

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW




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The Cornell International Affairs Review is a student-run organization aiming to provide an international, intergenerational, and interdisciplinary approach to foreign affairs.

Founded in 2006, the CIAR is proud to provide the Cornell community with a semesterly review, bringing together views from students, professors, and policymakers on the current events shaping our world.

It is our firm belief that true knowledge stems not just from textbooks and lectures but from engaging with others. Thus, the CIAR strongly emphasizes cooperation and dialogue amongst all our members, both on Cornell's campus and beyond.



When Should the US Intervene?

Criteria for Intervention in Weak Countries

Robert Keohane, Professor of International Affairs

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Letter from Tunisia

Elyès Jouini, Professor and Vice-President, Université Paris-Dauphine

Former Minister for the Economic and Social Reforms, Tunisian Transition Government

Empowering Women in the Chinese Capitalist Factory System

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The Problems with American Exceptionalism

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The Evolution of Revolution:

Social Media in the Modern Middle East and its Policy Implications

Taylor Bossung, Indiana University, 2012

Brazil's China Challenge

Carlos Sucre, MA Candidate, George Washington University

Information Technology and Control in the DPRK

Robert Duffley, Georgetown University, 2013

The Illusion of US Isolationism

Eugenio Lilli, King's College, London, Postgraduate Researcher, Teaching Fellow at the Defense Studies Department, UK Joint Services Command and Staff College

Militarization of Aid and its Implications for Colombia

Ian King, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 2012

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It is my great honor this semester to introduce the newest edition of the Cornell International Affairs Review and, in doing so, reflect on some of the intellectual activities CIAR and its members have participated in on Cornell's campus over the past several months. During a year of uncertainty in the international community, CIAR has spearheaded numerous events, as continues to foster dialogue online with its stimulating blog, The Diplomacist.

In September, following a fiercely partisan summer in American domestic politics, Professor Peter Katzenstein (Cornell University, Government) delivered a public lecture outlining his views on how the downgrade of American debt might affect United States foreign policy in a teetering global economy.

Marking a somber anniversary for the United States and the world, the Cornell community took a look back on the decade that has passed since the September 11th terrorist attacks during this semester's Lund Critical Debate organized by the Mario Einaudi Center. Through this event, students also had the opportunity to meet with Professor Stephen Rosen (Harvard College, Government) and Associate Professor Peter Beinart (CUNY, Journalism and Political Science) in more intimate settings to discuss their studies and backgrounds.

Then, in late September, the world suffered another tragedy with activist and Nobel Laureate Wangari Maathai losing her battle to cancer. In celebration of her life and legacy, CIAR invited visiting professor Dr. Waithera Karim-Sesay (Cornell University, Africana Studies) to deliver a memorial about the work and accomplishments of Wangari Maathai.

Returning to American foreign policy, Professor Elizabeth Sanders (Cornell University, Government) joined our members over coffee for a discussion of the Republican presidential field, why foreign policy has been largely neglected in debates thus far, and what we might expect to see from individual candidates.

Seeking to gain a deeper understanding of the effects new technologies and social media have had on the changing global landscape, our members shared a second coffee discussion later in October with Professor Lee Humphries (Cornell University, Communication) at the Carol Tatkon Center.

Against the backdrop of ongoing conflicts in Libya and Afghanistan, Professor Robert Keohane (Princeton University, Political Science) visited campus under the auspices of the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies as part of the Center's Foreign Policy distinguished speaker series. Professor Keohane met with students and delivered a public lecture on criteria for United States Military intervention in weak countries—a lecture that CIAR has the great privilege of publishing a transcript of in this semester's journal.

Finally, returning to the campus where her international career began, Livia Styp-Rekowska (Cornell University, Government, 1998) delivered a lecture for CIAR about her work with the International Organization for Migration, discussing humanitarian consequences and the human costs of conflict. Her remarks, both during her lecture and at a small dinner hosted in her honor, were an inspiration to the many students who had the opportunity to meet with her.

Looking back on my four years working with the Cornell International Affairs Review, I have truly been touched by the international, interdisciplinary, intergenerational mission of this organization. Like many of my colleagues, my time at Cornell has been enriched by the intellectual events and discourse provided by CIAR, as well as the truly unique opportunity to participate in the publication of an academic journal. I continue to be inspired by the bright students and professors I have had the privilege of working with and look forward to seeing the organization grow and succeed at new heights in coming years.

Robert H. Morrissey
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Editorial Letter

In the last six months, sentiments of political frustration have echoed throughout the world. Whether it came in the form of ignominious legislative debate in Congress, economic struggle in Europe, or momentous popular uprisings in the Middle East, these past months have made us revisit our views on our politicians and institutions. The Cornell International Affairs Review took the opportunity to start a conversation, creating a venue for public discourse concerning everything from the political impact of the financial crisis to the use of social media. We, as undergraduate students, have taken this moment to enrich ourselves and stay in touch with the political movements that are sweeping the world.

In our Fall 2011 Cornell International Affairs Review publication, we welcomed submissions from all over the country and the world, hoping to express some of these sentiments. This issue of our journal features the efforts of undergraduates, graduates, academics and professionals to fully encapsulate the attitudes surrounding a globalizing world.

We begin by looking at the state of America. In his talk at Cornell University in October 2011, Dr. Robert Keohane commented on the relative decline of US military power, and the criteria for US intervention in weak countries. Tim Borjian takes an introspective look at America, arguing that the US is no longer an exceptional country. In his view, feelings of American exceptionalism in fact impede domestic progress and foreign relations. Despite the seeming decline of American importance in international affairs, Eugenio Lilli expands upon America's foreign policy doctrine, claiming that a framework of interventionism has beaten a framework of isolationism on multiple occasions.

Regarding interaction between the United States and foreign countries, Ian King explores the use of non-military groups to deliver humanitarian aid to Colombia, as the United States' military approach had been increasingly under fire.

Meanwhile, China's role in the international sphere has blossomed. Carlos Sucre discusses Brazil's precarious relationship with China, and its inability to rise above China. Brazil's position on power in Latin America is challenged by China, not the United States. Sara Akl, however, reminds us of the long way China still needs to go. By highlighting the paltry conditions in which Chinese female factory workers live in, she reminds us how social development must also follow economic growth.

Not all contentious relationships are between states anymore, as the internet and global hegemony become increasingly intertwined. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has attempted to exert control on its people through blocking access to the internet, though Robert Duffley writes that this did not have the government's intended effect. Similarly, Taylor Bossung postulates that social media accelerated the process of political dissent in the Middle East. The internet, not any particular foreign world power, played a prominent role in the revolution. Dr. Elyès Jouini discusses the Tunisian revolution from a more personal perspective, offering an insider perspective of the various factors that caused the uprising.

We would like to thank the writers whose intriguing work is presented in this journal. We are also grateful for our colleagues who have contributed an endless amount of time and effort in assembling this publication, and to the general body members of the Cornell International Affairs Review who have continued the discourse of international affairs on campus.


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When Should the US Intervene? Criteria for Military Intervention in Weak Countries

Robert Keohane
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An edited transcription of Professor Robert Keohane's talk at Cornell University.

When should the United States intervene militarily in weak countries? This is a topic of pressing international concern because the United States keeps intervening in weak countries. We are currently involved indirectly in Libya and very deeply in Afghanistan, as well as still being involved to some extent in Iraq. We have a propensity to engage in this kind of activity, but it hasn't always worked out well for us. We need to reconsider the issue, and I want to discuss what the criteria should be for the United States when intervening militarily.

When should the United States intervene militarily in weak countries? This is a topic of pressing international concern because the United States keeps intervening in weak countries. We are currently involved indirectly in Libya and very deeply in Afghanistan, as well as still being involved to some extent in Iraq. We have a propensity to engage in this kind of activity, but it hasn't always worked out well for us. We need to reconsider the issue, and I want to discuss what the criteria should be for the United States when intervening militarily.

The first question is: what is a weak country? What do I mean by saying, "intervening in weak countries?" A weak country is a country not capable of preventing a United States invasion, where we can successfully at least take over key cities. So we are not talking about China or Russia, we are not talking about Brazil, or South Africa. This does not rule out the possibility, of course, that weak countries can use violence to inflict high costs on the United States. In earlier generations, Vietnam was a weak country. The United States, in a sense, intervened in Vietnam. The Vietnamese, especially the North Vietnamese, successfully used violence to drive the United States out. A weak country can stop the US from beating them but it could make the enterprise very costly for the United States.

I am going to talk about six cases or seven cases. You can count Afghanistan twice. The Gulf War in 1991, non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994,

Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan after 9/11, Iraq in 2003 continuing even now, Libya this year, and Afghanistan now. Let's call it six cases or seven depending on how you divide the Afghanistan case.

I am a little taken aback here because there is a friend of mine in the back who knows a lot about Afghanistan [Jason Lyall of Yale University] and it reminds me of a story I should tell: I am like a man who survived the Johnstown flood and did



Vladimir Putin and Muammar Gaddafi

nothing else to distinguish himself during life, but was a good person and therefore went to Heaven when he died. When the man was met at the pearly gates by St. Peter, the angel said, "we have a custom in Heaven: everybody gets to do a show and tell during their first afternoon in heaven, so you can talk about one episode in your life." So, this man, who was rather boring, started going on and on about how he had survived the Johnstown flood.

St. Peter looks more and more dubious and says, "It is all very well that you talk about the flood, but do not forget that Noah is in the audience." Noah is back there, so I could be in trouble.

I am going to talk about these cases, and Afghanistan is going to be the punch line. My key argument is that the criteria for intervention should depend first on US interests. It is key to differentiate the criteria that apply when the US has strong interests, when the situation is crucial to US interests, as opposed to when the US does not have crucial interests. More demanding criteria are needed when the United States does not have crucial interests in the area than when it does. I believe that the Gulf War (1991) and Afghanistan after 9/11 represented crucial US interests. Therefore, different criteria apply for the other cases. Rwanda is in italics because nobody intervened. So, I have one situation here where there was not intervention, where, as you will see, I think that the United States should have intervened.

So, here is the outline of the lecture. I am going to talk first about US power and US interests because they are related. We have to understand that the evolution of US interests, and the shifts taking place in these interests, in my view, come from shifts in US power. Before we can actually make judgments, I am going to talk about criteria justifying US military intervention when crucial US interests are involved. It is in those cases, in my view the Gulf war in 1991 and Afghanistan in 2001, that there were crucial US interests involved. In general, I think these criteria have often been met in those situations. I will then turn to criteria that should be met when crucial US interests are not involved. In general, it seems to me that these criteria have often not been met. We have often fallen short. The conclusion will then focus on when the United States should intervene. I am going to emphasize the key role of the exit strategy. Is there an exit strategy that is plausible? As you will see, I am not disposed toward the continuation of our intervention in Afghanistan.

I want to provoke thinking not just about Afghanistan, but about how to respond when the situation arises, which will recur in your lifetime, when somebody proposes US intervention in a

weak country and tells you it is going to be cheap. I do not want to tell you what to think – but I want to urge you to think carefully when military intervention is proposed. Let me tell a story from my father's notebook, which makes the point.

The story is about Robert Maynard Hutchins, who was the dean of Yale Law School at the age of 28. Think about that if you are 33 and still in graduate school. He later became the president of the University of Chicago. But it was 1925, and Hutchins, in his capacity as the dean of Yale Law School, was entertaining William Howard Taft. Taft was the former President of the United States, the current Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court, and the most distinguished jurist in America at the time. Taft was also a man who was sure of his own presence and importance; and he weighed about 350 pounds. He was an imposing figure in

My key argument is that the criteria for intervention should depend first on US interests.

every respect. So, Taft turns to Dean Hutchins and says, "Well Mr. Hutchins, I assume at Yale you teach your students that all judges are fools." To which Hutchins responds, "No, Mr. Chief Justice, at Yale we teach our students to find that out for themselves." So you can find this out for yourselves, not me.

I think you should at least have some criteria in mind when intervention is proposed. The first set of questions is about interest and power. Interest and power are related to each other in that interests are endogenous to power. What your interests are depends, in part, on what your power is. It is clear that the interests of Belgium or Switzerland are different from those of Germany, China, or the United States. There are certain things that small states simply cannot do. They cannot have an interest in maintaining world order. So, as power expands or contracts, so do interests. For example, as British power contracted in the years after 1914, British interests also gradually contracted. Britain had huge interests in India, interests in the Middle East and the Suez Canal, and it shed those interests gradually when it could not maintain them anymore. Britain did not have the

power to do so. The United States conversely, after World War II, expanded interests beyond Western Europe and even into Asia. Throughout the Cold War it expanded its interest into places like Afghanistan and the Congo. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States expanded its interests into Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Those were not major interests of the United States during the Cold War because the US was fairly sure it couldn't influence events there. And as I mentioned, the British interests, as well as French and even Dutch interests, contracted as their empires collapsed.

So if you're asking what a state's interests are, you have to know how powerful it is. A power shift will affect what its interests are. They are not written in stone forever. The United States, despite what former Governor Romney said in his recent speech, is manifestly less powerful and financially capable than it was 20 years ago. Compare now to 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and there were no rivals on the scene. China was not yet in world politics. I am not talking about US collapse; I am not saying there is a collapse in US power. Power is relative. So while the US is less powerful and financially capable than it was 20 years ago, it still remains the most powerful state in the system. We do not want to confuse relative decline with the proposition that the US is weak. The United States is not weak, but it is less powerful than it was 10 years ago. America is not in absolute decline, although America's cultural and economic preponderance will become less dominant than at the beginning of the century. America will face the rise of many others, both state and non-state actors. Power being relative, the US will be less powerful in the future.

It follows, then, that US interests will need to contract and that a sensible US foreign policy will not maintain the range of interests that were sensible when the US was as dominant as it was in 1991. What are the candidates for reduction? Where should the US sensibly pull back? I think Central Asia is an obvious case that is not crucial to our interests. We got along fine not doing anything about it until the collapse of the Soviet Union, and to me, in general, this includes Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the 1970's, I would joke in class that Afghanistan was the place in which we had

no interest. It is about as far as you get, especially since we are going to have to reach some sort of *modus vivendi* with China. We are going to have to focus on maintaining our crucial interests vis-à-vis China—Korea, Southeast Asia, and the areas around the South China Sea—as opposed to the secondary interests that might conflict with China in Central Asia. I think that Africa, except for major oil producers, the Mediterranean, and South Africa, is also not an area of great US interest.

It is impossible for the US to control the world, so the goal of preventing havens for terrorism must be abandoned. After all, terrorists can go lots of places; they do not have to be in Afghanistan. They can be in Yemen, in Somalia, or in 50 other countries. So, the notion that your goal is to prevent havens for terrorists and therefore we



US soldiers board a CH-47 Chinook helicopter during a military operation in Afghanistan.

should be in a particular place is senseless. It would only be sensible if terrorists committed themselves to one place and refused to move.

Let us go back and think about foreign policy interests for a minute. Arnold Wolfers, in a book published almost 50 years ago, made the distinction between possession goals and milieu goals.¹ Possession goals are what you want to have, especially for security and prosperity: the security of your homeland, access to resources, and markets needed for economic growth. Then there are milieu goals, like a safe world for democracy at home or a world with opportunities for cultural infusion. I am not talking about a world safe for democracy abroad; what I am talking about is what do we need for our democracy? The answer is that we have to have a world absent severe threats because such threats can lead to a garrison state.

The necessary means to crucial interests are also crucial interests. If one could show that something in itself is not a crucial interest, but a necessary means to obtain a crucial interest, you should treat it like a crucial interest. I have four here, which I think are crucial to American interests. Although you can see I am critical of US foreign policy, you can also see that I am not an isolationist. One crucial interest is the maintenance of fairly democratic governments in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific rim of Asia. That means Japan, South Korea, Australia, and perhaps other countries. The second crucial interest is access to crucial sources of energy, especially in Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, given the policies we have followed or failed to follow over the past 40 years, we are highly dependent on energy from abroad. Third, we need access to other important markets. The US economy is not nearly as globally oriented as Europe's major economies, but it depends substantially on global markets. If those markets were cut off, the US would certainly suffer. Finally, it is a necessary means for crucial interests like world peace that we maintain a strong working interest with major rising powers, including the BRIC powers of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. These, I would say, are the four necessary means to crucial interests, and they compound into a crucial interest or the equivalent of a crucial interest.

Crucial Interests

Now I want to turn to the second part of the talk. Suppose that crucial US interests are involved. The two cases I want to keep in mind are Iraq in 1991 and Afghanistan in 2001 after 9/11. I think there are five criteria for justifiable intervention when crucial US interests are involved:

1. Military action must not be unjust. It does not have to be just, but it must not be unjust.
2. There must be no superior strategy than use of force.
3. There needs to be a politically sensible exit strategy that retains the key achievements of the intervention. If the only exit strategy throws away your achievements, you should not be doing it in the first place.
4. The goals should be clearly specified with indicators so we know if we are achieving them.

5. Finally, there should be an explicit procedure for periodic reevaluation and substantial transparency.

Just war theory identifies just cause and proportionality as the two critical features for a just war. One should not go to war unless, consistent with normative theory, one has just cause. For example, one might be attacked or one's ally might be attacked without provocation. Second, one should only go to war in a proportional way. We should not use nuclear weapons, for example, to respond to a border incursion. Even if the incursion would give you just cause to fight, it does not give you just cause to blow up the other country with nuclear weapons. Joseph S. Nye wrote a very good book around 25 years ago on just war theory, which he summarizes as requiring appropriate motives, means, and consequences.² Motives must be to rectify a situation, not to aggrandize oneself. Means must be proportionate, and the foreseeable consequences must not be negative.

In my view, the Gulf War in 1991 and the war in Afghanistan after 9/11 meet both sets of criteria. The US or an ally was attacked, and the response was proportionate. The second criterion, that there must be no superior strategy to the use of force, is also met in these two cases. Saddam refused in 1991 to meet Security Council mandates; he had plenty of time to respond to threats of force. And in Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban refused to turn over the 9/11 planners or credibly promise no further attacks. In the Gulf War, the US had a clear exit strategy. It was to liberate Kuwait and restore its government, which had previously been able to run itself quite nicely with no substantial internal opposition. The government's legitimacy was intact, the infrastructure was intact, and there was a clear exit strategy: drive the Iraqis out, deter them from coming back, and let the Kuwaitis run their own affairs. In Afghanistan in 2001, I think there was not a clear exit strategy. I believe there could have been one. We could have handed over Afghanistan to the Northern Alliance and its allies and let them make the necessary deals to stay in power. Instead of propping them up, say, "Now you work out your own salvation." We didn't do that, so there was no clear exit strategy. Fourth, there must

be goals clearly specified with indicators. These goals were clear in the Gulf War: the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty and the destruction of the Iraqi army, sufficiently enough to prevent a new attack. There were indicators associated with that. The destruction of the Iraqi army as a fighting force against a strong opponent was clear from the photographs of burned out tanks indicating that Saddam's army had been destroyed, and the Kuwaiti government returned to power.

Unfortunately, the subsequent goal of making Saddam respect UN resolutions was opened. It did not have clear indicators, and it was not quite clear what would qualify as meeting those indicators. In Afghanistan, I think the goals were not well-specified, and I think that one of the faults was that the goals kept expanding. If you listened to the Bush Administration, the goals included nation-building, democratization, and women's rights. The prospect of nation building in Afghanistan was remote and the prospect of democratization was even lower. The prospect of sustainable women's rights was essentially nil. These goals were unrealistic, rhetorical goals. They were not really specified, and they kept on expanding.

Finally, there should be an explicit procedure for reevaluation. UN Security Council authorizations do require periodic reports. But the Security Council authorizations are somewhat ambiguous, and there was not enough attention, in my view, to explicit reevaluation in the US political system. There should be requirements for congressional hearings, even if nobody wants to do it. We need to have monitoring and more transparency of reevaluation.

So what is the report card on these crucial cases? On a pass-fail basis, on the whole, it is a pass. These actions were not unjust; that is a high pass. There was no superior strategy than force: high pass. There was a politically defensible exit strategy in the Gulf War: high pass. Afghanistan failed, but it could have been better. To some extent goals were specified with good indicators: marginal pass for the Gulf war and for Afghanistan. There was some procedure for re-evaluation, although it could have been specified better: marginal pass on this criterion as well. . Three high passes and

two marginal passes do not earn honors, but they clearly sum to a passing grade for the Gulf War. For Afghanistan we have two high passes, two marginal passes, and a failure: a generous grader would give this performance a pass. Being generous, I conclude that in both cases the initial action was justified. However, there was too little attention paid to avoiding mission creep in Afghanistan, which is partly where our current trouble comes from.

Non-Crucial Interests

Now I am going to turn to non-crucial interests. I have different criteria for intervention for these interests. Because you do not have to intervene, there should be higher standards. If you have to intervene, because you are being threatened or attacked, lower standards apply. But



US President Barack Obama

if you do not have to intervene, you should have a higher standard. So I have four identical criteria: no superior strategy than force, exit strategy, goals and indicators, and a procedure for reevaluation. Those, it seems to me, still apply. But I am going to alter the just cause part. I said, and I emphasized when I got to the just war part in my previous discussion, that where there are crucial interests, we can properly have motivations that do not stem from a desire to act justly. You have a justified motivation to defend yourself or to respond to attack, so justice is not your

only motivation. That is why I said that responses to attack or severe threat must not be unjust, but they may be defended as neutral with respect to justice. You still have the right to defend yourself even if you are not acting to improve justice in the world. But when no crucial interests are involved, it seems to me there must be just cause; there must be a positive reason to act and justice must be a key motivation. It must be possible to defend the intervention on the basis that justice needs to be done and there must be an intervention in order to maintain some form. That distinction will make it more demanding for the cases in which the United States did not have crucial interests.

I have four additional criteria for situations in which there is not a crucial US interest. The United Nations has enunciated one of the most imaginative and best acts of the UN, in my view, in the last decade. It has enunciated over the last 10 years something called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which I will discuss below. It seems to me that, if we are to intervene where our interests are not at stake, others should also believe that R2P criteria are maintained. There is a responsibility that we are taking, but others also must take it with us.

Second, there should be a broad international consensus. There need not be a UN Security Council resolution because a veto applies there, but there should be at least nine votes, which would pass a resolution, with no veto, with more support from the region affected. It should not just be outside interveners saying, "Oh no, this is a terrible situation in your region," the people in the region also need to care.

Third, there needs to be widespread and genuine international participation. I mean not just voting for it, but also participating in the operation. If the operation is not mandated by US interests there is no reason why it should be executed only with US troops and US forces. If it is a general world interest or global interest, others should participate; not as much maybe or as with many resources, but they should be prepared to participate. Finally, there should be an indigenous opposition, which is preferable to the status quo. There should be somebody to hand power over to when you are through with the intervention.

I want to say a word about Responsibility

to Protect. This came from the initial proposals made by the International Commission on State Sovereignty in 2001, endorsed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan over the next few years, and debated over the course of almost a decade in the UN. A report by the current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon in 2009 was accepted in principle by the UN General Assembly: that is, the General Assembly endorsed the principle that states have



A US Army physician's assistant provides medical assistance to an elderly Serbian woman in Kosovo.

a responsibility to protect their own people. This was the first time that this was actually enunciated in international law. It is not legally binding strictly speaking, but it is what is known as "soft law." It was a normative injunction passed by the international community.

According to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, there is an international responsibility to assist. States have a primary responsibility to protect their own people; if they fail to do so or egregiously violate that responsibility and persecute their own people, then the international community has the responsibility to respond and assist. So this doctrine puts a big hole in the old sovereignty norm that basically said that states could do whatever they wanted to their own people. The Responsibility to Protect is limited to four specific crimes, and especially crimes against humanity and ethics. As I mentioned, these are norms and not a legally binding treaty, but they are of strong form.

Analyzing Six Cases of Intervention

How do we get a broad international

consensus? The definitive evidence would be a UN Security Council authorization, something that in some cases we have gotten, like the Ivory Coast Intervention in the spring of 2011 that was supported by a Security Council resolution. In the Libya intervention there was also a Security Council resolution supporting it. That is definitive evidence for legitimate international intervention, but I do not think that we should make Security Council authorization a necessary condition. That would allow one, maybe two states, if they were Permanent Members of the Council, to veto crucial action in defense of the Responsibility to Protect their own citizens. In fact, there is a norm developing that is a little softer than the first norm, that a veto is illegitimate in essential situations; the UN Secretary-General has enunciated it before. So a consensus could be declared if the otherwise required number of states—nine in the Security Council—actually voted in favor of the resolution, even if a Permanent Member voted no.³

I talked earlier about participation. There should be broad participation: active engagement by more than one or two states, not just by us. And there should be active logistical support by a number of other states. In other words, they should not just passively sit back and raise their hand in the Security Council or General Assembly.

One of the most important criteria is that there has to be an indigenous opposition to the repressive regime. If there is no coherent indigenous opposition, which you can rely on once we've thrown out the bad guys in the state, then there is no exit strategy and no way to get out without undermining the actions. Now, if that is hard, you have to make a judgment. Is a coherent, indigenous coalition capable of ruling? Is it feasible? Do you have a reason to make a flawed judgment? It is a difficult judgment. I think we have to ask this question: after we intervene, if we succeed in totally ousting the regime and restore order, is there a group of people or locals who we

can hand power over to? I am not saying they have to be democratic, but they have to be effective and potentially better than the people prior. Now, take a look at Figure 1.

Now you get the big picture. What I have done is simply to take my nine criteria on the left hand column and the six cases across the top. So the first issue: was force essential to achieve the objective? The answer is yes in all of these cases; we could not have achieved the objective without force. So there is no easy way out. We are already in the hard cases, where in order to do anything effective, we needed to use force.

Is there an exit strategy? Well, there was not in Somalia. The first Bush Administration intervened in Somalia in 1992 and the Clinton Administration maintained the intervention until the Black Hawk Down incident in October 1993. But, there was no exit strategy; there was no one we could see to turn the reins over to. Ironically, in Rwanda, where we didn't intervene, there would have been an exit strategy. There was a Tutsi movement, self-organized without our help, and we could have intervened with an easy exit strategy. We should have intervened there. There was also an exit strategy with Kosovo: having an independent Kosovo. It would not have been run by the people you want next door to you, not your city council in Princeton, New Jersey, but they were able to run their own affairs with some help and not a huge amount of money. In Iraq, I think there was no exit strategy until at least 2007; it was notably absent in the Bush Administration's original intervention strategy. In Libya, it is still questionable whether the opposition is coherent enough to run a peaceful, orderly state. If the opposition movement that defeated Qaddafi is coherent, then we'll have an exit strategy. If they are going to start fighting each other, we won't. I think that we do not have an exit strategy in Afghanistan that will preserve the gains we hoped to achieve.

What about the goals, are the goals clear? The goal in Somalia was first to save people from famine; that was a clear goal. The other goal was to improve governance in Somalia, which was not achieved. There would have been a clear goal in Rwanda: stopping the murder of 800,000 people in two months. But tragically, there was no

intervention in Rwanda. There was a clear goal in Kosovo: to get the Serbs out and let Kosovo run their own country. In Iraq, there was one clear goal: remove Saddam. After that, it seems to me there was not a clear goal. In Libya, there was a clear goal: defeat Gaddafi, even though this was not the same goal that the UN approved. The UN approved a much more minor goal, but NATO took that as authorization to do what they pleased. In Afghanistan, I think it is not clear what the goal is; there is no attainable goal.

There was an implicit reevaluation in Kosovo; we scaled down our involvement and said we are not going to solve all these problems for you. In Iraq, we did not reevaluate until awfully late. In 2005-2006 we said, "Oh, we're in trouble here, what should we do?" We are not there yet in Libya.

If there is no coherent indigenous opposition ... then there is no exit strategy and no way to get out without undermining the actions.

I do not know if there is a plan for reevaluation, but I think there should be. And maybe Obama is reevaluating in Afghanistan.

Now I turn to the other criteria. There was just cause in Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. I think it is very unclear in Iraq what the just cause was for invasion. Saddam was a dictator, but it is not clear that Saddam was killing more people than have died after the invasion. But I think in Libya there was just cause, because Gaddafi was murdering his people and threatening war, and R2P was applied there. In Afghanistan, I don't see just cause now. There was just cause in 2001, but now there are maybe one hundred al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan.

Finally, let's consider The Responsibility to Protect. It was not in place in the 1990's, so Somalia and Kosovo are in parentheses. It was not tested in Rwanda because, tragically, there was no intervention. There are lots of oppressive regimes in the world. If you were committed to liberating people who were oppressed then you would be liberating lots of countries. In Libya, I think Responsibility to Protect criteria were met, but in Afghanistan I believe they are not.

Is there a consensus? Well, in general in

| | Somalia | Rwanda | Kosovo | Iraq | Libya | Afghanistan |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| Force essential? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes – to remove Saddam | Yes | Yes – to defeat Taliban. No to contain Al Qaeda |
| Exit strategy? | No – polity fragmented | Yes – opposition | Yes – sovereign Kosovo | No – until at least 2007 | If opposition coherent | No – plan depends on viable govt. |
| Goals clear? | Not after famine | Yes | Yes | Not after removing Saddam | Defeat Qaddafi (not UN goals) | No |
| Reevaluation? | Only after disaster | N/A | Implicit (low commitment) | Not until too late | No explicit plan | Perhaps finally in 2011 Obama drawdown |
| Just cause? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Unclear | Yes | Unclear |
| R2P? | (Yes) | Not tested | (Yes) | Unclear | Yes | No |
| Consensus? | Yes | (Yes) | NATO only | No | Yes | Decreasing |
| Broad Involvement? | Yes – 35+ states | Not tested | NATO involved | No – US-UK mostly | Key NATO players | Decreasing |
| Internal opposition? | Incoherent | Yes | Yes | Mostly exiles | Yes, but divided | US supports government |
| Justified? | Not long-term | Yes | Yes | No | Yes – risk of anarchy | No |

Figure 1: Intervention criteria where the United States lacked crucial interest.

Somalia and Libya there was consensus. In the Rwanda case, there could have been. In Iraq there was not. We did not have a lot of support if you look at the American coalition: the US and Britain, a few NATO allies, and a lot of tiny little states without any resources to speak of. The Bush Administration had an obvious, self-interested reason for going to war. I think we are seeing a decreasing consensus in Afghanistan.

With regard to the question of the internal opposition, the problem was that in Somalia there was no coherent opposition, unlike Rwanda and Kosovo. In Iraq, the problem was that Saddam's opponents were mostly exiles and they were not broadly integrated into the society. In Libya, there was internal opposition, which was crucial. In Afghanistan, the US supports the government. If the government were coherent, this could be OK; but I do not think it is.

Finally, I ask, "Were these operations justified?" In Somalia, we should have provided the famine help and then gotten out. In Rwanda, we should have intervened. This was, ironically, the case that meets the criteria best; and we did not intervene, to our shame. In Kosovo, we were right to intervene; it meets the criteria quite well. In Iraq, we were wrong to intervene. There was no exit strategy. There was no broad consensus. There was no broad involvement by others. There was no coherent opposition. There was no just cause under Just War Theory. And there was no valid, in my view, Responsibility to Protect justification. So it is a genuine, crashing failure, and I think that it should never happen again. In Libya, I say cautiously "yes", although I recognize that there is a lot of risk here, especially the risk of anarchy and division among the revolutionaries.

Our current involvement in Afghanistan is not justified. It is not quite as bad as Iraq, but I think

it is close. There is no exit strategy I can see, the goals are unclear, the R2P criteria are not met, and it is not a "Responsibility to Protect" situation. There is a declining consensus and commitment by others. And there is a very weak, feckless government, which is weak and unable even to prevent people from walking in and suicide bombing one of their leaders. It does not command much widespread support.

So my conclusion is as follows. Leaders in the future will call for military intervention, so you will have to think about it—10, 20, or 30 years from now. Beware of what Stanley Hoffman calls "the hell of good intentions."⁴ Do not let an idealistic set of good intentions lure you into supporting intervention without asking tough questions. I think that three of these six interventions, in the absence of crucial US interests, were unjustified, at high cost. So if you remember this talk, 10, 20, or 30 years from now when a new president proposes intervention, I would say be cautious and ask, "Has he or she articulated an exit strategy? Is this strategy based on the identification of a coherent opposition, which will be capable of running the country in a more decent manner, at least than the people they have already got, when they are allowed to be in power?" These are hard cases, and you have to make sure all the criteria line up. If a vigilant public does not hold its government accountable for interventions in a coherent way, the United States will continue to engage in poorly conceived or badly motivated interventions, as well as in those that are justified. As James Madison said in Federalist paper number 10, "enlightened leaders will not always be at the helm." It is up to us, in the attentive public, to offer criticisms as well as support on a reasoned basis to hold leaders accountable and give them incentives to enact sensible and justified policies.

Endnotes

¹ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

² Joseph S. Nye, *Nuclear Ethics* (NY: Free Press, 1986).

³ For my views on this issue in more detail, see Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane "Precommitment regimes for humanitarian intervention," *Ethics and International Affairs*, volume 25, no. 1 (spring 2011).

⁴ Stanley Hoffmann, "The Hell of Good Intentions," *Foreign Policy* 29 (winter 1977-78).

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
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Letter from Tunisia



Elyès Jouini

Distinguished Professor and Chairman of the Institut de Finance

Université Paris-Dauphine

Former Member of the Tunisian Transition Government

Elyès Jouini is the vice-president for research of Université Paris-Dauphine and former Minister for the Economic and Social Reforms of the Tunisian transition government. He currently serves as the President of the Fondation Paris-Dauphine, and as Chairman of the Institut de Finance of Université Paris-Dauphine. Named best young French economist in 2005, Jouini was also a member of the Economic Analysis Council (attached to the French Prime Minister) from 2008 to 2010.

I will remember that phone call of January 20th 2011 for a long time. Six days after the flight of the Tunisian president Ben Ali, the Prime Minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, called me and said, "I need you to form a new government." I asked for a few days to organize my departure from Paris, but Mohamed Ghannouchi passed the phone to one of his advisers, who said, "the situation is too unstable, come as soon as possible". So the next day, I took the 8am flight for Tunis and settled in an office adjacent to Prime Minister. My role was to attend all of the Prime Minister's meetings and assist him in forming a new government, which would become the second Ghannouchi government.

In terms with the Constitution, after the flight of President Ben Ali, the President of the National Assembly became Interim President and the Prime Minister appointed a new government. The new government was immediately criticized by the mob for not being that new, because although there were some figures from the opposition, the first Ghannouchi government had too many former ministers and close aids of Ben Ali. Therefore, the challenge facing us was to form a government that was able to stop the total vacancy of power and was able to govern with the consent of as much of the population as possible. I noticed this total vacancy of power upon my arrival in Tunis, when I presented myself at the office of the Prime Minister in the Kasbah. When I said I had an appointment with

Mr. Ghannouchi, I was told, "His office is on the first floor." No one checked my identity or whether I actually had made an appointment. It took several days to realize that the security of the Prime Minister did not fall under the police, but under the presidential guard, and as the leaders of the latter were arrested, nobody was ensuring the security of the Kabash!

The whole week was dedicated to consultations with the main forces of the country, and was marked by a struggle between those who wanted no change and those who wanted a government with the strongest possible foundation and



Tunisian protestors take to the streets, sparking the Arab Spring.

legitimacy. Therefore, Ghannouchi advocated a government largely made up of technocrats, that is, competent individuals who didn't have political issues. Figures ready to ensure the transition of government, so that at the same time the political forces could put themselves

in marching order, organize themselves, occupy the political arena, discuss, debate, and prepare the next steps.

After a week of marathon negotiations, the government was finally almost created and I accepted the position of Minister to the Prime Minister. I was in charge of economic and social reforms, and the coordination between the ministries involved. Within five weeks, without any political experience, I was the de facto number two of the Tunisian government in charge of organizing the democratic transition. Number two of a government that was immediately faced with a three sided challenge: how to transition the



Protester during manifestations in front of government buildings.

government, while ensuring that Tunisia is being placed on a short-term and long-term virtuous path, how to deal with current affairs, while initiating the construction of future institutions, and how to respond to the many legitimate requests that should be made by a real and legally constituted state.

The task was tough, especially because the government did not intend to last more than six months. The task was tough because building democracy is not only implementing a transparent and fair democratic structure, but also ensuring that elections are conducted in a socially and economically peaceful environment, in which everyone can take stock of the hopes and challenges opened up by this revolution. Hopes and challenges, because it was not about restoring social peace at the price of the sustainability of our actions. It was not about harboring false hopes

and distributing the benefits likely to generate the crises of tomorrow. The government's goal was to establish democracy in a peaceful climate, within the time promised, and to leave a healthy economy for the next government.

Furthermore, a successful transition to democracy after decades of autocratic rule was a cumbersome task – especially in attempting to build a legally constituted state while at the same time preserving the many achievements of 55 years of independence.

Although the responsibility was enormous, it was a very exciting task. The transitional government was there to allow the release of energy that was necessary to build tomorrow's Tunisia. The transitional government was there to avoid the political and institutional vacuum that constituted the greatest danger for the revolution, the return of dictatorship. Nothing predestined me to enter a government, nothing but an education, a journey and values. As Antoine de Saint-Exupéry wrote, "J'ai trahi mon but si j'ai pu vous engager à admirer d'abord les hommes. Ce qui est admirable d'abord, c'est le terrain qui les a fondés." Which translates to: "I have betrayed my goal, if I have seemed to encourage you to admire people first. What is admirable first, is the ground that has founded them."

Through education primarily based on example, my parents left me the strong values that guide me: respect for others, concern for others, and the pleasure of giving. Acting for others and acting in the public interest was, and still is, the motivation for my actions. I grew up with the image of my great-uncle Mohamed-Salah Mzali, former Minister and President of the Council. He enjoined those who would listen to not forget their duties towards those who came before them and those who would follow them, and loved to quote Gustave Le Bon, "Respecter les traditions est une condition d'existence, savoir s'en dégager lentement une condition de progrès." Which translates to: "Respecting traditions is a condition for existence, knowing how to diverge from them is a condition of progress." Being part of continuity, innovativeness, and developing

things are also some of my key traits, which may have been what made me think I had a role to play in the democratic transition; a role of promoting the long-awaited radical change, without rupture.

All of this would not have happened to me without the government's policy, which has been in action since the Tunisian independence, granting scholarships to the most brilliant secondary school students for a preparatory class for admission to the Grandes Écoles in France. My results in high school allowed me to receive such a scholarship. "Never forget that you carry the Tunisian passport and never forget what you owe to your country," told us Mokhtar Latiri, who was in charge of this scholarship program, to which he added, "and be polygamous!" which meant, being able to take on several activities simultaneously, and knowing how to be multiple.

Thus, in 1984, I went to the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Rue d'Ulm to study mathematics. It was in this institution, which formed the largest number of Fields medal winners in the world, that I prepared my PhD

The transitional government was there to allow the release of energy that was necessary to build tomorrow's Tunisia.

in applied mathematics and was immersed for the first time in the world of mathematics. Never forgetting my duty to "polygamy", I created at the same time the Association of Tunisian Grandes Écoles, which now has over 3,000 members and branches in Tunis, Paris, London, and wherever else Tunisian skills shine. In 1989, at the age of 24, I was recruited as an Assistant Professor at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, and at the age of 27, I became a full Professor there.

From a scientific point of view, my work is an interdisciplinary combination of mathematics and economics. From a geographical point of view, I have one foot on either side of the Mediterranean, since I also taught in Tunis and participated in the

great reform of Tunisian higher education initiated by Mohamed Charfi. I've participated in creating Tunisian preparatory classes, in developing mathematics, and in creating the Tunisia Polytechnic School. A few years later, I would also participate in the reform of the pensions sector, while teaching at the Stern School of Business at NYU.

For me, being "polygamous" meant building my career on both sides of the Mediterranean. It was in both of my countries that I had the opportunity to teach and help develop the education system: as a member of the Tunisia National Commission for University Reform (Commission Nationale de Rénovation Universitaire), and a member of the High Council of Science and Technology (Haut-Conseil de la Science et de la Technologie) in France; as vice president of Paris-Dauphine University, and director of Tunis-Dauphine; as member of the Council of Economic Analysis in France, and administrator of the Bank of Tunisia; decorated with the insignia of Chevalier in the Order of the Legion d'Honneur in France, and Commander in the Order of Educational Merit in Tunisia. This is how I have never stopped being double. Being double encourages tolerance, listening, and understanding each other. Being double also means to live twice as intensely, provided that you do not get lost. As Jorge Luis Borges wrote, "tout homme est deux hommes et le plus vrai est l'autre." Which translates to: "every man is two men and the truer one is the other." This has allowed me to never cease to be vigilant about my involvement in Tunisia. Thus, in 2008, I decided to give up my position of Administrator of the Bank of Tunisia rather than sitting alongside the members of Ben Ali's group when they decided to seize the bank and endorse their methods.

This is the journey that led me to co-sign a manifesto after the revolution with the French-Tunisian writer Abdelwahab Meddeb, in which we wrote:

"This revolution did not need a providential man and everyone fears that it will be confiscated from the people who brought

it. And yet, we must continue to manage current affairs, and yet, we must build the institutions of tomorrow. The task is difficult; however, a government acknowledging what it is to serve the people and not to administer the people is able to meet this challenge. Not because it will be the best, but because the Tunisian people is there, vigilant!

Indeed, it is futile to find the ideal government, as it will always be questionable. Faced with so much uncertainty and complexity to lead this transition and organize a new political landscape without further compromising the economy and solidarity, no government can be up to the task, a priori. It is by moving forward that we will all learn together. We need to project ourselves into a model where it is not so much the people but the mechanisms that matter. However, in this progressive construction, fundamental risks should be excluded by taking some tough and irreversible decisions, and we must be vigilant. The arrangements for this watch are yet to be finalized. It will be largely based on freedom of expression and, we know now, on new technologies. We need to converge all our energies. Events, neighborhood committees, exchanges on the web, manifestos, focus groups, debates, ... all show that from now on we want to take our destiny in our own hands with a huge surge of mobilization and solidarity, with our requests, with our requirements, with our vigilance! So yes, let us ask, demand, be vigilant and judge on the actual evidence!"

Chance or premonition, this text had been finalized and published on 20 January, on the same day of the telephone call from Mohamed Ghannouchi.

So, for five weeks, in charge of "economic and social reforms, and coordination with the ministries involved," I was working day and night in the tense atmosphere of revolutionary Tunisia. Outside my offices in the Kasbah demonstrators were standing to demand the fall of the government. I was questioned myself, by some in the revolutionary movement; as a Tunisian from abroad, my patriotism was

questioned. Although I had resigned from all my mandates of company administrator before entering the government, I was suspected of conflict of interest. I did not have the time to respond to those attacks as I was very absorbed by my tasks: putting an economy that was destabilized by strikes and the collapse of tourism back on track; receiving Foreign Delegations; reassuring the backers of the country; and rebalancing the development between the outskirts and the centre of the country. This, a few weeks later, would bring me to write in my letter of resignation:

"This government has probably taken more measures and more pivotal decisions in one month than many governments do in several months, or even years. Ratification of international conventions guaranteeing human rights, aid to needy families, implementation of an integration program for unemployed graduates, confiscation of property improperly acquired, protection of our heritage as part of the universal heritage..."

The government that I was part of had managed to restore an almost normal situation at the institutional level. This government of technocrats was the only possible solution to maintain continuity of the State while waiting the replacement of a policy not related to the former regime.

This is a new period that starts today. Outside the government, I had endeavored to mobilize my network to the service of my country. I took on the role of Sherpa of the Tunisian government for the preparation of the G8 in Deauville, whose guest of honor,

As a Tunisian from abroad, my patriotism was questioned.

together with Egypt, was Tunisia. In Tunis, I have just founded a think-tank to consider reforms in a spirit of social liberalism, attentive to the redistribution of wealth. In Paris, I have mobilized economists all over the world to



Protesters raid the streets in opposition to the government.

write a column distributed the same day in English, Italian, German and French to the international press calling on the developed countries to financially support Tunisia. This text, signed notably by Joseph Stiglitz, Philippe Aghion, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Richard Portes, Daniel Cohen, Klaus Zimmermann, and Nouriel Roubini, stated:

"Many countries in the region have focused all their attention on Tunisia, and a failure of its democratic transition would be a victory for all the dictatorships in the region and a severe defeat for democracy.

We have a collective responsibility to ensure the success of this transition and prove that economic cooperation is the best barrier against extremism.

The risk that we face today is the poor coordination of actions, the risk that the world waits Tunisia to complete its transition to help it, while Tunisia needs this help to carry out this transition successfully.

We economists know that investments are judged in the long term. We firmly believe that the establishment of democratic institutions will be a determining factor to improve attractiveness and economic performance over the medium to long term.


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The revolution has attracted support, sympathy and respect. Now, we must go further. It is the responsibility of the international community to prevent Tunisia from entering a vicious circle of poverty and rising unemployment leading to an increase of populism and extremism, which, in turn, lead to isolationism, and from there to the increase in poverty and unemployment. At the international level, the consequence would be the spread of extremism and the proliferation of waves of migration fleeing this extremism.

We now call on the G8 leaders to support the transition in Tunisia and more specifically to support a road map that would be developed and led by Tunisia; this road map would clearly identify the actors involved and the amounts to be mobilized.

Tunisia is the leader of the Arab democratic transition. Its population has reached a high level of education. The status gained by women, exceptional for the Arab world, is a big reason for hope. Its small size makes it a perfect laboratory of democracy. It offers us the unique opportunity to prove that democracy can develop harmoniously in the region. The cost of such a laboratory, the cost of the plan that we recommend is only 2 to 3% of the cost of German reunification and less than the cost of one to two months of the war in Iraq."



Empowering Women in the Chinese Capitalist Factory System

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Over the past thirty years, China has moved from a communist to a capitalist economy. This change has pushed millions of young, rural women to migrate to the cities in order to begin working in its many booming factories. These women, if they manage to avoid falling prey to false advertising and trafficking scams, enter the competitive capitalist system at the absolute lowest level. They find employment in foreign-invested companies, usually producing toys, clothing, footwear, and electronics.¹ Their service positions in an unregulated labor market subordinate them, and factory women are constantly reminded of their low positions within the workplace.

Although economists and supporters of the free market assert that the transition from rural farming to urban factory work empowers women, in practice it merely places women at the bottom of a corrupt, unregulated system.² Instead of taking this same approach, in this paper I will search for integrationist strategies that answer specific questions. How can migrant women become empowered within the hierarchy of China's capitalist factory system? How have measures taken by the state, NGOs, and factory-employed women themselves affected women's ability to gain status within the workplace? China's state policies enable, and sometimes force, women into the bottom of the capitalist system without effective enforcement of potential helpful ordinances. However, NGOs, such as the Asia Foundation, the HERproject, and the Chinese Working Women Network, provide programs and workshops in education, training, health services, and legal aid, in addition to support networks within and outside of the factory. Female workers within the factories also serve to empower themselves directly by confronting their bosses and even going on strike, despite the risks associated with speaking out.

To understand how women can empower themselves in the current Chinese


capitalist system, we must first understand how women entered into this arrangement of miserable jobs, and why they do so. There are certain incentives for rural women, especially unmarried ones, to urbanize, including the desire for independence and a better life, the obligation of honoring family, or the necessity of money. In addition, young migrants supporting their families often enjoy an elevated social status – these



Chinese women in Nanjing carrying vegetables and fruits across town.

women have more bargaining power in their hometowns and can negotiate on certain issues, such as finding a male partner or a permanent residence in the city.³ Women are encouraged to leave the home to work – the assembly lines of Dongguan (one of the largest factory cities in China) are estimated at seventy percent female.⁴ This is because families view their daughters as disposable labor; because they matter less, they are free

to leave and begin new lives in the cities. These “new lives” are often very difficult. As author Leslie Chang points out, “The city does not offer them easy living. The pay for hard labor is low – often lower than the official minimum wage...Get hurt, sick, or pregnant, and you're on your own.⁵ Chinese women, after “empowering themselves”, begin at the bottom of the capitalist pool. This situation is far from ideal, and we must endeavor to procure different options for women to become truly empowered in the workforce.



A knife factory in Guangzhou where women work arduously.

After the fall of communism and the opening of China's labor markets, the policies enacted by the state created an apartheid-esque social structure that placed the migrant workers in a no-man's land – the more educated workers disdain the men from the rural villages, but city men, in turn, look down on migrant women.⁶ These problems with class struggle have gone unresolved by the federal government.

Women specifically have found government practices and propaganda to be detrimental to their careers, as China “fosters the idea of marriage and/or pregnancy as the ‘natural’ termination of factory employment.”⁷ These young women are not interested in relinquishing their freedom by quitting the factories to work for their husbands, but the state continues to enforce the traditional marriage system within the rural communities. China has enacted several labor laws designed to protect workers, but the arm of the government never seems to reach into the provinces. Because residential laws remain unchanged, the federal government controls nearly nothing in the day-to-day of the young factory workers.⁸ State policy has not evolved enough to give women the opportunities they need and desire to succeed within the capitalist system, but women do succeed despite this. This is because they still have two possible sources to utilize. Migrant women, in lieu of help from the state, make use of NGOs as well as their own negotiating power.

As China has relinquished its hold on all organizations working within the state, NGOs have appeared and begun attempting to aid the millions of female migrant workers. These NGOs include the Asia Foundation, the HERproject, and the Chinese Working Women Network. Each of these projects has different goals, but all aim to empower women with knowledge and support, helping them to better their lives in multiple aspects. They accomplish this objective by working with different factories across multiple industries.

Over the past ten years, the Asia Foundation has created programs in China to empower women economically. In 1999, Asia Foundation developed activities including counseling, training, and legal aid services for workers, all free of charge, using local organizations in the Guangdong province, in which sixty percent of migrant labor is female.⁹ This NGO realized the limits

of the government's household registration system and worked around it, providing migrant women with services they sometimes desperately required. These services are often the only support that migrant workers can hope to receive upon moving to a new city with an immediate second-class citizenship. NGO legal services can help improve the capacity of labor bureaus, train labor inspectors, and provide good legal aid for workers – thus being a safety net that can empower migrant women to take a stand against unfair treatment within a factory.

Education remains one of the most important facets of Asia Foundation's work. In 2005, the NGO created the Scholarship Program for Migrant Women Works, and



A Chinese woman working in a factory in Suzhou.

committed itself to helping women advance their careers through a vocational school and a university scholarship program. Asia Foundation remained conscious of women who studied part-time in order to balance education with their work schedules.¹⁰ Also in 2005, the Asia Foundation, through

a partnership with Microsoft, developed the Increasing IT Literacy program. The grant from Microsoft helped establish Communications Technology Learning Centers, which taught basic computer skills to migrant women workers in addition to disadvantaged local community members.¹¹ In a market system where potential employers look at applicable skills first, these projects are immensely helpful in allowing women the opportunity to move forward.

The Asia Foundation, in a desire to bring together industry and NGO, sponsored a workshop in 2003 called the Workshop on Direct Labor Service Programs. Over thirty multinational corporations, trading companies, and international NGOs met with Chinese NGOs and academics in order to improve Chinese working conditions. Although few tangible results followed, participants agreed on establishing an annual roundtable discussing specific topics, such as health, education, and safety. These discussions would involve workers, government officials, NGOs, and corporations.¹² Health issues are very important, and Asia Foundation has worked hard distributing information and conducting classes on disease prevention, AIDS/HIV awareness, female hygiene, and occupational diseases.

Because of the prevalence of health issues, other organizations, such as HERproject, have appeared to supplement the work of other NGOs. HERproject is a BSR initiative, which promotes corporate responsibility, and it utilizes companies, NGOs, and foundations to improve the lives of female workers. In China, HERproject has cited seven major health issues: breast and cervical cancer, exposure to chemical hazards, feminine hygiene and STDs, HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, depression, and painful menstruation.¹³ Much of the risk presented by the HERproject acknowledges ignorance as a main issue; many women do not

receive sufficient training when handling hazardous chemicals and choose not to wear protective gear. Women are unaware of their risk for STDs or HIV/AIDS, often because factory management wrongly assumes unmarried women are not having sex. Because health care facilities in factories cannot write prescriptions and few migrant women have health insurance, drastic measures are often taken.¹⁴ Chang noticed a man, "a chain-smoker with a hacking cough [who] did not look in the least qualified

These interpersonal skills give women the ability to move upwards in their jobs as well as remain healthy.

to be giving out medical opinions. Yet a crowd of young men and women clamored for the flyers he was handing out," which demonstrates the necessity of other options.¹⁵ In 2009, HERproject received aid from Marie Stopes International to support a health program in the Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang provinces. The results are inspiring. Improved knowledge about all health issues made workers both healthier and happier at work and gave them greater confidence to discuss health issues.¹⁶ These interpersonal skills give women the ability to move upwards in their jobs as well as remain healthy, a definite benefit.

Aside from the educational, legal, and health programs administered by Asia Foundation and HERproject, the Chinese Working Women Network provides migrant women with something they miss while away from their homes: a social network. The Cultural Women Workers Centre offers "a cultural and physical space to building up collectivity apart from [the] factory shop floor and dormitory."¹⁷ Using social interaction, including reading groups, singing groups, poetry groups, the Centre simultaneously allows women to form support networks and educates them on

labor law, feminist rights, and occupational health. In addition, CWWN owns a bus that caters to migrant women in Shenzhen and the Pearl River Delta economic zone.¹⁸ This is a great aid to migrant workers, who have no other means of transport, especially if they are hunting for better job upgrades across cities. In 2000, the Chinese Working Women Network began factory training for production workers. They built a model of education for workers' empowerment with a curriculum focusing on labor rights, corporate responsibility, safety, health, and



A woman washing clothes in a canal, Zhouzhang Jiangsu.

communication.¹⁹ Hopefully, this program will enhance the decision-making skills of assembly-line workers, enabling them to rise within the capitalist market system.

The NGOs working in China today can help to empower these somewhat educated, young, rural migrant women by further educating them. Knowledge is power and security. NGOs like Asia Foundation, projects like HERproject, and networks like CWWN give women the opportunity to learn and to become empowered in China's factories. Of course, these are nascent initiatives, and it is uncertain whether they will ultimately make enough of a difference.

NGO programs are beneficial, but they are sometimes not enough or not present at all in some provinces. In this case, multiple studies have affirmed one thing – in order for a migrant woman to get ahead in the cutthroat capitalist world,

she must rely on herself. There are several opportunities for women to empower themselves; all involve a woman or group of women standing up to a boss, quitting in favor of a different job, and actively seeking out “good” factories. Chang found that, “The turning point in a migrant’s fortunes always came when she challenged her boss. At the moment she risked everything, she emerged from the crowd and forced the world to see her as an individual,” and one of her subjects, Chunming, used this strategy multiple times in order to receive raises, promotions, and equal treatment.²⁰ After jumping factories, she had discovered that her department heads received higher salaries, though they performed the same tasks. She fought back, writing to them, “If you don’t increase my salary to 1,500 Yuan a month...I refuse to do this anymore,” and she got what she wanted.²¹ She was boldly friendly with her managers, studying the higher-ups in order to become an expert in public relations. Although she found herself at the bottom of the barrel in the beginning, her own initiative and bravery led her to move upwards very quickly. This internal strength is something all working migrant women possess, and it should be utilized more often. Each woman’s personal struggle against oppressive forces reaches a zenith when she realizes that she is her own greatest weapon against those forces.

However, there are obvious risks associated with standing up and demanding rights – some factories do not allow their women to demand equality or empowerment. Bosses could easily fire low factory workers, and they oftentimes secretly attempt to replace the higher-level female workers who challenged them. In those instances, Chang and researchers Lang Ma and Francine Jacobs found that women merely “voted with their feet,” meaning that they quit. They used the ever-flowing market to their advantage and many girls used this strategy to obtain

better job prospects.²² Chang recounted tales of women hopping cities each month in order to make some extra Yuen or relocate to a safer factory, hoping to make enough money to quit the system or rise within it, “A young woman went to the city, endured hardship, and triumphed, usually by starting her own business...you can only rely on yourself.”²³ Despite claims by older studies that job mobility is low in China, Chang found that almost all the senior people in factories began on the assembly line.²⁴ The most assured way to create good opportunities was to find a good factory from the beginning; less time factory hopping and working in a “benign factory context” was conducive to open discussion and empowerment.²⁵ By searching right

These NGO programs can have vast impacts on the psyche of workers, enabling them to discuss new subjects with coworkers and bosses.

away for a better factory, women choose to place themselves in a certain position within the capitalist hierarchy and they do not have to begin at the very bottom, oppressed and economically squashed. Women can then use, work, and threaten the system to empower themselves, and gain enough money and status to leave the factory game behind and move forward.


China’s government has not done much to ensure or encourage true female empowerment, especially culturally. Because of this, women look to NGOs and rely on their own proud abilities to achieve this power. Whether it means moving out, finding a job that pays for your siblings’ educations, quitting an assembly job to start a business, or steadily advancing along the factory ladder by refusing to accept any less, women have the capability to empower themselves. In addition to this

power, NGOs provide helpful programs that function where the federal government fails, providing education for young girls regarding health issues, legal aid, and scholarly pursuit. These NGO programs can have vast impacts on the psyche of workers, enabling them to discuss new subjects with coworkers and bosses. Furthermore, NGOs offer services, such as transportation

and a social network – two things that the young migrant workers often desperately need. These integrationist approaches, while imperfect, provide the resources that women can utilize in order to ameliorate their situations after beginning at or near the bottom of the economic chain in China.


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The Problems With American Exceptionalism

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In 2001, German President Johannes Rau made a statement that divided Germany. In an interview with a television station, Rau said that although he is “pleased and grateful” to be German, he cannot be “proud” of it—as “it is not an achievement to be German, [but] just a matter of luck.”¹ This statement drew criticism from the opposition in Germany who claimed that without patriotism, it is not possible to adequately represent the interests of the country. Many politicians called for Rau’s resignation or, at the very least, a recant of his words—he did neither. The uproar died down shortly after, and Rau served as President for another three years.

After President Rau’s death in 2006, most Europeans looked back fondly on his time in office. An obituary in *The Times* claimed “he was a powerful presence who remained popular...and tempered any outbreak of nationalist arrogance.”²

A year after Rau’s death, in America, Barack Obama faced criticism for not wearing an American flag pin on his lapel during the Democratic primary. In similarity to Rau’s controversial statement, Obama’s critics said that his lack of patriotism made him unfit for office.



President Barack Obama speaking without a flag pin.

However, unlike Rau, after Obama attained the Democratic nomination for President, he went against his initial position and began to wear a flag pin. It is unclear whether Obama’s new stance, was actually driven by a true change of heart on the issue, or simply by a strategy to gain more votes. However, Obama’s patriotism was evident during last January’s State of the Union Address, where he called America, “not just a place on a map, but the light to the world.”

This comparison between President Rau and President Obama, in regards to the issue of national pride, serves as evidence that Americans are more willing than other countries’ citizens to tout their nation’s supposed greatness and proclaim that it is “exceptional.” The notion of American exceptionalism, which is interchangeable with American superiority, is often embraced and glorified by Presidential candidates who vie to be the so-called “leader of the free world.” In order to gain support, these

As Stephen M. Walt puts it, American exceptionalism today is the “self-congratulatory” belief that America is the world’s superpower and is “worthy of universal admiration.”⁴

politicians must emphasize their patriotism and try to tap into the commonly held voter belief that America is the nation that all others aspire to be. Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum point out that it is not a question as to whether they believe in “American exceptionalism,” but rather how much they believe in it, as “no politician will publicly question his or her country’s exceptional status” for fear of political suicide.³

However, even though Americans may accept the idea of American exceptionalism, the present-day United States is by no means an exceptional country. Without a consensus over

the criteria required to judge whether a country is considered exceptional or not, there is no evidence to suggest that the belief of American exceptionalism holds true. In this paper, I will analyze why America is not an exceptional nation. Subsequently, I will talk about why Americans’ exceptionalist view hinders progress at home and hurts their relations abroad.

First, it should be noted that when the word *exceptionalism* is used to describe America, it is not used to refer to America as unique or different from other nations, but rather as being more eminent and esteemed than other nations. Although Alexis de Tocqueville—the first academic to describe the United States as exceptional—originally used the term to emphasize how America was different from other Western nations, the modern view of American exceptionalism is something completely different.

As Stephen M. Walt puts it, American exceptionalism today is the “self-congratulatory” belief that America is the world’s superpower and is “worthy of universal admiration.”⁴ New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s (R-NJ) recent words at the Ronald Reagan library are a prime example of this modern view of American exceptionalism. In his speech, Christie not only called Americans “better” than other countries’ citizens, but also proclaimed that the US is “a beacon of hope for the world.”⁵

This modern interpretation of American exceptionalism has bipartisan backing with President Obama’s 2009 speech during the celebration of NATO’s 60th anniversary serving as evidence. He said the following:

“I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism. I am enormously proud of my country and its role and history in the world. If you think about the site of this summit and what it means, I don’t think America should be embarrassed to see evidence of the sacrifices of our troops, the enormous amount of resources that were put into Europe postwar, and our leadership in crafting an alliance that ultimately led to the unification of Europe. We should take great pride in that.”

And if you think of our current situation, the United States remains the largest economy in the world. We have unmatched military capability. And I think that we have a core set of values that are enshrined in our Constitution, in our body of law, in our democratic practices, in our belief in free speech and equality that, though imperfect, are exceptional.”⁶

These words, along with Robert Schlesinger’s—of *US News and World Report*—discovery that President Obama is “the only President in the last 82 years who has publicly uttered the phrase ‘American exceptionalism,’”⁷ prove that the notion of “American exceptionalism” is prevalent in the present age.

However, just because the idea of America’s superiority is talked about today does not mean that it is true. It could be argued that De Tocqueville and others have been successful in pointing out America’s uniqueness—through discussion of its absence of feudalism, its puritanical roots, or the fact that it was a nation built on an idea.⁸ However, when the discussion moves from uniqueness to superiority, a problem arises. If one is going to argue that a country is better, or more important than another country, then there needs to be criteria to decide this superiority.

For example, if it was decided that the best country in the world is the one with the best education system, South Korea would take the crown as its students scored the highest on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) multi-subject tests last year. The US, on the other hand, finished fourteenth.⁹ Thus, establishing criteria for judging is a vital aspect for determining superiority, as any country can essentially be considered the best as long as the criteria suits its strengths.

It is for this reason that most arguments in favor of the modern view of “American exceptionalism” never go very far: there is no universal consensus on how countries are to be judged. It is all relative to the one who chooses the assessment criteria.

In fact, if an objective third party were to judge all of the world’s nations on statistics alone,

then the US would not be categorized as a superior country, but rather as one in steep decline. King's College London recently released a study claiming the US not only has the highest incarceration rate in the world, but that this rate has quadrupled since 1980.¹⁰ The fact that the US prison population rises each year, while other countries—such as the Netherlands¹¹—are having to close down prisons due to lack of crime, does not put America in a favorable light when discussing its standing in the world. Moreover, according to a 2008 study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the infant mortality rate in the US is growing in relation to that of other countries. America had the 23rd lowest infant mortality rate in 1990, but dropped to 34th place in 2008.¹²

However, one cannot define a country through one statistic alone, as one has to consider many different ways of measuring achievement before making an unbiased list of the most successful countries in the world. In 2010, *Newsweek* undertook such a task as the magazine used the criteria of health, economic dynamism—defined as a country's economic openness and the breadth of its corporate sector—education, political environment, and quality of life.¹³ The list also took into account the income and size of the countries evaluated. In the overall rankings, the US finished eleventh. It did not finish number one in any of the categories—its only top-ten rankings were in economic dynamism and quality of life.

Of course, this is just one study, but these comparisons and statistics suggest the decline of America's superiority over time. Though only the current president has uttered the phrase "American exceptionalism", it seems that present-day Americans should now, more than ever, reevaluate their status in the world. Americans need to understand that much improvement has to be done, if they truly want to be considered as exceptional. Thus, present-day claims of exceptionalism are unfounded.

Although many Americans may be willing to admit that their nation is exceptional, they do not take into account the consequences that such a self-important view can have. In regards to domestic affairs, when American politicians

proclaim that their country is exceptional, they are thus suggesting that US policies are the best and that other nations' are inferior. With this mindset of US dominance, there is harsh reaction from Americans whenever there is even a mention of possibly adopting European-type healthcare or education reform. It does not matter if these countries' systems are consistently ranked better than America's, or that their adoption could possibly improve the average American's daily life, as anything other than the US's way is considered to be subordinate.¹⁴

Outside of domestic governance, viewing the US as exceptional can also have grave consequences when it comes to foreign policy. This is the case because the belief of American exceptionalism is also linked with the principle of unilateralism—the doctrine that a country should be able to do an action for its own good, even if its action has international opposition. American exceptionalism and unilateralism suggest that since the US is the most important nation in the world, it should be exempt from global treaties, while having certain powers that other nations do not. Proponents of unilateralism, who Maria Ryan claims are mostly neoconservatives, may argue that since the US has great economic and military power, it should be allowed to act independently of other international factors.¹⁵ However, this philosophy has many negative outcomes.

Though the US is not an "exceptional" country in terms of superiority, it is still a nation with a famous historical reputation. Also, as Daniel Deudney and Jeffrey Meiser point out, due to the fact that it is the country with the largest economy and military defense, it is very influential on the global stage.¹⁶ This power is the reason why when the American government commits a global act unilaterally, and outright rejects multilateral organizations, it calls the legitimacy of such multilateral organizations into question. An example of this phenomenon is when the US government went to war with Iraq in 2003. Multilateral organizations, such as NATO and the United Nations—both of which are mostly made up of American allies—did not support the proposed invasion of Iraq, but the US disregarded

their opinions and went to war anyway. Kofi Annan—the United Nations Secretary-General at the time—said the war in Iraq violated the UN Charter, designed to achieve international cooperation, and that all UN members are bound to follow. In spite of this, the UN never formally punished the US government for violating the Charter, and to this date, the US still has troops in Iraq.¹⁷

The United States' unilateral act was a dangerous precedent because it challenged the UN's authority with regards to international law: it made it so that other nations can use the Iraq war as an exemplar for why they should be able to



United Nations General Assembly

go to war without the UN or NATO's approval. In going against the UN and NATO—two multilateral organizations designed to promote world stability—the US is essentially implying that the decision to go to war should be a country's decision alone, and that an international consensus is no longer needed. If a smaller, less influential country—such as North Korea in 2009¹⁸—had violated the UN charter and committed military actions despite international objections, then that country would have been imposed with sanctions. However, even though both America and North Korea violated the UN Charter, the US didn't face any punishment because of its influential role in global politics.

The US has also rejected the Ottawa Treaty. This multilateral agreement—signed by 157 different countries—bans the use and further development of landmines. The US has not signed the treaty despite the fact that it owns one of the

largest landmine arsenals in the world.¹⁹ By not signing the Ottawa Treaty, which protects not only soldiers but civilians as well, the US runs the risk of portraying itself as uncooperative in the promotion of world peace. Not many agreements have more international backing than the Kyoto Protocol and the Ottawa Treaty, which suggests that most countries believe they provide worldwide benefits. The US, by choosing not to sign these popular treaties for whatever reason, is thus taking a stance that favors its own interests instead of supporting a global compromise.

This lack of international cooperation, supposedly justified by America's so-called "exceptional" status, has irritated other countries' citizens who reject the notion of a world dominated by the US. Kim Campbell—the former Prime Minister of Canada—noted her irritation with the idea of US superiority in an interview last January.²⁰ When asked how people from other countries view the idea of American exceptionalism, her response was, "dimly."²¹ While the people of the US are free to believe that their country is "exceptional," they have to understand that the perception of such a status is not for them to choose. American politicians may tout American exceptionalism and incorporate its ideology into domestic policies. Nevertheless, they cannot claim what Governor Christie did: other nations "aspire to be" the US if foreign opinion is to the contrary. Even though the US plays an influential and important role in global politics, Campbell's response provides evidence supporting the notion that American superiority is solely an American idea.

If the US were truly looked upon as being an "exceptional" nation, then the UN and NATO would not have opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003. American allies who did not go to Iraq—France, Germany, and Turkey—probably would have followed the US, and would have participated in the War out of fear that if they did not, then they would lose an alliance with a superior nation. If the US were actually an exceptional country, then the Kyoto Protocol and the Ottawa Treaty would not be effective or have respected legitimacy among the international community since they do not have US involvement. If other countries actually

did view the US as superior, then they would attempt to mimic American domestic policies, such as health care. However, it is the other way around. In March of 2010, after President Obama passed his healthcare reform bill, French President Nicolas Sarkozy — addressing Columbia University students in New York — said, “Welcome to the club of states who don’t turn their back on the sick and the poor.”²² Sarkozy’s claim shows that, at least in some respects, US policies are not seen with the same enthusiasm abroad that they are met with at home.²³

It is not only foreign heads of state that will not adhere to the idea of American superiority, as many foreign citizens do so as well. Several weeks before the proposed invasion of Iraq—February 15, 2003—an estimated six to ten million people, in sixty different countries, expressed their opposition to the United States’ foreign policy.²⁴ This global opposition to the war showed that there are millions of international citizens who reject the notion of American exceptionalism.²⁵ If these foreigners did accept the view that America

Excessive national pride ... causes arrogance and makes people believe that one’s nation is exempt from established ethical norms.

is exceptional, then they would have allowed the US to do as it wished instead of voicing disapproval for the nation’s unilateral actions. Even though the US went to war with Iraq—in spite of tremendous international objection—this action still does not support the view of American eminence.

In October of 2011, President Obama announced that virtually all US troops will withdraw from Iraq by the end of the year. In the eight years between the start of the invasion and this announcement, 54 different countries have officially condemned the US for its actions in Iraq. While many of these nations were against the war from the beginning, one of its main initial foreign supporters, Tony Blair—the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom—publicly expressed “regret” in regards to the invasion at Britain’s public

Iraq Inquiry²⁶. While proponents of unilateralism may scoff at these condemnations and regrets, this formal international opposition over the United States’ one-sided course of action not only stains America’s credibility and reputation on the global stage, but also discredits the notion that other nations view the US as superior.

Although the notion that America, and its policies, are the envy of the world has become a staple of US political campaign ideology, there is no reason to believe that America is an exceptional nation. However, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Former Prime Minister Kim Campbell raised such a point when she said, “America is a great country... but exceptionalism is a very worrisome doctrine because it suggests that you don’t have anything to learn from anybody else, and that you don’t owe anything to anybody else.”²⁷ Though a type of nationalist arrogance—the kind that Johannes Rau fought against in his time in office in Germany—may be prevalent in present-day America, those who believe in American exceptionalism need to understand that such a self-congratulatory view is counterproductive and alienates the US from other nations.

While the US may be a powerful and influential country, people need to realize that it is not an achievement to be an American. Many countries in Europe and Asia have surpassed America when it comes to quality of education, healthcare, and even seemingly primitive issues, such as infant mortality. Americans should learn from these nations’ successes and cooperate with them on global affairs instead of holding the single-minded view that the American way is always the best. Though the current political climate in the United States may not be favorable to a politician who points out his country’s weaknesses and ways that it has fallen behind, American exceptionalism should be removed from domestic political ideology and discourse. Excessive national pride is a dangerous thing, as it causes arrogance and makes people believe that one’s nation is exempt from established ethical norms. The American people need to understand that when countries work together to create multilateral universal rules, like the UN Charter, they do so in order

to strengthen the bonds between nations, not weaken them.

Though President Obama is noted for being the only President to publicly use the phrase “American exceptionalism,” he raised an important point on the matter later on in his 2009 speech for NATO’s 60th anniversary:

“Now, the fact that I am very proud of my country and I think that we’ve got a whole lot to offer the world does not lessen my interest in recognizing the value and wonderful qualities of other countries, or recognizing that we’re not always going to be right, or that other people may have good ideas, or that in order for us to work collectively, all parties have to compromise and that includes us.

And so I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships because we create partnerships because we can’t solve these problems alone.”

If this statement holds true, then the US government will be scaling down its notion of American exceptionalism in the future, and will thus, in return, be a stronger nation.


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The Evolution of Revolution: Social Media in the Modern Middle East and its Policy Implications

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Wael Ghonim, a 30-year-old Egyptian who works as an executive for Google, enjoyed a house in the United Arab Emirates with a pool and a nice car. But when news of the Egyptian protests reached him in January 2011, he anonymously started a Facebook page supporting a martyred dissident and traveled back to Cairo.

The 500,000 member Facebook group “We are all Khalid Said” became a virtual rallying point. Protests were organized on the site, and posts exposed police brutality in graphic pictures and descriptions. Days later he was in an Egyptian prison, a casualty of a 30-year-old emergency law that allowed the government to arrest and detain him without charge. Ghonim’s disappearance sparked a massive campaign against the Mubarak regime to release him, spearheaded by his employer, the United States, and the rage of the Egyptian street.

Hours after his release from days of torture and captivity, Ghonim appeared on Egyptian TV in front of tens of millions of his countrymen. His tears and impassioned pleas for the overthrow of the regime and the creation of a new Egypt revitalized the masses to continue protesting. He said later, “If you want to liberate a society, just give them the internet.”¹

Cyber-pessimistic scholars like Evgeny Morozov and Malcolm Gladwell dispute the notion that social media is a “magic pill” for the subjugated in the Middle East. Says Morozov, “The idea that the internet favors the oppressed rather than the oppressor is marred by what I call cyber-utopianism: a naïve belief in the emancipatory nature of online communication that rests on a stubborn refusal to admit its downside.”² Still, scholars and politicians like Clay Shirky and Nicholas Kristof suggest otherwise. Condoleezza Rice

trumpeted the internet’s utility as a tool for the oppressed, saying “the internet is possibly one of the greatest tools for democratization and individual freedom that we’ve ever seen.”³ Is social media democratizing by nature? How do cultural, social, and structural factors impact its potential influence? And finally, to what extent is the phenomenon responsible for the Middle Eastern uprisings?

The social media umbrella, which encompasses mobile texting, e-mail, social networking, and photo and video-sharing, certainly plays a role in disseminating information, galvanizing support, and

Whether it is used to incite unrest or promote democracy, social media is a superior tool for political dissidence precisely because it was not engineered for any particular narrow focus.

organizing protests.⁴ But how does one determine the nature, degree, and extent of its role in political dissidence?

This paper will draw parallels between the availability of social media and its potential for political dissidence. It will show that despite popular belief, social media is not inherently democratizing. It will delineate how Lessig’s Framework of Regulation can compare the varying degrees of social media in the Middle East. Finally, it will argue that social media is not a prerequisite to revolution but rather an accelerant to the process of political dissent.

Social Media: A Dissident’s Dream?

Specifically, what is the relationship between social media and political dissidence? Why did the Egyptian state, which received \$1.3 billion in military aid from the U.S. in 2010, feel it was necessary to kidnap a Google executive during protests? What is it about text messages, e-mail, and sites like YouTube and Twitter that scare long-standing authoritarian regimes?

Social media allows people to contribute to a virtual public discourse that they would otherwise not be able to take part in. Cyberspace and mobile networks form a gateway to a virtual world removed from police brutality, hierarchies, and corrupt



Egyptian citizens protesting on Tahir Square, Cairo, against the Mubarak regime earlier in 2011.

representation. This is a virtual world where the best ideas resonate without regard for the identity of the author. The male-dominated Middle East demonstrates the disparity between the physical and virtual. While women are restricted from joining the political chatter of the neighborhood water-pipe lounge, they are taking more liberties online. “They cannot go to the park unaccompanied and meet friends, but they can join a chat room or send instant messages,” a member of a Jordanian-based social media group explains.⁵ Social norms and customs are less of a hindrance with speech on the internet, and people that previously lacked a voice are finding access to one online.

Social media provides real-time information, up-to-date and unmolested, unlike Arab state television and government propaganda. Freedom of the internet means that people choose their sources, and those reputed as trustworthy rise to the top. Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan, and Syrian authoritarians tried to cow citizens by alleging that foreign conspiracy fueled the revolutionary fire. Due to access to independent news, many came to view these tactics as less credible. A freer internet exposes this propaganda by allowing for a meritocracy of ideas in a public discourse.

However, proliferation of information via social media does not allow for content control that traditional media outlets have. Consequently, the same tool that brings freedom and democracy can also be wielded to misinform. This real-time knowledge beguiles bogus claims, but can also cause hysteria and panic. Images of the Danish cartoon and news of the Quran-burning controversy that incited thousands to riot and kill across the Muslim world would not have spread as fast and as far in a world without social media.

Whether it is used to incite unrest or promote democracy, social media is a superior tool for political dissidence precisely because it was not engineered for any particular narrow focus. Its multifaceted nature means people who contribute to political dissidence blend in with those who use it to post photos, gossip, and keep in contact with friends and family.

The ubiquity of social media among many types of users means that governments cannot pinpoint individual dissidents as easily. Comparatively, as Clay Shirky argues, specialized encryption software specifically designed for dissident groups can be exposed by authoritarian government intelligence agencies.⁶ In addition to providing a private way for citizens to communicate amongst themselves, social media is used to organize, galvanize support, and promote causes of all kinds, politically motivated or not. A popular sociological theory explains the formation of an opinion in two integral steps. First,

viewpoints are transmitted by television and other forms of media. Opinions are formed in the second step, when family, friends, and acquaintances reiterate these viewpoints.⁷ Social media is a virtual replication of this process; in a sense, it is an “echo box.”

Social Media: Inherently Democratic?

Some experts believe fervently in Christopher Kedzie’s dictator’s dilemma theory (1997). With the existence of unchecked forums for public discourse, an autocratic state faces a dilemma: to censor dissidence or fight back with propaganda. Both choices run the risk of radicalizing citizens. According to the dictator’s dilemma, Egypt’s shutdown of mobile and internet networks during the protests in February 2011 risked alienating otherwise pro-Mubarak citizens whose communications were interrupted at a time of crisis. Likewise, the U.A.E and Saudi Arabia



Opposition rally in Iran due to the 2009 presidential election.

angered citizens in 2010 when they banned Blackberry phones for fear that dissident groups were using the popular Messenger feature to communicate while avoiding prying eyes. This decision also caused collateral damage, inconveniencing many more legal users than illegal users, offering a perfect example of the dictator’s dilemma. Thus, the theory posits that the mere presence of social media confronts regimes with hard choices, most of which lead to increased freedom of communication and political dissent.

Though a compelling argument, the dictator’s dilemma theory overlooks many

factors. The existence of social media is not a guarantee that a disgruntled population will unite or democratize at all. More separate and systemic environmental realities help political dissent transition into organized revolution, and these can explain why some countries in the Middle East face more serious threats to the established order than others.

Population density and homogeneity are extremely telling demographic factors helpful in enabling revolutionaries to coalesce. Take Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya as examples of the Middle Eastern countries that have faced the most serious changes in the political status quo. In Egypt, the Nile functions as the lifeblood of a country that is overwhelmingly desert and mountains. The consequence is a situation in which 95 percent of Egyptians live on less than four percent of its land. Tunisia and Libya are similar. Sixty-seven percent of Tunisians and 78 percent of Libyans live in populous cities near the coast.^{8,9} An ethnically homogenous country like Egypt (99.6 percent Egyptian) saw regime change become a reality in a matter of days.¹⁰ Tribal Libya took months, even with NATO help, to finally overcome loyal Qaddafi militias. Meanwhile Bahrain’s protests failed; the lack of religious homogeneity certainly did not help create an incentive for members of the Sunni ruling class to defect to the Shi’a majority’s side.

Even when protesters coalesce, demands are met, and dictators are dead or deposed, democracy is not concrete inevitability. Popular revolutions have happened before and failed. In Iran in 1979, a popular revolution was an excuse for a power-hungry mullah to wrest authoritarian control from the Shah. In Tunisia and Egypt, remnants of the former ruling parties are still trying to use their structural advantage to take representation away from upstart democratic parties. Conditions like population density and homogeneity are factors that correlate with successful revolutions. These affect social media’s ability to be a potent accelerant to revolution. Therefore, it is premature to

assume that the political dissent fostered by social media alone will automatically translate to freedom and democracy in the Middle East.

Regulators on Social Media in the Middle East


To explain the degree of social media availability in authoritarian regimes, scholars need a common schema. This paper adapts Lawrence Lessig’s framework of regulation to examine the relationship between social media and political dissidence (Lessig 1999). Lessig’s framework uses a highly adaptable four-variable system that shows how forces regulate an object, in this case, social media.¹¹ Syria, a country that is infamous for its systematic repression and killing of at least 3500 of its own citizens since March 2011, is a suitable environment to test this framework. Lessig’s framework calls for examining law, markets, norms, and architecture in a holistic analysis to gauge the degree to which these factors ease or hamper use of social media. This paper assumes that increased use of social media leads to an increase in civil discourse, which in turn allows for an increased degree of political dissent.

Efforts to spread dissidence in Syria reflect social media efforts in other protests such as Wael Ghonim’s memorial page “We Are All Khaled Saeed” on Facebook. Another example is the page “We Are All Child Martyr Hamza Alkhateeb” which serves as a hub to memorialize the 13-year-old who was tortured and killed by Syrian police after participating in a protest in the province of Dar’a in April.¹² By implementing Lessig’s framework, one can see more clearly what barriers the page’s administrator faces to maintain the site, which publishes a barrage of anti-government information and news daily.¹³

In Syria, an authoritarian regime that Reporters Without Borders bestowed the unenviable distinction of being among the “enemies of the internet,” there are no shortage of laws abridging free use of social media. Laws, Lessig’s first category, regulate usage

of social media by threatening punishment for the defiance of a command. The state in question has the agency here, especially given President Assad’s continued ignorance of international law during the crackdown.

Syria’s four-year ban on Facebook ended on February 9 2011, and there are now over 580,000 users in the country.¹⁴ The publisher of a revolutionary-sympathetic page like Hamza Alkhateeb’s would no doubt be cognizant of the specter of criminal prosecution, harassment, and torture if he or she resided in Syria. There have been many reports of security services demanding certain users’ Facebook passwords.¹⁴ Offline print and publication law is extended to online publishing in Syria, and comes with heavy restrictions on criticism of the regime. Though President Assad ended the emergency rule that since 1963 had banned public demonstrations, placed the media in control



Ghazi el-Mahalla labor leader Kamal el-Fayoumi experimenting with Twitter.

of the state, and allowed it to spy on its own citizens, if anything laws regulating the use of social media and the internet have increased in rigidity and scope.¹⁵

On 28 August 2011 Syria strengthened its regulation of free speech by introducing a law mandating “responsible freedom of expression”. It bans reports about the armed forces entirely, and further places restrictions on news that exhorts violence, sectarian division, or endangers the country’s unity¹⁶. Perhaps sensing a threat from the anonymity allowed in internet cafés from which the

majority of Syrians get online, the regime ordered that the cafés save the names and ID cards of patrons in March 2008.¹⁷ More recently, the Syrian government has shut down mobile 3G networks, making it harder to upload video online and communicate by phone. Clearly, the established laws criminalizing online dissent work against the free use of social media in Syria.

Markets, Lessig's second regulator, are not always incumbent on government action. In Syria, however, where the Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology has a monopoly on telecommunications infrastructure and internet service providers, there is limited competition between private telecommunications companies and

Norms are subject to the winds of cultural change, and part of what makes revolutions so revolutionary is that people feel empowered to go against these norms.

therefore little reason for internet price to gravitate downwards.¹⁷ The administrator of a Facebook page like the one memorializing Hamza Elkhateeb would therefore have to be economically stable enough to afford home internet (the privilege of 20 percent of Syrians) or maintain the site through internet cafés, which cost only a small fee per hour but whose networks are monitored by the regime.¹⁷

The trend of telecommunications privatization has mostly eluded Syria but translated to lower prices in countries like Egypt. In Syria, mobile phones are widespread but the 3G service that allows them to connect and upload media to the internet is around \$50 a month, "prohibitively expensive" for ordinary Syrians.¹⁷

Inexpensive internet service is a boon to the availability of social media, since it encourages a wide range of users to share information, educate themselves, and debate each other online.¹¹ A Facebook page administrator would be able to reach a larger

audience as he or she spreads information harmful to the regime. The opposite is also true. Countries with little or no private competition can keep prices artificially high to limit internet penetration from the masses.¹¹ Syria's reluctance to open the telecommunications market may show that it fears widespread access. Overall, market regulators seem to be working against the availability of the internet in Syria and the access to civil discourse it affords.

Normative regulators are fluid and are evidenced on the basis of what behavior is acceptable or unacceptable in the community. This factor can explain the absence of dissent in a country, though typically difficult to quantify or measure. A powerful normative regulator is self-censorship. The stigma associated with spreading an unwelcome or controversial message through social media may make our Facebook administrator think twice about posting in the first place, unless he or she resides in a neighborhood or area that aligns itself against the Syrian regime. This is especially applicable if doing so may endanger or reflect badly on the family. In a region where young adults (the foremost users of social media) often live with parents until marriage, the social risks of engaging in dissent can outweigh the benefits. But recent events seem to be changing this status quo. Entrenched dictators like Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar Qaddafi have proven vulnerable, and politically minded citizens have noticed. The result is a domino effect: the more people who openly flout restrictions, the more people are emboldened to do the same. Norms are subject to the winds of cultural change, and part of what makes revolutions so revolutionary is that people feel empowered to go against these norms.

Lessig's last regulator is architecture, or the network infrastructure and internet coding. Rules that govern coding and infrastructure place limits on the scope and breadth of social media communication. For example, the nature of Facebook governs that

the administrator of the Hamza Alkhateeb page can only send messages to Facebook followers and those who indicate they "like" the page. Syria takes advantage of the architecture of the internet to pinpoint dissidence. Filtration software sifts out "deviant" content, blocks users from accessing critical political sites, and stops citizens from associating with banned groups. OpenNet Initiative categorizes this political filtering as "pervasive."¹⁷

There is a counterweight, however. Dissidents and secret groups can use encryption software to disguise and verify communications without third party interference. There are also proxy servers that individuals can use to hide IP addresses from the government. In Syria, pervasive filtering, censorship, and spying uses the architecture of the internet for purposes that restrict free access to social media.

Conclusion

Given the link between social media and social dissidence in addition to the aforementioned Framework of Regulation, it is simpler to evaluate how the prevalence of social media can play an integral factor in transitioning dissidence to full-blown revolution. But as this transition progresses it is at the mercy of factors not completely at the behest of the parties involved. For example, the willingness of a dictator to choose relative restraint, reform, or brutality in the face of opposition plays a factor not explained by Lessig's framework. "You can't turn off the light and kill people now as you could turn off the light a generation ago and get away with it," the professor Fouad Ajami stated on the TV program The Situation Room on March 22, 2011.¹⁸ This is correct, but as the dire situation the Syrian protestors face suggests, a harsh initial crackdown can kill the flashpoint momentum of a revolutionary movement. Similarly, the absence of a significant social media presence does not mean that a revolution cannot occur. Let us remember, popular revolutions in the area happened

before social media came about in Algeria in 1962 and Iran in 1979.

Therefore, rather than serving as a prerequisite to revolution, social media can be considered an accelerant to revolution. It does not foment revolutionary fervor; instead, it acts as a medium for that fervor to spread and galvanize the connected masses. Though reports of Twitter and Facebook being responsible for revolution have gained popularity, this notion is exaggerated and misleading because it leaves out the more traditional means of organizing. More likely, social media has helped the spread of information, but not as much as general word of mouth in the cities of Cairo, Tunis, and Benghazi.

This paper tries to illuminate the link between social media and political dissidence while providing a systematic framework to compare the degree of social media in authoritarian regimes. It stops short of crediting social media with the recent Middle East revolutions, instead pointing out that more traditional factors like population density and word of mouth play an underestimated role. There is a big difference between having a million virtual friends on the internet and a million marching on the street. In the end, social media as a vehicle of truth should never be underestimated. As George Orwell said, "During times of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act."

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Brazil's China Challenge



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In 2001, Goldman Sachs named Brazil one of the four most important emerging economies, with China, Russia and India.¹ The BRICs, a term coined by Jim O'Neill, are prophesized to become four of the top six economies in the world by 2050,² and, with the United States, form a new core of power. O'Neill argued that if Brazil could, "keep inflation low and engage with the rest of the world, Brazil could immediately become something else."³ In the past twenty years, Brazil has done that and more. It has established a vibrant democracy, controlled inflation and achieved solid growth.⁴

Introduction

Brazil has become something else: a rising power. It now plays an important role in international governance, through the G-20 and the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization.⁵ The international community has welcomed Brazil with open arms, naming it host for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. It certainly seems possible that Brazil will be an established world power by 2050.

However, where will it be by 2025? Today, it appears that it will not rival the U.S. or China by that time since Brazil has a number of obstacles to overcome. It will surmount some, but it seems clear that China will keep Brazil below the rank of a power with wide-reaching influence. In essence, Brazil's growth is explained by demand from China for commodities and raw materials. This is not a sustainable model for a rise to world prominence. Furthermore, China's entry into Latin America challenges Brazil's drive towards regional primacy. Every global power first influences in its own continent, then neighboring regions, and then acquires a global role.⁶ China's increasingly important role in Latin America leaves Brazil without this natural progression.

Brazil's Claim to Power

What is Brazil's call to primacy in terms of economics, politics, and international affairs? Politically and socially, Brazil's transition to democracy in the mid-1980s is its first step towards global prominence. In the last two decades, Brazil has built solid democratic institutions and deepened democratic values throughout the citizenry. These democratic credentials have allowed it to play a larger role in Latin American affairs, with several countries viewing it as a political role-model.⁷

While Brazil's democracy signifies a calling card to power⁸, it is minor when compared to the stable growth that Brazil has experienced since the late 1990s.⁹ Thanks largely to an economic scheme in 1994 called the "Real Plan," Brazil made major adjustments that brought inflation under control and stabilized the economy.¹⁰ Introduced by Fernando Cardoso, then finance minister for President Itamar Franco, the plan stabilized the economy thanks to a new currency, austerity measures, better tax collection, and reorganized spending.¹¹ It lacked "anti-colonialist passions [and] the hostility to foreign links,"¹² of previous schemes and achieved widespread popular approval.

Cardoso's subsequent election to the presidency allowed him to further reform and

open up the Brazilian economy.¹³ Increased participation in international markets then produced the most significant part of Brazil's growth.¹⁴ His successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a union leader known for his leftist views, carried on Cardoso's policies during his term in office between 2003 and 2011.¹⁵ This continuation resulted in Brazil growing an average of 3.3% annually between 2000 and 2009.¹⁶ The country's GDP in 2010 was around US\$1.6 trillion,¹⁷ making it one of two Latin American economies in above a trillion dollars.

Brazil's democracy and growth give the country's leaders the impetus to vie for a more visible international role. As described by Rubens Ricupero, Cardoso's successor as finance minister, Brazil's foreign policy revolves around three goals: attaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, concluding the World Trade Organization's Doha Round and achieving preponderance in South America.¹⁸

Enter the Dragon: China in Latin America

One of the most important developments in Latin America in the last ten years is the increased participation of China within the region. This is mainly seen by the rise in trade between China and Latin America. The Sino-Chilean relationship is illustrative. In 1990, China was Chile's 30th trading partner; today it is its largest export partner and second largest for imports.¹⁹ In 2009, China received 9.3% of Argentina's exports, 12.5% of Brazil's, 16% of Peru's, and 16.5% of Chile's.²⁰ For Brazil, China is now its largest export destination.²¹

Between 2000 and 2007, the export-import relationship between China and Latin America increased almost tenfold. In 2000, "China exported \$4.2 billion to, and imported \$5.1 billion from, Latin America," and by 2007, China was exporting "\$44.4 billion to, and imported \$46.7 billion from, Latin America."²² This level of trade is widely believed to rise and China could eventually surpass the U.S. as the region's largest trading partner.

This increase in trade volumes

between China and Latin America can be seen as a positive exogenous shock to the Latin American economies.²³ *The Economist* points out that Chinese (and Indian) demand for raw materials "ha[ve] played an important role in accelerating the region's rate of economic growth to an average of 5.5%"²⁴ in the mid 2000s.

China's foray into South America is driven by an unquenchable thirst for securing raw materials and commodities.²⁵ China needs massive amounts of oil, iron ore, agricultural products and other commodities, most in high supply in South America.²⁶ However, there are potential downfalls to this trade pattern, as suggests Patrice Franko, at Colby College. Most concerns are due to the relationship between China and Latin America being overwhelmingly driven by demand for commodities and raw materials.²⁷ As Latin American countries strive to meet China's demand, they risk becoming too reliant on this income. Given that commodities make up around 70% of Sino-Latin American trade, the region is dangerously exposed to the whims of commodity price fluctuations.²⁸

Specialization in producing commodities to meet China's demand has shifted investments into those markets

China needs massive amounts of oil, iron ore, agricultural products and other commodities, most in high supply in South America.²⁶

and away from more capital-intensive segments. We have already seen how Mexico's manufacturing plants, the *maquiladoras*, losing out to Chinese companies that offer lower costs of production.²⁹ Brazil and other countries have been pushed out of producing value-added, manufactured goods and deeper into commodity production.³⁰

With China now Latin America's second largest trade partner, the economics of the region has greatly changed. China's importance is such that "the US has almost fallen off the map."³¹ Latin American

countries have begun to view this period of Chinese preponderance more positively when compared to U.S.-backed *Washington Consensus* era of the 1990s.³² Taking advantage of the relative decline in America's influence in Latin America, China has gained real power: the ability to get states to do what it wants it.³³ The case of Ecuador shows this clearly: When the Ecuadorian government in 2008 requested that a Chinese-backed infrastructure project have a local partner, the Chinese refused funding and the Ecuadoreans relented.³⁴

Leadership in South America: China, not Brazil

In essence, China has carved out a space for itself in through economic prowess and investment. It has also "noticeably intensified its diplomatic engagement with



Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff

the region."³⁵ A clear example of this Latin American-Chinese rapprochement is the strengthening of military ties with many countries in the region: China now sells weaponry to several Latin American militaries – traditional clients of American defense firms.³⁶ Military ties between Latin America

and China have been further bolstered by military education courses for Latin American officers given in China.³⁷ Latin American militaries have traditionally been close to the U.S. While these ties have not been severed – Colombia and Mexico have remained close to the U.S. – China's engagement with Latin American militaries remains an important change in the region.

Further deepening its participation in Latin America, China has become a player in the region's most important international organizations: the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In 2004, China became a formal observer at the OAS,³⁸ and begun making sizeable contributions to missions, development programs, and purchases.³⁹ In 2009 it signed a renewed five-year, US\$1 million fund and pledged US\$300,000 annually to fund a five-year scholarship program.⁴⁰

In 2009, China became the third East Asian country to join the Inter-American Development Bank, joining Japan and South Korea.⁴¹ China will be contributing US\$350 million to "soft loans for the region's poorest nations and investment capital for small and medium-sized enterprises."⁴² For 2010, China's contribution quotas totaled US\$125 million.⁴³ Brazil contributed US\$544.4 million in 2010 and controls 11% of votes, to China's 0.004%.⁴⁴ Yet, China's engagement signals a determination to become a major player.

The China Effect

China's participation in Latin America challenges Brazil's position as the region's leader, but China also threatens Brazil's economic advantages. The evidence shows that the economic relationship between the two nations in the past ten years is not aligned with Brazil's global power ambitions. Rather, like its neighbors, Brazil runs the risk of becoming too reliant on income from exporting commodities to China.

Roberto Abdenur, a former Brazilian

ambassador to China, contrasts the relative power and economic situation. In the early 1990s, both had GDPs of around US\$450 billion.⁴⁵ Today, China is three times larger than Brazil, standing at US\$4.9 trillion.⁴⁶ Aside from increased competition in third markets, China has left Brazil behind economically. Over the past twenty years, Brazilians have seen, “a huge gap open between [their] international proportions and weight and the dimensions and influence of a ‘central country.’”⁴⁷ In essence, China has climbed to world prominence, while Brazil has lagged behind.⁴⁸

Silverio Zebral, an economist at the OAS, characterizes Brazil’s current growth as a bubble created largely by China.⁴⁹ Despite the Real’s (Brazil’s currency) recent overvaluation, Brazilian exports remained undisturbed thanks to Chinese consumption sustaining high international commodity prices.⁵⁰ However, Brazil’s China-backed expansion does not equate with solid fundamental growth. Instead of building strong bases, Brazil has simply designed good economic rules and taken advantage of unparalleled demand for its commodities.⁵¹ Thus, China’s role in Brazil’s rise is a double-edged sword: it creates short-term growth and conditions for long-run decline

This decline hinges on two developments: the Real’s appreciation and increased competition for exports from China itself. Today, Brazil operates under increased demand for its goods and an appreciated currency, while greater Chinese competition undermines its exports in third markets. Tomorrow, Brazil faces losing its competitiveness in manufactured goods and even in commodities – if it remains reliant on Chinese-demand to drive its export-led growth model.

Increased competition has already caused shifts in the Brazilian export structure.⁵² In 2001, around 50% of Brazil’s exports were manufactures, while commodities were 30%. By 2010, the situation reversed: commodities

totaled 52% of exports while 30% was manufactured goods.⁵³ The relationship then has the potential to not only impede Brazil’s ascent, but to push it backward, as it is not one between equal partners, but between colony and metropolis

In 2009, 70% of Brazil’s exports to China were commodities⁵⁴ and 90% of Chinese exports to Brazil were manufactured products.⁵⁵ Ricupero argues that this is “simply a colonial relationship.”⁵⁶ China also inhibits Brazilian added-value exports from entering the Chinese market.⁵⁷ While Brazil’s competitive advantage lies in commodities, it has a large added-value industry. It produces automobiles, airplanes, and high-tech products. Yet, few of these can enter the Chinese market, thus weakening Brazilian added-value industry.⁵⁸

Brazilian authorities have recognized this and taken action. Brazil has initiated anti-dumping cases against Chinese products⁵⁹ and in 2009, Ivan Ramalho, then trade vice

Brazil’s economy is now the most important in the region.

minister, declared that, “Brazil wants to export more value-added products to China,”⁶⁰ recognizing the unbalanced trade relation. While claiming that, “Brazil needs China as much as China needs Brazil,” Sergio Amaral, head of the China-Brazil Business Council, accepts that the relationship is indeed distorted in China’s favor.⁶¹

Most significantly, trade minister Fernando Pimentel announced that Brazil would make China’s overvaluation of the renminbi a priority.⁶² Following a meeting in Brasilia with Rousseff, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said that the U.S. and Brazil would “work together on the global stage to build a more balanced and more stable, stronger multilateral economic system,” a signal they would lobby China to appreciate its currency.

The agreement with the U.S. shows that Rousseff understands the challenge that

China represents to Brazil’s long-term growth and economic stability. She has “identified the undervalued yuan as a major threat to Brazil’s economic boom,”⁶³ and agreed to act. In further response, Brazil has imposed tariffs on Chinese imports, including a new 4.10 U.S. dollar per kilo tariff on Chinese synthetic fibers – on top of the 26% import tax those goods are already charged.⁶⁴

However, should Brazilian diplomacy fail in changing China’s position on the renminbi or unbalanced trade, Brazil will be unable to foster the development of added-value industries necessary to be a global power economy. Under such conditions, Brazil will most certainly not become a world power by 2025. It will continue to experience growth as long as Asia continues to demand its products, but the foundations for achieving sustained development and gaining power will remain absent.

A South American Power Struggle

As outlined, China has become an important player in Latin America, mostly through increased trade. It makes investments and loans, participates in the region’s international institutions and bridges cultural gaps with Latin America. China funds scholarships and has opened several Confucius Institutes in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and others throughout the region.⁶⁵ While these are still in the formation stage, the investment makes China’s intention clear: gaining power in Latin America.

As China’s experience in Latin America deepens, its influence only increases. Compared to Brazilian weight in the region, we have already seen important effects of China’s importance to the Latin American economies. In 1995, Brazil’s manufactured exports to Latin America totaled US\$ 5.7 billion as China exported US\$1.4 billion. By 2004, China was exporting US\$ 7.8 billion and Brazil around US\$ 6.5 billion.⁶⁶

Perhaps trying to reverse this pattern, during Lula’s government, Brazil

became more involved in regional affairs.⁶⁷ Long hesitant to act on the regional stage,⁶⁸ Brazil has now taken a high profile role in establishing organizations like the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) or in organizing regional meetings such as the Latin American and Caribbean Summit for Integration and Development (CALC).⁶⁹ Brazil now hosts regional meetings and in 2008, all South American nations adopted its proposed South American Defense Council.⁷⁰

Along with increased political involvement, Brazil’s economy is now the most important in the region. Thanks to its recent growth, Brazil is around 60% of the regional GDP.⁷¹ Brazil is using some of this wealth to



A view of Brazil’s National Congress.

fund development projects, not only through international organizations, but also through the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação – the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. Though focused on African development, Brazil funds more than 100 projects throughout South America.⁷²

However, this pales in comparison to the level of spending and investing that China carries out in Latin America. Over the first half of 2010, China invested around US\$20 billion in Brazil alone.⁷³ It committed US\$8.5 billion in July 2010 to refurbish Argentina’s railway system, with the condition that Argentina buy Chinese trains. Indeed, “China has even begun to adopt a gringo swagger that stands in contrast to its old role as the cheerleader for the Third World.”⁷⁴ For all of Brazil’s newfound wealth, it is simply unable to compete with the

way China gains influence in Latin America and elsewhere. China can offer enormous loans at “tiny interest rates that can stretch beyond 20 years.”⁷⁵ It is impossible for Brazil to match China in this regard.⁷⁶

Further weakening Brazil’s position vis-à-vis China in the region is the probability that the country will take a different path under new president Dilma Rousseff. She is widely expected to take a more introspective approach than her larger-than-life predecessor.⁷⁷ Brazil will focus on resolving its many social ills, investing in infrastructure, including building Olympic and World Cup venues, reforming its revenue structure and reining in government spending.⁷⁸

With a president uninterested in international prestige and lacking an inclination to participate on the global stage, Brazil will take a more measured approach to its heretofore seemingly unstoppable drive to global prominence. In turn, this gives China more space in South America to gain power and thus keeping Brazil from becoming a global power by 2025.

Closing Thoughts

Brazil is viewed as a rising power thanks to its stability and growth. After decades of rampant inflation and chaos, innovative policymakers managed to control the currency and usher in an era of prosperity. It is undoubtedly true that Brazil has performed admirably, economically and politically. Yet, this age of stability and growth is not yet twenty years old. It was only in 2008

that Brazil received its first investment grade rating, from Standard and Poor’s.⁷⁹ In essence, Brazil’s claim to global power lies in relatively recent developments. Only twenty years ago, Brazil was experiencing hyperinflation and was considered an economic basket case.

However, China’s challenge to Brazil’s ascendancy depends upon continued Chinese performance. Yet, many have begun to question the fundamental strength of this development. Nouriel Roubini warns of China’s massive infrastructure spending possibly creating artificial growth.⁸⁰ Other problems remain, including socio-political concerns threatening overall stability. J.P Morgan has voiced worries regarding China’s social tension risking China’s performance.⁸¹ It must address a creeping inflation problem, which has begun to produce considerable unrest.⁸² Clearly, China’s ascent to power is not without serious challenges and obstacles.⁸³

To close, we note the warning that Alvaro Vargas-Llosa, a Peruvian politics and economics writer, issued regarding the hype surrounding Brazil’s takeoff: “Brazil, a bewitching country, needs to take a deep breath,”⁸⁴ and focus on reforming its political system and addressing other ills. Indeed, sustained growth and prosperity cannot be built upon “high revenue from commodities and some manufactured goods,” along with social welfare programs.⁸⁵ Brazilian authorities should be mindful of Argentinean experience of the early 20th century. Its neighbor reached developed status through commodity exports, only to regress in less than 20 years.⁸⁶

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Information Technology and Control in the DPRK



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In the Hermit Kingdom, information is a crucial resource. Its possession represents access to resource and weapons development techniques, but more importantly, information is what separates North Korean society from the rest of the world. Since the state's inception, meager rations of information combined with hearty doses of propaganda have kept the populace starved with respect to knowledge of the rest of the world's progress, which has quickly surpassed their own in the past two decades. Why, then, has the current regime dared implement 21st century communications systems such as internet technology if such a move would increase the possibility of an information risk?

I argue that Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il's regime encouraged the implementation of such systems because the technology had been adapted with restrictions judged sufficient to minimize their security risk. Through tracing their implementation in comparison with that of other technologies such as radios and weapons technology, it can be seen that communications systems were given the same treatment as these other potentially society-changing technologies: tailored so specifically to North Korean purposes in accordance with Juche doctrine that their use for any other was thought impossible. However, we can see from examining recent information leaks from within North Korea that these controls may not be as watertight as hoped by their implementors.

In the Western world, where information exchange is a profitable and fast-growing area of the economy, the idea of opposing connectivity is unthinkable. However, in North Korea's case, the question of whether or not to implement information technology, and how to do so, is an important one. To overlook this question is to miss a key opportunity to analyze the highly reclusive state's methods of operation, as well as its

current views toward an interconnected world of which it does not participate. Though most news sources have sparingly documented North Korea's recent quiet moves toward implementing internet access, academic analysis of why this technology is being implemented in the first place is limited.

One school of thought on North Korea's steps toward net access proposes that the regime uses extremely limited IT implementation to enforce its control of the



DPRK Guard peers out from behind a granite pillar.

population. A CIA study from 2007 entitled "Hermit Surfers of P'yongyang: North Korea and the Internet" argues that the internet actually "serves as a pillar supporting Asia's

most authoritarian government.”¹ The main argument behind this claim is that researchers working abroad or in a few tightly monitored facilities within North Korea access the Internet and essentially strip-mine it for foreign technical information posted there, downloading the information, scouring it of any politically dangerous content, and then sending this data to research facilities, which are responsible for domestic research and development. Before the rise of internet technology, the North had to network, in however limited or parasitic a fashion, with other nations in order to make any scientific progress – as was the case with the USSR and China. Now, however, a single researcher with an internet connection can harvest “vast amounts of information with an ease unimaginable ten years ago.”² In the view of this study’s authors, this method of one-sided scientific exchange is much safer for the regime, because it allows the acquisition of information with no dangerous discourse, and the scientists to whom the information eventually makes its way get no exposure



An aerial view of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang.

to the original ideological contexts of these ideas. In all other sectors of society, the report maintains, there is no access to information technology. Since this study, information has arisen suggesting that North Korea recently has been investigating IT possibilities beyond simple data harvesting and the personal enjoyment of key leaders.

In 2003, Kim Jong Il Identified three types of fools in the 21st Century: people who do not appreciate music, people who smoke, and

people who cannot use the computer.³ In the same year, North Korea’s *Kwang Myong* intranet went live. Just like the internet accessible to the rest of the world, *Kwang Myong*, meaning “light,” has e-mail and access to various internet sites and is available to at least the more affluent of Pyongyang’s inhabitants.⁴ Critically, *Kwang Myong* is an intranet, rather than constituting part of the Internet, meaning its computers are connected only to each other, and the network is inaccessible from the outside. Despite these limitations, *Kwang Myong* represents a big step toward connectivity in the North. In the same year, on the Internet, North Korea launched its own official website, *uriminzokkiri.com*, hosted on a server in Shenyang, China as if to showcase these advances to the world.⁵ This website made headlines in 2010 when it opened a Twitter and YouTube account.

In 2004, there was a step back in communications technology when cell phones were outlawed. This law mainly affected visiting diplomats, because mobile phone use within the country was limited to only the highest officials. However, after years of effort by the Egyptian communications company Orascom, Koryolink, a North Korean-exclusive cell phone network, was launched in 2008. The government registration fee of \$1,000 USD, which had to be paid in foreign currency, served automatically to limit the possession of cell phones to government elites at first, but since 2009, the first year of Koryolink’s operation, the number of subscribers has jumped from 69,261 to 450,000 as of April 2011, proving that the consumption of cell phones has broadened widely from society’s elite.⁶ Cell phone use is still almost exclusively limited to the Pyongyang and Nanpo wealthy, but the fact that this network exists is a large change from years prior.

Since these policy changes, North Korean presence on the Internet has increased quietly. As of March 2011, there are twelve websites whose servers are located in North Korea and another 18 run by the regime remotely from servers in China and

Japan.⁷ Most recently, and most surprising to observers of North Korea, however, was the long-postponed opening of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology in October 2010. Pioneered by American evangelical scholars, the university offers a state of the art campus and curriculum to its hand-picked 160 students, including access to the web. This access is censored, but it is real, and thus unprecedented outside Kim’s closest circle.

Thus, it can be said with certainty that North Korea has been increasing web access – albeit slowly and cautiously - since the turn of the millennium. But the question remains: why? Why permit this access in a country where even radio stations and televisions remain tuned to official state channels, and where any communication with the outside world is strictly forbidden and treated as a severely punishable security breach? In contrast to other, older analyses, I maintain that it is in the restrictions in the utilization of the new products and services, and not the introduction of the technology per se, that the answer to North Korea’s technological ascendancy lies. Re-examining these areas of development, there is a common thread of restriction and monitoring. I find that the DPRK regime permits and continues the implementation of these IT goods and services because it believes it has implemented restrictions on their use adequate to minimize any security risk.

The guidelines for these restrictions can be found in the *Juche* philosophy of self-sufficiency. Unlike the Internet, the *Kwang Myong* intranet links only computers within North Korea. Users have email, but on this intranet they can only email other domestic users, while people on the Internet abroad cannot send messages to the *Kwang Myong* system. By the same token, the internet pages accessible through *Kwang Myong* are screened and, once approved, downloaded from the real internet by regime agents working overseas. Thus, the system is a limited simulacrum of the world net. In the same way, Koryolink cell

phones can only call other phones on the Koryolink network. There is no international calling, and data accessible from these phones is an offshoot of *Kwang Myong*. Additionally, anyone who wants to carry a cell phone must pass a rigorous registration and screening process, and is then subject to government eavesdropping and censorship at all times. Again, this cell network is not linked to that of the rest of the world, but is rather a restricted facsimile. The system is automatically self-defensive, as censorship and oversight are common. In these respects, North Korean IT policy developments to date do splendidly embody the Party’s idea of *Juche* in all fields.

Other homegrown copies of outside world tech favorites are also becoming more common. The code that runs the popular Firefox browser has been re-appropriated by the DPRK for their own national browser system. The code and functions are the same, and the original Firefox logo makes an appearance on several of the browser’s feature pages, but the product has been rebranded as “Naenara,”



North Korean student during a computer class.

or “Our Country.” This browser features prominently in “Red Star OS,” North Korea’s recently-released Linux-based operating system. Details about the OS are limited to screenshots and descriptions posted online by a Russian blogger studying in Pyongyang,⁸ but it has emerged that the operating system plays a patriotic anthem at startup and contains copies of popular programs such as Microsoft Office and games.⁹

Essentially, internet technology was

a new resource treated with old caution. *Juche* philosophy, in its most practicable interpretation, mandates self-reliance. In terms of resources, this doctrine is manifested as a refiguring of resources to be Korean-produced and Korean-used: creating a closed loop. This closure is, of course, antithetical to the internet as the rest of the world knows and uses it, but for North Korea, which viewed the net primarily as a database and secondarily as a method of exchange, this problem was easily solved. In IT terms, *Kwang Myong* is the definition of a closed-loop system.

These first steps towards net connectivity have not resulted in widespread economic success, but they indicate that the leaders no longer are naysaying any internet access due to political fears. More recently, the door has been cracked open wider, most significantly with the recent

Even ten years ago, most North Koreans had never seen, let alone interacted with, a computer.

opening of Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST). This important event represents, for the first time, the opening of a direct link to the world internet (the real one, not *Kwang Myong*) that, however restricted, is in the hands of the nation's best and brightest. A triumph for negotiators from the US, China, and South, Korea, the university, now in its second year of classes, enrolls students from North and South, and brings together faculty from all the nations named above. For the first time, Kim Jong Il has allowed a hand-picked academic elite to step outside the tight walls of *Juche* facsimiles in hopes that, with their education, they will help North Korean adaptation to the 21st century's new technologies. To what extent these adaptations will extend beyond the elite, and what the effects of this early exposure will be, it is simply too early to say.

That said, there is a genuine possibility that these cracks in North Korea's information block may fracture and widen, opening the way

for a distant but possible flood of information. The possibility that even current IT levels pose a risk to the regime arises from from data on consumer trends and recent events where communications technology was used explicitly against the regime.

The first consequence of IT implementation, even at its current limited extent, that represents a risk for the North Korean government is the simple familiarity with technology that comes as a natural consequence of exposure. Even ten years ago, most North Koreans had never seen, let alone interacted with, a computer. Now, with Chinese-made computers being sold to the wealthy in Pyongyang, most citizens of the Worker's Paradise have some idea of the machines and their capabilities. Computer education is becoming a key part of North Korean schooling, and those students with exceptional promise have an opportunity to study further at "Computer Genius Training Centers."¹⁰ Graduates of these centers may be sent to work in the research sector, or in development of products like Red Star OS that will in turn increase exposure to the internet within North Korean society.

Even on a limited scale, computers have become a non-trivial part of North Korea's economy, a step up from ten years ago, when they were merely a personal plaything of Kim Jong Il. In 2006, "Silver Star 2006," a computer game made in North Korea, went on sale in the South,¹¹ while in 2005 a South Korean company released the film *Empress Chung*, co-animated by a team in the North.¹² Diplomats even report that more and more business cards – not just Kim Jong Il's, as in 2000 – carry email addresses, meaning there is a real link to communications technology to the outside world maintained somewhere within the DPRK's murky industrial sector.¹³

On a basic level, North Korean society is becoming more and more familiar with computer technology. The first North Korean internet café (connected to *Kwang Myong*, not the real web) opened in Pyongyang in 2002,

and others have opened since, some even outside the capital.¹⁴ They boast computer games popular with children, access to email, and even online dating.¹⁵ All the computers in these cafés perhaps predictably open to the North Korean government homepage, where old propaganda takes a new digital form.¹⁶

In the mobile phones sector, the scenario is much the same. South Korean unification minister Um Jong-Sik cited in 2010 that the North currently had an estimated 450,000 cell phone users.¹⁷ As documented above, these phones are limited to use within the country and can only access the domestic intranet. However, their popularity and the industry's rapid growth (the number of Korean cell phone users rose 50% from 2009-2010)¹⁸ demonstrate that, again, there is a definite demand for, and growing familiarity with, these communications products.

Importantly, it is this familiarity that holds daunting possibilities for the regime's future security. These technologies were originally allowed because they were restricted to DPRK-only use, with no possibility for connection to the opposite world. These restrictions work – there is no way to reconfigure a Koryolink phone to dial internationally or to connect to the Internet from within *Kwang Myong*. But because these products are simulacra of products popular in the outside world, their operation is almost identical. If someone familiar with the workings of a Red Star computer were granted access to, say, a Chinese or South Korean computer, he would be familiar enough with the technology that he could work it. By the same token, anyone with mobile phone know-how honed by practice with domestic products would also be quite prepared to use foreign phones with unrestricted capabilities. With 450,000 cell phone users in the country at the time of writing, this familiarity would be hard to stamp out even if the regime changed its mind. As use expands, it is experience with these products and not their *Juche* manifestations that marks IT's biggest threat to the Korean regime. These

risks have already been realized in several cases. Most prominently, North Korean informers have recently come to use their domestic phone knowledge to send information via Chinese cell phones, which have no *Juche*-inspired restrictions. Smuggled at great risk through the North Korea-China border, the phones operate on prepaid SIM cards capable of calling and texting defectors working to collect information from China. When used near the Chinese border, these phones are even said to be able to receive Chinese internet signals.¹⁹ Information from the users of these cell phones has been revealing and important.



Students working in the Grand People's Study House.

According to one *New York Times* article, news from these informants constituted the first information about North Korean outrage over the currency reevaluation enacted in 2009.²⁰

Before cell phones, there were indeed defectors who came to China or the South bearing important information about happenings in the DPRK. But the two-way properties of the internet, with informers in the country reporting to defectors on the outside, is a truly revolutionary development. In previous cases, defectors could only provide what information they could bring with them when they exited the country, and returning as a spy was almost completely out of the question. Now, however, thanks to this technology, these networks have constant updates from within the country, which can continue indefinitely. It is estimated that as many as 1,000 of these smuggled phones are currently in use within the DPRK.²¹ The reports

come from individuals not likely to have any special knowledge about or access to North Korea's gravest threats to the outside, such as its nuclear program or the question of Kim Jong-Il's successor, but the mere presence of reports from within the country is a major change from only a few years prior.

The regime is aware of these threats. Smuggling across the Chinese border has been a problem before the rise of cell phones, but this new commodity has prompted speculation and the implementation of policies that appear anticipate a crackdown. In the wake of the recent revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, in which cell phones and internet technology played an unquestionably vital role, North Korea's leaders were visibly concerned. Just after the revolutions broke out, Pyongyang required both institutions and households to report on how many tech devices they owned. This drive included computers and cell phones but extended even to USB flash drives and MP3 players.²²

This measure indicates a great deal about North Korea's own technological self-awareness. First of all, it is certain that such devices exist outside the highest levels of government. The inclusion of flash drives and MP3 players indicates a consumer sophistication beyond that of most analyses, which, as noted above, hold to the outdated idea that technology has almost no footing in modern North Korean society. Though it is foolish to assume that anyone outside the Pyongyang and Nanpo wealthy has access to an MP3 player, it is interesting that anyone at all should have access to these devices. Are they a gift of the beneficent and omnipotent Worker's Party, or the first black market trickles of a powerful economic sector into an economically isolated society?

Even more importantly, this recent measure to register technology is a huge departure from policies of just seven years ago. In 2004, the government's response to a bomb blast along train tracks that missed Kim Jong-Il was much more extreme. A cell phone

was found among the rubble, and the regime promptly banned all cell phones within the country's borders, including those carried in by diplomats.²³ It is speculated that the regime suspected the bombers of using cell phones to coordinate or even detonate the blast. This reaction reveals a fundamental shift in policy in recent years motivated by a deepening integration of these technologies into North Korean society. This technology has taken a substantial hold in North Korean consumer markets – to the point that the regime cannot easily change its mind and go backwards. In fact, given growth rates for the past years, it is safe to assume that North Korean consumers will expect increasingly attainable telecommunications products. If the state does not cooperate with these demands, it has been shown that determined citizens will turn

The two-way properties of the internet, with informers in the country reporting to defectors on the outside, is a truly revolutionary development.

to the black market despite harsh penalties, and these products from China do represent a substantial danger to the regime's information control.

Future analyses of the domestic situation in North Korea must embrace and investigate further the notion that North Korea is no longer a total information blackout: there are pinpoints of access, even if they are guarded and small. No longer will it be accurate to depict the DPRK as having no interest in connecting with the outside world.

For governments and organizations working from the outside to improve human rights in North Korea and defuse a possibly explosive collapse of the regime, these connections should be monitored closely. Policy-wise, these organizations should continue existing campaigns to provide information to North Korea's citizens, but the beginnings of internet access in North Korea

offer a key opportunity for change: existing methods of floating in AM radios or brochures into the country have proved to be the most effective way to get these resources into the reclusive country, but they have also proved to be dangerous. If average citizens come upon these parcels or leaflets by chance, they are automatically placed in grave danger of being caught with the devices, or even of being punished for simply having seen them. These offenses have repeatedly proved punishable by transport to a labor camp or death. The recent appearance of North Korean IP flags on international news sites shows that there are individuals in North Korea looking for information on the outside. Concentrating on novel ways to target information to these individuals, who are already looking for it though conscious of the danger, is perhaps a safer and more advantageous strategy made possible by this technology.

In other spheres, governments should find new and meaningful ways to support projects for continued IT development in the DPRK. The Hermit Kingdom has showed it is at least interested in progress in this sector, and IT development has been a key method of new and constructive discourse. The most prominent example is the recent opening of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. The project was spearheaded by a Christian group, but the US State Department was deeply involved in funding and overseeing the program's development, including oversight of individual class syllabi. Any projects like this, that increase North Korean exposure to information from the outside, should be viewed as key opportunities for discourse. PUST's prominent advantage is that it grants the internet as an educational tool to 160 of North Korea's brightest students. Through one investment, the outside world now has 160 possible contacts – not in fields of intelligence or espionage, but in the fields of outside knowledge, perhaps even included lightly censored current events. That is a high return for any single investment.

In conclusion, both investors and governments should insist to the regime that increases in communicative potential are a valuable resource, regardless of their use. These sales pitches can easily be accompanied by small policy carrots that convince the regime that it stands to profit from wider access to world communication. The fruits of these connections will likely come naturally once they are established, so the current focus should be on establishing new connections, rather than on manipulating existing ones.

Given its many anomalies (students and faculty from multiple nations, full web access), it is possible that these strategies are already beginning to be effective at PUST. The university doesn't fit clearly into the *Juche* facsimile structure observed primarily between 2000 and 2010, with the university's openings. With the freedoms it delivers, and the international partnerships central to its existence, the university is no facsimile. Kim Jong Il has proved nothing if not mercurial, but at the moment, the university represents a genuine academic foothold in the ascent to widened DPRK web access. With no degrees awarded yet, the university has not had any tangible effects, either with respect to economic or civil advancement. Its opening, however, realized in October 2010 after seven years of delay, shows that the DPRK may be edging into a new approach to IT and out of a *Juche*-based system in use for the past decade whose contours are only just beginning to become clear.

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
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The Illusion of US Isolationism




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*As of September 2011, the United States was involved, at different levels, in military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Somalia. America has more than 700 military installations overseas, and its military expenses account for almost half of the world's total. This substantial foreign engagement directly contradicts the United States' self-professed isolationism in foreign policy. The concept of US isolationism dates back to the colonial days. Evidence for example can be found in Thomas Paine's work, *Common Sense* (1776). It was then often reiterated by US leaders, such as Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams, not long after America had gained its independence. Nowadays, characterizations of US foreign policy as isolationist are even further complicated if one moves beyond the field of military intervention and considers the thick web of economic, political, and cultural international relations existing among states. But what about past American foreign policy? Is it sensible to describe it as isolationist? This article analyzes US foreign policy rhetoric to suggest an answer to this inquiry.*

The term 'foreign policy rhetoric' describes the ideas – included in speeches and documents – which characterize American foreign policy discourse. Skeptics may argue that public rhetoric should not be relied on as evidence to support the genuine intentions behind a country's foreign policy. They believe that public rhetoric is an instrument in the hands of the elites to deceive public opinion and hide the real reasons for a state's international behavior³⁴. Although this may be the case at times, this argument does not weaken the utility and importance of analyzing public rhetoric in foreign policy. According to the political scientist Michael Hunt, professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, "Public rhetoric is not simply a screen tool or ornament. It is also, perhaps even primarily, a form of communication, rich in symbols and mythology and loosely constrained by certain rules. To be effective, public rhetoric must draw on values and concerns widely shared and easily understood by its audience [sic]³⁵". In other

words, if public rhetoric is to be effective, it must be consistent with concerns and values deeply cherished by society. Public rhetoric is, therefore, essential to



US troops storm a beach in North Africa during World War II.

understanding a nation's culture and to explaining certain fundamental aspects of its international behavior.

Action Versus Example

American exceptionalism has been a pervasive theme throughout much of its history. Americans have considered themselves as an exceptional nation with a mission to reshape the world according to its universal values. The idea of US exceptionalism has been characterized by strong religious and secular components. The religious one draws on the beliefs of the first Puritan settlers from England and Scotland. They considered America the 'New Israel' and 'a special religious place' whose inhabitants were 'blessed by God'. The secular component of US exceptionalism could be traced back to the age of Enlightenment. It is strongly influenced by the liberal philosophy of



George Washington warned against foreign entanglements.

John Locke and the political economy of Adam Smith, and grants a special status to the concept of freedom. However, the same kind of widespread consensus has not always been reached on the way in which the United States should pursue this special mission. Can it be done by setting an example? Or does it require direct action? Ever since America adopted this exceptionalist credo, the primary debate over implementation has centered on two competing schools of thought.

On the one hand, the 'lead by example' strategy calls for restraint in foreign policy. Proponents of this strategy argue that immoderate interventionism in an immoral international system would eventually corrupt the Republican values

of the domestic system. Democracy is a fragile plant which needs constant care and protection. Liberty should primarily be perfected at home and then exported to others solely by the force of the example. Thomas Jefferson was a strenuous supporter of this strategy. He writes: "I hope that peace and amity with all nations will long be the character of our land, and that its prosperity under the Charter will react on the mind of Europe, and profit her by the example⁶". And then again:

"The station which we occupy among the nations of the earth is honorable, but awful. Trusted with the destinies of this solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights, and the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth shall ever become susceptible of its benign influence⁷."

The strategy of leading by example is also advanced by John Quincy Adams in one of his most famous quotes. "She [The United States] goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example⁸".

On the other hand, the 'lead by action' strategy calls for an assertive foreign policy. Democracy and freedom at home are inextricably bound to an active advancement of these American values abroad. As early as 1795, Alexander Hamilton describes the United States as "the embryo of a great empire⁹". The narrative of the Manifest Destiny emblematically represents this strategy of action. John O'Sullivan, the American

journalist who coined the term in the 1840s, writes that it was "the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions¹⁰". He also adds "We are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our onward march? Providence is with us, and no earthly power can¹¹". Although originally framed for the United States' westward continental expansion, the narrative of Manifest Destiny was later adjusted for US interventions throughout the world¹².

The existence of two conflicting strategies often gave rise to lively debates and passionate confrontations on issues of foreign policy. The first one took place during George Washington's

Even if we accept the marginalization of the economic aspects of foreign policy, it is still hard to define US behavior in world affairs as isolationist.

administration and revolved around the ratification of the Jay Treaty with Great Britain. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton supported the ratification and an assertive foreign policy. Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, was against it and in favor of a foreign policy of aloofness. One of the criticisms moved to the treaty was that overly close economic relations with London would endanger America's recently acquired freedom. The second confrontation concerned the 1846-48 War against Mexico. It saw President James Polk pushing for the annexation of the Mexican territories of California and New Mexico against the opposition of several members of Congress, both Democrats, as Senator John C. Calhoun, and Whigs, as Senator Joshua R. Giddings. The Spanish-

American War of 1898 prompted the third debate. President William McKinley's project to annex the Spanish territories of Hawaii, The Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico faced a strong resistance organized by a diverse group of politicians and intellectuals united under the banner of the Anti-Imperialist League. The fourth contest regarded US participation in the First World War. Senators George W. Norris and Robert M. La Follette were two leading voices within the anti-interventionist camp. One strong argument against intervention was that President Woodrow Wilson was taking the United States into war only to serve the interests of Wall Street bankers who had loaned large sums of money to the Entente powers. The onset of the Second World War set the stage for the fifth confrontation between the supporters of the two different foreign policy strategies. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Century Group favored US intervention, while the organization America First, and its leader Charles A. Lindbergh, strongly resisted it. Finally, it is sensible to accept the argument of the scholar Walter Mead, who set the date of 1947 as the crossing of the Rubicon for this debate¹³. In fact, President Truman's enunciation of the Containment Doctrine for the Cold War, that year, sanctioned, once and for all, the predominant status of the 'lead by action' strategy in US foreign policy. The strategy of the example did not disappear but markedly lost its power¹⁴. However, the persistence of the rhetoric of the 'lead by example' strategy throughout US history has largely contributed to the illusion of US isolationism in world affairs, which refers to the illusion of a nation pursuing a restrained foreign policy.

A Superficial and Partial Analysis of History

We call US isolationism an illusion because it mainly originates from a

superficial and partial analysis of historical events. Economically, America has always favored high levels of foreign engagement, especially in terms of trade. Indeed, since its independence and despite short-lived attempts at economic isolation, the United States has steadily increased its commercial relations with foreign countries. At the turn of the 20th century, the US already had the largest economy in the world¹⁵. US historian and then Senator Albert J. Beveridge effectively describes this American penchant for international trade: "American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours¹⁶".

Even if we accept the marginalization of the economic aspects of foreign policy, it is still hard to define US behavior in world affairs as isolationist. If we take into consideration the confrontations between the lead-by-action and the lead-by-example strategies listed above, we will find that the former has generally dominated. President Theodore Roosevelt briefly sums up US achievements in foreign policy during the 19th century, a time usually considered as one of American isolationism:

"Of course our whole national history has been one of expansion. Under Washington and Adams we expanded westward to the Mississippi; under Jefferson we expanded across the continent to the mouth of the Columbia; under Monroe we expanded into Florida; and then into Texas and California; and finally, largely through the instrumentality of Seward, into Alaska; while under every administration the process of expansion in the great plains and the Rockies has continued with growing rapidity¹⁷".

In about one hundred years the United States, whether it was through wars, treaties or purchases, tripled the total area of its national territory. This is by no means the record of a nation with a restrained foreign policy.

Moreover, an incomplete analysis of three other historical events has fuelled the illusion of US isolationism. These are: President George Washington's Farewell Address (1796), the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the US Senate's negative vote on the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919). The general wisdom holds that in his Farewell Address, President George Washington warns his fellow citizens to avoid "permanent

In about one hundred years the United States, whether it was through wars, treaties or purchases, tripled the total area of its national territory.

alliances with any portion of the foreign world"; thus promoting a policy of isolation. This is a literal interpretation that does not take into consideration specific historical circumstances of that time. Back then, the United States had recently gained its independence from Great Britain and it was still too weak to meddle in conflicts among the much more powerful European nations. Washington himself later implies – in the same document – the US would adopt a different stance when the circumstances became favorable. He expresses this conviction by claiming that "the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when

we may choose peace or war, as our interest guided by justice shall Counsel [sic]". Washington then adds that the US "at no distant period" would emerge as "a great Nation" in world affairs¹⁸.

President James Monroe's doctrine is also considered strong evidence for an aloof foreign policy. The document states that "[US] policy in regard to Europe... remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers." Nevertheless, an alternative reading of the same document could describe the United States as still avoiding direct involvement in European affairs because it was aware of its inferior military



Charge of the Rough Riders at San Juan Hill.

capabilities, but nonetheless ready to create its own sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, the Monroe Doctrine holds that "[the Americans] should consider any attempt on the part [of European countries] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and that "we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing [the countries of the Americas], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States¹⁹". At the turn of the 20th century, President Theodore Roosevelt gives more credit to this alternative by articulating his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: "in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force

the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power²⁰". Therefore, the Monroe Doctrine was not only a call for the principle of non-interference from European powers in the Western Hemisphere but it also, and perhaps primarily, affirmed the US exclusive duty and right to intervene and direct events in that region of the world.

Finally, according to the isolationist view, the US Senate's refusal to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations represented an additional sign of US unwillingness to get involved in world affairs. Probably this was in fact the position of a small minority led by Senator Robert M. La Follette, who had opposed entering into WWI in the first place. However, as pointed out by historians, the great debate surrounding the League, far from being a call for a restrained foreign policy, was "something of a family feud" on "how America should sustain and extend its power and authority" in the world²¹. In other words, it was essentially a debate on the different strategies the US should apply in pursuing an assertive foreign policy. The principal reason for the Senate's vote against the Covenant, was the provision contained in Article X:

"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled²²".

The critics of the ratification argued that such system of collective security would infringe on US sovereignty and unnecessarily reduce its freedom of action.

Final Remarks

This analysis shows that isolationism has represented a recurrent component of US foreign policy rhetoric. It also conveys that such an isolationist brand of US foreign policy has often competed with a more interventionist one. As a result of successive confrontations, however, the supporters of isolationism have generally ended up on the losing side.

Thus, going back to our original question, is it sensible to define past US foreign policy as isolationist? After this assessment, the answer should be no. In fact, it is reasonable to argue that calls for an isolationist foreign policy had and still have an important place in US public rhetoric. But in the past, as for today, these calls were not the main and more potent driver of US foreign policy.

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Militarization of Aid and its Implications for Colombia

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The US has increasingly turned to using the military to administer humanitarian aid in recent years. This process has come under attack from many academics and foreign officials. Using action in Colombia from 1999 to present as a case study, this article evaluates the use of military vice civilian and NGO agencies to administer humanitarian aid. The article includes a suggested model of response to situations such as that found in Colombia today, where the military first has to maintain security, then transition over to civilian and NGO aid.

In recent years, both academics and officials have grown increasingly critical of the militarization of humanitarian aid, as witnessed in Colombia since 1999. This article considers the various organizations and politics underpinning US foreign policy and aims to clarify the reasoning behind the militarization of aid, focusing primarily on official reports from government agencies, as well as differing angles of criticism and support for the militarization of humanitarian aid.

In 1999, the United States bolstered its humanitarian aid commitment to Colombia by participating in President Andrés Pastrana's "Plan Colombia."¹ Although this plan rose and fell with the State Department's Andean

Critics of the militarization of aid, such as Chalmers Johnson and Amnesty International, often point to its potentially negative consequences as reasons to avoid it for humanitarian purposes. However, the actual decision to use the military is usually a short-term reaction to crisis with the aim of providing security and stability in the affected country. The real, longer-term problem stems from the lack of planning for the transition to aid from civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).³

The Practical Need for Military Action

The involvement of any military force in response to crisis is viewed as a dramatic event and raises suspicions. However, according to a report from the RAND Corporation:

"The United States has historically provided assistance to the security forces of repressive, non-democratic countries that do not share its political ideals. This assistance is intended to improve their ability to deal with threats such as terrorism and perhaps to improve human rights. The security forces in these countries are not accountable to the public, and their activities and approaches are not transparent."⁴



Fmr. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Meeting with Fmr. Colombian President Andres Pastrana

Counterdrug Initiative, it left behind a significant military presence for security and training purposes.²

The US military's ample resources and constant level of readiness give it greater capabilities for rapid deployment than any

other entity in the government. Within hours of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, US Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft were in the area performing evacuations and delivering supplies, while the US Coast Guard Cutter *Forward*, arrived in Port-au-Prince to provide additional support.⁵ The military provided more medical care in Haiti than even the deployable teams from the Department of Health and Human Services. Military personnel performed over 1,000 surgeries in the two months following the earthquake, while the Health and Human Services deployable teams performed 167. Military aircraft handled nearly every MEDEVAC case. Coast Guard and Navy teams worked around the clock to restore the port facilities, and the Air Force reopened the local airport to allow more humanitarian flights to enter and leave the country.⁶ A month and a half later, an earthquake in Chile also prompted an immediate response from the US Air Force.

Bringing a peaceful solution to internal conflict requires a significant reduction in the threat of armed conflict.

Flying 17 humanitarian flights in one day with only two planes, the Air Force demonstrated a level of efficiency that no civilian agency or NGO is able to match.⁷

When providing humanitarian aid in an underdeveloped country, internal security naturally becomes a concern, and sometimes foreign forces are necessary to provide “emergency justice” until the true process of nation-building can begin.⁸ In the case of Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist guerrilla organization, has become increasingly known for its kidnapping of key personnel. Just recently, FARC released Corporal Josué Calvo, of the Colombian Army, in a deal brokered by the Red Cross and Brazilian military after Calvo had been in captivity for almost a year.⁹ In 2002, FARC captured Ingrid Betancourt, a presidential candidate. She was released

along with several members of the Colombian military and police forces in 2008, as well as three US defense contractors whose plan had been shot down in 2003.¹⁰

Bringing a peaceful solution to internal conflict requires a significant reduction in the threat of armed conflict. The mere presence of US forces in Colombia has made FARC and the right-wing paramilitaries such as the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) much more complicit in negotiations.¹¹

In addition to providing immediate security, one of the primary functions of the US military in Colombia has been to train the Colombian National Police and the Colombian Armed Forces. In accordance with various congressional authorizations, the “DOD provides counternarcotics foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve the counternarcotics capacity and capabilities of relevant agencies of foreign governments with its Counternarcotics Central Transfer account appropriations.”¹² This assistance often involves transfer of equipment, including several aircraft sold and loaned to the Colombian National Police and the Colombian Armed Forces in support of counterdrug missions, evacuations, and the recovery of displaced persons.¹³ This advance in Colombian knowledge can only come from the US military, as no other part of the US government has the ability to provide these resources or advanced training techniques to forces that need them.

Military training can include lessons on human rights practices as well as teaching respect for international law, both of which typically yield positive results.¹⁴ The US government can also provide incentives to follow its message of promoting democratic ideals by refusing assistance to governments known to engage in corruption. In 2005, the State Department denounced certain parts of the Colombian Armed Forces because of its known cooperation with corrupt right-wing paramilitary forces.¹⁵ This incentive to promote human rights stems from the Leahy Amendment, which prohibits the

US government from working with known human rights violators without the expressed permission of the Secretary of State, who would only allow such actions when a clear effort is being made to correct the problem.¹⁶

Military action is not without detractors and critics. One such critic is Bruce Michael Bagley, whose writings decry the first Bush administration’s policy in Colombia. Although his writings are from several years ago, his ideas are still valid today. Bagley raised concerns over President George H.W. Bush’s plans to emphasize the military aspects of his plan to develop Colombia because of “evidence of [Colombian] military complicity in the drug trade and the trafficker-funded paramilitary groups.”¹⁷ In an official statement, Amnesty International echoed the same position for the



Fmr. Secretary of State Colin Powell greeting Colombian Military personnel.

current operations in Colombia, citing possible human rights violations due to the heavy military and counterdrug emphasis of Plan Colombia.¹⁸

Bagley also expresses concern about the legitimacy of former Colombian president Barco if the United States were to get too involved in supporting him. Instead he argues, “US policy should seek to strengthen the Colombian state’s institutional capacity to govern its national territory, to enforce the law, and to promote economic development.”¹⁹ Bagley is right to make this assertion, but these goals do not have to be exclusive or the antithesis of military action. Bagley’s plan for the ideal policy includes the majority of the

goals for civilian and NGO aid but it does not account for the necessary security for those civilian and NGO workers to even do their job of promoting the transition back to Colombian control and bolstering the legitimacy of the Colombian government.

Another critic of militarization of humanitarian aid is Chalmers Johnson, who accuses the military of lacking accountability to the public and calls its presence in other countries a sign of imperialism. Johnson also takes issue with the military’s constant request for more technology and—funding, even when DOD’s budget is already the largest in the federal government and the US military boasts most cutting-edge technology in the world.²⁰ However, with the advent of irregular warfare, the constant increase in technology is paramount to overcoming the threat of non-state actors that otherwise would never give up. Without the military to provide security and training, civilian and NGO workers continue in vain. There must be some sort of force in the country, and the US military is capable of being that force.

The Parallel Need for Transition and Planning

Ultimately, the goal of any humanitarian mission is to return a country’s government to a point at which it can effectively govern its own people. As Roy Godson of Georgetown University, said before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere:

“Unless foreign police organizations recognize and internalize what the rule of law means, what its key characteristics are, and why the rule of law is necessary to accomplish their mission, no amount of aid will get the job done.”²¹

The emphasis in Colombia and elsewhere should be placed on the restoration of legitimacy and authority rather than attempts to wipe out armed resistance groups. The people of Colombia need to know that their

government can protect and provide for them. To do this requires economic development and governmental reform. In countries like Colombia, military involvement does not inherently hinder economic development. Rather, the problem lies in the planning and the process of administering aid via the military. As Flournoy and Pan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argue, "the international community must take a much more comprehensive approach to justice and reconciliation for the intervention to succeed" in places like Colombia.²²

To start, any sort of military action, humanitarian or combat, needs planning and forethought that allow for some flexibility. There must be some sort of contingency plan to deal with the unforeseen circumstances of working against what is essentially an insurgency. As Philip Zelikow argues, "the 'engineering' task [of foreign policy] has seven parts: national interest, objectives, strategy, design, implementation, maintenance, and review."²³ Many contemporary policies, such as the current policy in Colombia, lack maintenance and review altogether. Instead, the standard operating procedures continue rigid and unchanged, regardless of the situation's dynamic nature.

To even make a policy decision requires quite a process in and of itself, which is where Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics and organizational process models are useful for explaining some of the undesirable effects. The possibility of human rights violations and the prospect of working with corrupt officials are not unique to military action. Because of the existing political system in the United States, these unintended consequences are always a possibility when trying to work with officials in a country like Colombia where rule of law is not always guaranteed. Although standard operating procedures provide guidelines on how to conduct foreign policy, they do not allow the flexibility that situations like Colombia require. "Since procedures are 'standard,' they do not change quickly or

easily...but because of standard procedures, organizational behavior in particular instances often appears unduly formalized, sluggish, or inappropriate."²⁴ As a result of the different political interests at the heart of every foreign policy issue, the result ends up to be nothing like any party involved desired, leading to overall disappointment with the process as well as the outcome. One example of bureaucratic politics is policy dictated by those who will ultimately not be involved in the implementation of the policy, such as the State Department's directive calling for military action in Plan Colombia, instead of the decision being in the hands of DOD.²⁵

In addition, actions are often beyond the control of any US official. For example, there is a long-standing belief among many members of the Colombian military that the right-wing paramilitaries can be an ally against

When the transition from military to civilian development fails to occur, the problems of insurgency only worsens.

the leftist guerrillas.²⁶ Local officials may also carry out their own policies that get in the way of US policy, such as President Uribe's 2007 plan to manually eradicate even more coca plantations, although the US emphasis had already begun to shift away from eradication as a way to combat production.²⁷ Uribe's actions in spite of US intentions are just one example of how the US development efforts never occur in a vacuum. There are always other stakeholders, including the country being developed.

Neither civilian workers nor the military can legitimize the government. The US government has learned this lesson countless times, such as in Vietnam and Honduras. Although the level of action and violence in Honduras never reached that of Vietnam, many officials, including Air Force Major Bernard Harvey, draw comparisons between the two scenarios. In a report, Harvey says

that "the US military could not win the hearts and minds of the Honduran people for their government...to think otherwise would be a grave strategic mistake."²⁸ However, economic development can aid the government of any country with legitimacy problems by helping the government provide for its people, and civilian agencies and NGOs are much better suited to carry out that development.

When the transition from military to civilian development fails to occur, the problems of insurgency only worsens. Certain U.N. officials in Afghanistan have recently expressed displeasure with NATO military actions, including the use of the military to provide healthcare and build schools. When the military gets too involved in the economic development of an area, the local people start to see no difference between the civilian and military aid workers. Because armed resistance or insurgency is almost always directed at



Colombian Special Forces soldiers training for combat.

the military, schools and hospitals are also targeted.²⁹ An insurgency directed at schools and hospitals would certainly be one of the most horrible outcomes of humanitarian aid imaginable, but can be easily avoided by creating a distinction between the different forces administering the aid.

The amount governmental reform needed in Colombia is enormous, and it cannot come from the military. Prior to US involvement, the Colombian judicial system was not very conducive to prosecuting high profile and high publicity cases, such as drug traffickers or armed resistance groups. However, with USAID and Department of Justice employees

working with the Colombian government to educate and train the judges, attorneys, and clerks in the Colombian judicial system, conviction rates for these types of cases have increased steadily.³⁰ In addition, Colombia has begun to extradite some of its drug traffickers to the United States and other countries with more established justice systems. Under this system, criminals are guaranteed a fair trial without the risk of criminal organizations pressuring witnesses or jurors.³¹

The mission of the US military is clearly not one of economic development. This should fall to the Treasury and State Departments through programs like USAID. Now that the military has secured certain parts of Colombia from the paramilitaries and guerrillas, the poor farmers, known as *campesinos*, no longer feel as if they are being forced to grow coca. With the help of agronomists and developmental economists, communities once known for coca production have shifted towards the production of rice and sugar cane. In these areas, the standard of living and the price of land have also increased significantly thanks to crop substitution and infrastructure improvements.³² Although the military is necessary to provide security in Colombia, no branch of the military can carry out the intricate plans required to rebuild areas like those plagued by coca production in Colombia.

Defining the Right Track

Despite some of the poor outcomes of US policy, Colombia in 2010 is a much better place than Colombia in 1998 in terms of security, human rights, and economic opportunity. The membership of the major armed resistance groups, while still rather high, is considerably lower than at the outset of Plan Colombia. In 2001, two years after the initiation of Plan Colombia, a report estimated that FARC's membership numbered around 18,000, while AUC had roughly 8,500 troops.³³ In 2009, FARC was down to about 9,000, and AUC had as few as 3,000 in its ranks.³⁴ These figures show that the work is not over. However, with all of

its flaws, US policy is certainly working. The reductions are just one example that progress is being made. Another such example is the March 2010 conviction in US courts and 20-year sentence given to Jorge Rodriguez, a top FARC commander.³⁵

In 2009, the US and Colombia signed a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement, which provides guidelines for US military assistance in the case of disaster or other need for military action in Colombia. Although the US military will receive guaranteed access to a select number of bases in Colombia, no actual US bases will be constructed on Colombian soil. No increase in civilian or military personnel is expected, even though US legislation permits the presence of several hundred more people to serve in Colombia on behalf of the United States government.³⁶ Clearly, the United States has grown sensitive to appearing imperialistic and now seeks to avoid this perception by transferring more responsibility to the local government.

Current procedures must become more adaptable and case-specific before the situation can be put onto a strategy board in Washington. Although there is something to be said for having all members of a service function together, the rigidity of standard operating procedures treats every insurgency in a cookie-cutter fashion, perpetuating the notion that US officials do not consider the culture and values of other countries. Once legislation and manuals change to allow the field commanders more flexibility to avoid supporting corrupt officials in another country, the planning must begin by incorporating methods to review and amend policy as needed.

In the unconventional warfare generated by today's insurgencies and terrorist groups, officials must be prepared for any imaginable contingency. However, this does not require a rigidly planned response to every particular situation that may arise. Instead, policy makers should explore multiple options in responding to complications while still

remaining open to new ideas. Nobody will be able to gauge the real situation from behind a desk, but the thought process must be there, as well as a plan to move the primary focus from security to development.

Once that shift does happen—and it should happen gradually—the military should play only a limited role, maintaining security and providing police and military training to the local agencies. At the same time, civilian workers from USAID and similar agencies should start to work to reform the existing institutions and educate local authorities on human rights, anti-corruption practice, and other democratic values. As the legitimacy of the government solidifies, NGO workers should begin to replace the civilian government workers as the primary administrators of aid. Because the NGO workers do not officially represent the US government, US control begins to diminish significantly at this time, but this should not be a concern if the economic and governmental reforms have been effective. However, before the US turns complete control back over to the NGOs and the local government, there must be verifiable checkpoints of key values, such as human rights, democratic practices, and transparency in the government. Once the aid operations cease, the US military, as the forerunner in most new military technology, still should share its techniques and continue working with the local military and police forces of what would presumably be a new ally.

This ideal timeline depends entirely on the situation. Either way, militarization of aid is not inherently the enemy. It is necessary to provide other forms of aid and reform crucial to the recovery of a country that is neither secure nor stable. Militarization only becomes a problem when it when it interferes with other forms of aid.

Note: The views here are solely those of the author and not those of the Coast Guard Academy or other branches of the US government.

Endnotes

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