Cornell International Affairs Review

www.diplomacist.org

BOARD OF ADVISORS

AARON SCHIFRIN
Cornell University
Arts and Sciences 2014
President, CIAR

The publication of our spring journal marks the conclusion of another exciting year for the Cornell International Affairs Review. Consistent with the organization's mission, we've continued to explore new ways to foster awareness and discussion of pressing topics in global affairs.

The on-going expansion of our digital presence has enabled us to extend the discourse well beyond our events and the pages of the Review. Our blog, The Diplomacist, continues to be regularly updated with articles from students across the country. Throughout the semester, it has featured short form editorial pieces on topics ranging from the death of Margaret Thatcher to India's urban political class. At the same time, we have continued to record and upload new episodes of our podcast. In an effort to bridge the gap between mainstream news sources and academic literature, we ask professors to relate their areas of expertise to on-going issues in international affairs. Not only has this given our members the opportunity to interview faculty at Cornell, it has also allowed us to broadcast their insights to the rest of the world for free via iTunes.

As excited as we are about these online developments, CIAR remains committed to promoting and hosting global affairs oriented events in the Cornell community. In addition to organizing a forum on French intervention in Mali, we teamed up with other internationally minded student organizations to cosponsor a number of different on campus panels. CIAR members also had the privilege to meet with 2013 Bartels World Affairs Fellow Kishore Mahbubani, Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Rajiv Chandrasekaran of the Washington Post.

None of what we do would be possible without the help of a vast network of dedicated faculty members and students. Before concluding, I'd like to extend a special thank you to the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies whose continued support has been integral to the growth of our organization. I hope you enjoy the journal.

EDITORIAL LETTER ●

LUCIUS ELLIOTT
Cornell University
Arts and Sciences 2015
Editor In Chief, CIAR

With this issue of The Cornell International Affairs Review, my first as Editor in Chief, we continue to expand upon the tradition of excellence that the CIAR has established since its first publication, six years ago. This issue covers topics ranging from cyber security to Middle Eastern autocratic societies, and I hope you will enjoy reading it as much I have enjoyed editing it.

We open with a transcript of Professor Kishore Mahbubani's address at Cornell. Mr Mahbubani paints an optimistic vision of the future, lauding various aspects of our progression as a race, while damning Western reluctance to address issues such as global-warming, the tension in the Middle East and the weakness of multilateral institutions.

We then transition to Marina Tolchinsky's analysis of US Army offshoot AFRICOM. Tolchinsky's article provides a commentary on the difficulties the U.S. has had in establishing a command base in Africa, and the rocky reception it received from the U.S. media.

Next, Paul Baumgardner provides an extensive timeline and commentary on the Obama administration's handling of the Benghazi attacks. His article explores the catalogue of mistakes made by the administration in the immediate aftermath of the attack, and the possible reasons for Obama's lack of full disclosure.

This is followed by an analysis of Bangladesh's divorce from Pakistan, by Aamir Hussain. Tracing the sources of Bengali nationalistic fervour, Hussain provides a compelling argument for the emergence of a nation-state on the basis of a common language and ethnicity.

Moving west, we have Sam Kuhn's discussion of autocratic monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Kuhn's article touches on political unrest in the region, despite it not having been overly affected by the 'Arab Spring', as well as providing a commentary on the establishment of dynastic monarchies in the two states.

Soomin Oh provides an extensive analysis of the history and functions of the ASEAN, a geopolitical and economic organisation of ten countries in Southeast Asia. Oh discusses the differences between the Northeast and Southeast regions, and examines the reasons for their divergence.

Finally, Connor Maag discusses the future of a legal system faced with challenges of a fast-developing virtual world – the Internet. Drawing on precedents set by cases such as the Pentagon Papers, Napster and Wikileaks, Maag analyses a problem that has caused extensive media consternation in recent weeks.

I would like to thank our graduate editors, junior editors and managing editor for all their help compiling this issue. Further, I want to thank the Einaudi Centre for all their help over the course of the semester, and everyone who contributed to the journal this year. I would also like to extend my special thanks to Sameera Razak, to whom all credit is due for both the redesign of the journal and the layout. Finally, I would like to dedicate this issue to my grandparents, Bob and Sue Elliott, both of whom passed away in October.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE GREAT CONVERGENCE

ASIA, THE WEST, AND THE
LOGIC OF ONE WORLD

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI

Mr Mahbubani is a Professor of Public Policy and Dean of the Lee Kwan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He is the former Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, and later served as Singapore Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In that capacity he served as the President of the UN Security Council from January 2001 to May 2002. He is the author of *Can Asians Think?*, *Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust between America and the World* and *The New Asian Hemisphere: the Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*. His articles have appeared in several publications outside Singapore, including *The Financial Times*, *The New York Times*, *Time*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*. He gave the Bartels World Affairs Lecture, in acceptance of the award, soon after the release of his latest book, *The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World*. The following is an edited transcription of his lecture.

The same story can be told in two exactly opposite ways. In the world of today there are two dominant narratives about our world: the one that has dominated the global discourse for the past few hundred years, which is of course the Western narrative; and a second narrative, a non-Western narrative to balance the former. One of the paradoxes of our age is that whereas the West has always provided the most optimistic societies of the world, with the belief that they could make the world a better place, and that they would succeed in doing so, today, in a remarkable reversal of a long-term historical pattern, we have a situation where the West has become progressively more pessimistic - if you want to drown in pessimism just go to Europe, where you will find that very few young people believe that the future will be great.

In contrast, the rest of the world is becoming more optimistic, and this is the reason I write this book, The Great Convergence, and that is what I am going to speak about today, because quite remarkably, while the 12% of the world who lives in the West are, as you know, becoming more and more worried about the future, the 88% who live outside the West are becoming progressively more. So what I propose to do, in order to explain the thesis of the book, is to split this lecture into three parts.

Firstly, I am going to share with you some good news, I may actually drown you in good news, to make you understand why there is so much optimism in the rest of the world. Then I will share with you some key challenges, be-

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI

*Now, while many of these MDGs will
not be met, because they were
relatively ambitious goals, the
halving of global poverty will not
only be met, it will in fact be
exceeded*

cause as you know, the world is not a perfect place. And I will end with a couple of incredibly easy prescriptions, what the Americans would call "low-hanging fruit", which I think it is a shame we are not picking.

The best way to put it is that the world has never been better than it is today. Let me give you two or three concrete examples. As you know, since the dawn of history, one of the main things that society has been concerned about are issues of war and peace, and throughout history, wars have killed millions of people, destroyed societies - we always thought it was a permanent feature of the human condition. But today, and it is amazing that it is going unnoticed, wars are becoming a sunset industry all over the world. The danger of a major interstate war is the lowest it has ever been. In fact there are very few places where you fear that war is going to break out in a major fashion. So, as a result of that, the number of people who are dying in conflict are the lowest it has been since statistics have been kept. In my book, I quote two major sources, one of whom is a Harvard professor, named Steven Pinker, who wrote a book recently called, The Better Angels of Our Nature, and he provides some remarkable data. What is significant is that he doesn't just say that less people are dying as a result of less conflicts, he's also saying there is

less violence in human society today. And that is a remarkable shift and improvement in the human condition. As recently as the 1950s, half a million people would die in some conflict or other every year, today, barely 30,000 die in any kind of conflict in a year, even though the population has grown dramatically since the 1950s. So that's one very sharp drop that has happened. And if you travel the world, you'll see that, with the exception of course of the Middle East and places like that, by and large, people are experiencing greater peace, and the best example of this is in Southeast Asia. When I grew up, Southeast Asia was meant to be the Balkans of Asia and we experienced all kinds of conflicts, communist parties, general insurgencies, war in Indo-China, and now Southeast Asia is finally at peace.

Another example: we have always been worried about global poverty, about the people at the bottom, the people that are starving et cetera, and here too something remarkable is happening. In 2000, when I was ambassador to the UN, we established something called the Millennium Development Goals, the MDGs. Several were set up, but one of the most important was that we should strive to halve global poverty by the year 2015, two years from now. Now, while many of these MDGs will not be met, because they were rel-

atively ambitious goals, the halving of global poverty will not only be met, it will in fact be exceeded. A lot of this success, as you can imagine, is down to China and India – China alone has lifted 600 million people out of absolute poverty as a result of its rapid growth. When I arrived in New York a couple of weeks ago, I was watching an interview with Bill Gates, and he was asked how he saw the future. And he said 'Oh, I'm very optimistic'. When asked why, he said, 'As recently as 20 years ago, 20 million babies would die before they reached the age of five. 10 years ago it went down to twelve million. Now it is down to 5 million'. Now why is this statistic important? This statistic is important because babies are the most vulnerable citizens of any society. So when babies die, the ecosystem that is supposed to protect them is not working. But when babies begin to survive, it shows that the ecosystem has been created to protect these babies, whether it's hygiene, education, health care, whatever it is, it's improving, and fewer babies are dying. So this shows that we are reducing global poverty.

Now I don't want to give you too many statistics, but if you want one that drives home the idea of the great convergence, remember this one statistic. Today in Asia, about 500 million people out of the total population enjoy a middle class standard of living – not a small number. But in 2020, in only 7 years time, that number is going to increase from 500 million to 1.75 billion. This is a remarkable uplifting of the human condition, and all part of the great convergence.

Of course, the big question is to figure out why this is happening. And I honestly confess that there are so many factors that are driving this great convergence that it's hard to say which ones are the most critical. But one factor that I emphasize in my books and writings is that the reason for this great convergence is that overall, in all parts of the world, people are coming to a common understanding of what it

takes to build a good society. There's a common set of aspirations developing all over the world. That's also why wars are diminishing, because most countries now realize that if the simplest thing you can do is go to war, that's not normal. Today the zeitgeist is different than prior to World War I, when Norman Angel made the assertion that war is impossible. Back then the brightest young minds from Oxford and Cambridge would say "give me a gun, I want to go fight a merry little war in England," because everyone thought that was the honorable thing to do. To fight. Today you have to be remarkably stupid to do that.

Now, as promised, I am going to quickly turn to show you that I don't have my head in the clouds and that I understand what's going on in the world. As someone who has been in diplomacy for 33 years I am acutely aware of the challenges and problems in the world, so let me discuss some of the key ones the world faces. Let me just mention three: the most important challenge, especially in geopolitical terms, is always the one between the world's greatest power and the world's greatest emerging power. The world's greatest power is the United States of America; the world's greatest emerging power is China. Throughout history, with the exception of the British ceding power to the US, the transition of power has been problematic. Today, the Anglo-Saxons have to hand power to a non-Western state for the first time in 700 years, so we should see rising tensions between the US and China. If that happened it would be normal. Which is why it is so puzzling to see the opposite happening. If you look at the US-China relationship there are difficulties and conflicts, but the overall level of tension is going down between the two.

You could argue that this is accidental, but I believe that it reflects conscious decisions made by various policymakers. I think that on the Chinese side they have worked out a rather sophisticated long-term policy of how to emerge as a great power, which is discussed

in my previous book, The New Asian Hemisphere, and they have decided that the best way to keep the US-China relationship healthy is to create a very deep interdependence between the two. China relies on the US to provide markets for factory produce, and that's why China has a major trade surplus with the US, but at the same time they have created a dependence, as the US relies on China to buy US treasury bills. This deep interconnectedness, which did not exist in the Cold War for instance, where the Soviets refused to buy US treasury bonds, will hopefully mean that the tensions between the US and China will be managed and not get out of hand in the world of tomorrow.

Another big challenge, and one that I worry about more to some extent, is the tension between Islam and the West. As you know, this conflict has very deep roots, going back to the Crusades a thousand years ago, and it has never been resolved, so it is no great surprise that the majority of the conflicts which you see today happen either in or around the Islamic world. You see it happening in Syria, in Egypt, in Tunisia and so on and so forth. There are some tensions in that area, but if you look at it objectively, you will see that many in the Islamic world are experiencing the great convergence that I've been speaking about. For instance, Indonesia is the world's most populous Islam

country. It has a population of 240 million – larger than all of North Africa combined. So while everybody is focused on the difficulties in North Africa, they forget the world's most populous Muslim country is growing steadily at 6-7% per year. In the next ten to fifteen years it will be one of the worlds top ten economies, and no one has noticed it. And Bangladesh, a country Henry Kissinger dismissed as a basket case, 'a country that will never succeed', has been growing at 6% over the last 10 years. So there are parts of the Islamic world that are also experiencing the great convergence.

However, there are certain bits of it,

Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel

especially in the Middle East and North Africa, which are having problems. And one point, which I want to make very delicately, is that if you really want to remove the poison, and I think it's a fact that there is some poison between the West and Islam, the best way to do it is to have, as quickly as possible, a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. Believe me, if you could do that it would make a huge difference in terms of actually changing the relationship between Islam and the West. About a year ago I wrote a column in the Financial Times, where I said, as a friend to Israel, 'Please, now is the time for you to make peace with Palestine and have a two state solution because time is no longer on Israel's side'. Because if you look at it, over the next ten or twenty years, even though US power will remain exactly the same, US relative power will decline and the power of the Islamic world, I promise you, will rise over the next couple of decades. Time is no longer on Israel's side. I say this as a friend of Israel - make peace now. Don't wait until things go badly for you.

Now let me mention a challenge that is not geopolitical, but is the number one thing that worries many of you: what is going to happen to the global environment? We're all talking about the middle clatss, it's wonderful that the middle class is exploding, it'll hit more than half the world's population, they'll be going out there, they'll be buying refrigerators, cars, consuming more energy, what's going to happen to our planet? What we need to find is a formula that allocates sacrifice equitably across the world. There is no solution to global warming unless we all make some kind of sacrifice or another. I will give you a concrete example. As you know, China and India have been put under a lot of pressure to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore reduce their coal-fired plants etc. And when someone asked the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, what he was going to do about this he said, and I think this was a very reasonable response, 'I am not going to deny 400 million Indians electricity just so Americans can keep on driving their SUVs'.

So this is where the global warming thing comes about; we have to find an equitable solution to this problem. And I, at the end of the day, am reasonably optimistic that this can be achieved. The reason for my optimism relates to the third part of my presentation, on how we can make the world a better place.

I referred earlier to the low hanging fruit that is out there. As you know, we live in an increasingly global village, which is becoming smaller and smaller. And every village, as you know, needs a village council. So, if

IT HAS BEEN
THE CONSISTENT
POLICY OF THE
WESTERN WORLD,
LED BY THE
USA, TO KEEP
GLOBAL VILLAGE
COUNCILS WEAK

we are becoming a global village, we should be strengthening village councils rather than weakening them. One of the things I do in the book is to give away a "dirty little secret". What is this secret? It is that it has been the consistent policy of the Western world, led by the USA, to keep global village councils weak. That is why the UN is kept weak; why UN specialized agencies are kept weak, and why they are not functioning. Now, this may have made sense when the West was completely dominant, and would have had no need for village counsels. But today the world is changing so quickly that the West has to rethink what its policy should be.

I open the book with a quote from a speech Bill Clinton gave in 2003. He said that if America assumes it will be number 1 forever, then fine. We can carry on doing whatever we are doing. But if we can conceive of the possibility that we may no longer be number 1 but maybe number 2, surely it is in America's interest to strengthen the world space order that will constrain whoever is the next number 1. Now, this was a remarkably wise thing for Bill Clinton to say in 2003 – the tragedy is that he could not say it when he was president. However, he was told during his tenure that if he raised this point it would be political suicide – Americans don't want to hear about Ameri-

ca being number 2. And this is a real tragedy because frankly, now is the time for the United States and the other Western countries to realize that it is in their long-term, rational self-interest to strengthen multilateral institutions. So I'm not appealing to idealism. I'm not appealing to altruism. I'm appealing to pure, naked self-interest. It is in the naked self-interest of the West to change their policy with regards to the world's multilateral institutions.
And what puzzles me, and I haven't solved this puzzle yet, is how is it that the West, which always prided itself on having the most rational, the most scientific, most logical approaches to solving problems, is now doing the exact opposite when it comes to its long-term self interest. It is carrying on on autopilot, continuing to weaken these multilateral institutions, even though it is no longer in its interest to do so.

If you try to create a new global architecture from scratch, it is impossible. But if you take the existing global architecture and strengthen it, then you can do wonders. And there are some remarkably irrational Western policies with regards to multilateral institutions. To give you one example, it's been a Western policy, one way they keep multilateral institutions in the background, is to have what they call a zero-budget growth policy. So even though the world economy has become bigger

and bigger, even though multilateral institutions are handling the problems of a larger population, their budgets are actually shrinking and that's because of Western demands. And this, as a result, is weakening institutions that the West should not be weakening today.

I'm going to give you two more dramatic examples. The first, and most obvious, example is that when you live in a global village, when a pandemic breaks out it's not going to stop at any border. Pandemics don't carry passports. So if you live in a small global village it's in your interest to strengthen your global health agency – the World Health Organization (WHO). 20 years ago, 75% of the WHO's budget came from regular, assessed contributions, which the organization could rely on, and therefore make long-term plans. Only 25% came from voluntary contributions, which, as you can imagine, vary year by year. In order to develop a long-term network of health inspectors, you have to rely on regular contributions rather than voluntary ones. 20 years later, 25% of the WHO's budget comes from assessed contributions, and 75% comes from voluntary contributions. That is insanity on a global scale. You don't develop a world health organization if you're going to make it rely on voluntary contributions. We are weakening a global agency just when we need it.

The second example; in the West we are afraid of nuclear proliferation. If you are afraid of nuclear proliferation, what you need are more nuclear inspectors, and in order to get more nuclear inspectors you need to give more money to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. However, again we find that the opposite is true. I discovered this firsthand a few years ago when I was a member of a commission to discuss the future of IAEA, and it was absolutely shocking to see how even the IAEA is being strangled by this irrational Western policy of depriving them of more regular SS contributions.

These are examples of low hanging fruit. These policies can be changed overnight, instantly, and will cost very little money. To understand how little this is in the grand scheme of things, you need only look at the budget for the UN Secretariat, which takes care of 7 billion people, and has a budget that is smaller than that of the New York City Fire Department. If you have enough money to fund a fire department for a city of seven million people surely you can find something more to fund a village of seven billion people. That's an example of how absurd the scale is. The USA is estimated to have spent three trillion dollars over seven years on the Iraq war. With 1% of that, $30 billion, you can fix the UN.

Now of course there are other multi-lateral institutions that would be harder to fix. These are organizations such as the UN Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank, but in the book I also provide concrete, specific ways in which they can be resolved. The Security Council has been trying to reform itself for 20 years, but the reason why it hasn't happened is because for every great power that wants to come in there is another that says "Why not me?" The best example of this came when I was ambassador to the UN, when Germany and Japan were pushing very hard to become permanent members. The Italian ambassador stood up and said "Why are you only pushing for Germany and Japan to join the Security Council? We lost World War II as well, so why don't we qualify?" So you can see how deeply these countries feel about this.

To solve this problem, what I have is a formula called the 7/7/7 formula, where you have seven permanent members, but you also have seven semi-permanent members taken from 28 states. So all the people who lose out at the moment like South Korea and Pakistan become winners because they get a semi=permanent seat when their neighbor gets a permanent seat.

And I mention this because everybody seems to look at the world, see all these problems, and assume there are no solutions available. All I am saying to you is that there are solutions out there, and that despite the fact that we don't have a great global plan to make to world a better place, we are making the world a better place and we should recognize that. Further, I am confident that if we recognize these trends then we can create an even better world in the years to come.

THE FORGOTTEN CONTINENENT

THE STORY OF THE U.S'S
RETURN TO AFRICA

MARINA TOLCHINSKY
University of Southern California

"In addition to the disturbing influence of racial friction, the nationalist movement in Africa is further harassed by the machinations of international Communism, forever seeking to turn fluid situations to advantage for the Communist bloc." – Joseph C. Satterthwaite, first Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs, October 1958. [1]

When President Eisenhower created the Bureau for African Affairs within the U.S. State Department in 1958, the intent was clear: to prevent the spread of communism. Never before had there been an office within the U.S. government that was solely responsible for developing U.S. foreign policy towards countries in Africa. The U.S. Bureau for Africa was born from the Cold War, and anti-communist rhetoric shaped much of its early policies. As the U.S. engaged in proxy wars to prevent the spread of communism on the continent, African issues gained a new importance to U.S. foreign policy. However, when the Berlin Wall fell, U.S. diplomatic attention to Africa withered. Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. paid little attention to Africa and the Departments of State and Defense concluded that there were few national interests at stake on the continent. It was not until 9/11 and the Global War on Terror that Africa re-emerged on the policy radar. In the early 2000s, defense studies scholars published literature on the importance of Africa to the Global War on Terror. Additionally, the rise of Chinese involvement on the continent began to gain attention as new natural resources were discovered. African issues were once again thrust into the spotlight as the rise of a new economic power and the presence of ungoverned territories worried U.S. policymakers. The personal convictions of President George W. Bush further played a role in defining U.S. national interests

AFRICOM LOGO

towards the continent.

On February 6th, 2007, U.S. foreign policy towards Africa saw the creation of another new organization: the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), a regional military command unit responsible for operations on the African continent. As with the Bureau for African Affairs, the creation of AFRICOM was seen as a shift in U.S. foreign policy towards the continent. Prior to AFRICOM's establishment, responsibility for countries in Africa had been divided amongst three different regional commands. After years of increasing discussion about the effectiveness of this system, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commissioned a planning committee to decide the fate of military efforts in Africa. The committee recommended a separate command be established and President Bush signed off on the new Africa Command the day Rumsfeld approached him with the idea. The creation of AFRICOM brought up several key questions about U.S. policy towards Africa as many analysts asked, "*Why now*?" As the media postulated that Chinese influence and access to natural resources were the driving forces behind AFRICOM's creation, the Department of Defense tried to assuage the controversy claiming that AFRICOM was the logical "next step" needed to enhance the effectiveness of the Global War on Terror.

"There has been much discussion and some debate as to why the command was created at this specific time in our nation's history. From my perspective, it was recognition of Africa's importance in our globalized world." – AFRICOM General William Ward [2]

The Changing Structure of the U.S. Military

In 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff inaugurated the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which aimed to increase the efficiency of military planning. As a result of the global warfare in World War II, military planners recognized the need for a unified military presence throughout the world. The UCP intended to consolidate military efforts and de-centralize decision-making as U.S. military presence around the globe grew. [3] Acknowledging the changing nature of the international system, the UCP architects implemented an annual review. As a result, the combatant command system has changed significantly from the original 1946 structure. For example, in 1983 President Reagan authorized the creation of a Central Command (CENTCOM) as a result of rising national interests in the Middle East region. Currently, there are six commands: Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM),

and Africa Command (AFRICOM). Prior to 2007, countries in Africa were split between EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. Each command, however, focused resources and time on their primary region of responsibility. Africa often fell to the periphery. This caused military efforts in Africa to be, as concluded by the DoD, "reactive, episodic, and without long-term strategy." [4]

Background: The U.S. and Africa in the 20th Century

Despite the fact that military efforts in Africa were low priorities for the regional commands, the U.S. had been involved with military training of soldiers on the continent for the past century. In the early 1900s, the U.S. army trained soldiers in Liberia, and during World War II, fought alongside them against axis powers. [5] World War II brought fighting to several other northern African states such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. However, it wasn't until after World War II that the U.S. decided that a foreign policy strategy was needed for the region. In 1958, President Eisenhower established the Bureau for African Affairs within the State Department, creating a staff and an assistant secretary of state whose sole job was U.S. strategy towards Africa. [6]

The creation of the Bureau came at a time when Africa emerged as a proxy battleground for the Cold War. The U.S. and Soviet Union financed rebels on opposite sides of conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). [7] When Donald Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense for his first time in 1975 under President Ford, rebels supported by the Soviet Union had just recently taken control in Angola. In his memoirs, Rumsfeld attributes this in part to Congress's amendment prohibiting the U.S.

from providing financial support to Angola to fight the Marxist rebels.

"While America had been preoccupied in Southeast Asia, the Soviets had broadened their empire-building efforts to nearly every continent in the world. … Without American assistance to fend off the Marxist rebels, Angola became a communist dictatorship. More worrisome, the Soviet Union came away believing it had a free hand on the continent of Africa." [8]

In the years after, Angola fell into a 27 yearlong civil war, with the U.S., the Soviet Union, and several other countries supporting various rebel groups and sometimes changing allegiances. Often, the nature of the Cold War caused alliances to switch, as the U.S. and Soviet Union supported certain groups in response to the actions of the other. For example, in the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, the U.S. had provided aid and weapons to Ethiopia, while the Soviets had maintained a close relationship with Somalia in the early 1970s prior to the war. At the start of the war, several factors caused the U.S. to remove support from Ethiopia. When the Soviets began to supply arms to Ethiopia, the U.S. responded by switching its allegiance to Somalia. [9] U.S. foreign policy towards Africa during the time of the Cold War was dictated by one thing: countering against the Soviets. Strategy was fairly straightforward, as the U.S. simply supported the group fighting the communist or socialist forces supported by the Soviet Union.

However, after the end of the Cold War, national interests in Africa became muddled. There was no apparent enemy to work against and no client states to be sought. Policy-makers were unsure what U.S. interests in the continent were in this new era. In 1995, Department of Defense (DoD)

analysts concluded that there were few U.S. national interests in Africa. A report rating regions of the world based on their strategic interest to the U.S. published that year listed Africa at the bottom saying, "ultimately, we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa." [10] This viewpoint persisted for the next several years. President Clinton's 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS) listed Africa last in terms of strategic regions where U.S. national interests were at stake. [11] According to Prudence Bushnell, Deputy in the State Department Africa Bureau in the Clinton administration, this low ranking "was an unspoken mantra by the White House. Africa issues, unless they turned into disasters, seldom made it to the seventh floor, where the top of the hierarchy worked." [12]

Yet, during the Clinton administration there were several efforts with humanitarian military efforts in Africa. The most well known of these occurred Clinton's first year in office , when 19 U.S. soldiers were killed in Somalia. Then in 1994 during the Rwandan genocide, EUCOM was briefly deployed to bring humanitarian supplies to refugee camps. Two years later, a military coup in Burundi and subsequent rise in violence prompted the Clinton administration to propose an African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The aim of ACRI was to set up a multilateral African peacekeeping force supported by the U.S. In Parameters, the quarterly journal of the U.S. Army War College, Dan Henk described ACRI as an example of the "limited and reactive character of U.S. involvement in Africa" [13]. The proposal received an unenthusiastic response from leaders in Africa, but was supported in Europe. In 1997, the initiative began to train militaries in several African countries. [14] Today, ACRI has evolved in the State Departments African Contingency Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, which trains African soldiers for peacekeeping missions. [15]

The ACRI program spurred an academic discussion about U.S. national interests in Africa among students at the U.S. Army War College, the Army's most senior education institution. More articles and reports such as Dan Henk's, which outlined eleven national interests the U.S. had in Africa, were published. The first report to suggest the creation of a new command solely focused on Africa was by Dr. Lieutenant Colonel William Fox Jr. Fox was a distinguished command surgeon who served in several special operations in Latin America and Africa, as well as a number of complex medical operations in the latter. Lieutenant Colonel Fox wrote a report published by the National Defense University in 1997 calling for the creation of an Africa command. [16] In it, Fox describes the strategy in Africa as reactive rather than proactive and writes,

"DoD can no longer afford simply to wait and react to the next crisis in Africa. A regional command separate from the U.S. European Command or the U.S. Central Command should be established to evaluate, plan and execute regional military exercises and operations." [17]

Several more reports criticized the current UCP and noted the need for a unified command in Africa. As Richard Catoire describes in a Parameters article, a command solely for Africa would "bring the constant attention of senior US military planners to African security issues and facilitate long-term coherent programs to shape the regional environment." [18] Catoire disagreed with the DoD analysis of Africa as a low-priority region saying, "that assertion is itself somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that the United States has intervened militarily in

the region more than 20 times since 1990."
[19]

As this academic discussion continued, U.S. foreign policy towards Africa remained stagnant and the continent continued to be ranked low in terms of strategic interests until after 9/11.

During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush seemed to agree with the prevailing opinion on U.S. interests in Africa, yet his first years in office indicate the opposite. During the campaign, Bush criticized Clinton's peacekeeping attempts, saying that the U.S. military shouldn't be involved in nation-building. He argued that "while Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into national strategic interests, as far as I can see them." [20] However, Bush began to emphasize African issues during his first year in office, starting with an increased diplomatic effort to end the civil war in Sudan. [21] Throughout his first term he established more initiatives aimed towards Africa than any president before him, including the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. According to African policy experts at the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), "over time, PEPFAR and MCC became symbols of the value of investing substantially in soft power in Africa, and, in the case of PEPFAR, came to be commonly regarded among the most positive Bush era legacies." [22]

In his memoirs, Bush describes Africa as a personal priority to him. When recounting his early discussions with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, he writes:

"One day our conversation turned to Africa. Condi had strong feelings on the subject. She felt Africa had great potential, but had too often been neglected. We agreed that Africa would be a serious part of my foreign policy." [23]

He also wrote that he "considered America a generous nation with a moral responsibility to do our part to help relieve poverty and despair." [24]

During the 2000 campaign, Bush described himself as a 'compassionate conservative,' which garnered him much support from the Christian Right and increased his appeal to moderates. In the campaign, Bush said he would aim to center his presidency on 'compassionate conservativism' ideals and his belief that "it is compassionate to actively help our citizens in need. It is conservative to insist on responsibility and results." [25]

"The events of 9/11 combined with 20/20 hindsight made clear that Africa was integral, not peripheral, to global security in general, and U.S. security in particular." – Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan [26]

September 11th transformed the landscape of U.S. foreign policy and led to another turning point for U.S.-Africa relations. As the investigation into Al Qaeda became public, Osama bin Laden's work in Sudan opened many questions about the role of unstable African countries in terrorist activity. The 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had alerted the U.S. to the possibility of terrorism in Africa, but until 9/11 the majority of policy-makers didn't think this threat could impact

*SEPTEMBER 11th
TRANSFORMED THE
LANDSCAPE OF
U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY AND LED
TO ANOTHER
TURNING POINT
FOR U.S.-AFRICA
RELATIONS*

the U.S. at home. September 11th shifted this paradigm and Africa gained new importance, which was recognized in the 2004 National Military Strategy:

"There exists an 'arc of instability' stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests." [27]

Part of the strategy to win the war on terror, as discussed in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, written by the National Security Council, was to address instability in countries that provides "safehavens" for terrorist activity.

"We will strengthen the capacity of such War on Terror partners to reclaim full control of their territory through effective police, border, and other security forces as well as functioning systems of justice. To further counter terrorist exploitation of under-governed lands, we will promote effective economic development to help ensure long-term stability and prosperity. In failing states or states emerging from conflict, the risks are significant." [28]

Prior to 9/11, Africa's political instability and humanitarian crises were not seen as threats to U.S. national security interests. However, after 9/11, these issues were seen in a new light. Politically unstable areas became known as "ungoverned" or "under-governed" spaces, and it was recognized that the U.S. Global War on Terrorism needed to include these regions.

After 9/11, the U.S. began several initiatives aimed at addressing the threats posed by instability in Africa. Two regions were seen as containing terrorist activity that could threaten U.S. interests: The Sahara/Sahel region, and the Horn of Africa. In 2002, the U.S. began the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), led by EUCOM. The PSI offered training support to national militaries of countries working to counter radical Islamists in the Sahel, which included Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania. In 2005, this became the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, and was expanded to include Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria, and Tunisia. [30] Two years later, in 2007, this mission became an extension of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which was the official name for the war in Afghanistan. Earlier that year, a radical Islamist Algerian group operating in the Sahel had pledged allegiance

to Al-Qaeda and officially changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). [31] AQIM's main activities involve drug and weapons trafficking, kidnapping of westerners for ransom, and small-scale attacks on the Algerian army. OEF-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) is an ongoing mission working to strengthen states' capacity to counter AQIM through military information sharing, communications system strengthening, logistical support, and training of soldiers. [32]

CENTCOM leads the second OEF extension in Africa, which focuses on the Horn of Africa (HOA) countries Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and also Yemen. Unlike OEF-TS, which built on previous initiatives, OEF-HOA began in 2002 to specifically counter the threat of Al Qaeda members fleeing into the Horn from Afghanistan. [33] The primary military component of the mission is the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which also began in 2002. When the threat of fleeing Al Qaeda members failed to materialize, the operation shifted focus to training local militaries, supporting humanitarian missions, and working on anti-piracy operations. CJTF-HOA has met some controversy, particularly during the 2006 war in Somalia during which there were many civilian casualties. [34]

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed that building the capacities of governments in African countries was necessary to combat terrorism. In his memoirs he writes of the importance of programs such as the OEF-HOA and PSI.

"Terrorists had an easier time indoctrinating, recruiting, training, equipping, raising funds, and planning their attacks when they enjoyed a stable base of operations. So I argued that our strategy should be to put them on the defensive—

indirectly (through the states that gave them safe havens) and directly (whenever we had actionable intelligence). The emphasis on a global campaign was important, I believed, because striking only al-Qaida in Afghanistan would result in little more than causing the terrorists to shift their base to Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, or elsewhere." [35]

Rumsfeld was a strong believer in the "global campaign" against terrorism. He was an early advocate of expanding counterterrorism initiatives in Africa, calling for a systematic change in the military's strategy of engagement with Africa in 2003. [36]

As these programs grew, it became evident that EUCOM and CENTCOM were stretched for resources to manage them. Previously, both commands had focused mainly on their main geographic center, meaning Africa was often a 2nd or 3rd priority. OEF-TS and OEF-HOA demanded more attention. When speaking about the decision to establish AFRICOM, Theresa Whelan explained, "Africa's direct relevance to U.S. national security demanded that DoD re-think the Cold War based structure." [37]

Africa's Rising Economic Importance

While Africa was becoming more important in the Global War on Terrorism, the continent was also rising in economic importance. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, U.S. and Chinese firms heavily invested in resource exploration, particularly in oil. In 1996, China acquired oil fields in Sudan that had been abandoned by the U.S. company Chevron because of the civil war. China developed the oil fields and discovered more oil reserves, attempting to revive Sudan's oil industry in the midst of

CHEVRON OIL REFINERY IN CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

the civil war. Currently, China receives ⅓ of its oil imports from Africa. [38] Sudan provides an estimated 5% of China's total oil imports. [39] In exchange, China is the largest supplier of military equipment to Sudan. This was a point of contention for China-U.S. policy during the Sudanese civil war when the U.S. wanted to impose harsh sanctions on the Sudanese government. [40]

Over the past decade, China has heavily invested in African oil, seeking to fulfill the growing energy demands of its population. In 2004 China obtained one fourth of its imported oil from Africa. [41] By 2011, this number had risen to one third and continues to grow. [42] African crude oil is especially attractive for China as it tends to be low in sulfur and high in quality. Chinese refineries often lack the capacity for heavier crude oil from the Middle East, which is high in sulfur. [43]

The African continent also possesses some of the world's largest reserves of mineral ores and precious metals. The Democratic Republic of Congo has 64% of the world's reserves of coltan, an ore used in the manufacture of electronic products, [44] along with a third of the world's cobalt reserves. [45] Sierra Leone, Angola, and Botswana are all well known for their mining of diamonds. Gold, uranium, steel, platinum, and copper are among the many other resources found on the continent. Resources are a large part of many African economies, as they are exported throughout the world. As China has grown in manufacturing, its trade with Africa in mineral ores has increased. In 2010, China imported a total of $50.6 billion dollars worth of minerals and $6.2 billion dollars worth of metals from African countries. [46] China is now Africa's largest trading partner, having surpassed the U.S in 2009.

The U.S. has also heavily invested in African resources throughout the past decade. In addition to oil, the U.S. imports precious stones and metals ($4.3 billion dollars worth in 2011). [47] However, oil makes up the bulk of U.S. imports from the region, with 16.8% of imported oil coming from Africa. [48] In 1996, the major U.S. oil company ExxonMobil invested in oil exploration at the Gulf of Guinea, which is off the coast of West Africa and belongs to the country Equatorial Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea is considered the world's hottest oil exploration hotspot, as exploration continues to expand oil sources. [49] The Gulf is located off the coast of West Africa, starting

south of Cote d'Ivoire and extending south to Angola. Like China, U.S. oil imports from Africa have grown significantly over the past several years, from 15% in 2004 to 22% in 2006. [50] In addition to the Gulf of Guinea, the U.S. imports oil from Nigeria and Angola. Angola is an important source of petroleum for both China and the U.S., but ChevronTexaco and Exxon Mobil remain its largest investors.

Planning for AFRICOM Begins

In the mid 2000s, after the start of the start of the Global War on Terrorism, the academic discussion over the UPC continued as more reports were published calling for a unified military command in Africa. [51] In 2006, EUCOM commanders noted to Congress that staff at the headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany were spending more than half of their time on African issues. This signaled a shift in the discussion about an Africa Command from the academic to the policy arena. [52] After spending time at CENTCOM's headquarters in Tampa, Rumsfeld realized that the command was too was overwhelmed, especially as it began planning for the Iraq war in 2002. [53] In July of 2006 during a routine annual briefing on potential changes to the UCP, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chief of Staff Peter Pace expressed interest in a change towards Africa. Rumsfeld directed the EUCOM commander to form a planning team to explore setting up a new command for Africa. Pace noted that there were several options on the table: a fully independent regional command similar to the current ones, a regional authority that answered to another command, or something in between. [54] For Rumsfeld, the key issues were how best to organize the command and integrate non-military agencies. [55] As the State Department has numerous counterterrorism initiatives in Africa, any new command would have to require interagency planning. From the start, AFRICOM was set up to be a different type of military command. According to General William "Kip" Ward, the commander of EUCOM at the time and leader of the planning team, "it's ok if it doesn't look like other COCOMs [combatant commands]." General Ward emphasized that the planning should aim for "innovative processes rather than a traditional military COCOM structure." [56]

At the Pentagon, Rumsfeld and Pace mentioned the EUCOM planning team during a Town Hall meeting in September. [57] This stirred much interest in the press, as a new command hadn't been created since CENTCOM in 1983. Soon after the Town Hall meeting, Rumsfeld was briefed by the EUCOM planning team. The team recommended setting up a full unified command for Africa, but with a non-traditional structure. EUCOM planners suggested that the command be "focused on traditional military tasks, as well as an emphasis on non-combat military roles such as capacity building and theater security cooperation." [58] To address Rumsfeld's concern about interagency cooperation, the team recommended the command integrate staff from non-military agencies into its leadership. Lastly, the team recommended the command's headquarters, along with five regional offices, be located in Africa "as a way to demonstrate long-term US commitment to Africa's security and stability." [59]

Rumsfeld agreed with the EUCOM team's conclusions, and advanced the planning for an Africa Command to the Pentagon. He approved the creation of an interagency Implementation Planning Team, to be headed by Admiral Robert Moeller. Admiral Moeller was a senior Navy official who was at that time Director for Strategy,

EX-SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROBERT M. GATES, PRESENTS THE DEFENSE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL TO OUTGOING COMMANDER OF AFRICOM, GENERAL WILLIAM WARD, DURING THE AFRICOM CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY

Plans, and Policy for CENTCOM. [60] Admiral Moeller's deputy for the team was Ambassador Robert Loftis from the State Department (DoS) [61], a career Foreign Service official who was a lead negotiator for status of forces agreements. From DoD, the team also included Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, who had served in the Balkans Task Force as the NATO team chief during the Kosovo crisis. [62] In addition to DoS and DoD officials, there were representatives from USAID and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [63] The purpose of the team was to work through November and outline the structure of a new command for Africa. Rumsfeld's instructions were for the command to have a staff that was half-military and half-civilian with a non-military deputy—essentially a mirror of the planning team. [64]

According to Claudia Anyaso, a member of the team from the African Affairs Bureau at DoS, the State Department supported the creation of an Africa Command. [65] In a speech at the WIIS-U.S. Army War College AFRICOM Conference, Anyaso outlined several reasons why the DoS supported AFRICOM. She pointed to a slide about AFRICOM saying, "at the top are the words, 'peace, stability, and prosperity,'

the goals that we are all striving for." [66] According to Anyaso, AFRICOM and the DoS had shared goals and "AFRICOM's mission will support the secretary's diplomatic policies." Lastly, AFRICOM would result in increased interagency collaboration, which would "provide an opportunity for continuous dialogue so that there will be a greater understanding of upcoming issues and afford an opportunity for better planning."

The final structure of the command also included a position for USAID Senior Development Advisor, along with several more representatives in the Programs and Humanitarian Assistance divisions. [67] USAID supported the creation of AFRICOM, but with some reservations.

"…yet experience has also taught us that when we work with the military, maintaining the essential humanitarian and development character of USAID is vital. USAID coordination with DoD should not be perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but rather as contributing to broader foreign policy goals." – Michael E. Hess, Assistant Administrator of Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID [68]WW

There seemed to be some skepticism within USAID about the new command. Kate Almquist, who was the Sudan mission director and assistant administrator for Africa at USAID, stated that the initial decision was met with "grumpiness at spending staff time and program resources to help AFRICOM do work that it had minimal resources and no competency or experience to do."[69] Almquist agreed with the DoD's aim to increase interagency collaboration in AFRICOM's planning, saying organizational integration could help the bureaucracies coordinate strategies and efforts. However, she also concluded, "that does not mean either should attempt to do the other's job." [70]

AFRICOM Goes Public

Planning for AFRICOM moved along at a fairly rapid pace. The interagency planning team presented a final briefing to Rumsfeld at the end of November. [71] In early December, Rumsfeld announced he would be resigning. AFRICOM could have easily gotten lost in Rumsfeld's transition out of office, but he ensured the planning team's recommendation was forwarded to President Bush on December 15th, who approved creation of the command that same day. [72] AFRICOM was officially announced on February 6, 2007 by new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing:

"The President has decided to stand up a new, unified combatant command, Africa Command, to oversee security cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to nonmilitary missions, and, if directed, military operations on the African continent. This command will enable us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central Command and European Command, an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War." – Robert Gates [73]

Later that day, the White House issued a statement by President Bush:

"This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa." [74]

As discussion of AFRICOM moved from the Pentagon into the public sphere, DoD officials had to defend the new command, as the press asked, "*Why now*?" Reporters wrote about the increasing influence of China in Africa and the growing economic importance of oil and other resources when reporting about AFRICOM. Theresa Whelan attempted to quell these misconceptions in a testimony for the House AFRICOM hearing. Whelan said the two biggest misconceptions about AFRICOM were that it would militarize U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that its primary purpose was to secure U.S. access to oil. Whelan countered these saying, "Africa Command is merely the logical next step in a course set almost a decade ago." [75] In regards to oil, she noted, "while Africa's growing importance as a global oil producer is certainly a factor in the continent's strategic significance, it was not, as has been explained previously in this paper, the rationale for the creation of AFRICOM." [76]

However, Whelan's reassurance did little to lessen controversy over AFRICOM in the media, especially as writings by

neoconservative groups such as the Heritage Foundation were publicized. In an NBC Frontline episode on Bush's decision to create the new command, Christopher Moraff brought up a Heritage Foundation policy backgrounder written in 2006 about China's increasing influence in Africa:

"The United States must be alert to the potential long-term disruption of American access to important raw materials and energy sources as these resources are 'locked up' by Chinese firms." [77]

According to Moraff, "Neoconservative groups call China's growing relationship with Africa 'alarming' and want a response." [78] Moraff saw Bush's decision to create AFRICOM as a response to pressure from neoconservatives to address China. Moraff further pointed out that the announcement of AFRICOM's creation came a week after Chinese President Hu Jintao had landed in Cameroon to start series of meetings with African leaders where he signed cooperation agreements and pledged to double China's assistance to Africa. [79]

The Search for a Headquarters

The DoD's search for a command headquarters in Africa caused additional negative publicity. The interagency implementation planning team had agreed with the original EUCOM committee's recommendation that the command's headquarters and regional offices be located in Africa. Further, in the White House announcement, Bush said the U.S. would work with African partners to find a location for the headquarters. This proved to be harder than the DoD had anticipated, as the response from African leaders was less than welcoming.

Within just a few months of the new command's announcement, it became apparent that only one African leader, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, had welcomed an AFRICOM headquarters. Even within Liberia there was harsh resistance from the public. According to Professor Theo Neethling at Stellenbosch University in South Africa, the response to AFRICOM was "a mixture of anticipation, trepidation, suspicion, skepticism, and condemnation." [80] South Africa, thought to be one of the U.S.'s closes allies in Africa, was critical of the new command, with the Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota saying, "The United States Africa Command

(AFRICOM) should stay out of the African continent." Lekota explained to BBC that South Africa's main issue with AFRICOM wasn't the command itself, but instead its location on the continent. [81]

In April, senior DoD officials traveled to Africa to discuss the command with African leaders. [82] DoD spokesman Ryan Henry said the discussions had been "fruitful" and denied that they had tried and failed to find a proper location for the headquarters. [83] In October of 2007, shortly after AFRICOM was activated, General Ward, who had been appointed the commander of AFRICOM, made the decision to indefinitely postpone the question of the headquarter location because it "distracted from the primary mission of the command, which was to build relationships and sustained programs." [84] Currently, the command headquarters is still located alongside EUCOM in Stuttgart, Germany, with no regional sub-offices in Africa.

Epilogue: What has AFRICOM Done?

"United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagements through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy." – AFRICOM mission statement May 2008 [85]

Five years later, with headquarters still in Germany, what has the young command actually accomplished? AFRICOM's starting budget in 2007 and 2008 was a combined $125 million, although President Bush had asked for more. In fiscal year 2009, AFRICOM's budget increased to $310 million, and in 2010 it kept fairly steady at $302 million. [86] The budget covers the command's operations, maintenance of its headquarters, the salaries of civil service employees assigned to the headquarters, and the costs of conducting AFRICOM's various military-to-military programs. [87]

AFRICOM's programs are carried out by its small staff of about 2,000, the majority of whom work in the Stuttgart headquarters, and around 50 civilian staff from other U.S. government bureaus. The command has taken over the OEF-TS and OEF-HOA operations, which include responsibility for the CJTF-HOA. Funding for the CJTF-HOA and its base in Djibouti,

however, comes mostly from the Navy, [88] and includes troops from allied forces as well. The Task Force is headquartered at Camp Lemmonier, a U.S. base that is leased from the Djibouti government. There are about 3,500 U.S. and allied personnel and DoD contracters. The Task Force has continued its main operations of training the Navies of HOA countries for maritime security. AFRICOM also created the Africa Partnership Station (APS), a program to further strengthen maritime security through training and joint exercises, infrastructure building, and the facilitation of cross-border collaboration. In 2010, APS worked with 17 African countries. In addition to the U.S. Navy, the APS program has included military professionals from European countries and Brazil. AFRICOM also coordinates a third maritime security-training program with the U.S. coast guard. [89]

OEF-TS has also continued to train and equip the national militaries of its ten partner countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia). The main goal of this training is to build the military's capacity to deter the illegal drug and arms trade in the Sahel/Sahara region and to prevent terrorists from establishing safehavens. In 2011, OEF-TS was the U.S. government's 3rd highest counterterrorism priority. The operation works with the State Department's International Military and Education Training (IMET) program, which in 2009 trained about 900 military students from Africa both in the U.S. and in Africa. This program recently came into some controversy when a soldier who had been trained by IMET led a military coup in Mali in March of 2012. [90]

AFRICOM has further received negative publicity when General Kip Ward was demoted due to allegations of "lavish spending." Ward had already retired and General Carter F. Ham had taken over, however, the DoD led an investigation into Ward's spending on trips to Africa and has ordered him to repay $82,000 to the government. [91]

Despite AFRICOM's rocky reception by the media, the command has been praised for its management of the early stage in the Libya intervention, called Operation Odyssey Dawn. This was AFRICOM's first military operation. The command coordinated the combat operations of eleven U.S. warships and dozens of aircrafts, fired over 100 tomahawk cruise missiles, and attacked 45 ground targets.[92] The operation ended after twelve days when NATO took over with a longer-term operation. AFRICOM's successes, however, received political backlash from several African countries due to the command's direct role in the intervention. After the hesitant reception to the new command in Africa, AFRICOM had tried to lay low and build the trust of its African partners. According to Jonathan Stevenson of Foreign Affairs magazine, "AFRICOM will have a hard time reestablishing its bona fides with African governments, which were fairly tenuous even before the Libyan intervention." [93]

In addition to the several programs and interventions mentioned, AFRICOM leads a number of smaller programs, such as Operation Onward Liberty, which provides U.S. military mentors to advise the Liberian Armed Forces, [94] and the U.S. LRA task force, which consists of 100 advisors to support regional effort against the LRA. [95] The command also assists with delivery of humanitarian assistance and emergency aid, and has recently incorporated disaster response into its training of African forces. [96]

Currently, terrorist activity in the Sahara/Sahel region and the Horn of Africa remains a key security challenge for African

countries and the U.S. The radical terrorist groups Al-Shabaab in Somalia, AQIM in North Mali, and Boko Haram in Nigeria pose the biggest threats to U.S. security interests in Africa. [97] Since AFRICOM's establishment, these groups have gained even more power, particularly in Mali, where AQIM-affiliated rebel groups have overtaken the northern half of the country. The command proved its military capacity during the Libya intervention; however, the success of its capacity-building programs is open to debate.

BARACK, BENGHAZI, AND BUNGLES:

Tracing the Obama Administration's Handling of the Benghazi Attacks

PAUL BAUMGARDNER
PhD Candidate, University of Michigan

"What did the president know? When did he know it? And what did he do about it?"- Senator John McCain, October 28, 2012 [1]

"If you wish to fault the administration, it's that we didn't have a clear picture, and we probably didn't do as clear a job explaining that we did not have a clear picture, until days later, creating what I think are legitimate questions." - U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, January 23, 2013 [2]

On the night of September 11th and the morning of September 12th, 2012, armed militants stormed the United States' consulate in Benghazi, Libya, and also attacked a nearby CIA annex. These attacks led to the death of four Americans, and ten more Libyans and Americans were injured. Among the dead was U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens. In the months following the Benghazi attacks, great political controversy has surrounded these events. One of the most contentious debates regards the Obama administration's handling of the attacks, in light of the 2012 presidential election. In this essay, I hope to trace the evolution of these debates, paying particular attention to the narratives given, both by the Obama administration and the intelligence community, to explain the identities and motivations of the Benghazi attackers.

By bringing attention to the administration's investigations, handling of the press, and inter-branch relationships following the Benghazi attacks, we may be able to determine whether the Obama administration's responses to the Benghazi attacks were riddled with cognitive bias and an intentional obfuscation of the facts. By reviewing the speech and activity of high-level members of the Obama administration, we can better mediate claims that a president on the campaign trail misled the American public and undertook misguided attempts to make this foreign policy debacle go away.

Immediately after the attacks took place, the world was wondering who was responsible for them and what motivated the attackers. Forced into answering these two questions, the Obama administration struggled to appease the American people, as well as Congress, about the true nature of the Benghazi tragedy.

I. Initial Responses: September 12 - September 19

Speaking in the Rose Garden on September 12, 2012, President Obama referred to the Benghazi attacks as "acts of terror." [3] Speaking on the same day, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echoed President Obama's remarks, adding that the administration was not certain about all of the details, or levels of

planning, behind the attacks: "We are working to determine the precise motivations and methods of those who carried out this assault." [4] However, the administration did produce an official stance concerning the catalyst behind the attacks:

"Administration spokesmen, including White House spokesman Jay Carney, citing an unclassified assessment prepared by the CIA, maintained for days that the attacks likely were a spontaneous protest against an anti-Muslim film instead of a concerted military attack perpetrated by extremists affiliated with powerful local and international terrorist groups." [5]

The anti-Muslim video, entitled *Innocence of Muslims*, had incensed multitudes worldwide, but was met with a particularly virulent response in the Middle East. Even a cursory review of recent Libyan history makes the administration's initial stance on Benghazi appear reasonable. In the years leading up to the Benghazi attacks, perceived slights against Islam had spurred several instances of violence in Libya: "a 2006 assault by local Islamists that had destroyed an Italian diplomatic mission in Benghazi over a perceived insult to the prophet… In June, the group [Ansar al-Sharia] staged a similar attack against the Tunisian Consulate over a different film, according to

the Congressional testimony of the American security chief at the time, Eric A. Nordstrom." [6]

In his press briefing on September 14th, Jay Carney followed the company line, harping incessantly on *Innocence of Muslims*, which Carney communicated as the reason behind the violence in Benghazi: "It is in response not to United States policy, not to obviously the administration, not to the American people. It is in response to a video, a film… that is offensive to Muslims." [7] Throughout the press briefing, Carney's responses to Benghazi questioning reflect a strong sense of campaign awareness. The White House Press Secretary defended against the Romney camp's criticisms of President Obama's preparedness and response to Benghazi, and Carney added that Obama has a better relationship with the "Muslim World" than when he entered office. [8]

In the days immediately after the Benghazi attacks, tentative initial reports offered from intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, became low-hanging fruit for those intent on criticizing the Obama administration. When U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan E. Rice went on early morning talk shows on September 16th, she responded to Benghazi questions with the official CIA talking points: "The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were

spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. Consulate and subsequently its annex. There are indications that extremists participated in the violent demonstrations." [9] As Rice would soon learn, the assessments offered to the public by White House officials, State Department leaders, and intelligence officers were at odds with the views of high-ranking officials of the Libyan government, as well as some members of the United States government.

By September 13th, anonymous State Department officials were communicating to the press that the Benghazi incident was a "clearly planned attack," not a spontaneous response to *Innocence of Muslims*. [10] A political chicken-or-the-egg problem arose, as Americans witnessed contradictory Benghazi narratives and did not know who was to blame: politics or the intelligence community. Were American intelligence agencies suffering from poor data gathering procedures? Were clashing political entities manufacturing divergent claims in order to achieve partisan gains? Or did the immediate politicization of the Benghazi events inappropriately pressure the intelligence community into supplying incomplete statements, with the understanding that further updates were on their way? The CIA insisted that immediately following the attack, its agents

were collecting evidence that showed both spontaneity and planning—with perpetrators described as a "flash mob with weapons" who displayed "some pre-coordination but minimal planning"—but politicians and the American public were clamoring for a tidier description. [11]

In the beginning, the National Counterterrorism Center's assessment aligned with the data being provided in unclassified CIA and FBI reports. The NCC report from September 14 states: "As time progresses, we are learning more, but we still don't have a complete picture of what happened… At this point, we are not aware of any actionable intelligence that this attack was planned or imminent. … We are very cautious about drawing any firm conclusions at this point with regard to identification and motivation of the attackers." [12] However, on September 19th, Matthew Olsen, the Director of the NCC, told the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that the Benghazi incident was a thought-out terrorist attack, likely perpetrated by individuals linked to al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. [13] Matthew Olsen's admission, coming more than one week after the Benghazi attacks, stood as the first statement made by a member of the Obama administration or a representative of the U.S. intelligence community that formally

In the days immediately after the Benghazi attacks, tentative initial reports offered from intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, became low-hanging fruit for those intent on criticizing the Obama administration

deemed the Benghazi incidents to be terrorist attacks.

II. Change of Course: September 20 – November 6

Late September erupted with political controversy due to Olsen's new testimony regarding Benghazi. For more than a week, several awkward situations arose wherein a Libyan government representative would publicly renounce the Benghazi terrorist attacks, just so an American official could follow up by denouncing *Innocence of Muslims*, while refusing to speak about the level of planning or nature of the attacks. Political conservatives had argued since the beginning that "the White House knew on day one that al-Qaeda terrorists were responsible," [14] but that did not stop President Obama from maintaining his initial viewpoint about a spontaneous-protest-turned-violent. Was the president intentionally misleading the American people? On the evening of September 18th, just a day before Olsen's remarks to the Senate, Obama appeared on *The Late Show with David Letterman* and reaffirmed that the *Innocence of Muslims* YouTube video was used as an excuse for Benghazi extremists, but the president did not refer to the events in Benghazi as planned terrorist attacks. [15]

On September 20th, the day after Olsen's testimony, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney referred to the Benghazi tragedy as a terrorist attack for the first time. [16] Secretary of State Clinton followed suit the next day. [17] That week, the Secretary of State—along with Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Adm. Sandy Winnefeld—provided a classified briefing to the Senate on the Benghazi attacks. [18] This briefing, one of the first between the State Department and the federal legislature, was viewed as "useless, worthless" by several prominent Senators, who complained that the Obama administration had furnished no answers or investigation updates. [19] One Republican Senator referred to the cagey briefing as a "one-hour filibuster." [20] For some, the Benghazi attacks represented yet another example of the poor working relationship between Congress and the Obama administration. For others, the tension between Congress and the Obama administration over Benghazi embodied a unique case of the administration striving to push an incident onto the political backburner for campaign reasons, even as Congress—and the American public—demanded greater attention on the matter.

One fact is clear: President Obama was remarkably hesitant to publicly label the Benghazi events as terrorist attacks, even

after the president of Libya, Secretary of State Clinton, White House Press Secretary Carney, and numerous officials from the intelligence community had claimed the events to be terrorist attacks. However, it was not until the end of September that President Obama called the Benghazi events terrorist attacks. Even on September 12th, the day that he referred to the Benghazi attacks as "acts of terror," President Obama told CBS reporter Steve Kroft that "it's too early to know" whether the attack constituted a terrorist attack. [21] Throughout September, Obama consistently deflected opportunities to label or elaborate on the nature of the Benghazi attacks, with the president instead routinely claiming "we're still doing an investigation." [22] However, it is hard to believe that this sluggishness was an act of political gamesmanship on the part of the campaigning Obama because, by late September, the president's unwillingness to refer to the Benghazi events as acts of terrorism became a rallying cry for the Romney camp, which was trying to disabuse voters of their strong faith in Obama's foreign policy leadership. [23]

Obama must have been aware that American intelligence agencies' investigations were slow to get underway. Even two weeks after the attack, FBI investigators were not allowed in Benghazi, the crime scene hadn't been secured, and "the FBI's request to directly question individuals who Libyan authorities have in custody was denied." [24] It ended up taking FBI investigators three weeks to arrive in Benghazi, and once investigators were in the city, they only stayed for four and a half hours. [25] Unfortunately, the investigation process has been plagued by more than its unbelievably late start. The administration urged intelligence agencies and law enforcement groups to "work not only with Libya but with other nations in the region to investigate the attack," which meant a lengthy investigation process—helping to push determinate and public results outside of election season. [26] However, according to some intelligence sources, the methodical and cooperative investigation process can be explained by agencies simply "want[ing] to be cautious about pointing fingers prematurely," especially after the conflicting nature of early intelligence. [27]

On September 26th, Libyan President Mohamed Magariaf reiterated his initial statement that the "preplanned act of terrorism" in Benghazi was committed by "Al-Qaeda elements who are hiding in Libya." [28] Speaking at a United Nations meeting on the same day, Secretary of State Clinton agreed in part with the Libyan president, suggesting that the attacks were linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). [29] Of course, administration officials later added that "the

question [of AQIM involvement] would be officially settled only after the F.B.I. completed a criminal inquiry, which could take months." [30] Answers would not be coming any time soon, although *The New York Times* reported that, as of October 15th, intelligence officers had still found "no evidence of planning or instigation by the group." [31]

Public unease and mistrust in the Obama administration to provide honest answers intensified in October. In a CNN interview on October 15th, Secretary Clinton attempted to defend the administration by arguing that the "fog of war" had led the administration to reach incorrect early assessments of what happened in Benghazi and what motivated the attackers. [32] On October 23, emails sent from the State Department Operations Center to "State Department, Pentagon, the FBI, the White House Situation Room and the office of the Director of National Intelligence" on the day of the Benghazi attacks came to light. [33] Some politicians and newspapers have argued that these emails show that the president immediately understood that the attacks were preplanned and committed by terrorists, yet he kept this information quiet. However, administration officials have responded, saying that the sole email which offered a possible link to terrorist activity was "an unclassified ops alert email, not a vetted intelligence assessment" and was not

as reliable as the intelligence assessments given to the White House in the days after the attacks. [34] Regardless of the supposed disparity in intelligence reliability, the fact remains that the Obama administration immediately was made aware of State Department intelligence that offered evidence of a planned terrorist attack, a description that later proved to be the official intelligence community narrative.

III. POST-ELECTION UPDATES

On November 16, former Director of the CIA David Petraeus met with legislative officials for the first time since his resignation. [35] While speaking to House and Senate Intelligence Committees, Petraeus reported that the Obama administration immediately knew of the terrorist involvement in the Benghazi attacks, and yet elected to mislead the American public, but for good reason:

"Classified intelligence reports revealed that the deadly assault on the American diplomatic mission in Libya was a terrorist attack, but the administration refrained from saying it suspected that the perpetrators of the attack were Al Qaeda affiliates and sympathizers to avoid tipping off the groups… avoiding alerting the militants that American intelligence and law enforcement agencies were tracking them." [36]

President Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stand during the transfer of remains ceremony, celebrating the sacrifice of Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods, who were killed in the attack

After more than two months of disagreement over the extent of the Obama administration's knowledge of the events, Petraeus's testimony convinced many legislators that the president's weak initial explanations had less to do with slow and contradictory intelligence, and more to do with national security concerns and maybe even political considerations. After Petraeus's hearing, the White House adamantly denied that the administration's discreet, and less than truthful, early responses were motivated by anything other than the noblest reasons. [37]

On December 18th, the State Department released its Accountability Review Board (ARB) report of the Benghazi attacks, in order to assess the government's preparedness and response to the attacks, as well as provide recommendations to protect against future assaults on American diplomatic posts. In the report, the ARB affirmed what the American public had come to accept: the attacks were not the natural outgrowths of spontaneous protests against *Innocence of Muslims*, but were "terrorist attacks" and "there was no protest prior to the attacks." [38] After requesting more aid and personnel authorization from Congress, the ARB report admitted of "systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels," as well as significant flaws in the intelligence community. [39] Instead of sharply

criticizing the Obama administration's misuse of on-hand and accurate intelligence, the ARB report harangued the intelligence community for early inaccuracies in the Benghazi narrative, claiming "known gaps existed in the intelligence community's understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests." [40]

Months after the attack, and the presidential election, controversy has continued to follow the Obama administration's handling of the foreign incident. When at a Senate hearing on January 23rd, Secretary Clinton was barraged with questions concerning Benghazi. Clinton responded to Senator Ron Johnson's questions about the inaccuracy of initial assessments, and the extent to which the Obama administration went to mislead the American public, by telling the Senate: "What difference, at this point, does it make? It is our job to figure out what happened and do everything we can to prevent it from ever happening again, Senator." [41] It has become apparent to political observers that the administration is purposely shifting its public posture towards future prevention and away from mention of past indiscretions.

IV. Conclusion

Almost one month after the Benghazi tragedy, U.S. State Department officials publicly

THE WHITE HOUSE ADAMANTLY DENIED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S DISCREET, AND LESS THAN TRUTHFUL, EARLY RESPONSES WERE MOTIVATED BY ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE NOBLEST REASONS

acknowledged that protests did not predate the attacks. [42] Previously, President Obama and other high-level personnel in the administration had maintained that the attacks were outgrowths of protests against an offensive online video. Even after intelligence officials and foreign politicians had come to solid conclusions on the Benghazi attacks, President Obama refused to make public statements about the known nature of the attacks and, as David Petraeus has argued, the president even withheld valuable intelligence from Congress and the American public. In the aftermath of the Benghazi terrorist attacks, FBI investigations have been slow and erratic, and the Obama administration has been remarkably vague and unhelpful to Congress when dealing with new information pertaining to the attacks.

To date, no report has explicitly and compellingly connected the inadequacies of Obama's responses to campaign considerations, and some data actually highlights how the president's cagey disposition about Benghazi adversely affected his campaign. After reviewing the administration's investigations, handlings of the press, and inter-branch relationships following the Benghazi attacks, I believe that the Obama administration wanted to keep this issue out of the political forefront, and this political agenda led to numerous oversights and bungles. It would be foolish, however, to heap all of the blame on the White House. Concrete evidence leads us to conclude that the shifting, incoherent nature of the nation's response to Benghazi represents the product of a perfect political storm, caused by many actors—from a campaign trail president to intelligence gatherers to foreign heads of state—approaching this foreign affairs crisis with different aims, checks, resources, and personal interests.

AAMIR HUSSAIN
Georgetown University

After the Partition of India in 1947, the two nascent countries of India and Pakistan each faced the difficult task of nation-state consolidation; however, Pakistan's problem was exacerbated by the fact that it had been geographically divided even further with its East and West sections "separated by over 1000 miles of Indian territory" [1]. The emergence of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (formerly known as East Pakistan) as an independent nation-state in 1971 therefore represents a significant case among modern countries because Bangladesh's seemingly mutually reinforcing identities of "nation" and "state" were in fact quite separate from the period 1947-1971.

Therefore, it is important to consider how Bangladesh has reconciled these two disparate identities into a unified nation-state? When attempting to answer this question, it is useful to analyze the paradigms of nation-state rise and consolidation that developed with regard to Europe, where nation-states first emerged. The purpose of this case study is to analyze the extent to which Bangladesh followed these paradigms. This study will use Benedict Anderson's definition of a "nation": an imagined community [based on common factors of identity such as ethnicity, language, religion, etc.] that is both inherently limited and

sovereign. [2] Also, for the purposes of this study, a "state" is characterized by "an organization with a definite territory, differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory, autonomous, centralized, with formally coordinated divisions". [3]

In Coercion, Capital, and European States, Charles Tilly suggests that the predominant factor behind the rise of European nation-states was war. He argues that complex institutions of capital generation as well as features of the contemporary nation-state such as taxation were created in order to increase the effectiveness of war-mongering. *In The Sources of Social Power*, Michael Mann suggests the significance of an additional factor, nationalism, in the determination of political developments.

This study aims to demonstrate that nationalism was by far the most important variable that influenced the rise of the Bangladeshi nation-state, insomuch that political grievances of East Pakistan against West Pakistan were defined primarily as threats to the concept of the Bengali nation. Since many state aspects including territorial boundaries, centralized government, and bureaucracy had already been established in both East and West Pakistan by the British during the Partition, the issue of autonomy largely served as the point of division between the two provinces of Pakistan.

This study aims to demonstrate that the desire for an independent Bengali nation-state was a relatively late development caused by perceived cultural imperialism from West Pakistan

Mann's theory successfully explains the critical ideological divide between the provinces because it accounts for the most important factor of Bengali nationalism that originally caused citizens in the East to distinguish themselves as separate from those in the West.

On the other hand, the emergence of Bangladesh also partially supports Tilly's theory, as the proximate cause of independence was violence in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. However, Bangladesh ultimately diverges from Tilly's long-term model because war-making was never East Pakistan's primary concern; this study aims to demonstrate that the desire for an independent Bengali nation-state was a relatively late development caused by perceived cultural imperialism from West Pakistan. Moreover, although institutions of capital generation had already been established post-partition, East Pakistan remained an extremely weak military power, and the latter part of this study will illustrate that Bangladesh's independence would have been highly unlikely if it were not for the successful intervention of an external force: India.

For this reason, Mann's model is far more useful than Tilly's because it explicitly accounts for this sense of unified Bengali identity. Tilly's analysis is too reductionist with regards to the emergence of Bangladesh, since the state and its corresponding institutions were not formed with the primary objective of war-mongering. Indeed, East Pakistan's need for India's aid in fighting West Pakistan in 1971 demonstrates that warfare was mainly an afterthought for the would-be Bengali nation-state. Therefore, the rise and consolidation of Bangladesh from a "nation" and a "state" into a nation-state primarily required a strong sense of Bengali national identity, while the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which ultimately resulted in Bangladesh's independence, was only the final event that solidified its status as an independent entity.

The Indian subcontinent is home to a wide variety of ethnicities and cultures, so language became an increasingly distinctive mark of identity as regions began to view themselves as distinct from each other due to the declining unifying authority of the British Raj. In many ways, this process is analogous to Mann's European theory of nation formation based on vernacular languages and the decline of the unified Catholic Church. Therefore, both India and Pakistan were faced with the inherent paradox of attempting to consolidate various regional identities into a unified national identity. However, East Pakistan diverged from the overall path of West Pakistan and began to develop a unique regional identity at odds with

Baitul Mukarram, The National Mosque of Bangladesh, Dhaka

West Pakistani goals that would eventually emerge in 1948 as the independent nation-state of Bangladesh .

Given the region's history, it is not surprising that the first major conflict between East and West Pakistan occurred over language. Soon after independence, the Basic Rules Committee of West Pakistan called for a single national language, Urdu, that would serve all official purposes in all of Pakistan [4]. This proposal was unpopular in both sections of Pakistan, because it seemed that Urdu-speakers, an intellectual elite and population minority, were implicitly declaring their culture as superior to all others. Opposition was especially vehement in East Pakistan because nearly 98% of the population, and virtually 100% of the urbanized, educated population, comprised a single ethnic group of Bengalis. [5]

The Bengali language was in a unique position compared to other languages of Pakistan commonly spoken in the West, such as Punjabi or Sindhi, because it was used by a *majority* of citizens and was the foundation of a cultural elite both geographically and historically separate from the Urdu-speaking aristocracy in the West [6]. Indeed, East Pakistan's language suggestion was not unreasonable since Bengalis constituted about 55% of Pakistan's overall population [7], and the people naturally assumed that the preference of the majority would be adequately represented in Pakistan's theoretically democratic government. In addition, Bengali was capable of having institutional status because it had a strong literary tradition from intellectuals during the British Raj. In contrast, languages of West Pakistan, aside from Urdu, were generally confined to villages and developed multiple dialects. [8] Because of these facts, East Pakistan presented a unified platform of resistance against the Urdu single-language proposal and further suggested that Bengali be instituted as a national language alongside Urdu. These proposals were summarily rejected by the ruling government of West Pakistan. [9] Stirrings of Bengali nationalism began with this incident, since nearly all East Pakistanis became united by their common language and their collective discontent with the policy of West Pakistan. Therefore, the "nation" and the "state" were separate since East Pakistanis (read: Bengalis) formed their own "limited imagined community" [10] on the basis of common language and ethnicity, while they officially remained as part of the Pakistani state without distinctive political representation.

Based on a demographic analysis alone, the only cultural commonality between the two sections of Pakistan was their overwhelming Muslim-majority population. West Pakistan

The Shaheed Minar (Martyr's Column) at Dhaka University, Bangladesh

attempted to capitalize on this fact and unify both halves under the banner of Islam. Unfortunately, West Pakistan's rationale for rejecting East Pakistan's language counterproposal only served to further drive a wedge between the two sections. Urdu-speakers claimed that since all of Pakistan was established as an "Islamic Republic", it should represent Muslim culture as best as possible. Urdu was linguistically related to and was written in the same script as the traditional Islamic languages of Arabic and Persian. As a potential compromise, West Pakistan suggested significantly "reforming" the Bengali language so it would have less of its Hindu influence. [11] This proposition inflamed the vast majority of East Pakistanis, 83% of whom were Muslim [12], since West Pakistan had not only rejected their language on its own merits, but also claimed that Bengali Muslims were inferior simply because their language had a significant linguistic influence from Sanskrit rather than from a traditionally Islamic language. For these reasons, it became increasingly apparent that Pakistan's national identity predicated on religious commonality was insufficient for unifying the country.

To complicate matters further, the government of West Pakistan attempted to institute its "reforms" of Bengali despite protests in the East that the program threatened Bengali culture and identity. For a short time, schools taught Bengali written in Arabic script (rather than its original unique script), and attempted to replace Sanskrit-derived words with those from Arabic or Persian. [13] Student protests eventually put an end to this program. Bengali nationalism again became stronger as a result of language conflict, and began to supersede any possible religious similarities between the East and West. In this way, the rise of Bangladesh also deviates slightly from the Mann's theory. In Mann's analysis, an important factor in creating national consciousness in European states was the presence of a common religion like Calvinism, Catholicism, etc.; in contrast, East Pakistan developed national consciousness *in spite of* religious commonalities between itself and West Pakistan by focusing exclusively on ethnic and linguistic commonalities. Indeed, East Pakistanis increasingly viewed themselves as primarily *Bengali* rather than Pakistani.

This sentiment was strengthened even further by West Pakistan's revival of the national language issue in 1952. The original conflict had never been resolved, and in January 1952, the Muslim League (the ruling party, based in West Pakistan) suddenly declared that Urdu would be the sole official language. East Pakistanis understandably felt disenfranchised from the political process. In clear defiance of West

Pakistani orders, students in Dhaka University held a mass protest against the proposal on February 21, 1952. Police fired on the crowd, resulting in the deaths of 26 and various injuries for an additional 400 people. [14] February 21st became known as *Shaheed Dibash* (Martyrs' Day) in East Pakistan, and a memorial known as *Shaheed Minar* (Martyrs' Column) was constructed near Dhaka University. [15] This massacre frequently served as a reminder to East Pakistanis of the oppression they faced under West Pakistani government. The martyred students were glorified as those who died in defense of their mother tongue, Bengali. [16]

In contrast, West Pakistanis were increasingly characterized as evil and oppressive. As a result, citizens of East Pakistan began to celebrate their Bengali heritage to an even greater extent. For example, obscure traditions such as Bengali New Year became celebrated by the majority of the population, and people would gather annually at *Shaheed Minar* to remember the fallen students and sing ethnic Bengali songs. [17] While many Bengali traditions had existed long before the Partition of India and Pakistan, they were suddenly brought into the mainstream as symbols of Bengali unity and as a reaction against West Pakistan. Moreover, "traditions" of honoring student martyrs were essentially invented after the language conflict;

this further highlights that although the concept of a distinct Bengali nation was "imagined", it was by now firmly entrenched in the minds of East Pakistanis.

As a result of the first language conflict in 1948, a new East Pakistani political party called the Awami League had been formed in 1949 that would serve as a counterweight to the Muslim League of West Pakistan. [18] Although the party was originally founded as the Awami Muslim League (designed to represent Bengali Muslims), the religious aspect was dropped in 1955 in order to emphasize that it was a party for all of East Pakistan, regardless of religion. [19] In fact, Awami League leaders stated that the primary goal of the party was to advance *Bengali* interests. [20] The formation of this party is a critical event in the rise of the Bangladeshi nation-state, since it is the first instance of East Pakistanis attempting to gain autonomy on the basis of their own "imagined community". They did not want to be subject to the whims of a government in West Pakistan that seemed to discard their preferences.

The major reason that Bengalis were denied adequate representation in the government was the existence of a strong executive branch established under British rule. In this system, the vast majority of political power was concentrated in the civil service

and the military, as these two arms were primarily responsible for implementing laws. [21] Unfortunately, the ethnic groups that held these positions were primarily those who had held them under the British, notably Punjabis of West Pakistan. Indeed, racial discrimination played a role in the selection of civil servants and soldiers. Punjabis are known as fierce warriors because of their immense height inherited from their Afghani tribe ancestors, and their religion's focus on bravery and strength in battle. Indeed, "in Punjabi society, a respect for military precision, administrative talent… and Western social practices were dominant". [22] In contrast, Bengalis are descended from the shorter natives of the Indian subcontinent, and tended to focus on studies in liberal and fine arts, notably language, music, and poetry. However, these cultural differences caused some "West Pakistani [people to] see the Bengalis as a 'lazy' and 'talkative' folk". [23] For this reason, Bengalis were stereotyped as weak, and therefore very few of them were selected for army or civil service by the government headquartered in West Pakistan.

The formation of the Awami League also represents the first expression of a desire for the Bengali nation to be married to the concept of regional autonomy. The Awami League ran on a platform of federalism, the devolution of powers and advocated reforming the political system to give East Pakistan (and by extension, ethnic regions in both sections of Pakistan) adequate representation in all branches of government. In this sense, this event was a precursor to the consolidation of the Bangladeshi nation-state. Nevertheless, it is important to note that at this point in history, East Pakistanis had no desire to be *independent* from West Pakistan. Bengali national consciousness was undoubtedly thriving, but East Pakistani leaders had still not conceived the idea of separating themselves completely from West Pakistan. They were primarily concerned with autonomy, and having their preferences represented adequately in a democratic fashion.

So far, this study has attempted to demonstrate that nationalism was the primary factor in causing the development of an East Pakistani regional identity separate from that of a unified Pakistan between 1947 and 1971. However, the cry for an independent Bengali nation-state only began towards the end of this period. The next section of this study will attempt to provide an alternative to Tilly's theory of nation-state formation by illustrating that the primary user of violence in Bangladesh's case was India, an external rather than internal force.

The desire for an independent Bangladesh (literally meaning "land of the Bengali people") crystallized in March 1971. Previously, free and fair elections were held in December 1970 in which the Awami League had won a majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly under a new system of proportional representation. [24] Fearing a political takeover by East Pakistan, President Yahya Khan of West Pakistan postponed the convening of the new Assembly in March 1971 to allow time for West Pakistani military forces to occupy East Pakistani territory. After hundreds of East Pakistani protesters were killed in army firing and Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested, Bengali nationalists declared their new nation-state of Bangladesh independent on March 26, 1971. [25] Obviously, West Pakistan was opposed to this secession and attempted to use its troops to restore order.

It was incredibly difficult for the emergent nation-state of Bangladesh to mount a stable defense against West Pakistan because the vast majority of soldiers were non-Bengali. Indeed, "representation of Bengalis in the army was…believed to be 10% or less". [26] An ad-hoc guerrilla army was created known as the Mukti Bahini ("freedom fighters"), but was mostly composed of student and youth volunteers from Bangladesh who were not militarily trained. Since Mujibur Rahman had been arrested, there was also no organized political system. Finally,

guerrilla forces were faced with a distinct lack of military equipment. [27] In contrast, West Pakistan had a professional military army that had the advantage of striking first without regard for civilian casualties.

It is clear that Indian intervention was integral in helping Bangladesh secure independence. First, India helped Bangladesh in erecting a provisional government that would allow for a unified military command. [28] This action was technically illegal since India was supporting a rebel force and had not formally declared war against Pakistan. However, this was incredibly important in coordinating the joint military commands of India and Bangladesh, which were opposed to West Pakistan. Although India did not legally enter the war until December 1971, between March and November India tacitly supported the Mukti Bahini by providing them with safe havens across the India-Bangladesh border from which to attack West Pakistani forces. In addition, Indian artillery provided covering fire to Mukti Bahini forces that encouraged them to push deeper in the West Pakistan-held territories in Bangladesh; at the same time, India firmly maintained its border integrity and refused to allow West Pakistani troops across the Indian border in pursuit of rebels. [29] These tactics were incredibly demoralizing for West Pakistani soldiers and allowed Bangladesh to endure as India prepared for legal entry into the war.

India finally entered the war on December 3, 1971 after a military base was bombed by West Pakistani forces. [30] The war had progressed from one of Bangladeshi independence into a full-scale conflict between two regional powers; it was now called the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. India had 833,800 troops not including the Mukti Bahini rebels (number estimates were not provided) compared to Pakistan's force of 365,000. [31] To make matters worse for West Pakistan, India's strategy was to initiate a two-front war, with one segment of Indian forces fighting along the India-Bangladesh border and the other engaging West Pakistan directly on its own border. [32] This approach proved devastating for West Pakistan, as it was firmly prevented from moving troops between Bangladesh and West Pakistan due to the geographical separation of the two sections by India and forcing it to allocate a large number of resources toward defending its heartland in the West. West Pakistan quickly realized that its military position was unsustainable, and surrendered on December 16, 1971, effectively recognizing Bangladesh's claim to independence. At last, the identities of a nation and a state were consolidated into the declaration of a new nation-state.

The original purpose of this study was to analyze the factors that led to the separate ideas of "nation" and "state" in East Pakistan being united as Bangladesh, a singular nation-state. Bangladesh was analyzed in comparison to Mann's theory, which was based on the formation of European nation-states. This study demonstrated that the most important factor in Bangladesh's nation-state consolidation was a nationalism based on common language and ethnicity. This also reinforces Anderson's theory of "imagined communities", since a Bengali identity based on those factors was given more prominence in order to distance East Pakistan from West Pakistan.

It is important to note that other factors such as political disenfranchisement and economic inequality also helped to separate the two provinces. In other regions of the world, those factors may actually play a larger role in determining the political outcome of the nation and state. This may be especially true among regions that display a lesser degree of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity than Bangladesh since national consciousness would need to develop in spite of those differences. In other regions, religion may also serve as a unifying factor. However, with regard to Bangladesh, it can be concluded based on the evidence in this study that nationalism based explicitly on cultural, linguistic, and ethnic commonalities (rather than religious homogeneity) played the most important role in determining the transformation of an "imagined community" into a unified nation-state.

However, the question that now arises is, how do we explain the lack of a nation-state despite the presence of strong, secessionist nationalism? Indeed, the many active, grassroots nationalist movements in the modern world that fail to crystallize into separate states are clear evidence that nationalism is not enough in and of itself to guarantee the emergence of a unified nation-state. Analysis of this fact illustrates the second conclusion of this study. Tilly theorized that war-making was the primary factor in nation-state development; while Bangladesh initially followed Tilly's model since it was officially created by the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, it also serves as a counterexample to aspects of the same theory because the war was won by an external force. As shown by this study, independence from West Pakistan would not have been likely without India's timely intervention and support. Thus, a plausible explanation for the lack of nation-states despite a strong sense of nationalism is that these "imagined communities" are not only incapable of sustaining a monopoly on violence, but external forces are also incapable or unwilling to commit sufficient resources in this regard. Therefore, a useful future study would be an analysis of the nationalism of communities that have not developed nation-states and the possibility of external intervention to help them achieve their goals.

THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN BANGLADESH'S NATION-STATE CONSOLIDATION WAS A NATIONALISM BASED ON COMMON LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY

45

SAM KUHN
Cornell University

Mounting Pressures for Reform in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

For all the border-transcending, common cause implications of the popular moniker "the Arab Spring," the sociopolitical upheaval it is meant to allude to seems, upon superficial review of its developing impacts, to have largely missed the Persian Gulf. The protests at Bahrain's Pearl Roundabout garnered minor international media attention relative to the "revolutions" undertaken in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, while Kuwait and Saudi Arabia project images of comparative regime stability. In fact, invigorated by the successes and mindful of the tactics of the self-determination movement throughout the Middle East, demonstrators in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have posed increasingly bold challenges to regime legitimacy.

I argue that, though the impact of this dissent has been far less dramatic than in other Middle Eastern states where entrenched regimes have been ousted, the subtler evolutions in the character of interaction between the state and the populace in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are of monumental importance to prospects for establishing representative governance. Although strategic allegiances between the established authoritarians and the United States create a significant roadblock to liberalization, the democratizing spirit of the Arab Spring has galvanized a significant contingent of Kuwaiti and Saudi dissenters to express their latent discontent across multiples communities of identification. As a result, unsettled regimes in both states have responded with disproportionate brutality.

Dichotomy of a Persian Gulf State

In some ways, it can be immensely useful to classify the Gulf States in terms of their similarities. Sunni royal families, controlling enormous oil revenues, rule over states with vast wealth inequality, very few opportunities for democratic or civil society participation, and strictly enforced limits on self-expression. Large expatriate or noncitizen populations and a striking juxtaposition between undeveloped desert hinterlands and gaudy, expanding metropolises also characterized the Gulf States. All of them, with the exception of Saudi Arabia — Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman — were British Trucial Mandates, which survived with nominal control over domestic policy until they were granted independence in the 1960s and early 1970s. Tribal ties were, at the time of independence, the primary organizing unit of power, and, where British military and financial aid helped prop up the ruling families in the days of the mandate system, oil wealth served much the

Burgan Oil Field, Kuwait: The world's largest sandstone oil field

same function for the nascent sovereigns.

Today the Gulf boasts some of the highest per capita GDP's in the world, as well as some of the lowest Freedom House scores — in 2012, 1 being most free and 7 least, Kuwait boasted the lowest aggregate score (9 —"Partly Free") between the categories "political rights" and "civil liberties," while the rest of the Gulf was in the 11 to 14 range, earning them the blunt designation of "Not Free." One might expect these two factors to create a potentially volatile cocktail of affluence and stifled political aspirations. But a combination of government patronage, strategic negotiation of sectarian divisions (e.g. divide-and-rule playing Shiite and Sunni fears off one another), religious authority, foreign support and brutally effective security apparatuses have maintained the status quo for these ruling families for decades, with only minor concessions.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia: Distinct Variations on the Persian Gulf Model

Having noted these commonalities, however, it is important to recognize the sociopolitical variety of the Gulf. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia represent the two ends of the (admittedly limited) spectrum of liberality of governance. Saudi Arabia's ruling family, the House of Saud, has maintained strict control over

all important executive positions — remarkably, family patriarch Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud's prolific procreation practices, along with those of his brothers, have supplied the most powerful offices of the kingdom with thousands of eligible princes. They rule a kingdom in the truest, most dynastic sense of the word, an absolute monarchy that has never tolerated the formation of a sustained political party or the implementation of a national election. Instead of a constitution, the *Quran* and *Sunnah* serve as the foundational bases for law; tensions arise between Wahhabi fundamentalist Salafis and more moderate and secular factions. Rulers of Saudi Arabia famously lean heavily on the legitimacy conferred by his self-proclaimed title of "Servitor of the Two Holy Sanctuaries," of the Hejaz, Mecca and Medina. [1]

Kuwait was founded as a sovereign nation by the entrenched Al-Sabah family in 1962. The Al-Sabah implemented a quasi-representative democracy, composed of a popularly elected parliament that has no control over the Emir or the Prime Minister he appoints. Therefore, the system is instrumentally doomed to an uneasy imbalance to be constantly and contentiously negotiated between the parliament and the ruling family, with the latter enjoying the full power to dissolve the National Assembly as well as to appoint the various ministers who make up the sixteen-member cabinet. Still, despite the clear authoritarian

They rule a kingdom in the truest, most dynastic sense of the word, an absolute monarchy that has never tolerated the formation of a sustained political party or the implementation of a national election

persuasion of the ruling system and the relatively frequent intragovernment tension it engenders, the Kuwaiti model has long been admired as a bastion of relative representative expression in the Gulf. Eligible citizens vote in regularly held elections, and parliamentarians are generally allowed to question the policies of specific ministers and to initiate legislation. The unsettled authoritarian-democratic dynamic is further manifested in the court system, which, though ostensibly an independent entity committed to determining the constitutionality of Kuwaiti legislation, has its administration and budget allocated by the Emiri authority. Judges in the lower courts are appointed by the Emir.

Saudi Arabia's Muted Political Dissent: Social Media and Beyond

Since January 2011, when the cries for independence that became the Arab Spring began to echo throughout the Middle East and North Africa, reports of popular dissent have been relatively sparse, especially regarding Saudi Arabia. Western media has largely been fixated on the expansion of self-expression and dissenting messages on Twitter, prompting two *New York Times* articles in October 2012 alone. Social networking was essential to the initial emboldening and organization of the successful revolutions across the Middle East, and it is significant that the simple volume and indirect expression Internet activism allows have facilitated the public expression of vast swaths of discontented Saudis. The discontent is various in nature, but much has been explicitly concentrated on the lack of political representation: "Twitter for us is like a parliament, but not the kind of parliament that exists in this region," said Faisal Abdullah, a 31-year-old Saudi lawyer. "It's a true parliament, where people from all political sides meet and speak freely". [2] Most popular are hashtags denoting disgust with the regime, including "Saudi Corruption" and "Political Prisoners," while formerly incarcerated dissenting cleric Salman al-Awda has more than 1.6 million followers. That these sentiments have been allowed to remain on the Internet at all is unprecedented; that private citizens choose to publicly identify with the messages is nothing short of a breakthrough. It represents testament to a well-trodden theme of the Arab Spring — safety in numbers. A certain critical mass of solidarity must be reached in order to challenge the formidable security apparatus of these security states. The Times notes, "with so many people writing mostly under their real names … the authorities appear to have thrown their hands up." Still, converting this cyber-solidarity into a physical presence is no simple task — this stark reality was illustrated at the March 11th, 2011 "Day of Rage" Protest, where schoolteacher

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia

Khaled al-Johani was the sole demonstrator to brave sure detainment in Riyadh. [3] Al-Johani was detained without charge until March 1st, 2013, when he was sentenced to 18 months in prison. [4] The relative leniency of the sentence in a state where adultery is punishable by beheading suggests the regime is beginning to understand that acting with impunity may be more inflammatory than pacifying.

Not all Saudi dissent has been electronic. Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, known as a bastion of Shiite population density, entertains the highest incidence of open dissent. In an interview with Jadaliyya, the anonymous organizer of the "Eastern Province Revolution's" Facebook and Twitter pages stated the movement's mission as seeking "to establish a consultative and electoral ruling system that represents the will of the people." Protests in the major Eastern Province cities of Qatif and al-Awamiyah have escalated, calling for the release of political prisoners and the end of the Saudi regime. Saudi officials are quick to condemn the unrest as Shi'a agitation and the work of a malicious Iran exercising encroaching influence in its closest province. But protests have been associated with various causes, peoples and regions. Women's suffrage and driving campaigns have enjoyed unprecedented support from Jeddah, in the Hejaz, to the capital in Riyadh and the far eastern city of Dammam. [5] Labor rights activists staged sit-ins in Riyadh and the Bedoon, Saudi-born people excluded from the benefits of citizenship by ludicrously strict and seemingly arbitrary standards, have begun to mobilize across the Gulf. [6]

The Saudi response to these various protests has been a brutal amalgamation of violence, placation, cosmetic political reform, political gamesmanship and craven appeals to religious authorities friendly to the regime. Initial requests of the Holy Najaf to issue a fatwa against protesting were rebuked, but on March 6th, 2011 the Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars acceded (29 March, The Guardian). Checkpoints and blockades have been established in regions deemed problematic by the regime, while the Eastern Province Revolution's organizer made the plausible claim (similar practices have been documented in Egypt and other Middle Eastern states in times of popular upheaval) that thugs known as *baltajiyya* were granted release from prison and armed with the sole purpose of terrorizing protesters. According to a 2011 Amnesty International report titled "Saudi Arabia: Repression in the Name of Security," "Since March, more than 300 people who took part in peaceful protests in Qatif, Ahsa and Awwamiya in the east have been detained," while "the government has drafted an anti-terror law that would effectively criminalize dissent as a 'terrorist crime' and allow extended detention without charge or trial." Most egregious, however, has been the regime's willingness to

use live ammunition to disperse crowds and kill protest leaders, an escalation which began only in January but which has been sustained through the spring and summer. The consensus among independent observers is that the Saudi regime has gotten progressively more repressive in the two years since the initial Arab Spring protests.

Kuwait: An Uneasy Equilibrium Unraveling

Kuwait's opposition and the corresponding regime crackdown have only recently left the relatively civil sphere of governmental turmoil, as tensions between the regime and government have largely played out in the form of parliamentary denunciations of the ruling ministers and their subsequent disbanding of parliament. However, recently this dynamic has proven too staid for the disapproving masses, who have taken to the streets in response to legislative gridlock and the empty promises of the Al-Sabah family. The most recent spate of tension began in 2006, when a youth-led movement consolidated the 25 gerrymandered voting districts determined by the regime in 1981 into 5 districts which were to more accurately reflect the will of the people. The motion had the desired effect, as parliament became increasingly composed of representatives who vocally opposed Al-Sabah policies and ministers. According to an oft-repeated BBC tagline, Kuwait's parliament "has the most power of any elected government in the Gulf, and opposition MPs openly criticize the ruling Sabah family." This power, along with a popularly-organized demonstration held at the parliament building, was instrumental in challenging former Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah on allegations that he bribed 15 MPs to support the regime. His resignation in November 2011 was a remarkable testament to the seriousness with which the Sabah family considers the protests.

In an effort to placate the restive masses, Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah announced a patronage program on January 18th, 2011 that awards citizens 1,000 Kuwaiti dinars and 13 months of free food staples. [7] But whatever good will he may have manufactured with this offer was quickly burned away by his indelicate management of the democratic segment of the government. In June, the Kuwaiti Constitutional Court ruled to annul the February parliamentary elections which had resulted in big gains for the opposition; since then, parliamentary proceedings have stalled as opposition MPs boycotted. In December, the most recent round of elections was widely boycotted by the opposition to signal the rejection of the Emir's power to unilaterally reconstitute the election system. Kuwaitis are increasingly fed up with the stunted, corrupt nature of their "democratic" system, which has

been increasingly under fire for persecuting protesters based on a vague social media law. [8]

Reuters reported on October 24th, "Kuwait saw some of the worst violence in its recent history when tens of thousands of demonstrators … protested this week at changes to elections laws they see as an attempt to limit the prospects for the opposition at the parliamentary vote." The regime's response underscored the illiberality it has been largely unsuccessful in concealing with its halfhearted appeals to representative government, banning "gatherings of more than 20 people" and "granting security forces authority to disperse any protests". [9] The regression toward Saudi-style repression continued on October 30th with the arrest of opposition leader Musallam Al-Barrak on grounds of "criticizing the Emir." Protests are ongoing, and cut across the ideological spectrum from liberal reformers to Sunni and Shiite conservatives to Bedoon activists seeking political enfranchisement.

CONCLUSION: TEMPERED OPTIMISM FOR CHANGE

Despite these encouraging signs of popular mobilization in the name of self-determination, there remain steep obstacles to true liberal reform. The United States has a vested interest in maintaining the Saudi and Kuwaiti regimes with whom they have built strong relationships based primarily on economic ties and military aid. The current balance struck between the staunchly Sunni monarchies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran makes the United States unlikely to aid efforts at undermining regime power, especially in the context of the recent antagonisms over Iran's nuclear program and threats by General Hasan Firouzabadi to close the Strait of Hormuz if their "interests are seriously threatened". [10] Toby C. Jones put it bluntly in a recent article in the *Middle East Research and Information Report*: "… when U.S. leaders iterate their commitment to security in the Gulf, what they mean is that they are committed to the survival of their allies and the political systems that dominate the region." [11] The regimes effectively propagate sectarian fears, seizing on the narrative of the cross-border Shiite conspirator to divide potential opposition groups. Though social networking provides a new echo-chamber forum in which grievances may be aired and solidarity established, media repression still precludes the spread of dissent movements in Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent in Kuwait. Patronage placation measures seem to have exhausted their political utility for the regimes in the short-term, but it would be unwise to discount the motivating nature of self-preservation that makes such craven appeals to public support salient. Deep-seated apprehension of the disturbingly efficient

security apparatus in Saudi Arabia continues to isolate protestors to a brave minority.

But the seeds of discontent have ripened in ways previously unimagined in both countries. The Al-Sabah regime has been forced to engage its political opponents within the government and on the street, demonstrating a disjointed strategy of appeasement, coercion, legitimate governmental engagement bounded by public law and underhanded attempts at destroying the tentative quasi-democratic system it helped establish. Perhaps most important is the fact that discontented Kuwaitis have proven willing to directly confront the regime in numbers; since the hotly-contested December elections, opposition groups have gone so far as to call for a fully elected government (though one that still exists within a constitutional monarchy). In Saudi Arabia, the regime's grip on power is far more assured, as the regime has maintained a close and uncompromising eye on any developing opposition. The intimidation felt by the populace in Saudi Arabia remains palpable. Still, the Arab Spring demonstrated with absolute certainty the uncertain nature of external perceptions of popular stasis in these Middle Eastern autocracies. Unaccustomed to having to respond to any real articulation of dissent, the Saudi regime has demonstrated a remarkable lack of subtlety in dealing with Twitter anger; the Mujtahidd Twitter account posts unverifiable allegations of royal corruption almost daily, and government accounts dignify the allegations with impassioned counterarguments. The exchange has gained the Mujtahidd account over 700,000 followers. [12]

The fates of both regimes are also dependent on their abilities to adapt to mounting economic challenges. The long-term unsustainability of their reliance on depleting oil reserves represents a serious threat to regime survival, especially when those reserves serve as the primary guarantor of American support and the source of the patronage schemes which placate a potentially restive citizenry. Saudi Arabia's Prince Walid bin Talal's $300 million investment in Twitter represents the fundamental tension between the regime's necessary engagement with modernity and its repressive practices. Seeking to invest in new markets, Kingdom Holding (the Prince's investment company) would be foolish to ignore the financial potential of a company whose popularity is such that the volume of Arabic messages sent using it has grown more than 2,000% in the last year. But that same company has been cited by many as a primary threat to the regime's stranglehold on power in the country. This irony speaks to the shifting political and economic realities with which the Gulf regimes must contend. Whether dissidents are able to capitalize on these shifts, and when, are key to regime stability. But upon close review, it seems undeniable that in both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia regime stability appears less assured now than it did two years ago.

Prospect of Northeast Asian Regionalism:

Comparative Case Study of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia

Soomin Oh

Political Science, Columbia University

Regionalism, as Edward Mansfield describes, usually involves policy coordination through formal institutions within a region. [1] Although there are conceptual debates surrounding what a region is and what regionalism is, empirically speaking one would say that there is a solid regionalism in Southeast Asia under the name of Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. Northeast Asia, on the other hand, lacks a definite regional organization, although there are multilateral alliances that involve nations of Northeast Asia, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Keeping these two regions in mind, the puzzle is, why is there a solid regional multilateral organization in Southeast Asia whereas bilateral relations dominate Northeast Asia? What is the main mechanism by which a region is able to form a regional alliance and what is the main hindrance?

This question could be assessed from two angles, a realist perspective or a culturalist/constructivist perspective, which focuses on the importance of cultural norms and ideas. The realists who view the international system as a self-help system are likely to argue that the reason for the presence of a multilateral cooperation organization in Southeast Asia is that there is no severe asymmetry of power and therefore the Southeast Asian nations are

less likely to perceive threat from one another. Northeast Asia, in contrast, has an element of asymmetrical power. In particular, China is rising as one of the two major global powers alongside the US, and Japan wants to maintain its status as a great power in Northeast Asia. The culturalist argument would be that Northeast Asia is historically ridden with intra-regional colonialism. That is, Japanese colonial history of Taiwan and Korea, Chinese historical influence over the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan's ambiguous status relative to China. The history of Southeast Asia, in contrast, is somewhat different in that the colonial powers in the region were extra-regional: Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch, Philippines by the Spanish, Burma, Malaya and Singapore by the English, and Indochina by the French. That is to say, from a culturalist standpoint, because the source of colonialism came from within the region in Northeast Asia, the region still maintains the hierarchal order, whereas in the case of Southeast Asia, although the same fate of colonialism had been shared, once the Western powers had left, they were geographically distant and thus no intra-regional hierarchy was present.

I examine the issue of the formation of multilateralism in Southeast Asia with the abovementioned debate around the question. My

The flags of the ASEAN members at the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia

argument sides with the realist perspective of power politics. As for Southeast Asia, a regional multilateral regime was able to form successfully in the region due to the existence of an external threat from outside. They were therefore able to form a regional coalition to balance against the external threat—not only from communist China but also Russia, Japan and the US. On the other hand, a multilateral regime is not able to form in Northeast Asia because the threat to the balance of power is within the region—China—which is geographically, politically and economically prominent—a prominence that has historical roots. Therefore, the countries of Northeast Asia chose to balance against the power of China with their bilateral alliance with the United States. In sum, my argument is that the crucial mechanism determining the presence, or the lack thereof, of a regional multilateral organization in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia is the element of threat perception that formed an insider-outsider approach to political stability for Southeast Asia and in Northeast Asia formed a competitive power dynamic within the region.

Case Study 1: Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The first case is ASEAN, a multilateral regime that was successfully formed in Southeast Asia as a regional coalition between the countries in the region. At the time of formation in 1967, Southeast Asia was facing a turbulent political situation. A period of "Confrontation" (*Konfrontasi*) that went on from 1962-1966 was launched by Indonesia against the union of states of the Malay Peninsula, Singapore, and the North Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak. Britain and the Commonwealth countries, in fear that *Konfrontasi* would escalate into a hot war, were forced to maintain and even increase their military presence in the region. British and other Commonwealth forces conducted a series of low-visibility penetrations of the Indonesian border of Borneo. Their purpose was to conduct preemptive, offensive combat operations against the Indonesian bases.

Given these internal and external political situations, the negotiated solution to stabilize the region was the multilateral regional organization of ASEAN in 1967. In the 1967 ASEAN Declaration, one of the major reasons for forming ASEAN was that they were "determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples." The aims and purposes of ASEAN were to promote economic

growth and political stability.

There are two institutions within ASEAN that show its efforts to bring about the two major goals of economic growth and political stability: ASEAN FTA (AFTA, 1992) and ASEAN Regional Forum. [2] The idea of AFTA has been initiated at the ASEAN Economic Summit in 1991, and quickly formalized to establish itself as an agreement in 1993. Bowles and MacLean analyze that the quick formation of AFTA is based on: first, the changes in political economy during the 1980s; second, rise in business influence in the region; and third, ASEAN's desire to establish itself as an important regional organization. [3] ARF came about through a combination of pressure from the outside powers including the US and Japan to form a forum, with their mounting concerns over North Korea, and of the threat posed by Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that existed since 1990 as an alternative forum. ASEAN saw the challenge of APEC to ASEAN influence and channeled the momentum to initially launching Senior Officials Meeting on Regional Security (1992) and a year later, ARF, with the support of the US and Japan. [4] Examination of the AFTA Agreement of 1992 seems to indicate that an agreement on preferential treatment had already been made in 1977, and that AFTA is a further step to the 1977 agreement. These two institutions are important for flushing out the determinants for success and failure of the multilateral regime.

First, the area of security cooperation within ASEAN was based on the idea "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. There was first the need to "mitigate latent tensions between its members left over from *Konfrontasi* period"; second, to bring economic development to member states, which would contribute to "political stability by helping to alleviate domestic social conditions" from communist insurgencies; last, to promote "internal security" so that ASEAN would be "less vulnerable to the machinations of outside powers. [5] Although ZOPFAN as a concept did not carry itself out fully

empirically, as seen in ASEAN interventions in Cambodia, Burma, and Philippines, the fact that ZOPFAN was established is significant. It shows the extent to which Southeast Asian nations feel the need to cast out foreign interference.

ASEAN's Regional Security Cooperation

Southeast Asia was infested with uncertainties due to political instability in the region, including tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia during three years of *Konfrontasi* and tensions between Philippines and Malaysia over territorial dispute. Therefore once ASEAN had been established, there was a need to drive towards security cooperation in order to firstly, "mitigate latent tensions between its members left over from *Konfrontasi* period"; secondly, to benefit the member states' economic development which would contribute to 'political stability by helping to alleviate domestic social conditions' from communist insurgencies, and lastly, by promoting "internal security, ASEAN would make its members less vulnerable to the machinations of outside powers". [6] The last point, I believe, is the most important objective, and is reiterated in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967: "...security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples". [7]

This objective of ASEAN has three implications: firstly, it illustrates that "outside powers" constitute the main concern for ASEAN countries. This seems to make the basis for their agreement for regional cooperation. Secondly, the common standing against the foreign powers' intervention illustrates a sense of regional identity: the member states of ASEAN all realize that they are vulnerable to such intervention, which fosters a sense of commonality between them. Lastly, it illustrates one of the defining characteristics of ASEAN: the doctrine of non-interference. This doctrine is one of the "ASEAN Way" that the

scholars talk about, which includes "equality in sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, consensus-based decision making, and informalism". [8] The doctrines of Non-Interference and Informalism explain the reason why ASEAN considered it unbefitting to adopt the second one of the two proposals discusses about in the article: the proposal to "develop ASEAN's role in addressing transnational problems". [9] This doctrine of keeping out from external intervention and non-interference between member states resulted firstly in Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) which is considered as a mere "reiteration of ASEAN's desire to be free of the influence of external powers, already expressed in the Bangkok Declaration". [10]

Second security cooperation of ASEAN was ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the only region-wide security forum of the Asia-Pacific, now comprising 25 states including China, Japan and the US. [11] ARF is considered by various scholars like Yuzawa [12], as unsuccessful in bringing about security cooperation in Asia-Pacific area. The main intention of formation of ARF is to play a role in Preventive Diplomacy and the inefficiency arising from the debates amongst ARF members around the topic of Preventive Diplomacy: the concept and principles of Preventive Diplomacy, specific

measures of Preventive Diplomacy, and structural reform of the ARF. These areas are addressed by Yuzawa's paper on evolution of preventive diplomacy in ARF.

There are two divergent views on concept and principles of Preventive Diplomacy in the ARF: "Activist" view of Japan that is shared by the US, Canada and Australia, and "Reluctant" view of China which is shared by ASEAN. The Activist view argues that concepts and principles of PD should be expanded to cover interstate and domestic issues, and that such expansion would not affect state sovereignty. This view argues that the obsessions with the non- interference/sovereignty principle of China and ASEAN are the main obstacles to ARF's intervention in any regional dispute and conflict. [13] This 'Activist' view can be backed up by empirical evidence: firstly, when China was threatening China, ASEAN and ARF remained as mute spectators although ASEAN was considered a potential regional counterweight to China; also, ARF had virtually no role to play on the Korean question when there were two navy incidents involving North Korean ships, chased and sunk by Japanese and South Korean navies respectively. [14] The "Reluctant view," on the other hand, argues that ARF should remain merely a venue for security dialogue not a path through which outsiders may intervene

in security problems involving their sovereignty and internal affairs. [15]

The debate concerning the limitation of multilateralism of ARF shows that there are conflicting views between the countries with greater power and those with relatively less power in the multilateral Forum. It could be argued that the great powers in the Forum—the US, Japan, Canada and Australia—advocated for expansion of scope to interstate and domestic issues because they considered ARF as a method through which they could expand their control over the region of Asia. Considering that Western powers were the main supporters of the Activist view also emphasizes this point, which could be summed up as divergent interests of individual states in defining their own regional interests. [16] More importantly, the fact that the stronger states were balanced by the weaker states of ASEAN in the issue of coverage expansion is important: although the result was ineffectiveness of ARF, ASEAN countries plus China served to counteract threat to balance of power, which suggests realism prevails in multilateral agreement as countries with substantial power disparities have come into the coalition.

The debate between the activist countries and the reluctant countries is continued to the topic of measures of ARF, namely Structural Reform. The Non-ASEAN nations complained that ARF agendas were limited, due to ASEAN's central role in the Forum, to Southeast Asian issues and "legitimized the Asian Way of institution-building into the operational rules of the ARF". [17] ASEAN Way, as the activist countries believed, were not suitable in promoting practical security cooperation in the ARF, therefore structural reform of the ARF was needed: firstly, to minimize the degree of institutionalization around ASEAN and secondly to share the ARF chairmanship with non-ASEAN members in order to expand the scope of agenda to non-ASEAN regions. The response of ASEAN countries, however, was the rejection of such

structural reform. ASEAN was 'neither ready to relinquish its leadership role' nor did it want to 'support further institutionalization of the forum." This rejection of the proposal for structural adjustment and continuation of ASEAN's leadership role was ardently supported by China, for China saw this as a 'counterweigh to U.S. and Japanese influence over the forum". [18] Important to note here is that China saw ASEAN's leadership as a balancing tool to US and Japan: power struggle, despite the nature of multilateral cooperation, was prevalent in ARF that led to its inability to reach a consensus on any major issues. From these two debates, it can be concluded that for a multilateral coalition to be successful, the countries need to be in similar standing in terms of power so that there would not be the incentive to use the security coalition to pursue the country's power expansion. It is also important to note that involvement of multiple great powers in a multilateral coalition results in extreme inefficiency and inability to reach any consensus. ASEAN itself had an incentive to cooperate because of the member countries' status as weak states in an inhospitable environment but ARF had many powerful states and the members were not unified the perception of common external threat [19], therefore another crucial element in forming a multilateral security cooperation is a common threat that is recognized by all member countries so that they agree to form a security coalition to balance that threat.

ASEAN's Economic Cooperation: ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA)

ASEAN entered a new stage of cooperation when AFTA was established in 1992 with the aim of increasing the cooperative power of ASEAN. Choi explains that AFTA was intended especially as a safety tool to prepare for uncertainty in world economy following Uruguay Round and to follow the global trend of formations of trade blocs in world economy

such as North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and European Economic Area (EEA). [20] Bowles explains that there are three factors in explaining ASEAN formation of AFTA: firstly, changes in the international political economy; secondly, change in internal power dynamics/ structures within ASEAN, and lastly ASEAN identity. Although Bowles argues that there are three explanations for AFTA's formation, I argue that this can be boiled down under the third reason (ASEAN identity), for if it weren't for ASEAN's regional identity, the countries could have joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which involved countries that were more economically developed than the members of ASEAN and thus would have aided their economic development.

First, I wish to define ASEAN identity, not in the cultural or social sense as has been argued with regional identity of East Asia ("shared Confucian heritage") [21], but instead as an identity based not on a shared ideology or culture but shared political concern. In that sense, the word identity may be misleading; however, because Southeast Asia is a highly heterogeneous region with no single explicable cultural identity as coherent as Confucianism in East Asia, this political concern binds the nations together on state-level. Some scholars argue that there is a fundamental Southeast Asian identity and preexisting norms particular to the region, most of which are cultural—cockfighting and tattooing, and sociocultural—charismatic leadership, bilateral kinship, and female prestige. [22] In more systematic analyses like Acharya's discussion of norm localization, he seems to suggest a preexisting set of Southeast Asian norms and identity, which transnational norms would be judged against. However, this frame of analyzing norm localization is in itself acknowledging that an insider-outsider dynamic exists and that although Acharya would not argue that such dynamic is built on *threat perception*, there are still regional political interests associated with norm localization. [23] This factor of threat perception that binds

together Southeast Asia as a region is evident in ASEAN's attitude toward APEC: a fear that they would become "marginalized by this new organization with power being vested in the largest players, Japan and the US" [24], partially offset by a "regionalistic" sentiment advocating a coalition to avoid being overpowered by larger nations. Evidence of such perception of threat is the passive of ASEAN towards the development of APEC despite agreeing to participate in APEC. [25] ASEAN nations have shown the tendency to hinder APEC's progress towards practical cooperative organization; for example, ASEAN's general viewpoint was expressed by the refusal of Matihar of Malaysia to attend the 4th APEC General Assembly. [26]

From considering the two areas of the Association's achievements, namely regional security cooperation and free trade agreement (economic cooperation), ASEAN seems to be a good model that fits Katzenstein's list of conditions that lead to successful multilateralism. [27] In terms of great power status, there was one great power (Indonesia) that could serve as the center of cooperation, there was a common perception of threat due to the member states' relative weakness to the rest of the world, and lastly there was regional solidarity based on this perception of threat thereby allowing economic cooperation. What needs to be taken into account, however, is that the ARF was largely unsuccessful and is considered ineffective because even though it was initiated by ASEAN, it was firstly and foremost not regional: it involved Asia, Oceania, North America and Europe which led most importantly to lack of regional identity and lack of common threat that would serve as the basis for cooperation. Also important is the presence of competing power structure in ARF: Realist point of view on balance of power and security dilemma prevails to hinder cooperation.

CASE STUDY 2: EAST ASIA

There are four aspects to be compared between the US and China: economy, military, foreign relations, and strategies. In all the above aspects the US is ahead of China; however, there have been forecasts from major international organizations predicting that China will overtake US economy in the near future. [28] In terms of military, US national defense expenditure is 7 times that of China; however the percentage increase in defense expenditure from 1999 to 2008 for the US was 66% whereas China increased by 194%, according to Chinese government reports. The gap in military capacity of the two countries is predicted to decrease dramatically in the near future. [29] Especially China has equipped itself with nuclear facility to increase the effect of nuclear deterrence and thereby strengthening its ability to keep its interests in the midst of regional conflict. [30] In East Asia, the US has formed alliances with Korea and Japan—the two of the three most influential countries of the region— that act as the central axes of East Asian politics. China, on the other hand, is trying to establish strategic cooperative relationships and mutual development, but it has been unsuccessful in establishing alliances (except in the case of the DPRK) and cooperative relationships—the factors that are most important conditions for powerful nations. [31] Nonetheless, despite the fact that US-Korea and US-Japan relationship largely defines the political agenda of East Asia, China is permeating into the power axes through China-ASEAN FTA, and exercising its importance in the issue of North Korea. The latter point needs to be highlighted: increasing threats from North Korea on the Korean Peninsula is leading the politicians in the US and Korea to recognize the crucial role of China in dealing with North Korea. [32] The logic is that China can act as a deterrence to North Korea's coercive actions towards its neighboring countries. Yet, China refuses to take on that role because firstly, China wants to ensure stability in the peninsula and the last thing China wants to do is provoke North Korea and cause instability in the region. Also, China gains from its economic ties with North Korea as North Korea's biggest trade partner. China also has the interest of maximizing PRC power through North Korea, by using North Korea as leverage in Asia and in talks like the Six-Party Talks. [33] This conflictive state of affairs in the region could be compared to Southeast Asia's conflict-infested situation right before the formation of ASEAN. Could East Asia, then, form a regional cooperative bloc to bring about the stability in politics as well as economics, just as ASEAN did?

US or China: Differing Perception of Threat in East Asia

In regards to perception of common threat that Katzenstein argued was one of the main components of multilateralism, I would argue that as far as the US remains as a global hegemon and North Korea and China remain major, nondemocratic powers, US-Korea and US-Japan alliances will not be breached. US-Korea relationship has been strongly maintained since 1950s and the evidence in current affairs can be seen firstly from Korea's regular joint military exercises with the US, and the naval exercise in November 2010 as a reaction to North Korea's artillery attack on the island of Yeonpyeong. Despite China's anger which led them to "warn against any military act in its exclusive economic zone without permission" [34], Korea's decision to go ahead with the military exercise with the US shows that Korea's concern for its security is greater than the historic hierarchic system that Kang is arguing for, and is greater than the projected economic benefits that Korea would gain from aligning with China. Further, the recent threats of military conflict posed by North Korea led international community, including US senators, to urge China to take action and led US and Korea to conduct ongoing joint military exercises. Yet, China has remained reluctant to take action, and Korea has not been pushing China to do so, either. This shows Korea's greater reliance on its long-standing ally, the US, rather than China.

The majority of Korea's foreign policy strategy researchers conclude that Korea should align keep strong bonds with the US: they argue that the disruption in US-Korea relations would not be limited to security area but also economy and trade, therefore the US-Korea security alliance needs to be maintained and strengthened. The alliance is also important because the US-Korea alliance does not only concern the Korean peninsula but the security issues of the Asia-Pacific, and will extend to become the basis for multilateral security cooperation. [35] The US-Korea relations seems to have almost absolute priority over any other bilateral relations for Korea, even though a Korea-China-Japan FTA is being discussed which, when is signed, is estimated to bring about a 1.45% increase in Korea's GDP. [36]

Japan's perception of threat or alliance is similar to that of Korea: Japan places emphasis on its alliance with the US, as seen in Japan's annual Diplomatic Bluebooks. [37] US-Japan relationship has been strengthening in 21st century, and Kim argues that this is due to an increasing perception of threat of China in the region. [38] Kim argues that after the Pacific War, Japan's diplomatic strategies have developed to escape from US pressure in order to have independent international position, but at the same time, through strengthening the alliance between US and Japan has pursued realistic foreign policies. [39] As for Japan's policies towards China, it can be seen as balancing against it in political and military aspects. China's economic and military ascension serves as a great challenge to Japan. [40] This idea of balancing against China is resonant in Japan's shifting military strategy to: providing its first military aid overseas since the end of WWII, approving a $2 million package for its military engineers to train troops in Cambodia and east Timor, and amending of the Atomic Energy Basic Law to allow the use of nuclear power for "national security." [41] The driving force behind Japan's shift in security strategy has been argued to be the dispute with China over the uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, and the financial struggles of the United States, which are leaving Japan vulnerable. [42]

North Korea, in contrast to the previous two countries' tendency to prioritize alliance with the US over China, is pursuing anti-imperialist strategies against the US. It has been strengthening relations with China and Russia as a "balancing strategy" against the US. [43] From this one can clearly see that the perception of threat of the main East Asian countries all differ,

and because there are disparities in interests and the perceptions of threat, the result is a lack of sense of regional coordination. Because there are low hopes for effective coordination within region, the East Asian countries tend to look outside the region. For example, China looks to Africa and the BRICS form new alliances. [44] That is not to say that China ignores Southeast Asia – the China –ASEAN FTA is a testament to that. Intra-regional cooperation has recently been attempted, an example of which is the aforementioned China-Japan South Korea FTA proposal, but the negotiations are being hampered by ongoing territorial disputes. [45] An example of a Northeast Asian multilateral cooperation that has had some progress is the Six-Party Talks, although it is not "regional" in its strictest sense. The relative success of the Six-Party Talks in dealing with North Korea's nuclear issues seems to lie on the fact that there had been a clear threat to the stability of the international system, although the specific interests of the nations differed—the US is hard on denuclearization; China less so, although it does want stability on the peninsula, hence has the role of providing the venue for forum and acting as the mediator between North Korea and the US, Russia and South Korea. [46] Some scholars are positive about the prospects of the Six-Party Talks developing into a wider Asia-Pacific regional security mechanism. [47] The institutionalization of Six-Party Talks could be possible, given the persisting threat to peace and security of the region from North Korea. However, there is also an equal chance that the formalization may be difficult, mainly because there are salient issues such as territorial disputes that are as important to parties like China and Japan that need to be taken into consideration when forming such security mechanism. Further hurdles to such coordination come from the fact that the two powers—US and China—would need to come to terms in forming a *security* treaty. From this, one can see that the prospect of regionalism in East Asia is fairly bleak.

Conclusion

The multipolarity in the region plus bipolarity of great powers that are invested in East Asian region seem to overpower the historical hierarchic system that Kang has argued for. Why then, were the three factors of Katzenstein's successful multilateralism relevant to Southeast Asian region but not East Asia? Firstly, Southeast Asian countries were in the beginning stages of economic development. They had no strong affiliations with one particular hegemon, nor did they have any strong political ties with the hegemon.

Anti-Japan demonstration by Chinese citizens in Shenyang on the 18th of September 2012

What this means is that regionalism was one of the strongest appeals to them than any other alliance system, for they could mutually benefit in economic and political terms without having to subject themselves to a great power. Considering that almost all of the Southeast Asian nations have been under colonial rule, such as of Netherlands for Indonesia, their distaste for another infringement in state sovereignty was only natural. As for East Asia, on the other hand, Cold War politics have led East Asian countries like Korea and Japan to become dependant on the US to counterbalance against communist China after 1949.

The major problem of East Asia was that the 'external' threat was actually within the region of East Asia, therefore there was no possibility of forming East Asian regional security bloc as ASEAN did against their external threat. The prospect of regionalism which would ensure stability and cooperation within East Asian region is not completely impossible: although political coalition seems to be out of consideration, if China were to rise above the US in economy substantially, because, as Organski argues with his 'power transition' theory, international order is hierarchically managed and driven by 'potential net gains that could be accrued from conflict or cooperation' [48], as opposed to the realists' claim that they are driven to maximize power. When East Asian nations—Korea and Japan in particular—see that net gain from aligning with China outweighs maintaining alliance with the US, regionalism will prevail.

LEGAL DILEMMAS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

CONNOR D. MAAG
University of Southern California

In the modern era of cyberspace and technology, advancements pose new threats to legal order. A 2010 census revealed that 2 billion people—over one quarter of the planet's population—use the Internet, communicating and sharing information all over the world. [1] This virtual reality is growing at an incredible rate, yet the laws that govern it are relatively immature and struggle to keep up. In an age of information, one reasonable question to ask is whether Internet censorship and personal freedom can coexist under international law. In contrast to several other nations—even those sharing similar Western philosophy—the United States tends to support the freedoms of speech and press, even when they could pose a threat to national security. Today, this ideal has reached a height of conflict in the new era of technology. Government censorship, copyright infringement and classified document hijacking are now major points of contention over international approaches to cyberspace policy. This article will discuss a number of issues regarding cyberspace and the regulation of this recent and relatively unexplored sector of law, while simultaneously proposing and analyzing solutions to such problems.

A description of cyberspace will lay the foundation to further understand problems in international law regarding the Internet. A range of opinions on Internet censorship will then be discussed to discern under what conditions it may be permissible to censor the Internet. The Pentagon Papers [2] are a case example that provides background in the American struggle to balance national security with freedom of press. Its contemporary counterpart WikiLeaks will then provide insight into modern cyberspace dilemmas. Finally, a discussion of copyright infringement within international law regarding the individual will highlight a holistic understanding of present cyberspace issues.

While the freedom of the press is often regarded as necessary and important, every government simultaneously has an obligation to protect its citizens. Whether it is China's censorship of Google, the WikiLeaks' disclosure of classified documents, or Canada's attempt to tame copyright infringement, nations constantly face the decision to either withhold information for reasons of national security or uphold the rights to free press. [3] This article will explore current debates in the international community about where the line should be drawn regarding national security.

This article argues that it is crucial for international law to promote free speech while maintaining the status of the Internet as a fair, responsible tool for society. At the same time, it is a tool the possesses great potential for abuse

by copyright infringers and whistleblowers. The Internet knows no state boundaries, yet it has the ability to affect every state in every corner of the world. The reason why cyberspace requires a new definition of community is because of the broad-ranging connections that it fosters — evidenced by the 2 billion users each day. [4] In the new era of technology, an international cyberspace body would prove beneficial as a rule-setting and coordinating mechanism to maintain order and create unity under international law.

A central question of cyberspace law is determining who has sovereignty and jurisdiction in a virtual world. The territoriality principle and the effects principle offer two guides on a state's ability to deal with international cyberspace. Under the territoriality principle, a state holds the right to control any and all information entering its borders, and can then choose how to make that information available within its territory. Furthermore, any restriction of a nation's jurisdiction within its territory is forbidden. [5] This principle argues that cyberspace is not an overarching pseudo-state that transcends territory, but rather a communication line that becomes the territory of a nation anywhere within its boundaries.

The territoriality principle has been adopted by China, as seen in its strong regulatory efforts to prevent "detrimental information" from entering its territory by means of the Internet. [6] In 2006, web search engine giant Google expanded offices to mainland China, where it encountered state demands for censorship of online discussion on issues such as Tibetan independence and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. [7] It became clear that Baidu, a major market competitor, was given preference over Google under the same domestic laws, and a highly publicized debate over Chinese and American views on Internet freedom ensued. While China reserves the right to censor the Internet within its own borders, there was not even a standard censorship policy amongst different search engines, which Google viewed as an undeniable threat to free press. Google then threatened to stop censoring its search results and demanded transparency from China, and the Chinese media accused Google of imposing Western values on their culture. [8]

Defending China in this situation, it seems only logical that a nation reserves the right to control the Internet within its own territory. However, given the nebulous nature of cyberspace, UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) takes a different stance. In 2006 UNESCO did not firmly support the freedoms of Internet expression when "[Internet] services are

THEY [THE NEW YORK TIMES] ARGUED THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION SOUGHT TO CENSOR A NATIONAL, PUBLIC NEWSPAPER AND DEPRIVE THE WORLD OF THE TRUE AND POSSIBLY UNFAVORABLE DETAILS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR

used […] to divulge information of a sensitive nature." This stance changed in the more recent UN Budapest Conference on Cyberspace held October 4-5, 2012, when Director for Freedom of Expression and Media Development, Guy Berger, lectured on the current UN position on Internet censorship. He explained that:

"The freedom of speech should not be compromised by measures taken in the name of cybersecurity—whether these measures are against cyberfraud or cyberwarfare. Security online is not a separate world from the world of rights, and particularly it has major bearing as regards to the right to freedom of expression." [9]

China, which is currently a member of the United Nations, clearly takes a rather different stance. Justifying their effort to ensure domestic social stability does not coincide with these positions asserted at the recent UNESCO summit. Berger went further to argue that the freedom of press in modern times is the result of such a hard-fought battle, and that it would be a great injustice to regress by censoring or limiting the Internet. [10] However, even the most liberal of nations, like the United States, do not always agree that the approach to censorship should be unconditional.

In the late 1960s, the American government faced a similar choice to either censor public press—in this case censor *The New York Times*—or potentially endanger national security by allowing the media's release of The Pentagon Papers. The Pentagon Papers referred to an official military-sponsored report on the entire history of American involvement in the Vietnam War. The records contained secret information about the U.S. military, and it was argued that their disclosure to the public (and in turn U.S. enemies) would pose a serious threat to national security. [11] When the Nixon administration found that the documents had been leaked to *The New York Times* and were to be published, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit placed a temporary restraining order on the newspaper to prevent the information from being released. [12] In response, *The New York Times* sued the U.S. government for attempting to restrict its first amendment right to freedom of the press. In a case heard before the Supreme Court, they argued that the Nixon administration sought to censor a national, public newspaper and deprive the world of the true and possibly unfavorable details of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Supreme Court Justice Black gave the majority opinion that the right to free speech and free press is absolute and should under no

circumstances be violated for stated reasons of national security. In contrast, Justice Stewart gave a dissenting opinion that the dangers of modern (nuclear) warfare should give the government discretion in national security matters. [13] The Court ultimately decided that the Nixon administration did not meet its "heavy burden in order to justify the restraint [on free speech]." [14] The government would have to provide a compelling justification for any potential censorship, and national security in this situation was not a strong enough argument.

Eventually, *The New York Times* did publish sections of the Pentagon Papers [15], but the opinions of Justice Black and Justice Stewart reflect the current debate in international cyberspace law: should governments or Internet service providers censor and regulate content for the sake of national security—do they have any legitimate right to censor cyberspace?

Today, the Internet is our equivalent to the newspaper as a communication medium with national reach. The difference today, however, is that a government's ability to block publication is severely limited when information and digital media can be spread around the world in seconds, with one click of a mouse. [16] This is precisely what happened in the WikiLeaks case.

WikiLeaks is a self-proclaimed whistleblower website, begun in 2006, that obtains and publishes classified government information on the Internet. Founded by an Australian and based in Sweden, the site claims that its purpose is to expose corrupt regimes primarily in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa in order to promote a more open and democratic world. [17] On the one hand, the site upholds and promotes the importance of free press by exposing corruption worldwide. However, the disclosure of military intelligence can be dangerous and frustrating for national governments, especially during armed conflict. The United States has utilized the effects principle in its legal response to WikiLeaks, because it claims the actions of the Swedish website pose a threat to American security.

Dubbed the "Afghan War Diaries," WikiLeaks published hundreds of thousands of classified reports on the United States' military activities in Afghanistan in 2010. [18] The most controversial aspect of the documents' publication was that the armed conflict was still occurring, and the reports may have offered valuable information to U.S. enemies on everything from base camp locations to troops' daily routines. Private First Class Bradley Manning (now standing trial for the release of classified documents to WikiLeaks) allegedly provided vast amounts of additional classified military information to the site, which was subsequently published. [19] Ironically, *The New York Times* collaborated with the Obama administration to determine which information might threaten national security before they published excerpts of the reports as well. [20] It is not surprising that the U.S. is angered over the situation, as the document leaks could prove a danger to national security, American diplomacy, and the status of conflicts in Afghanistan. Moreover, it should also be noted that once documents are leaked onto the Internet, there is no retracting the information. [21]

The Obama administration's vigorous response to the WikiLeaks case has attracted its fair share of supporters, including Senator Diane Feinstein of California who argued that

Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks

THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HEADQUARTERS IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange is just an "agitator" of armed conflict, who contributes to violence more than to fixing the world's problems. On the other hand, advocates for absolute free speech like Justice Black in The Pentagon Papers case would probably argue that WikiLeaks is just another, more extreme exercise of the right to publish even classified information for public knowledge.

In congruence with UNESCO and the rulings in the United States to uphold free speech over national security, why should all information on the Internet not be free and allowed? Do all people reserve the right to knowledge and can they be trusted to responsibly use their right to free press? In order to better understand the effects of cyber freedom and the problems related to free press, the next section of this article examines the issue of copyrights under international law.

In addition to the debate over national security and free speech, the other prevailing topic of legal debate in cyberspace is between copyright protections and free speech. Current law struggles to address how to properly govern online activity, which infringes on copyright protections while simultaneously upholding individual rights to free speech and free press. [22] The Internet is permanent; once copyrighted or classified information is

disclosed, it is usually irreversible and can spread rapidly across cyberspace. [23] The problem is that once a document is released, there is no telling when and where it has been copied or who has seen it—the copyright is effectively rendered useless. For a copyright owner, the ability to exclusively possess and distribute digital material for commercial profit is arguably the reason for a copyright in the first place. [24] One scholar, Alejandro Zentner from the University of Texas at Dallas, shows in a 2006 study that sales of copyrighted material have decreased dramatically, and Internet users have become 30% less likely to legally obtain music since the emergence of Napster in 1999. [25] This drastic increase of copyright violations over the Internet is of great importance to the issue of property rights and shows an imperative need to address cyber theft.

When people have the right to publish what they please, they may also distribute information and digital media that they do not own. People have the right to secure their own creative property and ideas through copyrights, but the current infrastructure of the Internet and file-sharing websites make effective copyright protection difficult. Countries must create a way to balance this dilemma between personal property and illegal publishing online.

One of the first attempts to do so was

the implementation of the Berne Convention of 1886, a multilateral treaty among 166 nations, which specifies international copyright protection for literary and artistic works. [26] This convention has since given birth to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a United Nations agency dedicated to the protection of intellectual property through copyrights as well as trademarks and patents. [27] Although these conventions boast a large consensus on cyber copyright, cyber theft still remains prevalent, and it is often credited to a method called file-sharing. [28] Within the United States, the Napster case set an important early precedent, as it introduced the file-sharing programs so prevalent today. [29]

Napster is often credited as the pioneer of file-sharing websites for illegal music downloads and cyber theft, and left a legacy in cyberspace copyrights that will not soon be forgotten. The site does not actually send copyrighted files to other users, but rather connects the files of all users who are simultaneously logged on the site and allows users to download them. [30] This scenario, harmless by definition, most often results in users sharing copyrighted materials such as music, software and films. In fact, when the site was operating in 2001, one survey showed that 87% of shared files on Napster were copyrighted music. [31] Unsurprisingly, Napster was sued by major record companies, but the legacy of the story lies in the Supreme Court's ruling that a website cannot be held liable for contributory negligence merely because the system allows for misuse—for example, Napster's potential for copyright violations. [32] The Napster case also set precedent that a search engine (defined as anything from Napster to Youtube to Google) must be put on notice for specific instances of copyright infringement before they can be held liable for users' conduct. [33] In the instance of Napster, the court held that the company should be responsible for policing the wrongdoings on its own site to the best of its ability, but was allotted up to three days to remove copyrighted

material if notified by a complainant. [34] The transmitting entity (in this case a file-sharing search engine) was not held immediately responsible for Internet violations on its own site. The bottom line is that file-sharing websites that partake in copyright infringement are not held fully liable for users' misuse of their service; they are given notice and time to fix copyright violations on their sites, which does not put the fault on the site that simply connects the infringing web users together.

In Canada, the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada sued the Canadian Association of Internet Providers in 2004 during a similar situation. Unlike the Napster case, however, the plaintiff did not sue for connecting users who make illegal downloads on a specific website, but rather providing the Internet service that offenders were using. This case, known as SOCAN, addressed the location of Internet Service Providers—called ISPs—in another attempt to find a party liable for Internet copyright violations.

In SOCAN, the Canadian Internet Service Provider was accused by a group of copyright holders who argued that providing the Internet service under which illegal sharing of copyrighted material took place constituted negligence. [35] The Canadian Supreme Court held that an Internet intermediary (an ISP) was not liable so long as it was acting as a content transmitter and not a content provider; as long as the ISP does not provide the illegal content, it is not liable for unknowingly transmitting illegal content from one user to another. [36] So long as there is fair use and good intention, the ISP is not at fault. [37] Under the territoriality principle followed by countries such as China, a country possesses authority for all affairs within its territory—both for the intentional censorship and for the actions of ISPs (the claim to territoriality goes both ways, whether positive or negative).

Regardless, the Canadian Supreme Court did not choose to adopt the doctrine of territoriality and still concluded that an ISP was

not responsible simply because it was located in the country where the violations took place. [38] The court did not go as far as to assert that the content providers or downloaders on either side of the ISP were at fault, but a lack of comment by the Court suggests that the content provider is the main violator.

The surge of cases similar to SOCAN is now pressuring ISPs to filter content or regulate the information that they offer out of fear of litigation, even though there is no formal requirement in international law for them to do so. [39] Although a few, such as WikiLeaks, publically dissent from this phenomenon by continuing to publish protected information, the fear of litigation for actions online may provoke indirect censorship and deprivation of knowledge. Article 19 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all people have the right to "receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." [40] Yet, the fear of litigation for online behavior may encourage censorship and prove inimical to free speech.

The analysis thus far shows that there are three steps in any cyberspace transaction: one user initiates the transaction by posting material, an ISP or file-sharing site transmits the information, and the end user downloads the material. [41] As discussed previously,

the Napster case set an early precedent in the United States that a transmitting site is not liable for copyright infringement. Similarly, the SOCAN case set a precedent in Canada that the ISP is not at fault either. While international law has yet to offer a clear guidelines on the matter, the discussed case examples demonstrate the approaches adopted by forward-thinking and influential nations in the realm of cyberspace that the transmitting institution (whether an individual, a nation or a corporation) should not be held liable for cyber theft as long as that institution promotes fair use in its services and does not seek to intentionally commit copyright infringement.

If file sharing sites and ISPs are consistently not held liable for the copyrights that are violated on their watch, then it could be argued that WikiLeaks and *The New York Times* in The Pentagon Papers case should not be legally liable under U.S. law for the information they transmitted either. WikiLeaks essentially acts as an ISP of political information and claims good faith in attempting to expose political corruption. The site does not create the information that it posts, just as Napster does not create illegal music files. It only transmits the information into the public sphere where at least the information is available. The UN might view this as simple practice of human

69

rights, as defined in Article 19. But while certain nations such as the U.S. and Canada support the human rights to free speech over the argument for national security, the amorphous nature of cyberspace still requires a system to adjudicate potential dilemmas which may arise between other nations, as well as protect individuals and intellectual property rights. The parties of the 166 nations at the Berne Convention suggest that this desire to protect IPP is fairly universal, even among developing nations.

A solution to these issues would be a governing cyberspace body. Institutions such as the European Union and the World Trade Organization are examples of a gradual international shift for nations to cede power to larger, specified governing institutions in certain situations. [42] An international body to govern cyberspace could help to standardize regulations, boost implementation, and aid international cooperation to address cyber crime. There is unequivocally one common, overarching theme in the cyberspace cases discussed thus far: disputes are on the rise around the world, but as of yet there is no concrete, unified system for international law-making and law enforcement.

Without actively protecting from wrongdoings—which could be as minor as a copyright violation or as major as cyber warfare—states may open themselves to harm just as if they had chosen not to protect the physical borders of their nations. In the same year that Napster emerged, the 1999 Harvard Law Review asserts that, "Internet regulations are necessary to protect state sovereignty" for this very reason. [43] In order to maintain the legitimate freedom of press and freedom of expression in the international sphere, a system must be put in place to ensure that cyberspace remains free.

Treaties such as the UN Universal Declaration for Human Rights and the Berne Convention put forward by the United Nations, WIPO and UNESCO offer a strong framework upon which a more formal governing body can be constructed. One proposed solution is to organize national state Internet servers that all answer to a collective, regulated international server overlooked by an international tribunal. One power of such a tribunal proposed by UNESCO would be to unify Internet domain names and restrict usage of the sites found guilty of cyber crime. [44] Perhaps even super-injunctions to prevent leaks of confidential material would prove useful. [45] This way, violators would be more likely to be held accountable for leaking classified information. Essentially, the Internet needs to be unified in order to create a structure that allows for order in cyberspace law.

Arguments against an international governing body for cyberspace generally take the position that the Internet is a unique system that should be left to govern itself, because it is too vast and intangible to ever effectively control. The fallacy of this argument is that the Internet provides too much opportunity for abuse. Governments unjustifiably censor information contrary to the desire of the United Nations; file-sharing sites infringe upon copyrights and intellectual property laws; and the current system discourages the freedom of speech. However, practical obstacles to the construction of an international governing body remain. There are apparent differences between the Internet censorship policies of many nations at present. This is an especially pertinent issue because cyberspace has no boundaries and has recently proven to interact between the physical boundaries of differing nations. Despite these challenges, the combination of rapidly developing cyberspace and increasing globalization has brought new urgency to addressing concerns about intellectual property and freedom of speech within an international legal framework. [46]

FOOTNOTES, REFERENCES

THE GREAT CONVERGENCE

To view the full lecture, go to: <http://www.cornell.edu/video/bartels-world-affairs-lecture-kishore-mahbubani>

THE FORGOTTEN CONTINENT

Footnotes

[1] Claudia E. Anyaso, edit., 50 Years of U.S. Africa Policy (Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2011): 18.
[2] United States Africa Command: The First 3 Years (Stuttgart, Germany: US Africa Command Kelley Barracks, 2011): 6.
[3] Paul P. Cale, "African Command: The Newest Combatant Command" (U.S. Army War College, 2005): 1, accessed November 4 2012.
[4] United States Africa Command: The First 3 Years: 10.
[5] Ibid, 13.
[6] Claudia E. Anyaso, 50 Years of U.S. Africa Policy: 239.
[7] Patrick Sharma, "Review Essay," review of The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times by: Odd Arne Westad, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Spring 2007.
[8] Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: The Penguin Group, 2011): 215.
[9] Claudia E. Anyaso, 50 Years of U.S. Africa Policy: 160.
[10] Nicolas van de Wall, "US Policy Towards Africa: The Bush Legacy and the Obama Administration," African Affairs, 109 (2010), accessed October 20 2012, doi:10.1093/afraf/adp065.
[11] Robert G. Bershinski, "AFRICOM's Dilemma: The 'Global War on Terrorism,' 'Capacity Building,' Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa" (U.S. Army War College, 2007): 3.
[12] Claudia E. Anyaso, 50 Years of U.S. Africa Policy: 211.
[13] Dan Henk, "US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa," Parameters, (1997-98): 92-107, accessed November 4 2012.
[14] Ibid.
[15] United States Africa Command: The First Three Years, 15.

[16] Ibid, 16.

[17] William Fox, Jr. "Military Medical Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa: The DoD 'Point of the Spear' for a New Century" (U.S. Army War College, 1997): 27, accessed Oct 25, 2012.

[18] Richard G. Catoire, "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan," Parameters (2000-2001): 102-117, accessed November 4 2012.

[19] Ibid. The interventions Catoire lists are: noncombatant evacuations from Liberia, Somalia, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and the Central African Republic; humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Central African Republic; election support in Angola; UN support in Somalia; and ECOWAS support in Liberia.

[20] Robert G. Bershinski, 3.

[21] Jennifer G. Cooke and J. Stephen Morrison, U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years," Center for Strategic and International Studies (Center for Strategic and International Studies Press: 2009): 3.

[22] Ibid.

[23] George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 334.

[24] Ibid, 335.

[25] Jamie Holguin. "'Compassionate Conservativism' Returns," CBS News, February 11 2009, accessed November 17 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-507503.html

[26] Theresa Whelan, "Why AFRICOM?" U.S. Department of Defense, August 2007, http://www.africom.mil/research/Why%20AFRICOM-Whelan-August2007.pdf.

[27] Paul P. Cale, "African Command: The Newest Combatant Command": 5.

[28] National Security Council, "Section V: Strategy for Winning the War on Terror," in National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionV.html, accessed December 8 2012.

[29] Ibid, 11.

[30] Robert G. Bershinski, 23.

[31] Jonathan Masters, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)," Council on Foreign Relations, Oct 15 2012, http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717.

[32] "Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara," U.S. Africa Command, http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp, accessed October 20 2012.

[33] Robert G. Bershinski, 24.

[34] Robert G. Bershinski, 25.

[35] Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir: 356-357.

[36] Charles M. Brown, "U.S. National Security Interests in Africa and the Future Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Proposal to Create an African Regional Combatant Command" (Naval Postgraduate School, 2005): 9.

[37] Theresa Whelan, "Why AFRICOM?"

[38] "The Geopolitics of China-African Oil," China Briefing, April 13 2011, http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2011/04/13/the-geopolitics-of-china-african-oil.html.

[39] Joyce Hackel, "China Struggles to End Hostilities along Oil-Rich Sudan Border," PRI's The World, April 25 2012, http://www.theworld.org/2012/04/china-struggles-to-end-hostilities-along-oil-rich-sudan-border.

[40] David H. Shinn, "Africa, China, the United States, and Oil," Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 8 2007, http://csis.org/publication/africa-china-united-states-and-oil.

[41] Ibid.

[42] "The Geopolitics of China-African Oil."

[43] David H. Shinn, ", "Africa, China, the United States, and Oil."

[44] David Gootnick, Statement to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Hearing, March 6 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08562t.pdf: 3

[45] "Global Witness Welcomes DR Congo's Decision to Publish Resource Contracts," Global

Witness, June 3 2011, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-welcomes-dr-con-go%E2%80%99s-decision-publish-resource-contracts.

[46] Solange Guo Chatelard, "Viewpoint: Africa Must do More to Profit from China," BBC News, May 21 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18143515.

[47] "Africa," Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed Oct 20 2012, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/Africa.

[48] Corey Flintoff, "Where Does America Get Oil? You May Be Surprised," NPR, April 12 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/04/11/150444802/where-does-america-get-oil-you-may-be-surprised.

[49] Ricardo Soares de Oliviera, Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea (Colombia University Press: 2007): 4.

[50] David H. Shinn, "Africa, China, the United States, and Oil."

[51] Examples include: Regina M. Curtis, "Countering Destabilization in Africa: A Threat to U.S. National Security" (U.S. Army War College: 2004) and Charles M. Brown, "U.S. National Security Interests in Africa and the Future Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Proposal to Create an African Regional Combatant Command" (Naval Postgraduate School: 2005).

[52] United States Africa Command: The First Three Years, 18.

[53] Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir: 485.

[54] Sidney E. Dean, "Rumsfeld Favors Independent Africa Command," US Fed News Service, October 1 2006, accessed November 15 2012.

[55] Ibid.

[56] United States Africa Command: The First Three Years, 18

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] "Vide Admiral Robert T. Moeller," United States Navy Biography, September 11 2008, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=217.

[61] http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=6362

[62] "The Roger Jones Award: Theresa M. Whelan," American University School of Public Affairs, accessed November 20 2012, http://www.american.edu/spa/dpap/whelan.cfm.

[63] Gordon Lubold, "DoD's Proposed Map Includes Africa Command," Armed Service and Government News, September 11 2006.

[64] Alex Belida, "AFRICOM's Origins: The Final Stages of the Proposal," September 30 2008, AFRICOMWatch Blog, http://africomwatch.blogspot.com/2008_09_01_archive.html.

[65] Claudia E. Anyaso, "An Overview of AFRICOM: A Unified Combatant Command," (presented at WIIS-US Army War College AFRICOM Conference, Washington DC, April 22 2008) http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2008/103890.htm.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Susan G. Reichle, Statement to the House, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, Hearing, July 28 2010, http://transition.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2010/ty100728_1.html.

[68] http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/37068.pdf

[69] Kate Almquist, "Africa Doesn't Need the Pentagon's Charity – Why I'm Grumpy about DoD's Development Programs in Africa," Center for Global Development, August 27 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201208271112.html.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Alex Belida, "AFRICOM's Origins: The Final Stages of the Proposal,"

[72] United States Africa Command: The First Three Years, 19.

[73] Ibid, 20.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Theresa Whelan, "Why AFRICOM?"

[76] Ibid.

[77] Christopher Moraff, "AFRICOM: Round One in a New Cold War" (Institute for Public Affairs: 2007), Frontline, October 2007, accessed November 5 2012.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Theo Neethling, "Establishing AFRICOM: Pressing Questions, Political Concerns, and Future Prospects," Scientia Military: South African Journal of Military Studies 36.1 (2008): 32.

[81] "South African Defence Minister Says Regional Bloc Against AFRICOM," BBC Monitoring Africa, August 29 2007, accessed October 20 2012.

[82] "Officials Visit African Nations, Discuss New Command with Leaders," US Fed News Service, April 24 2007, accessed October 20 2012.

[83] Ibid.

[84] United States Africa Command: The First Three Years, 21.

[85] United States Africa Command: The First 3 Years (Stuttgart, Germany: US Africa Command Kelley Barracks, 2011): 7.

[86] "About United States Africa Command," last modified August 2011, http://www.africom.mil/AfricomFAQs.asp.

[87] Ibid.

[88] John H. Pendleton, Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, DoD Needs to Determine the Future of its Horn of Africa Task Force, April 2010, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303408.pdf: 1.

[89] "About United States Africa Command."

[90] Joshua E. Keating, "Foreign Policy: Trained in the U.S.A.," NPR, March 29 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/03/29/149605074/foreign-policy-trained-in-the-u-s-a.

[91] Lolita C. Baldor, "AFRICOM General Demoted for Lavish Travel and Spending," Federal News Radio, November 13 2012, http://www.federalnewsradio.com/394/3117444/AFRICOM-general-demoted-for-lavish-travel-and-spending-.

[92] Jonathan Stevenson, "AFRICOM's Libyan Expedition," Foreign Affairs, May 9 2011, accessed December 10 2012.

[93] Ibid.

[94] "About United States Africa Command."

[95] General Carter F. Ham, Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, "2012 Posture Statement," March 1 2012, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=7665&lang=0.

[96] Donna Miles, "Africom Promotes Humanitarian Response Readiness in Africa," American Forces Press Service, July 5 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117018.

[97] General Carter F. Ham, Statement to the House Armed Services Committee.

BARACK, BENGHAZI AND BUNGLES

Footnotes

[1] http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57541807/face-the-nation-transcripts-october-28-2012-mccain-and-emanuel/

[2] http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/23/politics/clinton-benghazi/index.html

[3] http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya

[4] http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/09/197654.htm

[5] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/us-usa-benghazi-emails-idUS-BRE89N02C20121024

[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/world/africa/election-year-stakes-overshadow-nuanc-

es-of-benghazi-investigation.html?_r=0

[7] http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-car-ney-9142012

[8] Ibid.

[9] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/benghazi-attack-becomes-political-ammuni-tion/2012/10/19/e1ad82ae-1a2d-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html

[10] http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/12/world/africa/libya-consulate-attack-scene/index.html

[11] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/benghazi-attack-becomes-political-ammuni-tion/2012/10/19/e1ad82ae-1a2d-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html

[12] Ibid.

[13] http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/homeland-threats-and-agency-responses http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/11/05/regardless-of-who-wins-on-tuesday-benghazigate-is-not-go-ing-away/

[14] http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/11/05/regardless-of-who-wins-on-tuesday-beng-hazigate-is-not-going-away/

[15] http://www.washingtonpost.com/president-obamas-interview-on-the-late-show-with-david-letterman/2012/09/19/ef906ff8-0227-11e2-bbf0-e33b4ee2f0e8_video.html

[16] http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/20/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-car-ney-en-route-miami-fl-9202012

[17] http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/09/198060.htm

[18] http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/20/republican_senators_decry_useless_worth-less_clinton_briefing_on_libya_attack?wp_login_redirect=0

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/05/benghazi-attack/1684503/

[22] http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/05/benghazi-attack/1684503/ http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2012/09/26/obama-libya-terrorism-romney/1594965/ http://www.factcheck.org/2012/10/benghazi-timeline/

[23] http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2012/09/26/obama-libya-terrorism-romney/1594965/

[24] http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/26/world/africa/libya-investigation/index.html

[25] http://www.theworld.org/2012/10/benghazi-investigation/

[26] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/world/africa/clinton-cites-clear-link-between-al-qaeda-and-attack-in-libya.html?_r=0

[27] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/us-usa-benghazi-emails-idUS-BRE89N02C20121024

[28] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/world/africa/clinton-cites-clear-link-between-al-qaeda-and-attack-in-libya.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0

[29] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/world/africa/clinton-cites-clear-link-between-al-qaeda-and-attack-in-libya.html?_r=0

[30] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/world/africa/clinton-cites-clear-link-between-al-qaeda-and-attack-in-libya.html?_r=0

[31] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/world/africa/election-year-stakes-overshadow-nuanc-es-of-benghazi-investigation.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0

[32] http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/10/199196.htm

[33] http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/10/white-house-responds-to-release-of-real-time-emails-about-benghazi-attack/

[34] Ibid.

[35] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/world/africa/benghazi-not-petraeus-affair-is-fo-cus-at-hearings.html?pagewanted=2&_r=2&

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.
[38] www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/23/politics/clinton-benghazi/index.html
[42] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/10/198791.htm

38

Image Attribution

Works Cited

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso, 1991. 1-46. Print.

Das, Mitra. From Nation to Nation: A Case Study of Bengali Independence. Calcutta, India: Minerva Associates, 1981. 88-111. Print

"Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Language." CultureGrams World Edition. ProQuest, 2011. Web. 13 April 2010.

Kyle, Major, Royal Canadian Artillery. "The India-Pakistan War of 1971: A Modern War."

GlobalSecurity. GlobalSecurity.org, 1984. Web. 10 Apr 2011. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/KRG.htm>.

Mann, Michael. The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914. 1993. 214-51. Print.

Muhith, Abul Maal Abdul. American Response to Bangladesh Liberation War. Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press Limited, 1996. 37-62. Print.

Qureshi, Hakeem. The 1971 Indo-Pak War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.

Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States A.D. 990-1990. Oxford, UK: Wiley –Blackwell, 1990. 19-33. Print.

Uddin, Sufia M. Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity, and Language in an Islamic Nation. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 117-55. Print.

Umar, Badruddin. The Emergence of Bangladesh: Class Struggles in East Pakistan (1947-1958). 1. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006. 108-11. Print.

Umar, Badruddin. The Emergence of Bangladesh: Rise of Bengali Nationalism (1958-1971). 2. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print.

United States. Department of State: Bureau of Central and South Asian Affairs. Background Note: Bangladesh. Washington: Department of State. Web. 10 Apr 2011.

 Department of Defense: Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. An Atlas of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War: The Creation of Bangladesh by John H. Gill. Washington: National Defense University Press. Print 10 Apr 2011.

 Weber, Max. "Politics as a Vocation." Free Students Society. Munich University, Munich, Germany. Jan 1918. Lecture.

Footnotes

[1] U.S. State Department
[2] Anderson, 1-2
[3] Tilly
[4] Uddin, 124-125
[5] U.S. State Department
[6] Das, 97
[7] Muhith, 54
[8] Culturegrams World Edition
[9] Uddin, 124
[10] Anderson, 1-2
[11] Uddin, 125
[12] U.S. State Department
[13] Uddin, 125
[14] Ibid.
[15] Uddin, 126
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Umar, 109
[19] U.S. State Department
[20] Uddin, 121
[21] Das, 98
[22] Das, 94
[23] Muhith, 61
[24] U.S. State Department
[25] Muhith, 49
[26] Muhith, 48
[27] Kyle
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Gill, 12
[31] Gill, 13
[32] Kyle

LIBERAL OPPOSITION

Image Attribution

By Javier Blas (Javier Blas) [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-

Works Cited

Allam, Abeer. "The House of Saud: Rulers of Saudi Arabia." Financial Times. N.p., 30 Sept. 2010.
Web. 30 Oct. 2012.

Bsheer, Rosie. "Saudi Revolutionaries: An Interview." Saudi Revolutionaries: An Interview.
Jadaliyya, 21 June 2012. Web. 31 Oct. 2012. <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6104/sau-
di-revolutionaries_an-interview>.

Calderwood, James. "Kuwait Gives Each Citizen Dh13,000 and Free Food." The National. N.p.,
18 Jan. 2011. Web. 31 Oct. 2012. <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/kuwait-
gives-each-citizen-dh13-000-and-free-food>.

Countries at the Crossroads 2012. N.p.: Freedom House, n.d. Print.

Humphreys, R. Stephen. Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age.
Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1999. 169. Print.

"Iran Says It Has Plan to Close Strait of Hormuz." USATODAY.COM. N.p., 7 July 2012. Web.
30 Oct. 2012. <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-07-07/iran-strait-of-hor-
muz/56083762/1>.

Jeddah, Reuters In. "Saudi Arabia Prints 1.5m Copies of Religious Edict Banning Protests." The
Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 29 Mar. 2011. Web. 30 Oct. 2012. <http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2011/mar/29/saudi-arabia-edict-banning-protests>.

Jones, Toby C. "Embracing Crisis in the Gulf." Middle East Journal (2012): 27-43. Print.

Kareem, Mona. "An Invisible Nation: The Gulf's Stateless Communities." An Invisible Nation:
The Gulf's Stateless Communities. Jadaliyya, 21 Aug. 2012. Web. 30 Oct. 2012. <http://www.
jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6964/an-invisible-nation_the-gulf%E2%80%99s-stateless-communiti>.

Kennedy, Dana. "Imprisoned Father of Autistic Boy Called 'the Bravest Man in Saudi Ara-
bia'" AOL News. AOL News, 8 Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Oct. 2012. <http://www.aolnews.
com/2011/04/08/khaled-al-johani-the-bravest-man-in-saudi-arabia/>.

"Kuwait's Prime Minister Resigns after Protests." BBC News. BBC, 28 Nov. 2011. Web. 30 Oct.
2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15931526>.

Lulu, Tahiyya. "Let's Talk About Sect." Let's Talk About Sect. Jadaliyya, 24 Feb. 2011. Web. 31
Oct. 2012. <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/733/lets-talk-about-sect>.

Maher, Shiraz. "The Febrile Atmosphere within Saudi Arabia." Spectator Blogs. The Spectator, 01
Mar. 2013. Web. 03 Mar. 2013.

Monroe, SL. "Salafis in Parliament: Democratic Attitudes and Party Politics in the Gulf." Middle
East Journal (2012): 409-16. Print.

"Saudi Arabia Accused of Repression after Arab Spring." BBC News. BBC, 1 Dec. 2011. Web. 31 Oct. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15977980>.

"Saudi Arabia." News. New York Times, 7 Oct. 2012. Web. 31 Oct. 2012. <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/saudiarabia/index.html>.

"Saudi Arabia: Repression in the Name of Security." Amnesty International, Dec. 2011. Web. 30 Oct. 2012.

"Voters Register for Saudi Municipal Elections - Middle East - Al Jazeera English." Al Jazeera English. Al Jazeera, 23 Apr. 2011. Web. 30 Oct. 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/201142320134356901.html>.

Worth, Robert F. "Twitter Gives Saudi Arabia A Revolution Of Its Own." The New York Times. The New York Times, 20 Oct. 2012. Web. 30 Oct. 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/world/middleeast/twitter-gives-saudi-arabia-a-revolution-of-its-own.html?_r=1>.

Footnotes

[1] R. Stephen Humphreys, "Islam as a Political System," 169
[2] New York Times, 10/12/2012
[3] AOL News
[4] Shiraz Maher, The Spectator
[5] Al-Jazeera 23 April
[6] Jadaliyya 21 August
[7] 18 January 2011, "The National"
[8] 17 February 2013, Kinninmont
[9] 24 October, Reuters
[10] 7 July 2012, AP
[11] http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/embracing-crisis-gulf?ip_login_no_cache=01d-1367c9a08ed20df0f7eb82281c84e
[12] New York Times, 20 October 2012

PROSPECT OF NORTHEAST ASIA REGIONALISM

53

Image Attribution

Works Cited

Acharya, A. (2004). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. International Organization , 58 (2), 238-275.

ASEAN. Bangkok Declaration (1967).

Bowles, P. (1997). ASEAN, AFTA and the New Regionalism. Pacific Affairs , 70 (2), 219-233.
Bowles, P. (1996). Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade

Area. Review of International Political Economy , 3 (2), 319-348.
Choi, D.-S. (1997). ASEAN Strategies for Regional Cooperation. Research Institute of National

Unification , 243-276.
Choi, K. (2004). Direction for the Future of Korea-US Alliance. In S.-C. Lee, 21st Century

Northeast International Relations and Korea (pp. 297-326). Seoul: Nanam.
Gilpin, R. (2002). The RIse of American Hegemony. In K. O'Brien, Two Hegemonies: Britain

1846-1914 and the US 1941-2001 (pp. 165-182). Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Kang, D. (2003). Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks. International

Security , 27 (4), 57-85.
Katzenstein, P. (2002). Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism. International Organization (56), 3.

Kim, H.-S. (2010 йил 18-December). Korea's GDP to rise by 2.6% if Korea-China-Japan FTA were to be signed. Retrieved 2010 йил 19-December from http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/201012/e2010121917411270080.htm

Kim, S.-C. (2004). Japan's Diplomatic Security Strategies. In S.-C. Lee, 21st Northeast Asian International Relations and Korea (pp. 133-170). Seoul: Nanam.

Lee, G.-D. (2004). North Korea's Diplomatic Security Strategies. In S.-C. Lee, 21st Northeast Asian International Relations and Korea (pp. 259-294). Seoul: Nanam.

Narine, S. (1997). ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the "ASEAN Way". Asian Survey , 37 (10), 961-978.

Narine, S. (1998). ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security. Pacific Affairs , 71 (2), 195-214.

New York Times. (2010 йил 27-November). U.S. and South Korea Begin Joint Naval Exercises. Retrieved 2010 йил 19-December from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/world/asia/28korea.html?scp=5&sq=korea%20us% 20joint%20military%20exercise&st=cse

Organski, A. (1989). The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation. In M. Midlarsky, Handbook of War Studies (pp. 171-194). Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Park, C.-G. (2010). Prospects for Changes in US-China Relations and Korea's Strategy for Security Cooperation (Vol. 26). Seoul: Korean Institute for Defense Analysis.

Park, E.-H. (2006). ASEAN Way and the Changing Role of Southeast Aisan NICs: The Controntational Co-Existence of Soveriegnty, Development and Human Rights and its Evolution. Southeast Asia Research , 16 (1), 119-147.

Peth, S. (1999). ASEAN and Regional Security. Economic and Political Weekly , 34 (33), 2304. Yang, S.-Y. (2001). The Future of Regional Cooperation in Asia: ASEAN's Policy Toward ASEM. East Asian Review , 13 (4), 79-92.

Yuzawa, T. (2006). The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospects. Asian Survey , 46 (5), 785-804.

Footnotes

[1] Mansfield, 147
[2] ARF, 1993
[3] Bowles 1997, 221
[4] Antolik 1994, 118-121
[5] Narine, 196
[6] Narine, 196
[7] ASEAN 1967
[8] Park, 121
[9] Acharya, 240
[10] Narine, 968
[11] Yuzawa 785
[12] Yuzawa has done extensive research on ASEAN, especially ASEAN Regional Forum and its role in Asian security dynamic. One of the few major English sources on ASEAN.
[13] Yuzawa, 789.
[14] Peth, 2304
[15] Yuzawa, 791
[16] Narine, 213
[17] Yuzawa, 801
[18] Yuzawa, 802
[19] Narine, 973
[20] Choi, 254
[21] See Rozman, Gilbert. The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation (ed., Princeton University Press, 1991).
[22] See Reid (1988)
[23] See Acharya, A. (2004). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. International Organization , 58 (2), 238-275.
[24] Bowles, 340
[25] Choi, 261
[26] Ibid.
[27] Peter Katzenstein offers criteria for successful multilateralism. The three factors in the criteria are as follow: first, presence of a great power in the region; second, presence of threats; and third,

regional identity (Katzenstein 2002).

[28] See Johansson, et al. "Looking to 2060: Long-Term Global Growth Prospects." OECD Economic Policy Papers (2012);

[29] Park, 98

[30] Park, 99

[31] Park, 101

[32] Londoño, Ernesto. (April 9, 2013). Senators urge engaging China in North Korea effort. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com

[33] China's interests in North Korea are well-established in the literature; See Nanto, D. "China-North Korea Relations." CRS Report for Congress (2010).

[34]http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/27/world/asia/27korea.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

[35] Choi, 303

[36] Pi, Yong-ik. (March 15, 2013). First Button for Korea-China-Japan FTA to be put on this month. Edaily News. Retrieved from http://edaily.com (in Korean).

[37] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Diplomatic Bluebook. 2010.

[38] Kim, 154

[39] Kim, 156

[40] Kim 139

[41] Korea Times. (June 22, 2012).

[42] Fackler, Martin. (November 26, 2012). Japan Expands its Regional Military Role. New York Times.

[43] Lee, 275

[44] Xiaokun, Lin. (April 8, 2013). China-Africa Coordination at strongest. China Daily.

[45] Shengxia, Song. (March 27, 2013). China, Japan and S. Korea begin FTA talks. Global Times.

[46] Bajoria, J. "The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program." Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder. (Updated: March 2013).

[47] See Zhongying, Pang. "The Six-Party Process, Regional Security Mechanisms, and China-US Cooperation: Toward a Regional Security Mechanism for a New Northeast Asia?" Brookings Institution (March 2009).

[48] Organski, 172

Works Cited

Barron, Jerome A. The Pentagon Papers Case and the WikiLeaks Controversey: National Security and the First Amendment. Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy 1 (2011) 49-74. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

Belknap, John W. Recent Developments: Copyright and Napster. Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law. 5 (2001) 185-203. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

Berger, Guy. "The Budapest Conference on Cyberspace." Millenáris Park, Budapest. (4-5 October 2012). Retrieved from UNESCO database.

Developments in the Law—the Law of Cyberspace. Harvard Law Review. 112 (1999) 1680-1704. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

Dinwoodie, Graeme B. (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name System. University of Pennsylvaina Journal of International Economic Law. 21 (2000) 495-522. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

Dutton, W. H., Dopatka, A., Hills M., Law, G., Nash, V. Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet. Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University. (2010). Retrieved from UNESCO database.

Handler, Staphanie G. The New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing a Legal Approach To Accommodate Emerging Trends In Warfare. Stanford Journal of International Law. 31 (2012), 209-236. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

Hannibal, Travis. Opting Out of the Internet in the United States and European Union: Copyright, Safe Harbors, and International Law. Notre Dame Law Review. 84 (2008) 358-364. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

Kelly, Tiffany. "CALIFORNIA; JPL employees demand inquiry; Theft of a laptop carrying data on up to 10,000 workers prompts the action.." Los Angeles Times. (November 29, 2012 Thursday): 521 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2012/11/29.

Kelly, Tiffany. "CALIFORNIA; JPL employees demand inquiry; Theft of a laptop carrying data on up to 10,000 workers prompts the action." Los Angeles Times. (29 November 2012): 521 words. LexisNexis Academic database.

Leong, S., Lim Saw, Cheng. Copyright in a Borderless World—Does Territorality Matter? International Journal of Law and Information Technology. 15 (2007), 38-53. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

Miaoran, Li. The Pirate Party and the Pirate Bay: How the Pirate Bay Influences Sweden and International Copyright Relations. Pace International Law Review. 21 (2009), 281-307. Retrieved from Index to Legal Periodicals & Books Full Text database.

Opper, Melissa H. Wikileaks: Balancing First Amendment Rights with National Security. Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment and Law Review. 31 (2010-2011) 237-267. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

UN General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (10 December 1948), 217 A (III), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 1 December 2012]

United Nations. WIPO. What Is WIPO? United Nations, n.d. Web. <http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/>.

World Intellectual Property Organization. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. (9 Sept. 1886. Revised 28 Sept. 1979). Web. <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html>.

Zekos, Georgios I. State Cyberspace Jurisdiction and Personal Cyberspace Jurisdiction. International Journal of Law and Information Technology.15 (2007), 1-38. Retrieved from the Heinonline database.

Zentner, Alejandro. Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music Purchases. Journal of Law and Economics. 49 (2006), 63-90. Retrieved from JSTOR Database.

Footnotes

[1] William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law, Victoria Nash. Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet. Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University (2010). Retrieved from UNESCO database.
[2] June 1971
[3] William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law, Victoria Nash Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet. Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University (2010). Retrieved from UNESCO database.
[4] Developments in the Law—the Law of Cyberspace. Harvard Law Review. 112 (1999) 1680-1704. Retrieved from Heinonline database.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law, Victoria Nash Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet. Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University (2010). Retrieved from UNESCO database.
[8] William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law, Victoria Nash Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet. Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University (2010). Retrieved from UNESCO database.
[9] Guy Berger. "The Budapest Conference on Cyberspace. Millenáris Park, Budapest." UNESCO. 4-5 October 2012. Retrieved from UNESCO database.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Jerome A. Barron. "The Pentagon Papers Case and the WikiLeaks Controversy: National Security and the First Amendment." Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy 1 (2011), 49-74. Retrieved from Heinonline database.
[12] ibid.
[13] ibid.
[14] ibid.
[15] Jerome A. Barron. "The Pentagon Papers Case and the WikiLeaks Controversey: National Security and the First Amendment." Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy 1 (2011), 49-74. Retrieved from Heinonline database.
[16] Melissa Hannah Opper. "Wikileaks: Balancing First Amendment Rights with National Security." Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment and Law Review. 31 (2010-2011): 237-267. Retrieved from Heinonline database.
[17] ibid.
[18] Jerome A. Barron. "The Pentagon Papers Case and the WikiLeaks Controversy: National Security and the First Amendment." Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy 1 (2011), 49-74. Retrieved from Heinonline database.
[19]Melissa Hannah Opper. "Wikileaks: Balancing First Amendment Rights with National Securi-

ty." Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment and Law Review. 31 (2010-2011): 237-267. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[20] Jerome A. Barron. "The Pentagon Papers Case and the WikiLeaks Controversy: National Security and the First Amendment." Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy 1 (2011), 49-74. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Elaine M. Chen. Global Internet Freedom: Can Censorship and Freedom Coexist?. DePaul-LCA Journal of Art and Entertainment Law. 13 (2003), 229-268. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[23] Melissa Hannah Opper. Wikileaks: Balancing First Amendment Rights with National Security. Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment and Law Review. 31 (2010-2011): 237-267. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[24] Susanna H. S. Leong, Cheng Lim Saw. Copyright in a Borderless World—Does Territoriality Matter? International Journal of Law and Information Technology. 15 (2007), 38-53. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[25] Alejandro Zentner. Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music Purchases. Journal of Law and Economics. 49 (2006), 63-90. Retrieved from JSTOR Database.

[26] World Intellectual Property Organization. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. (9 Sept. 1886. Revised 28 Sept. 1979). Web. <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html>.

[27] United Nations. WIPO. What Is WIPO? United Nations, n.d. Web. <http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/>.

[28] Alejandro Zentner. Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music Purchases. Journal of Law and Economics. 49 (2006), 63-90. Retrieved from JSTOR Database.

[29] Ibid.

[30] John W. Belknap. Recent Developments: Copyright and Napster. Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law. 5 (2001) 185-203. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[31] Ibid.

[32] John W. Belknap. Recent Developments: Copyright and Napster. Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law. 5 (2001) 185-203. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[33] Travis Hannibal. Opting Out of the Internet in the United States and European Union: Copyright, Safe Harbors, and International Law. Notre Dame Law Review. 84 (2008) 358-364. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[34] John W. Belknap. Recent Developments: Copyright and Napster. Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law. 5 (2001) 185-203. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[35] Susanna H. S. Leong, Cheng Lim Saw. Copyright in a Borderless World—Does Territoriality Matter? International Journal of Law and Information Technology. 15 (2007), 38-53. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Travis Hannibal. Opting Out of the Internet in the United States and European Union: Copyright, Safe Harbors, and International Law. Notre Dame Law Review. 84 (2008) 358-364. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[38] Susanna H. S. Leong, Cheng Lim Saw. Copyright in a Borderless World—Does Territoriality Matter? International Journal of Law and Information Technology. 15 (2007), 38-53. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[39] Guy Berger. "The Budapest Conference on Cyberspace. Millenáris Park, Budapest." UNESCO. 4-5 October 2012. Retrieved from UNESCO database.

[40] UN General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (10 December 1948), 217 A (III), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 3 December 2012]

[41] Susanna H. S. Leong, Cheng Lim Saw. Copyright in a Borderless World—Does Territoriality Matter? International Journal of Law and Information Technology. 15 (2007), 38-53. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[42] Developments in the Law—the Law of Cyberspace. Harvard Law Review. 112 (1999) 1680-1704. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[43] Developments in the Law—the Law of Cyberspace. Harvard Law Review. 112 (1999) 1680-1704. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

[44] William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law, Victoria Nash Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet. Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University (2010). Retrieved from UNESCO database.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Georgios I. Zekos. State Cyberspace Jurisdiction and Personal Cyberspace Jurisdiction. International Journal of Law and Information Technology.15 (2007), 1-38. Retrieved from Heinonline database.

FRONT COVER

Image Attribution

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

The Cornell International Affairs Review proudly presents the Cornell Political Forum Award for excellence in undergraduate composition. The Cornell Political Forum was founded in 1987 and ceased publication in the early 2000s. In recognition of the organizations' shared characteristics, Cornell Political Forum alumni have generously endowed an award to be presented by the CIAR in honor of an undergraduate writer whose work demonstrates insightful analysis and overall academic excellence. The recipient will be selected from each year's publication by a jury consisting of advisers to the CIAR and its executive board.

We believe this award will encourage undergraduate writers to share their ideas with Cornell and the broader community.

In order to make a donation to our organization, you can visit Cornell University's Give to Cornell website (www.giving.cornell.edu). There, select option to give online under the designation of "Cornell University – Other". In the description, please specify that the gift is going to the Cornell International Affairs Review. If you would like assistance in planning your gift or preparing the paperwork for tax credit, you can also contact the Office of Trusts, Estates and Gift Planning (gift_planning@cornell.edu or 1-(800)-481-1865 and they can guide you through the process.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES • THE CORNELL POLITICAL FORUM AWARD • CONTRIBUTE • CONTRIBUTORS •

CIAR

MASTHEAD