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PRESIDENTS' LETTER

Lucas Png
Cornell University
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Thank you for picking up a copy of our latest issue. CIAR is grateful for your support! Our club has grown with an influx of freshmen and new members, and at the end of this current year, we will be passing the torch to the next Executive Board, to continue CIAR's mission of stimulating discussion about international affairs at Cornell and beyond.

The Journal is as stunning as ever. By no means a quick read, it provides insightful and thought provoking analysis of important issues at hand. I am grateful to have had the honor of working alongside Jessie and her impressive undergraduate and graduate editors.

The Diplomacist has continued to prosper with Demetri at its helm. Together with a dedicated team of undergraduate writers and editors that spans colleges and countries, they provide timely and relevant commentary on world events. Through the Diplomacist, CIAR has continued to expand its podcast series, with invigorating discussions about topics such as the ongoing European Refugee Crisis and Issues related to Cybersecurity.

In partnership with many professors, the Programming Board has managed to put an impressive series of events, including a panel on the Iran Nuclear Deal and a panel on the ongoing European Refugee Crisis. We are grateful for the continued support of our advisor, Dr Heike Michelsen. We have also continued to work closely with departments, institutes and groups on campus that have similar objectives, including the Einaudi Center, the Cornell Institute for European Studies and CIAS.

I am definitely sad to see my tenure as President of this wonderful organization come to an end, but I am grateful for the opportunity to have served and seen the club grow. I hope you enjoy reading the journal as much as I did!

EDITORIAL LETTER

Jessie Weber
Cornell University
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Editor In Chief, CIAR

Reflecting on my time with the journal, I find that there are many people I am thankful to. I have received support and encouragement from countless sources, including CIAR members, the Einaudi Center, our alumni, and interested peers. My undergraduate and graduate teams have poured many hours of work into refining each piece. Devang Davesh Dave is responsible for the beautiful cover on this issue. Chad O'Shea and his coworkers at Cornell Printing Services always provide impeccable work on a tight schedule so that you can hold this journal in your hands today. Terry Ector and the other members of SAFC grant us the funds to print, and Ryan Bisaillon coordinates all financial endeavors associated with this publication.

There is much that is exciting in this issue, but nothing can be said about what fills these pages so much as the pieces themselves. Each is a testament to its author's dedication and to the expertise of our editors. To the authors, I thank you for your continued pursuit of knowledge and understanding in the world around us, and for your dogged pursuit of perfection through revision. To those who submitted without being published in this issue, thank you for granting our entire team the chance to see what makes you passionate about world affairs.

Finally, to echo Lucas, I thank you for choosing to read this issue. I highly encourage you to continue turning the pages and exploring—you may be surprised by what you learn.

This issue is dedicated to the other two Musketeers and to the other two members of the Triumvirate, who have shaped my time here immeasurably.

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Terrorism and the Infinite Bargaining Model

Alexander Farrow is an undergraduate at Harvard University, concerntrating in Government with a focus on national security.



FROM THE Ku Klux Klan's lynchings to al Qaeda's World Trade Center attacks, terrorist organizations have historically exploited fear and destruction to achieve their end goals. Attacking both a nation's government and population, terrorist organizations inflict damage on their intended audiences, or *targets*.[1] This paper explores how terrorist organizations interact with their targets. In my analysis, I assume complete rationality and build an infinite bargaining model of political concession between both actors. I claim that terrorist organizations bargain with targets in the long run by increasing the payoffs for cooperation and decreasing the payoffs for noncooperation.

Rational Bargaining

Terrorism refers to the "the unlawful use of force of violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives".[2] I define a terrorist organization, therefore, as an organization that uses terrorism to achieve its objectives.

Relevant scholarly literature establishes that terrorist organizations often bargain with the group from which they desire political concessions—the classic bargaining model of terrorism.[3] Furthermore, they manipulate the target's utility function in order to coerce concessions from the target.[4] Specific goals—regime change, territorial control, policy change, social influence, and/or status quo—motivate terrorist organizations to manipulate the political sphere.[5] Hezbollah, for example, seeks to evict Israel from Lebanon (territorial control) and establish a Palestinian Islamic state (regime change). Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to diminish US influence (policy control) and establish an Iraqi state (regime change).

However, the main counterargument to the bargaining model is that these uses of force sometimes result in *no* political concessions. "A major puzzle for the model, then, is that although terrorism is by definition scary and destructive, organizations rarely if ever attain their policy demands by targeting civilians".[6] Not only can attacks sometimes yield zero political gains, but they may also cause the target to vehemently oppose conceding to the terrorist organization. The Irish Republican Army's attack on the public, for example, rekindled British commitment to imperialism. The ISIL beheadings of journalists, such as James Foley, undoubtedly redoubled American commitment to airstrikes.[7]

My claim is that an *infinite* bargaining model better illustrates rational bargaining. Terrorist organizations not only bargain for immediate concessions, but also increase their capacity

The Hezbollah flag flies in a street.

In a finite game there is an incentive for each actor to be noncooperative...an infinite bargaining model explains mutual cooperation as a sub-game Nash equilibrium.

to bargain for future concessions by coercing long-term cooperation with their targets. In the following sections, I will outline the conditions for infinite bargaining and clarify how terrorist organizations increase payoffs for cooperation and decrease payoffs for noncooperation.

The Infinite Bargaining Model

In this model, the terrorist organization and the target have two strategies: to cooperate *(c)* or not *($\bar{c}$)* with one another. By cooperating, I refer to the act of conceding to the other actor's specific end goal. Note also that the strategy set is (target strategy, terrorist strategy). The two actors play a bargaining game similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma because *(c,c)* yields mutual political gains, *($\bar{c}$,$\bar{c}$)* yields lowered political gains, and any deviation yields increased political gains for one actor and none for the other. *($\bar{c}$,c)* is not efficient, as the terrorist organization cannot achieve end goals when the target does not concede. *(c,$\bar{c}$)* is not as efficient, as the target cannot cheaply sustain its end goals when the terrorist organization does not concede. The only way that both actors receive significant political concessions, therefore, is to cooperate with one another, *(c,c)*. However, in a finite game, there is an incentive for each actor to be noncooperative, resulting in Nash equilibrium at *($\bar{c}$,$\bar{c}$)*.

As I will illustrate, an infinite bargaining model explains mutual cooperation as a sub-game Nash equilibrium. The necessary preconditions for this model are (1) the game is played an infinite amount of times and (2) the players value future payoffs.[8] The first condition for cooperation is the initiation of an infinite game. Historically, terrorist organizations initiate an infinite game by signaling their commitment to longevity. Abrahms, for example, outlines that terrorist organizations "survive for decades, notwithstanding their political futility".[9] Even organizations that attain large political concessions do not necessarily disband. Hezbollah, for example, continues to thrive even after successfully liberating southern Lebanon (2000) with guerrilla attacks on Israeli Defense Forces. Other terrorist organizations, such as the Red Army Faction in Germany, even dynamically morph their political objectives after exhausting a conflict.[10] And even if they attain their immediate goals, terrorist organizations prolong their activities in order to push the game into infinite play.

The next condition for infinite play is weighted value for future utility. I define *d* as the discount factor, or a variable determining how much preference an actor gives to future payoffs *($0 < d < 1$)*. A higher *d* indicates more preference to future utility. Terrorist

organizations, therefore, must establish a condition for which cooperation for infinity yields more utility to the target than deviating for one period and acting at Nash equilibrium for every period after that. The condition is modeled with the following utility inequality for the target:

$$U(\text{cooperation in infinity}) > U(\text{initial deviation}) + U(\text{Nash equilibrium in infinity})$$

$$U(c,c) + U(c,c)d + U(c,c)d^2 + U(c,c)d^3 + \ldots = U(c,c) + U(c,c)d + U(c,c)d^2 + U(c,c)d^3 \ldots$$

$$\frac{U(c,c)}{1-d} > U(\tilde{c},c) + d\left[\frac{U(\tilde{c},\tilde{c})}{1-d}\right], \text{given } 0 < d < 1$$

If the above condition holds true, a target will value cooperating at the grim-trigger strategy of *(c,c)* over infinite noncooperation. There are a variety of historical examples in which this has played out, including the withdrawal of US forces in Lebanon after the attacks on the Marine barracks in Beirut and the Philippine withdrawal of troops after a kidnapping.[11] Furthermore, more than half of all suicide bombings result in some political concessions by the target.[12] Some organizations even maintain enduring relationships with "high level" leadership in the target, resulting in continued gains. For example, Hamas and Iran form a sort of long-term strategic alliance, exchanging political leverage in Palestine for funding.[13] Whether terrorist organizations secure catalytic temporary gains or cooperative long-term gains, they can coerce a target to cooperation.

Payoffs for Mutual Cooperation

In order to maintain long-term bargaining capacity, terrorist organizations increase targets' payoffs for mutual cooperation, *U(c,c)*. Terrorist organizations can do this by providing support and resources to the target in four distinct areas: politics, economics, society, and ideology.[14] In terms of providing political utility, terrorists can provide a number of resources, including security and political leverage. Hezbollah is a prime example of a terrorist organization that provides political leverage to Iran. Because Hezbollah and Iran share common sentiment about the political sphere of the Middle East, Hezbollah acts as Iran's asymmetric political puppet in regions like Lebanon in exchange for Iranian resources, funding, and support.[15]

Terrorist organizations also provide economic incentives for cooperation. Establishing social welfare programs, funding political parties, and stimulating the target's economy are all ways that these organizations can manipulate economic incentives. Hamas, for example, spends $50-70 million a year on social services in Palestine in order to bolster support.[16] This subsidiary Islamic NGO, therefore, distributes "money, clothes, and food" to the target's population.[17] Because Gaza's unemployment rate hovers around 50% and Israel blockades international humanitarian relief, the population covets these social services. Hamas, therefore, attempts to buy off the population's support with increased economic utility. Consequently, the Palestinian population has increased its support of Hamas.

Additionally, terrorist organizations manipulate social incentives through familial ties and friendship networks. Psychological analysis suggests that some terrorists join these organizations "to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists"; these organizations provide a bond of solidarity to "unmarried young men or widowed women who were not gainfully employed prior to joining".[18] Furthermore, having a friend or relative in a group, like al-Qaeda or Hezbollah, heavily influences a recruit's decision to join that organization. In other words, recruits join because they desire the familial affirmation and social network that the organization provides. Terrorism, in this way, is a social activity.

There is an incentive for media outlets to grossly exaggerate the costs of terrorist attacks...modern "soft news" publicizes these events to a larger audience.

Ideological utility also factors into the way that terrorist organizations manipulate the targets' payoffs for cooperation. Intergroup bias, influenced by variables like ethnicity and beliefs, shapes support.[19] Similarly, support is particularly high in regions where mutual cultural affinity is high.[20] A terrorist organization can achieve cultural affinity by establishing an ideological link between its goals and society's preferences. An example of this concept is the Islamic link between organizations like al-Qaeda and their target populations.[21] While al-Qaeda's conception of jihad is not reflective of Islam as a whole, it relies on extremist tenets of the religion in order to justify political action. By doing so, the organization can establish similarities with potential recruits and boost its chances of attaining cultural legitimacy in Islamic regions.

Payoffs for Noncooperation

The terrorist organization also decreases the target's payoff for noncooperation, $U(\bar{c},c)$. The physical impact of a terrorist attack is usually minimal compared to other attacks like chemical, biological, nuclear, or conventional warfare.[22] However, the physical damage from a terrorist attack is not the sole manipulator. Rather, *fear* is the mechanism through which attacks significantly impact the target.[23] Consider, for example, the psychological effects on the American public after Oklahoma City bombings; the public perceived terrorism as a higher security risk after the attack.[24] Some individuals even experienced symptoms of PTSD after watching attacks like 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombings on television.[25] Terrorism, in that sense, works through the medium of fear in order to inflict costs.

Media can act as a cost multiplier because it disperses fear throughout the target's population. Media assessments of risk are based on the desire to sell drama to consumers.[26] Therefore, there is an incentive for media outlets to grossly exaggerate the costs of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, modern "soft news" publicizes these events to a larger audience.[27] It is important, of course, to consider the effects that the target's framing, priming, and indexing have on the quality of coverage, as biases in rhetoric may skew the media multiplier.[28] All of these variables, linked with media coverage, affect to what extent the terrorist organization can disseminate fear through costly action.

Now that I have clearly outlined the mechanism with which terrorism coerces its target, I will illuminate how terrorist organizations' strategies of attrition and intimidation can manipulate costs through fear.[29] The attrition strategy is intended "to persuade the enemy [target] that the group is strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs, so that the enemy yields to the terrorists' demands".[30] Attacks by Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel during the second Intifada correspond with this tactic, as the organizations sought to increase the human costs associated with noncooperation. Therefore, terrorist organizations pursuing the attrition strategy propagate the fear that the costs of a policy will outweigh the benefits in the long run.

The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building after being targeted by the Oklahoma City bombers.

Intimidation also acts as a deterrent by threatening future costs if the target deviates from cooperation.[31] A terrorist organization signals credibility and capacity to impose future costs with (1) violence and (2) charged rhetoric. As Criado illustrates, "violence can be a sign of the terrorist group's strength, and therefore, its bargaining position with the government".[32] An increase in violence symbolizes commitment and credibility. Suicide terrorism, for example, is one of the more aggressive tactics in a terrorist's arsenal because it signals to the target that the issue is more important than the terrorist's life.[33] The conditions around suicide terrorism can be manipulated to portray an "act of martyrdom", adding credibility to the act by attributing it to an ongoing political campaign.

Charged rhetoric intimidates the target by signaling continued potential for future attacks. Renewed threats can demonstrate the organization's commitment to existence. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, recently declared a renewed offensive for the spring of 2015.[34] In this way, the Taliban demonstrated their continued commitment to imposing their ideal political world. Furthermore, delegitimizing the target bolsters perceived moral dominance. Osama bin Laden's scathingly charged that US concessions after the Beirut attack illustrated a US lack of courage.[35] In this way, bin Laden sought to demonstrate moral superiority in order to inflate his organization's end-goal of dominating the US. Both of these tactics are ways that the terrorist organization convinces the target that punishment follows deviation.

Susceptibility to Imposed Costs

$$\frac{U(c,c)}{1-d} > U(\bar{c},c) + d\left[\frac{U(\bar{c},\bar{c})}{1-d}\right]$$

Simplifies to

$$U(c,c) > (1-d)[U(\bar{c},c)] + d[U(\bar{c},\bar{c})]$$

In the simplified inequality, we can see that $U(\bar{c},\bar{c})$ is weighted by d *(given* $0 < d < 1$*)*. By solely analyzing the expression $d[U(\bar{c},\bar{c})]$, we can determine how d will affect the magnitude of a given change in the costs of not cooperating. Let us assume that the terrorist organization decreases the target's payoffs for noncooperation, $U(\bar{c},\bar{c})$. The decrease in utility will be weighted more in the inequality if d is a higher value. Recall that d is the discount factor, or amount that the target values future payoffs (as d approaches *1.0*, the target appreciates future payoffs more). Therefore, changes in the target's payoff for noncooperation create more of an impact on the target that values long-term payoffs; fear hurts more when you care about the future.[i]

Walter illustrates that more democratic

The costs imposed by terrorist organizations affect democratic targets more significantly than they affect authoritarian targets.

targets, in fact, value long-term payoffs more; therefore, they cannot as easily shoulder the costs of terrorist attacks. Free media, competing to dramatize impactful terrorist attacks, disperses the fear amongst the population, resulting in the people "demand[ing] an end to the attacks".[36] The fear of being attacked, coupled with casualty aversion, places significant audience costs on politicians, who thus are incentivized to concede more in the infinite struggle against terrorism.[36] Furthermore, the majority of political assassinations and suicide bombings occur against democracies, implying that terrorist organizations understand that democracies are more susceptible to these costs.[37] The infinite bargaining model complements the evidence that the costs imposed by terrorist organizations affect democratic targets more significantly than they affect authoritarian targets.

Conclusion

For a given goal, a terrorist organization bargains with a target long-term by increasing the payoffs for cooperation and decreasing the payoffs for noncooperation. From providing political, economic, social, and ideological utility to engendering the fear of future attacks, terrorists calculatingly coerce a target toward long-term cooperation. By doing so, they seek to not only achieve immediate concessions, but also to sustain increased bargaining capacity in the future. I hope that this model will provide a basis for assessing terrorist organizations as rational long-term actors in the sphere of international relations. Furthermore, I anticipate that this model may be used as a springboard for future research, such as how counterterrorism, antiterrorism, and counterinsurgency mitigate utility manipulation by the terrorist organization.

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LGBT Rights & Geopolitics in Maidan and Post-Maidan Ukraine

Jesse Sanchez is a sophmore undergraduate at Cornell University from Pico Rivera, California. His research interests include geopolitics, minority rights, and postcolonialism.

Introduction

"In Paris, everybody is in black, but in Ukraine, everyone wears bright colors,"
-Olga Kurylenko[1]

A faceless speaker cries out in a crowded square. Around him is an uneven cacophony produced by an undefined group of people. Fires crackle, smoke soars, and skies blacken. These masses rush frantically toward a new world order beckoning lustfully, greedily with open arms. They rush toward a vision of a new Ukraine—a European Ukraine—no longer bound to a traumatic destiny with its neighbor Russia. A European Ukraine could spell infinite possibilities but, most importantly, is seen as an optimistic future for a Ukrainian nation scarred by centuries of foreign control. Unfortunately, this vision of Ukraine has amounted to nothing more than a wicked tease for a large minority of Ukrainians.

The aforementioned description is derived from Sergei Loznitza's critically acclaimed documentary *Maidan*[2], a cleverly construed collection of footage of the Maidan Revolution. The Maidan Revolution, also known as the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, emerged as a mass reaction to the Ukrainian government's decision to break negotiations for EU membership and has produced many unforeseen consequences on the part of Ukraine, Russia, and Europe. While much in the documentary is ready to be devoured by eager scholars and parties interested in contemporary Ukraine, I find that there remains a part of Ukraine and the revolution completely nonexistent from the narrative (if one deems the word appropriate for such a piece). Absent from the sea of yellow and blue on the maidan (Ukrainian for "square") were four other colors: red, orange, green and purple. Among a mass of protestors waving proudly their nationalist flags were a silent few who left their rainbow flags to remain in the confines of an ancient closet.

As these flags continue to collect dust, so too do their owners' dreams of a new Ukraine free of its aggressively homophobic consciousness. This is a conscious decision on the part of these Ukrainians as many queer groups choose to hide their identity deliberately among a larger protesting crowd to which they also belong. Why is it that the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and other sexual and gender identities (LGBT+) community drowns its own aspirations for acceptance and integration in a new post-revolution European Ukraine? Putin, the EU, and a legacy of homophobia within the former Soviet Union (FSU).

In an effort to break away from the Russian sphere of influence, Ukraine underwent a revolution (colloquially referred to as Maidan) to rid itself of a corrupt, pro-Putin government

led by former president Viktor Yanukovych. However, lack of international pressure in post-revolution Ukraine due to an escalating geopolitical struggle between Russia and "the West" has allowed for continued discrimination against those who identify in the LGBT+ spectrum.[3] This is despite the fact that the LGBT+ community has helped play a considerable role in supporting and carrying out the actions of the Maidan Revolution which ousted the former pro-Russian government.[4] LGBT+ activists were among the original Maidan protestors who helped begin the revolution in Ukraine but, given an intense legacy of Soviet homophobia, could not openly express a desire to see their own rights immediately realized in the European Ukraine to-be. In an effort to help legitimize the revolution, LGBT+ Ukrainians have chosen to remain silent on their cause hoping their revolution is just moments behind that of their nation's revolution.[5] In addition, the EU's abandonment of its advocacy for LGBT+ rights in Ukraine has further contributed to self-shrouding of LGBT+ individuals within the Maidan. As tensions rise between not just Ukraine and Russia, but Russia and the West as well in a manner unprecedented since the Cold War, these hopes seem a long way off.

Maidan vs. Putin's Russia

The Maidan Revolution began on 21 November 2013 on Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti ("Independence Square") following the Ukrainian government's decision to "[suspend] plans for a landmark agreement with the European Union [and instead]…renew active dialogue with Russia."[6] Protestors took to the streets in anger and flooded into the capital's maidan in large numbers to riot against the Yanukovych government's decision. The EU-Ukraine agreement would have meant "a pivotal shift westward for the ex-Soviet republic's 46 million people, away from [its] historic Russian ally."[7] The Yanukovych government did not anticipate, however, that its decision would result in it being ousted from power some three months later by pro-West Ukrainians occupying the Maidan Nezalezhnosti. Those pro-West Ukrainians, in turn, must not have anticipated the ability of Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, to use Maidan against them.

In an official 2014 speech to the Kremlin, Putin declared the lack of a "legitimate executive authority in Ukraine" due to the onset of the 2014 revolution.[8] Consequently, Putin, in order to protect Russian "interests" in Ukraine, called for a referendum in Crimea that would allow its residents "for the first time in history…to peacefully express their free will regarding their own future."[9] Putin included statistics on the referendum claiming that an overwhelming majority—96% of the 82% of Crimean voters[10]—voted for independence from Ukraine and eventual integration into the Russian Federation. The fall of the pro-Russian Kiev government at the hands of what he called "[Ukrainian] nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites" revealed Putin's view of the post-revolution government as both illegitimate and composed of deliberately staunch anti-Russian agents. This revival of World War II-Era rhetoric, coupled with the Russian

In an effort to help legitimize the revolution, LGBT+ Ukrainians have chosen to remain silent on their cause... the EU's abandonment of its advocacy for LGBT+ rights in Ukraine has further contributed to self-shrouding of LGBT+ individuals within the Maidan.

The rhetoric espoused by the ousted Ukrainian government consisted of heavily inspired uncompromising homophobia imported from an increasingly LGBT+-hostile Russian Federation.

president's description of the referendum as a purely Western-style referendum, allowed Putin to depict himself as a leader against fascism, a discreditor of the hostile Ukrainian government, and the implementer of Crimea's justified "reunification of Russia."[11] "[T]he people," Putin claimed, are "the ultimate source of all authority."[12] Yet, there exists a flaw in the president's logic: the "people" chose Europe, not Russia, popularly.

Yale University professor and historian Timothy Snyder looks past the Kremlin's smoke and mirrors by characterizing the Maidan Revolution as "a classic popular revolution."[13] The revolution began with a corrupt leader (Yanukovych) taking power via democratic means. Subsequently, this leader began increasing and exploiting said power (embezzling millions from the Ukrainian treasury to fund "the ugliest [homes] in architectural history,"[14] among other things) for personal gain to the detriment of the people. Consequently, the people rose up and rebelled against this corruption and exploitation via a popular revolution (Maidan). Snyder, in a multitude of works concerning Ukraine, Maidan, Crimea, and many other Ukrainian contemporary histories, slams the Russian government's actions and rhetoric concerning events which transpired (and are still transpiring) in Ukraine. Snyder labels the intense homophobic propaganda which dominated the state-sanctioned news cycle in Russia as "the gay conspiracy."[15] The rhetoric espoused by the ousted Ukrainian government consisted of heavily inspired uncompromising homophobia imported from an increasingly LGBT+-hostile Russian Federation. "Ukraine could not have closer cooperation with Europe, since the EU [is] interested chiefly in gay marriage,"[16] was the reasoning behind a failed deal between Ukraine and the European Union. Russian propagandists coined the term Gayeuromaidan during their propaganda waves as well in order to persuade Ukrainians out of their desires for membership in the European Union. The former government claimed there could be no Ukraine in the EU without conceding to popularly opposed pro-LGBT+ measures. Yet despite a hostile Russian front and a domestic uncertainty, the greatest threat to a future in which Ukraine embraces its LGBT+ population is, arguably, not Russia or Putin or conservative Ukrainians, but the European Union. The very liberalizing force so tantalizing to the Ukrainian nation—a force Ukrainians have and continue to die for—has proven to be a false hope for many.

Voiceless Echoes: The EU & LGBT+ Ukraine

In 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine made history by becoming "the first post-Soviet country to decriminalize homosexuality."[17] But, other than this landmark achievement, conditions for the gay community in Ukraine have been at a stagnant low point compared to its East European neighbors. Despite multiple violent attacks targeting Ukraine's LGBT+ population in recent years, "there is no article in the [Ukrainian] criminal code on hate crimes committed on the basis of sexual orientation."[18] However, had the Yanukovych government completed the deal former Prime

Minister Yulia Tymoshenko helped negotiate with the European Union, Ukraine would have needed to meet certain requirements, including an anti-discrimination bill to be implemented in Ukraine which would have finally protected LGBT+ Ukrainians under strict federal and international law.[19] Consequently, a powerful propaganda machine by the Kremlin emerged against Ukraine's EU bid, since "the [European Union] really does mean homosexuality."[20] Dmitriy Kiselyev, head of the Russian media conglomerate Rossiya Segodnya, known to be a staunch homophobe, "successfully weaponized gay rights and turned them against the process of European integration."[21] Kiselyev, who once said that gays' "hearts should be buried in the ground or burnt as unfit for helping to prolong anyone's life,"[22] discredited Ukrainian politicians Vitalii and Volodymyr Klychko after they "met with the gay former German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle."[23] Yet, while the Kremlin attempted to question the legitimacy of a pro-LGBT+ Ukraine, the European Union already turned a blind eye to Ukraine's own homophobic agenda.

During initial talks between the revolutionary Ukrainian and European Union officials, rumors spread among the Ukrainian LGBT+ community that the EU considered dropping its anti-discrimination requirement for the nation to join the union. In March 2014, the newly appointed Ukrainian Justice Minister Pavlo Petrenko "triumphantly announced that the EU had dropped a demand requiring the inclusion of sexual orientation in an anti-discrimination bill."[24] A mixed response within the LGBT+ community surfaced, some arguing the Kremlin's effective anti-gay spin team would have salivated at the opportunity to scare Ukrainians straight while others felt betrayed by their supposed Western liberators. European Union officials denied the dropping of the anti-discrimination bill. Yet Ukraine reportedly "ignored the requirements of the EU visa liberalization roadmap by failing to include prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation"[25] in the amendments package requested by EU officials. In May 2014, the European Union endorsed Ukraine's exclusion of the anti-discrimination bill for LGBT+ citizens "by allowing Kiev to move to the second phase of visa liberalization anyway."[26] Such a move by an organization viewed as the epitome of Western ideals contributes to the lack of "visibility"[27] of a large minority of LGBT+ people in Ukraine. Domestic homophobia, Russian propaganda, and an increasingly aggressive Putin policy toward Ukraine have

Pictured opposite, protestors celebrate after a compromise deal is reached between parliament and President Yanukovych.

been cited by Ukrainian politicians, LGBT+ activists, and EU officials as reasons to deter LGBT+ legislation. This has proven critical in the LGBT+ community's decision to halt calls for pro-LGBT+ legislation.

"Gay" Euromaidan & Ukraine

In any piece of writing concerning attitudes towards homosexuals in contemporary Ukraine there appears a commonly quoted statistic. A poll conducted in 2013 by Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK Group) "found a full 80% of [Ukrainian] citizens [hold] negative attitudes towards sexuality."[28] This is an almost universally referenced finding in journals, newspapers, blogs, and interviews on homosexuality in Ukraine. Less featured is another poll conducted in 2013, this time by Gay Alliance and the State Sociology Institute, which found "63% of surveyed Ukrainians said homosexuality is a perversion or mental disease [and] only 9% supported same-sex marriage."[29] Even after the revolution the LGBT+ community helped create, violence against the LGBT+ community has only increased. The number of far-right groups in Ukraine "who prey on LGBT+ people has increased from 30 to 74"[30] between 2012 and 2013 alone, before the revolution. During a screening of an LGBT+-friendly film at a Ukrainian youth festival in November 2014, "right-wing radicals burned down the Zhovten cinema in Kiev"[31] which played the film. To the many LGBT+ people in Ukraine, these are not statistics but facts of life. They are a legacy of the Soviet regime and an amalgamation of homo-hostile historical factors. Surprisingly enough, it is not the intensely homophobic Ukrainian majority that has succeeded in actively suppressing invisible pro-LGBT+ activists from Maidan, but the LGBT+ community itself.

"We use Ukrainian and EU flags instead [of rainbow flags],"[32] replied prominent Ukrainian LGBT+ activist Bohdan Globa when speaking on LGBT+ participation in Maidan, describing the process of intentional concealment as "self-closeting."[33] Globa, like many other LGBT+ Ukrainians, chooses to place gay rights on the backburner of the Euromaidan Revolution, and "opposes including sexual orientation in the non-discrimination law [required by the European Union for Ukrainian acceptance into the organization] because Moscow would cynically seize upon it to tell Ukrainians [the EU means homosexuality]."[34] Realizing the current geopolitical calculus in the Russo-Ukrainian region devised by a certain anti-Western Russian president has made LGBT+ rights in the foreseeable future in Ukraine a very unlikely possibility, LGBT+ activists in Ukraine like Globa have chosen to put the revolution before their own political aspirations. In fact the LGBT+ community "was almost the only revolutionary group which, in the aftermath [of Euromaidan], did not insist on converting their participation in the events into new positions of power"[35] as many other revolutionary groups had done.

In order to preserve and maintain the unity of Maidan protestors and prevent an already extensive homophobic propaganda campaign from Putin's Russia to discredit the revolutionary vision, the LGBT+ community "didn't champion the rights of the gay minority."[36] This is not to say that

the gay rights movement in Ukraine has been permanently silenced in order to establish the "European Ukraine" desired by Euromaidan activists (whether LGBT+ or not). Rather, leaders of the movement have opted to wait for democratic revolution (in the form of Maidan) to establish a democratic government (a pro-Western government) so as to "start a nationwide debate, based on logic, science, and European values, about Ukraine's history of intolerance [towards homosexuals]."[37]

Post-Soviet Ukraine: Axing the Soviet Legacy

Political science professor Philip Ayoub argues "the extent of states' openness to international organizations and informational flows…has demonstrable effects [by allowing]…new ideas to enter the domestic discourse."[38] In a Ukrainian context, openness to Western ideas of LGBT+ rights as fundamental human rights would come from a dissemination of pro-LGBT+ ideas. Furthermore, the degree to which "international norms [in this case LGBT+ rights] resonate in various states—and become internalized within them—depends on…transnational channels and domestic interest groups that make political issues visible."[39] Consequently, international pressure, through the creation of a transnationally homophobic solidarity network, coupled with strong domestic efforts, has proven effective in combatting traditional political atmospheres. Ukraine possesses a cultural climate in which LGBT+ rights are "inherently contentious…often portrayed as violating the moral foundation on which nationhood is structured."[40] Ukraine has yet to "come out" to itself. Only through this "coming out" process, which Ayoub terms as "visibility," can LGBT+ rights fully emerge. What proof is there that these political theories can translate into tangible success?

During the consolidation of the Soviet Union, attitudes toward homosexuality seemed to be radically changing for the better. During the October Revolution, Russia decriminalized homosexuality.[41] LGBT+ people living within the ever-changing borders of the Soviet Union experienced a period of tolerance. This would be a very brief period as 1933 witnessed the reinstitution of many of its anti-LGBT+ legislation.[42] Sociologists Roman Kuhar and Judit Takács trace the development of anti-homosexual attitudes in the former Eastern Bloc in their book *Beyond the Pink Curtain.* They find that LGBT+ people represented in film appear "not as themselves, but as a metaphor for political dissidence, or for capitalist exploitation and corruption."[43] However the political suppression of LGBT+ people under strict homophobic laws kept them closeted allowing "straight directors" to create representations of LGBT+ people. Under Article 121 of the Soviet criminal code, "sexual relations between men are punishable by prison terms of up to five years."[44] Yet over time there would be a fusion of identities, the homosexual taking on the form of the antithesis to an ideal communist form. By rooting the norm of LGBT+ as a synonym for internal collapse, the Soviet government successfully propagated a negative image of homosexuals. In doing so, a suppression

Ukraine has yet to "come out" to itself. Only through this "coming out" process, which Ayoub terms as "visibility," can LGBT+ rights fully emerge.

Protests and parades often experience forceful and even violent interruptions.

of sexuality spearheaded by the government created a lack of visibility of LGBT+ citizens in the country.

Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, its legacy remains largely intact in much of its former territory. In fact, certain portions of Ukraine – specifically the pro-Russian eastern Ukrainian provinces as well as the whole of Crimea – have made a conscious effort to return to criminalization laws such as Article 121. In the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution, tensions between a pro-European western Ukraine and a pro-Russian eastern Ukraine have produced a crisis of political legitimacy. "Russia has waged an aggressive propaganda war in Crimea"[45] that leaves many LGBT+ people in Crimea just as susceptible to legal discrimination found throughout separatist regions of Ukraine. The new prime minister of Crimea, Sergei Aksynov, has taken to implementing "Soviet legal templates" of anti-gay legislation in Crimea as the province "[does] not need such people."[46] What hope then lies for LGBT+ Ukrainians? Current research suggests that historically homophonic nation-states, when tempted with economic advancement and efficient international pressure, are willing to redefine the national consciousness to include their LGBT+ population despite an overwhelmingly homophobic majority.

Eastern Europe 'Comes Out': LGBT+, ECE, the EU and Post-Maidan

Ayoub argues that "individuals in groups less wedded to nation and tradition, will be more likely to incorporate [the] '"framed"' or '"grafted"' international norm [of LGBT+ rights]."[47] Conversely, individuals embedded in tradition are "more likely to reject"[48] international efforts to redefine national norms. In a Ukrainian context this would mean that Ukrainians closely linked to traditional nationalist Orthodoxy are more likely to reject international LGBT+ efforts. Similarly, Ukrainians less committed to traditional nationalist character are more likely to accept LGBT+ rights as an internal norm compatible with nationalist characteristics. As a result, eastern Ukraine and Crimea have been more resistant to the post-Euromaidan government citing traditional Slavic Orthodoxy as inherently mutually exclusive to a gay Ukraine. Ayoub would attribute this to the fact that if "LGBT+ right norms are portrayed as an inherently external, then the degrees to which individuals are socialized in their national identities and traditional values [Slavic Orthodoxy] will influence reactions to the norm [homophobic retaliation]."[49] Only by resisting the branding of LGBT+ as an external threat to society and promoting an understanding and awareness of LGBT+

What prompted the governments of such traditional and historically homophobic nations to make such radical efforts? The European Union.

within a Ukrainian context can the LGBT+ rights movement in the region make headway.

Serbia, a traditionally homophobic nation, launched its "first successful gay pride parade in Belgrade"[50] in 2013, despite a sizeable number of homophobe protestors at the ready. Serbian riot police were required to attend the event to ensure violence did not break out against the 500 participants in the parade. That same year another triumph for LGBT+ rights occurred in equally conservative Moldova when the government "repealed an anti-gay law modeled on Russia's [2013 legislation]."[51] What prompted the governments of such traditional and historically homophobic nations to make such radical efforts? The European Union. Serbia, desperate to show its liberalizing efforts to a reluctant EU, used the event as a gesture of good will. Similarly, Moldova repealed its discriminatory law only when "it became clear that it was standing in the way of further integration with [the European Union]."[52] Even in Ukraine, desire for European integration resulted in some success for LGBT+ rights. When Ukrainian parliament members "proposed a bill to 'prohibit promotion of homosexuality,'"[53] there emerged "pressure from human rights organizations and foreign diplomats"[54] in predominately Western countries arguing that it mirrored the 2012 Russian anti-gay propoganda laws. Thus, it can be argued that Ayoub's theory of coordinated international solidarity efforts and "incentivization" of promoting LGBT+ rights has proven effective in the cases of these three countries. Yet as the aforementioned geopolitical realities have noted, Euromaidan, Russia, and the European Union have placed each other in a gridlock so as to deter any semblance of LGBT+ triumph. With nowhere to turn, LGBT+ refugees are pouring into Kiev from throughout the country only to find they are unwelcome in their own state.

As recently as January 2015, Kiev has received an influx of immigrants from eastern Ukraine and Crimea seeking refuge from "both war and rising levels of homophobia."[55] Yet the Ukrainian government remains opposed towards its supposedly decadent and unorthodox population of gays and lesbians. Yuriy Syrotyuk, a Ukrainian parliament member of the conservative Svoboda party, claimed "LGBT+ legislation will blow up [Ukraine]…and not only Crimea will secede, but Ukrainian provinces will also start to leave the country."[56] Although not the sole reason for conflict in Ukraine, LGBT+ rights remain an explosive issue in the nation, leaving many politicians indifferent if not outright hostile towards LGBT+ Ukrainians. The same month of the Ukrainian LGBT+ diaspora, "participants of [a gay march] in downtown Kyiv were brutally beaten by Euromaidan activists [after trying]…to join a pro-EU demonstration."[57] Euromaidan hostility towards pro-EU LGBT+ activists is so well-known throughout the Ukrainian gay community that leaders of Ukrainian LGBT+ organizations swiftly condemned the march in Kiev, accusing Russian propagandists of

While the Iron Curtain may have fallen some 25 years or so ago, many people in this region of the world continue to be subjected by the legacies of its architects and engineers.

orchestrating the "fake march." No evidence supports these claims. Ukrainian journalist Dimiter Kenarov argues LGBT+ groups actively and aggressively condemned gay Euromaidan activists "because [of] an understanding that talking about gay rights in Ukraine in the current political situation [is] a huge liability."[58] Ironically, this self-closeting is stagnatin LGBT+ rights in Ukraine. In essence, LGBT+ Ukrainian leaders are willingly digging the graves of their own, aiding the rest of the world in shadowing the visibility key to regaining a lost hope of a free Ukraine for all.

Conclusion

As Europe continues further into the 21st century it continues to evolve both in structure and meaning. In the past 100 years alone the continent has gone from the center of global imperial power to the wasteland of declining converging forces. As of today, the idea of Europe acts as a symbol of modernity and liberalism. And yet, despite its reputation as a force of change, its people continue to live under the specter of the Cold War which brought the whole of Europe to its knees and created stark polarization within the very heart of Europe. While the Iron Curtain may have fallen some 25 years or so ago, many people in this region of the world continue to be subjected by the legacies of its architects and engineers. The fall of communism and the Soviet Union may have marked the end of "postwar parenthesis"[59] in the historical development of the whole of Europe, but by no means did it destroy its legacy on the hearts and minds of many Eastern European peoples.

Ukraine—the historical heart of Russia—in its attempt to embrace Europe, left Russia scorned and in shock. The "special relationship" between Ukraine and Russia, unlike its Western counterpart, suffered the wrath of Euromaidan in 2014 from which it has yet to recover. Many view the events in Ukraine not as a revolution but as the final confrontation, the definitive battle of East meets West. As the former Eastern bloc turns its head toward the direction of the setting sun, Russia is left to confront itself for the first time in 25 years. While abstractly the grandest geopolitical encounter takes place on Ukrainian territory, on the ground a battle older than Russia and Ukraine takes place: the battle for acceptance. Bearing the brunt and beatings of not one but two frontiers (internationally via Russia and domestically in Ukraine), and with empty promises from its "ally," the European Union, Ukraine's LGBT+ population faces an uncertain future.

Even with its revolutionary intensity and ferocity, Euromaidan has failed and continues to fail to include some of its most significant initiators. Some, like Maidan Amazon member Olena Shevchenko, ask "what gay rights would [Ukrainians] be talking about [in the case of a pro-Russian government]"[60] not overthrown by Euromaidan (despite its not so friendly pro-LGBT+ stance). Others, such as Ukrainian gay activist Zoryan Kis argue the "new Ukrainian government uses the chaotic,

post-revolution situation as a pretext for not letting any kind of gay rights legislation to pass through parliament [it's]…a sellout."[61] Another LGBT+ activist, Olena Semenova, claimed LGBT+ Ukrainians "are between two evils: Russian homophobic culture and Ukrainian homophobic intolerance."[62] The task is difficult, but, without an international effort, LGBT+ Ukrainians will continue to be subjected to discrimination, terror, and fear of death.

"There are some people who just want to join 'Europe' without changing their values and without understanding what it all means. But if people really want to change [Ukraine], the change has to start within them and their relationship to others."
-Anonymous LGBT+ Ukrainian[63]

Ukraine's LGBT+ population faces an uncertain future...even with its revolutionary intensity and ferocity, Euromaidan has failed and continues to fail to include some of its most significant initiators.

United States-India Defense Relations:

A Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century



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Introduction

Starting with a high profile push through the region in 2011, the Obama Administration has made the "Pivot to Asia" a central part of American foreign policy. Enlisting regional partners who share strategic interests will be critical to ensuring the success of such efforts, which will be discussed below. U.S.-India relations have flourished since 2001, and a series of initiatives and expanding agreements, such as the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), have formalized the two countries' military relations to a degree previously unseen. The uptick in U.S.-India cooperation originated late in the Clinton administration, was carried through the Bush Administration, and has been continued by the Obama Administration's pivot to Asia and recent renewal of the mutual defense framework. I argue that although past relations have been tumultuous, collaboration will continue to grow in the future as a result of converging interests and strategic necessities. India is rapidly growing in influence and power; with 1.3 million active personnel, it is the world's third largest military, and with 1.2 billion people, its largest democracy.[1] In an increasingly complex world characterized by war, uncertainty, and clashing interests, the history and future of this bilateral relationship is critical to understanding the prospects for U.S. influence and power in the Asia-Pacific region.

Post WWII Historical Paradigm

In the aftermath of World War II (WWII), U.S relations with newly independent India were typically characterized by indifference. Starting with their first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, India practiced nonalignment in foreign policy.[2] This strategy revolved around foregoing formal alliances and focusing instead on asserting independence on the world stage. The overarching goal of India's defense policy was self-reliance, seen in the creation of the Defense Research and Development Organization in 1958, which sought to advance India's understanding of military technology and properly equip their armed forces.[3] From independence to the mid 1960s India focused on self-sufficiency, from the mid 1960s to the late 1980s they finally realized greater self-reliance, and since the 1980s they have focused on coproduction and modernization.[4] Over these three stages, relations with the United States have shifted along with India's interests and capabilities. The relationship has evolved from one of relative indifference, to one of occasional annoyance, to a cooperative, exercise-based partnership; India now performs more military exercises with the United States than with

any other nation.[5] This evolution was not inevitable, but its occurrence is a boon for both India and the United States.

With its manufacturing of weaponyry during WWII, the modern militarization of India began.[6] Post-independence, India began establishing technology for transport vehicles and trainer aircrafts, the building blocks for future technology.[7] As India grew on the world stage and perceived a threat from a rising communist China, they were forced to bolster their military capabilities through foreign acquisitions. These included buying jeeps from Japan, trucks from West Germany, and tanks from Britain.[8] Notably, these acquisitions did not involve the United States.

India was displeased in 1948 when the United States imposed an arms embargo during the first Indian-Pakistani (Indo-Pak) war over Kashmir, although the embargo was placed on both countries.[9] Yet India's actions have also angered the United States, especially their refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.[10] Differences over nuclear policy have been one of the main inhibitors of successful U.S.-India defense relations over the last 40 years.[11] U.S.-India relations were significantly harmed by India's nuclear test at Pokhran in 1974, and moreover when India bitterly opposed the U.S. - supported permanent extension of the NPT in 1995.[12] During the Cold War the United States was continually frustrated by India's adherence to nonalignment, seemingly in contradiction with their reliance on the procurement of Soviet equipment and arms, such as MiG fighter aircraft.[13] It often appeared that Pakistan and India were regional proxies of the United States and Soviet Union, respectively, yet this development was not significant enough to create lasting damage to U.S.-India relations. A recent change in nuclear policy is encouraging; the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act was finalized in 2008.[14] This accord has been instrumental in nurturing closer political relations, which serve as the backbone of current and future defense cooperation.

As the Cold War wound down, U.S.-India relations gradually improved. India participated in small-scale arms trade with the United States from 1986-1988.[15] They also provided military logistical support for the 1990 Gulf War.[16] The Indo-U.S. Steering Committee of the two Navies was formed to resume naval exercises in 1992, leading to the restart of the annual Malabar naval exercise that same year.[17] Malabar focuses on anti-piracy measures, rescue operations, and counter-narcotics training, among other objectives. Naval-military relations are the most prominent aspect of U.S.-India defense relations.[18] Naval capabilities, fundamental to power projection in the pacific, will continue to be a critical component of the U.S.-India relationship.

In January 1995 the United States and India signed the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations, providing for military-to-military exercises between the countries. This agreement was an important step leading to the signing of the so-called "Vision Document" in 2000, which provided a

Differences over nuclear policy have been one of the main inhibitors of successful U.S.-India defense relations over the last 40 years.

Common interests will foster closer relations and greater collaboration... the United States will need to make concerted efforts and find reliable partners to maintain a balance of power, ensure peace and security, and retain the ability to influence regional events.

The primary drivers of this relatively new relationship are enhanced acquisition activity and an alignment of naval interests around issues such as anti-piracy and counter-narcotics.

roadmap for future relations.[19] Also that year, Bill Clinton became the first U.S. President to visit India in 22 years.[20] After the attacks of September 11th India escorted U.S. ships through the Strait of Malacca and launched Operation SAGITTARIUS, providing escorts to U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean. This strategic move helped relieve the regional security burden on the U.S. Navy and thus facilitated operations in Afghanistan.[21] Moreover, India offered its bases to help in the invasion of Afghanistan.[22] This is a prime example of the converging strategic interests that are driving advancements in U.S-India defense relations. These developments led to what is today a budding strategic partnership for the 21st century.

Although past disagreements indicate India is far from being in lockstep with the United States, the 21st century has seen a coalescence of American and Indian interests around several policy issues. Common interests will foster closer relations and greater collaboration. With China rising, Japan flexing its muscles, and considerable regional economic development continuing, the United States will need to make concerted efforts and find reliable partners to maintain a balance of power, ensure peace and security, and retain the ability to influence regional events. With its shared interests, India will be a close partner in this venture.

The 21st Century: Acquisitions, Joint Exercises, and Nuclear Power

Defense relations between the United States and India had been on the upswing since 2001,[23] and their successful military cooperation in the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 solidified the basis of their promising regional partnership.[24] The United States provided aid and conducted joint rescue operations with the Indian Navy. A 2002 Department of Defense released a report in which it concluded that it was clearly in the interests of the U.S. to pursue a strategic partnership with India.[25] The primary drivers of this relatively new relationship are enhanced acquisition activity and an alignment of naval interests around issues such as anti-piracy and counter-narcotics. In the 2006 Maritime Security Cooperation Agreement, the United States and India outlined collaboration in promoting the free passage of goods around the world and cracking down on the illicit trafficking of weapons.[26] Additionally, this agreement produced an increase in intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation.[27]

Military acquisitions are an indispensable area of U.S.-India cooperation with the potential to greatly expand in the future. India purchased

more conventional weapons than any other developing country in the period from 1992-2004.[28] April 17, 2002 marks the first major weapons deal between the two countries, consisting of 12 radar sets, a remarkable strategic development considering Indian procurement reliance on the Soviets during the Cold War.[29] Defense trade has increased since, but often with ambivalence from U.S. lawmakers; because India refuses to sign a formal defense accord, the United States cannot share certain classified defense technologies The Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) are two formal defense accords.[30] These agreements establish protocols for the sharing of military technology; certain sensitive technology and advanced weaponry can only be sold to countries that have signed one or both agreements.[31] As defense relations have warmed, India's refusal to sign has become a sticking point.

In 2005, India and the United States signed a ten-year defense framework in which they committed to increasing defense trade, the transfer of technology, and counterterrorism collaboration.[32] The 2005 framework was followed in 2006 by an agreement on cooperation in science exchange and development to foster co-production of defense technology. The United States also offered India the ability to purchase F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft.[33] These platforms are among the most sophisticated in the world. However, a potential 8.5 billion dollar Indian procurement of U.S. fighters fell through, and India shifted focus to European options.[34] Despite this, acquisitions have boomed: defense sales to India went from zero dollars in 2008 to over 9 billion dollars in 2014.[35] As a result, the United States surpassed Russia as the biggest supplier of arms and military equipment to India. Despite the fighter deal falling through and minor scuttles over technology, India has generally looked to the United States for military procurements over the past decade, leading to a 13 billion dollar backlog of Indian defense procurements.[36] Bureaucrats in both countries are still

Developing U.S.-India Air Force cooperation opened the opportunity for the Indian Air Force to purchase technology from the United States, including C-130J Hercules aircraft, pictured below.

Despite the fighter deal falling through and minor scuttles over technology, India has generally looked to the United States for military procurements over the past decade... bureaucrats in both countries are still working out the details of Indian acquisitions.

working out the details of Indian acquisitions that amount to over 13 billion dollars of arms, systems, and technology. This acquisition activity, absent in the past, will be a central driver of closer U.S.-India relations in the future.

U.S.–India Air Force cooperation is also rapidly expanding. Participation in the annual Cope India air-based exercises eventually led India to purchase six C-130J Hercules aircraft and related equipment and services for over 1 billion dollars.[37] This was followed up by a 2.1 billion dollar acquisition of eight P-81 maritime surveillance aircraft from Boeing in 2009.[38] And in 2010, India purchased ten C-17 Globemaster III cargo aircraft, a sale approved in 2011 for 4.1 billion dollars.[39] India's most recent defense purchase, pending approval by India's Cabinet Committee on Security, includes 22 AH-64E Apache and 15 CH-47F Chinook helicopters from Boeing totaling over 2.5 billion dollars.[40] All of these purchases reflect India's efforts to bolster their strategic proficiencies in the region - the P-81 maritime surveillance aircraft will augment antipiracy measures, the C-17 is an excellent aircraft for strategic airlift and airdrop missions, and the helicopters serve as vital transport for special operations missions and provide tactical flexibility. All of these acquisitions demonstrate India's desire to step into their growing role in the region.

The Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) grew out of meetings between senior officials about fostering co-production and transfers of defense technology. The idea behind DTTI is to develop military capabilities for both countries to use.[41] Current plans include building a mobile solar power source for use in remote areas and creating a lightweight chemical and biological protective suit for hazardous environments.[42] India's Defense Research and Development Organization and the United States' Pentagon Research Labs will oversee these projects.[43] Before, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has stated that the DTTI must overcome "the historical burden of bureaucracy,"[44] a burden seen in the 13 billion dollar acquisition backlog. The DTTI is the centerpiece of the newly signed ten-year defense framework between the countries, and through it, the United States and Indea seek to change their defense relations from a buyer-seller relationship to one based on joint technological development.[45] Because India will have a greater investment in the relationship, it is possible this could lead to clashes over events in the region or the strategic direction of cooperative efforts. Yet with similar policy interests, a U.S.-India clash remains unlikely.

Military to military exercises now constitute the most tangible aspect of U.S-India defense relations. As some analysts have suggested, the U.S.-India defense relationship can be characterized as an "exercise-based relationship."[46] In addition to Malabar, the U.S. and Indian Navies now take part in three other annual exercises together.[47] Areas of focus in naval exercises include anti-sub warfare, counter piracy,

and disaster response.[48] In addition to this close working relationship, India has begun to exercise maritime leadership apart from the United States, as seen in the creation of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008. The Symposium seeks to bring together the heads of the Indian Ocean Navies for information exchange.[49] Exercises between Air Forces began in 2002, and were followed by U.S.-India Army exercises in 2004.[50] In contrast with the global reach and presence of the United States Air Force, the Indian Air Force typically has a limited, regional focus.[51] As a result, air exercises typically concentrate on India's regional security. Other air-based projects include public-private partnerships. For example, Boeing now works with India to co-develop software for navigation systems, landing gear, and cockpit controls.[52] The countries recently began partaking in combined Special Forces training in addition to conventional military exercises.[53] India and the United States have also formed various groups and projects to foster a greater working relationship. These include the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group, which since its revival in 2001 meets annually, and the U.S.-India Cyber Security Forum which was launched in 2002.[54] U.S.-India cooperation has also extended to humanitarian efforts such as recovering the remains of WWII soldiers previously lost on the subcontinent. All of these developments are signs of a budding strategic relationship.

Differences over nuclear policy and weapons have long been the greatest source of strain between India and the United States, but the Bush Administration's 2006 nuclear deal successfully turned the page. The deal distinguished between India's civil nuclear facilities, which were put under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, and their military facilities. Because it recognized and allowed India to use nuclear energy for military purposes, the deal was criticized as undermining the NPT, which India has never signed.[55] However, 65% of India's nuclear generating power is under international guidelines, and analysts have shown that India's use of military-specific nuclear technology will be primarily for submarines, not more warheads.[56] That being said, India's nuclear arsenal sits between 60-100 warheads.[57] The United States' legitimizing of India as a nuclear power, though criticized domestically, was a strategic move that significantly and positively affected relations with India over the last decade.

Defense Relations Moving Forward

The Obama Administration's strategy of pivoting to Asia makes a strategic partnership with India increasingly enticing to the United States.[58] The formal nature of this relationship was renewed in June of 2015 with the signing of a new 10-year U.S.-India defense framework highlighting the cooperation between their respective militaries.[59] In the future, relations will likely improve and not change in any dramatic way.[60] However, important modifications must be made. Co-production, information exchange, and joint exercises are not an end in and of themselves; they must be utilized to build an understanding of shared strategic interests, and create a positive working relationship to act when those interests are threatened. In the future, defense relations between the countries must move from being merely transactional to being more strategic in nature.[61]

There are also a series of issues that could derail future relations. India's controversial Cold Start doctrine, which is considered offensive and specifically directed at Pakistan, has been criticized by and hampered relations with American military commanders.[62] Beyond doctrine, Indian military modernization has been driven by its relationship with the United States, which has the potential to upset regional power

President Barack Obama shaking hands with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

dynamics with Pakistan.[63] With respect to Indo-Pak problems, the United States has maintained that the issue of Kashmir should be resolved through negotiations.[64] Other challenges to future India-U.S. relations include India's continuing acquisition of arms from Russia, the relative closeness of U.S.-Pakistan relations, India's refusal to sign CISMOA or LSA, and potential strategic differences with regards to a rising China.

Although India purchases more weapons from the United States than they do from any other country, India remains the top purchaser of Russian arms. With tensions rising between Russia and the United States, India could find itself forced to choose between suppliers in the future. Lastly, the domestic politics of both countries could affect the relationship. A failure to adequately address domestic instability could lead to mass uprisings, and thus complicate relations with the United States. Moreover, in the wake of two long and unpopular wars, the United States' populus is wary of any foreign engagements. India is not the only regional partner for the United States, but it holds the greatest prospects for increased strategic collaboration.

Despite the issues on the horizon, there are also a number of areas ripe for future cooperation, and these issues of unity are of greater consequence than the issues of division. A recent movement towards U.S.-India collaboration on space endeavors demonstrates a growing opportunity for further collaboration.[65] There are also strong prospects for cooperation in fighting transnational crime, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and responding to natural disasters.[66] Other opportunities exist in maritime security, counterterrorism, and military logistics support.[67] Although it is not publicly acknowledged, in pursuing their strategic partnership, both countries have kept in mind the growing clout of China,[68] especially as it has taken aggressive action in the pacific region to assert their increasing influence.[69]

President Obama has endorsed the prospect of India having a permanent seat on the U.N Security Council. This move was met with wide applause but remains only a sentiment.[70] As the 21st century unfolds, India has been moving closer to the United States while simultaneously promoting a multipolar world.[71] It remains to be seen how exactly leaders in both countries will move forward from a transactional paradigm to a more strategic one, as India neither seeks nor wants official "allied" status with the United States.[72] However, there are myriad opportunities to foster defense familiarity

and a closer working relationship. Defense relations could fluctuate with politics. Despite this, India's unique position in the region will continue to provide common ground upon which to build upon the partnership.

Conclusion

In September of 2014, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi agreed to "revitalize the existing partnership and find new areas for collaboration and mutual benefit."[73]. Successfully fostering the U.S.-India defense relationship will continue to be strategically crucial for both countries as they look to combat Chinese aggression, piracy, terrorism, and the trafficking of narcotics and weapons. The United States' pivot to Asia will depend on it.

The New Silk Road

Assessing Prospects for "Win-Win" Cooperation in Central Asia



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Introduction

The New Silk Road, formally termed the Silk Road Economic Belt and also known as the "One Belt, One Road," was first proposed by China's President Xi Jinping during his 2013 visit to Central Asia. This initiative aims to revive the historical vitality of trade and exchanges among Central Asian countries and China.[1] The vision of the Economic Belt "[brings] together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and the Indian Ocean."[2] In Central Asia, the New Silk Road is designed to pass through Khorgos, Almaty, Bishkek, Dushanbe, Samarkand, and Turkmenistan before reaching Tehran.

The New Silk Road is the landmark initiative of China's economic engagement in Central Asia, serving to meet China's economic needs of developing its western provinces such as Xinjiang and gaining access to energy resources in Central Asia. However, China's efforts at engagement are set to compete directly with those of Russia. Central Asia has traditionally belonged to Russia's sphere of influence. Starting from the 2000s, Russia has started to reengage with Central Asia with the goal of playing "a dominant or privileged role" in the region.[3] China's increased economic presence in Central Asia may conflict with Russian initiatives to reinstate its prominent regional role, most notably through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). As Chinese and Russian engagement in the region continues to intensify, it is inevitable that they will vie for the Central Asian countries' attention and resources.

However, interactions between China and Russia in Central Asia are not necessarily zero-sum due to the vast size and potential of the economic market within the Russia-Central Asia-China triangle. This paper argues that the coexistence of the New Silk Road with the EEU is feasible, and that potential exists for China and Russia's "win-win" cooperation in Central Asia. It provides evidence for this claim through examination of the New Silk Road's bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms, with a focus on the areas of infrastructure and trade, and evaluating China's overall economic and diplomatic strategy toward the region.

The New Silk Road

From its inception, the New Silk Road was a strategic concept to be realized through "bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms," not an initiative driven solely by China.[4] The white paper issued jointly by China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce, stresses cooperation as the mechanism to achieve strategic goals. It states, "The

The New Silk Road spans across many of the region's countries, providing incredibly enhanced opportunities for trade and cooperation.

Belt and Road Initiative is a systematic project, which should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all."[5] More specifically, the white paper mentions several multilateral organizations in which Central Asian countries participate in some form and whose functions align with the strategic vision and objectives of the New Silk Road initiative.

In the transportation sector, a key regional multilateral organization is the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), which plays an important role in achieving "road connectivity," a basic component of the New Silk Road.[6] Formed by 10 member countries in the greater Central Asian region, including China, CAREC has been working on regional cross-border transportation development long before the New Silk Road initiative was established. With regard to road building, CAREC's Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy identified six transport corridors as the organization's "flagship initiative."[7] Many older transportation corridors in Central Asia are oriented north toward Russia, not east toward China. However, since 2001 CAREC has invested approximately $28.3 billion in developing these corridors, three of which lead to China.[8] For example, within CAREC Corridor 1, the Urumqi-Kashgar road connects Xinjiang to Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Russian Federation.[9] CAREC Corridor 2 links Kazakhstan with China, Russia and western seaports, including Aktau, a port on the Caspian Sea that transports goods to Europe and Asia.[10] In CAREC Corridor 5, a toll expressway connects Xinjiang to Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.[11]

Energy pipelines, another major component of regional infrastructure development, have been developed primarily through bilateral efforts. China's main pipeline project in Central Asia is the Central Asia-China Gas pipeline. On the basis of bilateral agreements between China and other involved countries, Line A, Line B and Line C have already been completed, running parallel from the Turkmen-Uzbek border through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before reaching Xinjiang.[12] In September 2013, China signed bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to commence plans for Line D. These state-to-state agreements were followed by agreements between China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its Central Asian counterparts, such as Tajiktransgaz and Uzbekneftegaz, to establish joint ventures and manage the construction and operation of Line D.[13] Upon Line D's estimated completion in

2016 the annual transmission capacity of the entire Central Asia-China pipeline will reach 85 billion cubic meters, making it "the largest gas transmission system in Central Asia."[14] Other major joint projects have been developed between China and Central Asian countries, such as the gas field development in Amu Darya in Turkmenistan.[15]

Improved infrastructure constructed through multilateral and bilateral efforts advanced by the New Silk Road initiative is critical to facilitate trade. CAREC's transport corridors aim to facilitate 5 percent of all Europe-East Asia trade by 2017, which will significantly increase the income of the transit countries.[16] Oil pipelines built through bilateral efforts also boost trade. The Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, which is part of the Central Asia-China Gas pipeline network, will transport 55 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China by the end of 2015, approximately 20 percent of China's annual natural gas consumption.[17]

In addition to trade gains reaped through joint infrastructure construction, Central Asian countries and China are also collaborating to improve regional trade policies. Beyond the formal economic relationships between China and Central Asia, informal trade or "shuttle trade" among countries in the region is substantial but often overlooked.[18] Chinese consumer goods are brought into the region through Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic without full declaration at border customs, and the individual traders who transport them take advantage of arbitrage to earn profit.[19] The New Silk Road initiative will deepen China's cooperation with Central Asian countries to improve border control and reduce entry barriers, so that informal trade will be directed into formal channels, and countries will reap tax, customs and security benefits.[20] Cross-Border Transport Agreements have already been signed between countries such as Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.[21] In the Kyrgyz Republic, freight associations also monitoring travel and waiting times so that border crossing and the transnational shipment of goods can be improved.[22]

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral organization focused on regional security, will also play a greater role in the New Silk Road initiative. Member states of the SCO include China, Russia and four Central Asian states, who are involved in the SCO Business Council and the SCO Interbank Consortium to work on multilateral financial and economic projects. At the SCO Summit in July this year, the Russian and Chinese leaders agreed to consider SCO as "a convenient floor for integrating the implementation of [the New Silk Road and the EEU]."[23] Both countries voiced support for joint infrastructure development and financing development in the region, calling for a common SCO transport system that incorporates and enlarges the volume of existing transport systems such as Russia's Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur railways.[24]

The New Silk Road initiative will deepen China's cooperation with Central Asian countries to improve border control and reduce entry barriers, so that informal trade will be directed into formal channels, and countries will reap tax, customs and security benefits.

The SCO will facilitate China's economic engagement in Central Asia and advance the goals of the New Silk Road.

China's "Win-Win" Strategy

Although China is entering Russia's traditional sphere of geopolitical influence and deepening its economic presence in Central Asia, Russia's official reactions have been largely mild. One key reason for this is that China offers Russia a substantial piece of its domestic energy market, thus achieving a "win-win" in this area. According to British Petroleum data, Russia produced 12.9 percent of the world's total production of oil in 2013.[25] China (including Hong Kong), on the other hand, was responsible for 12.5 percent of world total oil consumption.[26] As the world's largest energy consumer and still a fast-growing emerging economy, China seems to have few problems offering energy contracts to both Russia and Central Asian countries.

As Jane Nakano and Edward C. Chow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies observe, China and Russia have grounds for mutual benefit in the energy sector. China needs to expand its energy imports to meet domestic demand and improve its environment, while Russia needs to diversify exports in its natural gas market and sustain its economy.[27] Revenue from energy exports comprises over 70 percent of Russia's total export revenues; however, this revenue has been jeopardized by Russia's economic crisis and the fall of oil prices.[28] Due to these complementary needs, a score of bilateral energy deals were signed in 2014. In May 2014, China and Russia concluded a landmark $400 billion natural gas supply contract. Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a deal on supplying 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year from West Siberia to China, starting from 2018.[29] Also, Russia's Novatek is to supply at least 3 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to China, and Rosneft will double its oil supplies to China.[30] Russia has even allowed CNPC to take a 20 percent stake in Novatek's project and a 49 percent stake in Rosneft's oil development project in East Siberia, "rare moves of the Russian energy sector" since Russia doesn't usually invite foreign investment in this industry.[31] With the European market stagnant and the European Union imposing economic sanctions on Russia, it is in Russia's interest to expand its energy exports to Asia, starting from China, its closest Asian Pacific neighbor. Indeed, Russia's energy strategy to 2035, released in 2014, forecasts that "23 percent of all energy exports will be sent to the Asia-Pacific region by 2035," up from the 6 percent it currently exports to the Asia-Pacific.[32]

Unlike Russia, however, Central Asian nations cannot match China's geographical size, international status, economic power and political clout. For these countries then, economic relationships with China present both an opportunity and a dilemma. While China is eager to expand trade and build infrastructure in Central Asia, Chinese imports from Central Asia remain mostly raw materials, and Chinese infrastructure projects often involve Chinese companies that employ more Chinese workers than locals.[33] For example, while Kazakhstan exports metals and crude oil to China, China exports clothing, electronics and household appliances to Kazakhstan.[34] The imbalance in both trade volumes and content between China and Central Asian countries risks fueling public discontent and social tension, as demonstrated by protests against leasing farmland to Chinese farmers in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in 2010.[35] While such issues should be recognized and resolved either through short-term policy corrections or long-term economic development, they



President Nazarbayev and President Xi Jinping, pictured center and right, at a talk before Xi Jinping accepted a peace prize for his New Silk Road vision.

should not overshadow the fact that "win-win" economic opportunities for China and Central Asian countries do exist. Central Asian countries can employ the New Silk Road to diversify their trading partners and revive their importance in "trans-continental transit trade" as goods are routed "through the reemerging East-West and North-South trade routes."[36]

Infrastructure development advanced by the New Silk Road initiative is a "win-win" because it diversifies and enlarges trade opportunities for both China and Central Asian countries. CAREC Corridor 1 is "an important transit route for cargo" from China, Kazakhstan, Russia, and European countries that will generate significant revenue in transit fees for the countries it traverses.[37] The Korla-Kuqa expressway, part of CAREC Corridor 5, connects "improved rural roads to schools, hospitals, and markets for about 50,000 rural people," facilitating the expansion of trade.[38] With regard to oil and gas, the most important product in China's trade with Central Asia, it is as much in Central Asian countries' interest to diversify their energy exports as it is in China's interest to import from them. When in 1998 Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin cut off the export of gas from Turkmenistan, it reminded the country that trade diversification was indispensable for economic security.[39] For Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the two states in Central Asia with more politically autonomous relationships with Russia, China has become an increasingly important trading partner. For instance, 60 percent of Uzbekistan's energy resources now flow to China.[40]

Coexistence between the New Silk Road and EEU

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) aims to become a powerful economic union that will accumulate "natural resources, capital, and strong human potential" in the region to become a competitive regional bloc in the international economy.[41] Currently, the EEU has five members: Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Together, the EEU members produce a GDP of $2,411.2 billion and are the top natural gas producers in the world.[42] The common understanding among its members is that the EEU seeks to deepen regional economic integration, with its first and foremost goal to create "common markets of electric power, gas, oil and petroleum products."[43] A common market of labor" is the intended next step—an ecnomic boost for member countries whose national income relies substantially on remittances.[44]

Tajikistan needs Russia as a market to export labor.[47] At the same time, Tajikistan is worried about limitations on its trade with non-EEU countries and constraints on its foreign policy.

The recent accession of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan into the EEU occurred amid domestic opposition and doubt. Their concerns, shared by other Central Asian countries, derived from the potential risks of accession to the EEU: losing economic gains in trade with non-EEU countries and losing political influence in sovereign affairs to Russia. Kyrgyzstan is currently a key re-exporter of Chinese goods, in which it imports goods from China on a low customs fee scheme and makes profit by selling these goods to Kazakhstan and Russia, where customs fees on goods from China are higher. However, the EEU's new import tariff for goods originating outside the EEU is higher than Kyrgyzstan's current tariff regime and might cause Kyrgyzstan to lose its profitable position in this trade.[45] Tajikistan, the next likely candidate for membership in the EEU, has similar concerns. The majority of Tajiks favor joining the Union in hopes of less restrictions on their ability to work in Russia.[46] With its working-age population rapidly growing and domestic job growth unable to keep pace, Tajikistan needs Russia as a market to export labor.[47] At the same time, Tajikistan is worried about limitations on its trade with non-EEU countries and constraints on its foreign policy. Higher and less uniform tariffs within the Union would result in more expensive imports from non-EEU member countries.[48] Smuggling from border countries will be reduced due to tightened security, and the volume of Chinese goods available for re-export will decrease.[49]

Central Asian countries are also apprehensive about Russia's political motives for economic integration. In 2014, Russia supplied 61.9 percent of the volume of goods in the EEU market, while Belarus supplied 29 percent, and Kazakhstan supplied a mere 9.1 percent.[50] Russia's economic clout could easily translate into political leverage within the economic union. Comparison with the development of the European Economic Community and the Eurasian Economic Union also suggests the possibility of further political integration. EEU institutions, such as the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the Eurasian Economic Commission, are modeled after those of the European Union.[51] It seems inevitable that political considerations will come into play as Russia "coordinates" policy for the ends of achieving "common markets" in the Union.[52] For one, Moscow's threats of reducing migrant worker quotas would be an effective way of pressuring other EEU members. For another the EEU should in principle "apply a common external trade policy in all respects to third countries," and Russia's counter-sanctions against Europe are also imposed on other EEU countries, which affects their economic growth and displays Russia's tendency of aligning other countries' economic interests with its own to meet political objectives.[53] Such action has already provoked reaction from Belarus and Kazakhstan, who are not complying with these counter-sanctions and continue to purchase banned European goods.[54]

In contrast, China's New Silk Road initiative is an economic agenda and does not even remotely resemble a political union. As this paper has discussed, China's initiative relies on bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, some already existing, for developing infrastructure

Expanding trade with China enables Central Asian countries to balance against Russia's economic power, which also curbs Russia's political leverage on them.

China and Russia...must choose whether to compete or cooperate while pursuing their goals in Central Asia.

and trade in Central Asia. The New Silk Road "centers" its approach to regional integration on economic cooperation and "economic facilitation."[55] Its main components as identified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are policy communication, road connectivity, trade, monetary circulation and people-to-people exchange.[56] These components all serve the overarching goal of facilitating economic growth. China also takes extra care to stick to its economic agenda and avoids interfering with domestic politics in the region. For example, it has held off from investing in the Rogun Dam until Tajikistan and Uzbekistan resolve their disputes over the project.[57] Using David Arase's phrase, the aim of the Silk Road Initiative is "to channel economic flows to or from China."[58]

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the New Silk Road initiative offers great potential for "win-win" cooperation in Central Asia, between China, Russia and Central Asian countries. For Central Asian countries, an economic relationship with both Russia and China is double insurance. Expanding trade with China enables Central Asian countries to balance against Russia's economic power, which also curbs Russia's political leverage on them.[59] According to Nate Schenkkan of Freedom House, Central Asian countries are especially vulnerable to low oil and gas prices, ruble depreciation, remittance income from migrant workers in Russia, and Russian investment and contracts for infrastructure.[60] Deeper energy and economic ties with China serve to boost growth when the Russian option is yielding weak results, such as during Russia's current economic crisis beginning in 2014. At the same time, maintaining trade ties with Russia guards against China's potential "economic imperialism,"[61] with negative consequences for economic dependency and the environment. Central Asian countries can balance both Russia and China to ameliorate the negative effects of going over completely to one side and cutting ties with the other.

With regard to the relationship between China and Russia, they must choose whether to compete or cooperate while pursuing their goals in Central Asia. Cooperation is the more pragmatic and likely choice. Indeed, China and Russia have already begun to take concrete steps to cooperate. In May 2015, China and Russia agreed to "set up a dialogue mechanism for the integration" of their strategic initiatives towards the region.[61] As Andrew Scobell, Ely Ratner and Michael Beckley of the RAND Corporation point out, China's influence in Central Asia "remains quite modest except in the economic realm," and China is unlikely to impede Russia's political ambitions in the region in the foreseeable future.[62] The two countries are courting the same Central Asian countries

with a shared aim of regional economic growth. Joint development of infrastructure projects would give Russia access to China's deep investment pockets for improving connectivity in Central Asia, and a joint customs space would cut costs for Chinese goods going to the European Union through the EEU.[63] By advancing regional infrastructure development and trade, the New Silk Road may prove a new engine for realizing "win-win" cooperation among all players in the region.

Norm or Necessity?

The Non-Interference Principle in ASEAN

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Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one of the most prominent intergovernmental organizations in Asia. ASEAN's main achievement has been to unite ten countries in Southeast Asia through shared goals of regional peace and prosperity.[i] It attributes this success to the "ASEAN Way", of which the principle of non-interference is an integral part.[1] Singapore's former Foreign Minister, Shunmugam Jayakumar asserted in 1997 that ASEAN's principle of non-interference in countries' domestic affairs had been "the key factor as to why no military conflict had broken out between any two member states since 1967."[2] Since 1997, however, countries outside the region have blamed the non-interference doctrine for ASEAN's ineffectiveness in dealing with regional problems.[3] Calls for the adjustment and even abandonment of this norm have been voiced inside and outside the association, but ASEAN has kept the non-interference principle at the core of its diplomacy. In its first charter, signed in 2007, non-interference was retained as ASEAN's bedrock principle despite recommendations it be adjusted by a high-level advisory group of ASEAN's elder statesmen.[4]

This paper evaluates the importance of the non-interference principle in ASEAN and explains the group's steadfast adherence to it. Although ASEAN has never provided an official definition of this principle, in this paper interference is identified as ASEAN's deliberate attempts to influence the outcome of a conflict in a country without the consent of its government. Based on ASEAN's activities from 1997 to 2007, the paper argues that the non-interference principle does not actually impact ASEAN's decision-making about whether to interfere in a domestic conflict. However, the organization retains the principle primarily because it gives nondemocratic members of ASEAN confidence in their immunity to external intervention.

Literature Review

Although ASEAN has never defined the non-interference norm, the organization's key documents and references show that the norm means protection of its members' Westphalian sovereignty. Krasner (1999) defined Westphalian sovereignty as "an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures."[5] The non-interference norm requires that ASEAN refrain both from criticizing member governments' actions towards their own citizens and from making the domestic

political system of states and the political styles of governments a basis for deciding their membership in ASEAN.[6]

Krasner also discusses two logics of action in international affairs: a logic of expected consequences and a logic of appropriateness.[7] A logic of expected consequences views "political action and outcomes, including institutions, as the product of rational calculating behavior designed to maximize a given set of unexplained preferences."[8] A logic of appropriateness sees "political action as a product of rules, roles, and identities that stipulate appropriate behavior in given situations."[9] The debate over ASEAN's non-interference principle centers on the question of whether its adoption follows a logic of expected consequences or a logic of appropriateness. In other words, scholars still disagree whether ASEAN adheres to the principle because of its practical benefits or because of its virtues.

Acharya (2009) argues that a logic of appropriateness drove ASEAN's founding states to adopt the non-interference principle, although he acknowledges this decision was also partly due to their concerns about regime security and internal stability under threat of communist subversion.[10] Given the Southeast Asian states' diversity with regard to size, economic development, ethnicity, socio-cultural heritage and history, ASEAN's founders needed appropriate codes of conduct and norms to help ASEAN countries unite and foster a peaceful political environment.[11] In particular, the principle of non-interference "played a crucial role in molding this interaction and compromise" among ASEAN countries.[12]As non-interference has become "part of the ASEAN identity," ASEAN has adhered to it fairly consistently, even though it inhibited the organization from reacting effectively to regional political crises.[13] Many scholarly works assume that ASEAN's non-interference principle is indeed sacrosanct.[14]

However, a logic of appropriateness cannot explain why ASEAN intervened in the domestic affairs of Cambodia in 1997 or those of Myanmar after 2003. Those aforementioned scholars merely dismiss these cases as exceptions in an otherwise consistent pattern of ASEAN non-interference. They fail to recognize that these were the only post-Cold War political conflicts that occurred in small and weak Southeast Asian states, while all the ones that ASEAN remained silent about related directly to big regional players.

In contrast, other scholars adopt a realist perspective and explain ASEAN's non-interference principle based on a logic of consequences.[15] According to this view, ASEAN countries stick to the non-interference principle because it protects member states with illiberal regimes. It can be relaxed on occasion to soothe international criticisms of ASEAN inaction, but overall, the organization's concern for regime security is predominant.[16] Khoo and Jones highlight cases where ASEAN countries have interfered in others' internal affairs to argue that the non-interference principle is applied flexibly to best serve certain states' interests.[17] However, these scholars' focus on the instances where ASEAN violated its non-interference principle (termed "violation cases" hereafter) overlooks those where it did not (termed "non-violation cases" hereafter). They fail to completely rule out the possibility that these interventions were just exceptions to ASEAN's norm of non-interference.

Overall, existing scholarship fails to offer a systematic analysis of ASEAN's responses to political and security conflicts in the region and their implications for understanding

the non-interference principle. Instead, they only provide disconnected examples and anecdotes to support their arguments. This method also makes it difficult to identify patterns in ASEAN's adherence to the non-interference principle over time and across cases.

Assessing ASEAN's non-interference: logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness?

To evaluate ASEAN's adherence to the non-interference norm and its motivations, this paper examines a decade of the organization's responses to prominent internal political-security conflicts. The timeframe for my analysis begins in 1997, when criticisms of the non-interference principle first appeared, and ends in 2007, when ASEAN decided to formalize the principle in its charter.[18] Although political-security conflicts are not the only realm where the non-interference principle is applicable, they are most directly related to governments' concerns about regime security and stability, which many realists argue is the reason for ASEAN's attachment to the principle. The list of conflicts is drawn fro the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, scholarly articles, and news reports from the NewsBank database. The information on ASEAN's responses is taken from official statements on the ASEAN Secretariat's website and reports in domestic and international media. ASEAN's intervention is defined as its deliberate attempts to influence the outcome of a conflict in a country without the consent of its government. Table 1 presents the conflicts, the parties involved, and whether ASEAN intervened or not.[ii, iii]

Table 1: Political-Security Conflicts In Southeast Asia 1997-2007

Case	Conflict	Year*	Conflict parties	ASEAN intervention?
1	Cambodian coup d'état	1997	CPP (led by Hun Sen) vs. FUNCINPEC (led by Norodom Ranariddh)	Yes
2	Philippines-Mindanao conflict	1997-2007	Government of Philippines vs. Muslim rebel groups (MILF, MNLF,ASG)	No
3	Political persecution of former Malaysian Deputy PM Anwar Ibrahim	1998	Government of Malaysia vs. Anwar Ibrahim	No
4	Insurgency in Aceh, Indonesia	1999-2005	Government of Indonesia vs. Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	No
5	East Timorese crisis**	1999	Government of Indonesia vs. East Timorese	No
6	Myanmar's suppression of the pro-democracy movement	1997 – 2007; Aung San Suu Kyi's arrest (2000-2002; 2003-2007)	Military government vs. National League for Democracy (NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi)	Yes
7	South Thailand insurgency	2003-2007; Tak Bai Incident (2004)	Government of Thailand vs. Patani insurgents	No
8	Thai coup d'état	2006	Royal Thai Army vs. PM Thaksin Shinawatra	No

These two cases of ASEAN interference in the domestic affairs of Myanmar and Cambodia suggest a double standard in adherence to the non-interference principle

During these ten years, ASEAN only intervened in two cases: the coup in Cambodia (1997) and the political persecution of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar (cases 1 and 6). It is tempting to conclude that these cases are only rare exceptions to the norm. However, closer examination reveals that all cases of non-interference are related directly to the founding members of ASEAN – Thailand (case 7 and 8), Indonesia (case 4 and 5), the Philippines (case 2) and Malaysia (case 3). These countries are also the most advanced economies in the region. In 2002, for instance, Indonesia's GDP comprised 30% of the region's total GDP and was the biggest ASEAN economy.[19] Thailand was the second biggest with 19.5% of ASEAN's total GDP, while Malaysia and the Philippines contributed 15.5% and 12.5% of ASEAN's total GDP respectively. In contrast, Cambodia and Myanmar were among the poorest countries in the region. In 2002, Myanmar's GDP was only 1.2% of ASEAN's total GDP while Cambodia was the second poorest state with only 0.66% of ASEAN's total GDP. Moreover, both Myanmar and Cambodia were relatively new members of ASEAN; Cambodia was still applying for the membership when the coup happened.

These two cases of ASEAN interference in the domestic affairs of Myanmar and Cambodia suggest a double standard in adherence to the non-interference principle: the organization upholds the principle whenever conflicts occur within its powerful members (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia) are primary parties, but can interfere when they involve its poorer and weaker members. To further assess and analyze this pattern, the following sections examine the two cases of norm violation and then discuss the non-violation ones.

Violation Case #1: Cambodia

In July 1997, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) ousted the First Prime Minister Norodom Ranaridh of the Royalist Party (FUNCINPEC) in national elections. This broke the two-prime-minister government system arranged after the UN-supervised election in 1993.[20] The event happened while Cambodia was in the process of applying for ASEAN membership. When the crisis hit, ASEAN initially denied that this internal conflict would affect its decision about whether to admit Cambodia as a member state.[21] This was in line with its non-interference principle; according to the principle, ASEAN should not use the domestic political system of a country as grounds to decide its admission into ASEAN.[22]

However, ASEAN's attitude changed after its major trading partners - the United States, the European Union and Japan - all pressured it to use its economic leverage to solve the political crisis in Cambodia.[23] ASEAN's foreign ministers announced after their ministerial meeting in July 1997 that they had decided to delay Cambodia's entry into ASEAN indefinitely.[24] In addition, ASEAN sent a delegation consisting of the Indonesian, Thai, and Philippine Foreign Ministers to Cambodia to mediate a settlement.[25]

Violation Case #2: Myanmar

A military dictatorship took over the government of Myanmar in 1989.[26] The junta refused to convene the parliament and transfer power to the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, despite the NLD's landslide victory in the 1990 national election. Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest from 1989 to 1995, and then again from 2000 to 2002, and 2003 to 2007.

Unlike Cambodia, Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN in 1997 despite strong objections by the US and EU due to Myanmar's poor human rights and democracy record.[27] With abundant natural resources, Myanmar was a potential engine of economic growth for ASEAN.[28] ASEAN did not want to delay Myanmar's entry into ASEAN because it worried that Myanmar might get closer to China as a result.[29] ASEAN justified its admission of Myanmar with the concept of "constructive engagement", promising to encourage political liberalization in Myanmar by helping it develop its economy.[30] This "constructive engagement", however, proved unsuccessful when the military junta in Myanmar put Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for the third time in 2003. After this, the Western powers put more pressure on ASEAN to resolve the issue. The EU boycotted any meeting or cooperation project with ASEAN that Myanmar participated in.[31] Washington also stalled free-trade talks with ASEAN to signal its disapproval of Myanmar's political behavior. Consequently, ASEAN ministers, for the first time, jointly urged Myanmar to release Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members.[32] In 2004, with no progress toward democratization in Myanmar, the US and some EU members, led by the UK, threatened not to attend the 2006 ASEAN Summit chaired by Myanmar unless Myanmar released Ms. Suu Kyi from house arrest.[33] Powerful ASEAN members such as Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia pressured Myanmar to relinquish its position as chair.[34] Arguing that Myanmar's internal affairs carried "implications for the region," ASEAN continued to break the non-interference norm to push for quicker political reforms.[35] It sent an envoy headed by the Malaysian Foreign Minister to Myanmar in 2006 to examine Myanmar's progress in improving its human rights conditions.[36] ASEAN also publicly urged Myanmar to speed up political reforms and demanded tangible results in what amounted to the strongest statement ASEAN has ever made about the domestic politics of one of its member states.[37] When Myanmar's military government suppressed a protest by Buddhist monks, ASEAN foreign ministers openly expressed their horror and urged the junta to exercise restraint.[38]

Although the conflicts in Myanmar and Cambodia differed in nature and length, ASEAN received tremendous international pressure in both cases to intervene, especially for Myanmar. One can argue that because both countries have abundant natural resources and border many ASEAN countries, ASEAN was particularly concerned about their stability. Nevertheless, ASEAN was reluctant to break the non-interference principle in both cases before it came under significant pressure from its top trade partners. This suggests that international pressure, in addition to the relative power of the states involved, is an important factor

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The flags of ASEAN flying during the 18th ASEAN Summit in Jakarta.

in these cases. However, as the following sections show, when ASEAN's powerful members are directly involved, even international pressure cannot force ASEAN to break its golden rule of non-interference.

The Non-Interference Principle Upheld

To examine the effectiveness of a norm, one not only needs to look for violations, but also to evaluate whether actors would still behave in the same way without the norm.[39] I argue that the involvement of powerful states, not the non-interference principle, was the reason why ASEAN refused to interfere in the non-violation cases.

The East Timorese crisis is a telling example. East Timor was Indonesia's colony for more than 30 years. In 1998, in a referendum organized by UN peacekeeping forces, 79.5 percent of East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia.[40] Immediately after that, the pro-Indonesian Timorese militia, armed by the Indonesian army, killed approximately 1,200 civilians in East Timor.[41] Similar to the conflicts in Cambodia and Myanmar, the East Timorese crisis also attracted much international attention. Its timing (1999) was close to that of Cambodia's coup and was during the period when ASEAN was trying to shore up its standing after the Asian Financial crisis. However, although the Security Council and the US urged ASEAN to persuade Indonesia to accept external intervention, ASEAN insisted that East Timor was Indonesia's internal affair and maintained the non-interference principle.[42] The organization also avoided discussing East Timor in their meetings.[43] Only when Indonesia explicitly consented to UN peacekeeping and requested ASEAN countries' participation in these peacekeeping forces did ASEAN members collaborate with the UN.[44]

Considering that ASEAN interfered in Cambodia and Myanmar's domestic affairs despite initial protests by those two countries' governments, ASEAN's sensitivity to Indonesia's reaction can only be understood in terms of Indonesia's importance in the organization. Not only is Indonesia one of ASEAN's founders, it is also the largest country in Southeast Asia and had the highest GDP in the region in 1999.[45] Therefore, ASEAN countries had strong incentives to avoid offending this nation. ASEAN's deference toward Indonesia was apparent even before the crisis. The organization stood by when Indonesia's invasion of East Timor was raised in 1976 at the UN General Assembly.[46]

Given that ASEAN refused to offend Indonesia despite tremendous international pressure,

It is no surprise that ASEAN remained silent regarding the conflicts in Mindanao (Philippines), Aceh (Indonesia), southern Thailand, the political persecution of a former Malaysian deputy prime minister, and the 2006 coup in Thailand.

it is no surprise that ASEAN remained silent regarding the conflicts in Mindanao (Philippines), Aceh (Indonesia), southern Thailand, the political persecution of a former Malaysian deputy prime minister, and the 2006 coup in Thailand. All of these conflicts not only directly involved powerful ASEAN states (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia) but also generated relatively lesser international pressure on ASEAN. Moreover, as the list of conflicts shows, most of ASEAN's powerful states had to deal with separatism and ethnic tensions in their territories. Thus, it is only logical that they would resist ASEAN's involvement in ethnic conflicts (cases 2, 4, 5 and 7), because they did not want to establish a precedent that would allow future ASEAN inference in their own ethnic conflicts.[47]

Therefore, even without the non-interference norm, ASEAN would still not have intervened in the non-violation cases, because it feared offending its most powerful members. Together with the two cases of violation in Cambodia and Myanmar, this conclusion strongly suggests that the non-interference norm does not decide whether ASEAN intervenes in a conflict or not. The question, then, is why ASEAN would still kep the non-interference principle.

Reasons for Retaining the Non-Interference Principle

To understand why ASEAN insisted on keeping the non-interference principle in its 2007 Charter, even though the norm itself does not determine ASEAN's pattern of interference, one must understand the value of this principle to ASEAN member states. Realist scholars like Haacke and Jones have incorrectly assumed that all ASEAN member states value the non-interference principle for protecting their sovereignty. However, the ten ASEAN countries have very different political systems, interests and priorities, and thus different valuations of this principle. Therefore, they have different levels of resistance toward changes to the non-interference norm. An examination of ASEAN members' diverse reactions toward challenges to the non-interference principle illuminates their attitudes.

How much an ASEAN country resists changing the non-interference principle depends on how confident it is of its immunity to future ASEAN interference in the absence of the non-interference principle. I argue that this confidence (called "Confidence" hereafter) depends on two factors: the country's level of democratization and its relative power in the region. The more democratic a state is, the more legitimacy the government has and the less it worries that ASEAN would come under international pressure to interfere in its domestic affairs on the grounds of supporting human rights or democracy. On the other hand, the more relative power an ASEAN country has, the less other member states wish to offend this country and damage their relations with it.

To illustrate this point, I create a Confidence scale from 0 to 1 to measure ASEAN members' confidence that their sovereignty

will not come under threat even without the non-interference principle. Each country's score is the weighted sum of its level of democratization (calculated from its Freedom House score[iv]) and its relative power (a composite indicator estimated based on its GDP, population and military expenditures).[v] Graph 1 shows the Confidence scores of all ASEAN countries in the period 1997-2007.

Based on these scores, ASEAN members can be divided into three groups. The first group with Confidence score less than 0.15 includes weaker and less democratic members of ASEAN, such as Myanmar, Laos, Brunei, and Vietnam. I predict that these countries would most resist any change to the non-interference norm, because they would be the most likely targets of future ASEAN intervention, given the undemocratic nature of their regimes and their limited relative power. The members of the second group, with Confidence scores ranging from 0.15 to 0.3, are Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia (before 1999) and Thailand (after 2005). These countries are major powers in ASEAN, but with relatively democratic regimes. Thus, they still want to keep the non-interference principle to protect their illiberal political system, but they are more flexible regarding its applications due to their confidence in their relative power. The last group with the highest Confidence score (above 0.3) includes all democratic countries in ASEAN: the Philippines, Indonesia (after 1999), and Thailand (before 2005). They are the most confident in their legitimacy because of their more democratic systems. Therefore, I predict they would be the strongest advocates for changes to the non-interference principle in ASEAN.

To test my hypotheses, I examine the diverse responses of ASEAN members to proposals and issues that challenged the non-interference principle between 1997 and 2007. Because ASEAN exercises quiet diplomacy and holds private meetings, these responses can only be collected from foreign ministers' public statements and interviews with journalists. Therefore, one can only observe the reactions of countries with the strongest opinions regarding whether ASEAN should adhere or deviate from the non-interference principle. Table 2 (Challenges for the non-interference principle in ASEAN 1997-2007) represents cases when there were diverse opinions regarding the application of the non-interference principle, together with the strongest proponents and opponents of changes to the principle. Their Confidence scores are put in parentheses next to their names. For issues that lasted more than one year, the ranges of Confidence scores are reported instead of a single score.

The results in Table 2 fit my hypothesized expectations for the three groups, except for the highlighted cases of Indonesia and Thailand (which will be addressed in further detail later). Countries in Group 1 (with a Confidence score less than 0.15) persistently opposed any deviations from the non-interference principle. For them, the non-interference principle guarantees protection for their weaker and less democratic regimes. They are afraid that any small deviation from the principle will set a dangerous precedent for future ASEAN interference in domestic affairs.

Apart from the highlighted cases of Indonesia and Thailand, countries in Group 3 (with a Confidence score more than 0.3), with high Freedom House score and strong relative power, are the strongest proponents for changes to the non-interference principle. As these countries are democratic, their governments have to respond to their constituents and bear responsibility for the results of their foreign policies. Therefore, when international criticism of the non-

Graph 1: Confidence Scores of ASEAN countries (1997-2007)



Table 1: Challenges for the Non-Interference Principle in ASEAN 1997-2007

Cases	Issues/ Proposals	Year	Advocates for deviation from the non-interference principle	Opponents of deviation from the non-interference principle
1	Myanmar's entry despite its human rights record	1997	*Reluctant to admit Myanmar:* - Thailand (0.42) - Philippines (0.43)	*Advocate for Myanmar's admittance:* - Malaysia (0.27) - Singapore (0.25)
2	Postponement of Cambodia's entry because of the coup	1997	*ASEAN decided to postpone Cambodia's admission, but no countries publicly expressed their individual opposition to Cambodia's admission*	*Against the postponement of Cambodia's membership* - Vietnam (0.04)
3	Proposal for "flexible engagement" to allow interventions when domestic conflicts have regional implications	1998-9	*Strongest proponents* - Thailand (0.45) - Philippines (0.44)	*Strongest opponents:* - Myanmar (0.04) - Laos (0.04) - Vietnam (0.04) - Indonesia (0.26 – 0.37) - Malaysia (0.22 – 0.23) - Singapore (0.23 – 0.24)
4	Proposal for Troika – a mechanism to tackle issues of urgency with regional impacts	1999	*Strongest proponents* - Thailand (0.45) - Philippines (0.44) - Singapore (0.24)	*Strongest opponents* - Myanmar (0.04) - Vietnam (0.04) - Cambodia (0.03) - Laos (0.04) - Malaysia (0.23) - Indonesia (0.37)
5	"ASEAN Security Community" proposal – "flexible non-interference"	2003	*Proposes the idea:* - Indonesia (0.46)	*ASEAN struck down the proposal, but no countries publicly expressed their individual opposition*
6	Proposal for southeast Asian peacekeeping force	2003	*Proposes the idea:* - Indonesia (0.46)	*Strongest opponents:* - Thailand (0.44) - Singapore (0.20) - Vietnam (0.09)
7	Myanmar's arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi	2003 – 2007	*Publicly criticize Myanmar* - Indonesia (0.43 – 0.52) - Philippines (0.34 – 0.42) - Malaysia (0.26 – 0.31) - Singapore (0.26 – 0.27)	*Public defend Myanmar* - Thailand (0.19 – 0.44) - Cambodia (0.13) - Vietnam (0.09 – 0.14) - Laos (0.04)
8	Proposal for a regional mechanism on human rights	2004 – 2007	*Strongest proponents* - Indonesia (0.43 – 0.52) - Philippines (0.34 – 0.43)	*Strongest opponents:* - Myanmar (0.06) - Cambodia (0.13) - Laos (0.04) - Vietnam (0.10 – 0.14)
9	Review of non-interference principle in the new Charter	2006-2007	*Publicly recommends* - Philippines (0.34 – 0.38) - Malaysia (0.30 – 0.31) - Singapore (0.27)	*Publicly opposes* - Vietnam (0.12 – 0.14)

Activists gather to protest the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi.

interference principle started to damage ASEAN's reputation, it also lowered these states' credibility and damaged relations with their major partners (the US, the EU, and Japan). Therefore, these democratic governments felt the need to change the non-interference principle and improve their images. Moreover, democratic countries often have strong civil society actors who oppose human rights abuses by their undemocratic ASEAN partners and demand actions from their democratic governments. For example, in 2004, the Philippines' parliamentarians pressured the government to oppose Myanmar becoming the chair of ASEAN in 2006 because of its continued detention of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.[48] This also explains why all the proposals to change the interpretation of the non-interference principle came from democratic ASEAN members.

Countries in Group 2 (with a Confidence score more than 0.15 but less than 0.3) have the most inconsistent patterns of adherence to the non-interference principle. The countries in this group, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia (before 1999) and Thailand (after 2005), are concerned enough for their illiberal governments to want to maintain the existence of the non-interference principle. However, they are also confident enough in their relative power within ASEAN to deviate from the non-interference principle when the cost of upholding it exceeds its benefits. For instance, in 1998, Singapore strongly opposed Thailand's proposal for "flexible engagement" to loosen the principle of non-interference (case 3). However, in 1999, Singapore advocated for the Troika mechanism to respond to urgent internal issues that may have spillover effects in the region (case 4). Singapore's position was affected by its concern about the regional economic recovery and investors' confidence. Singapore's former Foreign Minister, S. Jayakumar, emphasized that "ASEAN faced a crisis of confidence."[49] The international community had criticized ASEAN's non-interference principle for paralyzing the organization during the 1997 Asian Financial crisis. Singapore realized that unless ASEAN made some changes to the non-interference norm, its economy would suffer. Nevertheless, it still wished to maintain the non-interference principle to protect its own undemocratic government. Although the Troika mechanism was clearly a deviation from the non-interference principle, Jayakumar tried to argue that it should not be construed as "compromising sovereignty," but as "greater cooperation and pooling of our resources to deal with problems that countries cannot handle on their own separately but yet can affect the others."[50]

Indonesia and Thailand provide the three observed instances of prediction outliers,

suggesting the analytical limits of the Confidence score. When Indonesia's Confidence score was 0.37, it still opposed the proposal for Troika in 1999. Indonesia's confidence score increased dramatically from 0.27 in 1998 to 0.37 in 1999 because Indonesia's nondemocratic President Suharto was forced to step down because of his failure to fix the problems of the financial crisis. Indonesia's Freedom House score changed immediately from 5 to 3.5. Although Suharto's successor, President B. J. Habibie, started to democratize the country in 1999, its transition into a full democracy was not complete until 2003. In the four years after Suharto stepped down, two presidents were ousted by the Indonesian parliament.[51] With its unstable new democracy, Indonesia in 1999 was not yet ready for changes to ASEAN's non-interference principle. The Confidence score, which is strongly based on the Freedom House score, cannot pick up Indonesia's vulnerability during this transition from 1998 to 2003. Starting from 2003, Indonesia's behavior fits this paper's prediction well. It tirelessly advocated for a reinterpretation of the non-interference principle with proposals for ASEAN Security Community (case 5), a Southeast Asian peacekeeping force (case 6), and an ASEAN human rights mechanism (case 8).

Thailand's behavior in 2003 and 2004 also deviates from the prediction based on the Confidence score. This result is also due to the insensitivity of the Freedom House scores. Although Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was democratically elected in 2001, he was not a liberal leader. Under his harsh policies, Thailand's human rights record worsened. His 2003 police crackdown on drug-trafficking caused the deaths of an estimated 2,200 suspects.[52] His suppression of Muslim separatists in southern Thailand led to the infamous Tak Bai incident in 2004, when 87 protestors died of suffocation after they were packed into military trucks.[53] Thaksin kept using the non-interference principle to prevent discussions of these incidents in ASEAN. He threatened to walk out of the ASEAN Summit in 2004 if anyone mentioned the Tak Bai incident.[54] Therefore, even though technically Thailand was still a democratic country in 2003 and 2004 (and thus its Freedom House score was still 2.5), its government started to need the protection of the non-interference principle to shield its human rights abuses from criticism.

By examining individual ASEAN members' attitude toward the non-interference norm, one can clearly see that the strongest supporters of ASEAN's strict adherence to the non-interference principle are weaker, less democratic countries. The more democratic a country is, and the more relative power it has within ASEAN, the less it needs the non-interference norm. However, because relative power is relative – that is, an increase in country A's power causes a decrease in that of other countries – it is not possible to mitigate its influence on a country's stance regarding the non-interference principle. Only democratization is likely to prompt ASEAN to change this principle. Indonesia, for instance, transformed from a staunch protector of the non-interference principle into the most active advocate for its modification after its own democratization. Thus, as long as there are still few democratic countries in ASEAN, the non-interference norm is still likely to remain.

The more democratic a country is, and the more relative power it has within ASEAN, the less it needs the non-interference norm.

Conclusion

This paper has evaluated the importance of the non-interference principle in ASEAN and has explained its members' steadfast loyalty to it by examining the organization's actions from 1997 to 2007. Analyzing cases of violation and non-violation of the non-interference principle, it provides strong evidence that the non-interference principle has not determined whether ASEAN interferes in a domestic conflict or not. To explain ASEAN's attachment to the non-interference principle, I created a novel Confidence (of immunity) index and examined individual ASEAN members' responses to proposed challenges to the principle during this decade. The results demonstrate that the greater a state's level of democratization and relative power, the more confident it is of its immunity to future ASEAN interference and thus the less it insists on the continued existence of the non-interference principle in ASEAN. However, as relative power is relative, the main reason why ASEAN still retains the non-interference principle is because its democratic members are a minority. ASEAN's non-democratic members need the principle to give them confidence in their immunity to external intervention. Therefore, a logic of consequences best accounts for ASEAN's behavior regarding the non-interference principle.

ENDNOTES, REFERENCES

Terrorism and the Infinite Bargaining Model

Image Attributions

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Endnotes

[i]Note that d[U($\bar{c}$, c) and (1-d)[U($\bar{c}$,c)] both account for changes in the discount factor. My point, however, is to solely isolate the payoffs of noncooperation (the former expression) and explain how differences in the weight (d) affect its value, as it represents the category in which terrorist attacks reside.

A Silent Dissonance
LGBT+ Rights & Geopolitics in Maidan and Post-Maidan Ukraine

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Appendices

Appendix A: Confidence Scale Calculation

The Confidence scale measures ASEAN members' confidence that their sovereignty will not be subject to external interference. The first component of the index, democracy, is based on the Freedom House score of each country. Freedom House measures political rights and civil liberties of states, giving each country a score from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic). Here, this score is rescaled to fit the 0 to 1 scale and to vary in the same direction with the confidence level. For example, if a country's Freedom House score is 4 (like Indonesia in 1999), its Democracy index is calculated according to the formula below:

$$Dem=(7-4)/(7-1)=3/6=0.5$$

The second component of the Confidence scale, relative power (RP), is estimated from three proxies: GDP, population and military expenditures.[7] I calculate the GDP index (GDP) by dividing a country's GDP by ASEAN's total GDP of that same year. For example, in 2006, Thailand's GDP was 207.089 billion USD, while the total GDP of ASEAN was 1109.629 billion USD. Thus, its GDP index equals to 207.089/1109.629=0.187. The population index (Pop) and the military expenditures index (Milex) for each country are calculated using the same method with the GDP index. Because there has not been any dominant theory on which factor is more important to a country's relative power than the others, we distribute the weight equally for all factors. So the RP index is calculated using the formula:

$$RP=1/3\times GDP+1/3\times Pop+1/3\times Milex$$

The Confidence scale of each country, which measures the country's confidence in its immunity against future ASEAN's intervention in the absence of the non-interference principle, is the weighted sum of the two components – democracy (Dem) and relative power (RP):

$$Confidence=1/2\times Dem+1/2\times RP$$

$$0\leq Confidence\leq 1$$

Appendix B: Detailed Sources for Table 2

Table 2, showing cases when there were diverse opinions regarding the application of the non-interference principle from 1997 to 2007, is reproduced below with detailed sources for ASEAN members' positions in each case:

Cases	Issues/ Proposals	Year	Advocates for deviation from the non-interference principle	Opponents of deviation from the non-interference principle
1	Myanmar's entry despite its human rights record	1997	*Reluctant to admit Myanmar:* - Thailand (0.42)[4] - Philippines (0.43) [5]	*Advocate for Myanmar's admittance:* - Malaysia (0.27) [6] - Singapore (0.23) [7]
2	Postponement of Cambodia's entry because of the coup	1997	*NFNI for need to postpone Cambodia's admission, but no countries publicly expressed their individual opposition to Cambodia's admission*	*Against the postponement of Cambodia's membership:* - Vietnam (0.04) [8]
3	Proposal for "flexible engagement" to allow interventions when domestic conflicts have regional implications	1998-9	*Strongest proponents:* - Thailand (0.46) [9] - Philippines (0.44) [10]	*Strongest opponents:* - Myanmar (0.04)[11] - Laos (0.04)[12] - Vietnam (0.04) [13] - Indonesia (0.28 – 0.37)[14] - Malaysia (0.22 – 0.27)[15] - Singapore (0.25 – 0.24)
4	Proposal for Troika – a mechanism to tackle issues of urgency with regional impacts	1999	*Strongest proponents:* - Thailand (0.44) [16] - Philippines (0.44)[17] - Singapore (0.34)[18]	*Strongest opponents:* - Myanmar (0.04)[19] - Vietnam (0.04)[20] - Cambodia (0.09)[21] - Laos (0.04)[22] - Malaysia (0.23) [23] - Indonesia (0.27) [24]
5	"ASEAN Security Community" proposal – "flexible non-interference"	2003	*Proposes the idea:* - Indonesia (0.46)[25]	*ASEAN struck down the proposal, but no countries publicly expressed their individual opposition*
6	Proposal for Southeast Asian peacekeeping force	2003	*Proposes the idea:* - Indonesia (0.46)[26]	*Strongest opponents:* - Thailand (0.44)[27] - Singapore (0.26) [28] - Vietnam (0.09) [29]
7	Myanmar's arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi	2003 – 2007	*Publicly criticize Myanmar:* - Indonesia (0.43 – 0.52)[30][31] - Philippines (0.34 – 0.42) [32][33] - Malaysia (0.26 – 0.31) [34] - Singapore (0.26 – 0.27)[35]	*Public defend Myanmar:* - Thailand (0.19 – 0.44)[36] - Cambodia (0.13)[37] - Vietnam (0.09 – 0.14)[38][39] - Laos (0.04)[40][41]
8	Proposal for a regional mechanism on human rights	2004 – 2007	*Strongest proponents:* - Indonesia (0.43 – 0.52)[42][43] - Philippines (0.34 - 0.42)[44][45]	*Strongest opponents:* - Myanmar (0.04) [46][47] - Cambodia (0.13) [48][49] - Laos (0.04)[50][51] - Vietnam (0.10 – 0.14) [52]
9	Review of non-interference principle in the new Charter	2006-2007	*Publicly recommends* - Philippines (0.34 – 0.38)[53] - Malaysia (0.30 - 0.31)[54] - Singapore (0.27)[55]	*Publicly opposes* - Vietnam (0.12 – 0.14)[56]

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[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

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[6]Peter Alford, "Thais Push Radical Shift in ASEAN," Australian, The/Weekend Australian/Australian Magazine, The (Australia), July 6, 1998, 1 edition.

[7] Peter Alford, "Neighbours Fear Burma," Australian, The/Weekend Australian/Australian Magazine, The (Australia), July 10, 1998, 1 edition.

[8] Greg Torode, "Crisis-Hit Nations to 'Usher in' New Order," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 4, 1998, 2 edition.

[9]Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] "Indonesia Opposes Changing ASEAN's Nonintervention Policy," BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 15, 1998, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/0F98E44997028BED?p=AWNB.

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The (Australia), July 20, 1998, 1 edition.
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[16] Kim Chew Lee, "Potential for Action Shows There's Life in Asean yet," Straits Times, The (includes Sunday Times and Business Times) (Singapore), July 24, 2000.
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[18] Lee, "Potential for Action Shows There's Life in Asean yet."
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[21] Siangkin, "Is There a Lack of Focus in Indonesia's Foreign Policy?," Straits Times, The (includes Sunday Times and Business Times) (Singapore), October 2, 2000.
[22] Kornelius Purba, "Building 'Non-Interference,'" WorldSources Online, October 15, 2003, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/0FE3C061A81B689A?p=AWNB.
[23]Kim Chew Lee, "Peacekeeper Plan for Region Shelved - Jakarta's Proposal Fails to Get Support from Its Partners in Asean Which Say It Is Too Costly and Premature," Straits Times, [24]The (includes Sunday Times and Business Times) (Singapore), June 29, 2004, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/10382BB397AEED-E8?p=AWNB.
[25] "Undesirable Consequences of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force," WorldSources Online, March 2, 2004, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/101170A261AEB861?p=AWNB.
[26] "Asean's Peace," Straits Times, The (includes Sunday Times and Business Times) (Singapore), March 8, 2004, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/1012EE02450C0526?p=AWNB.
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[41]Ibid.
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Footnotes

[1] The ten countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.
[2] Conflict may have started or ended outside of this time frame
[3] This conflict is included because East Timor was Indonesia's colony and ASEAN referred to this conflict as an

internal issue for Indonesia (Dupont 163).
[4]Freedom House measures states' political rights and civil liberties on a scale from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic).
[5] More details on the calculation method are given in Appendix A.
[6] More details on sources for Table 2 are listed in Appendix B.
[7] Data sources: GDP -"IMF DataMapper."; Population - "Data | The World Bank," accessed January 13, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/; Military expenditures - J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," Peace, War, and Numbers 19 (1972), http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm; J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985," International Interactions 14, no. 2 (1988): 115–32.

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