developing Countries.”

<sup>x</sup>Lack of trust of elected officials has been demonstrated time and again in Nigeria via frequent coups and political unrest. It has been recently evidenced by the violence following the presidential election of Goodluck Jonathon, which some have likened to the unrest that led up to the Biafra War (BBC News).

<sup>xi</sup>Nigerian journalist Adisa Adeleye offers some criticisms and suggestions in her articles published in one of Nigeria’s leading newspapers (Adeleye).

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US PIVOT TO ASIA

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## FROM FIGHTING NAZIS TO ELECTING NAZIS

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<sup>17</sup>Emile Durkheim's theory that a set of shared beliefs, ideas and moral attitudes operate as a unifying force within society

<sup>18</sup>Crimes that "spread mischief in the land", including treason, terrorism, rape, adultery and homosexual behavior

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