

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

VOL. VIII

ISSUE I

FALL 2014

A BEAUTIFUL MESS


WHISTLEBLOWING

INCENTIVE OR SHOCK

POLICIES TOWARDS AFRICA

GREY MARKETS

CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY



www.diplomacist.org

ISSN 2156-0536



Professor Fredrik Logevall, Primary Advisor
 Director, Einaudi Center for International
 Studies, Department of History

Professor Robert Andolina
 Cornell Johnson School of Management

Professor Ross Brann
 Department of Near Eastern Studies

Professor Matthew Evangelista
 Department of Government

Professor Peter Katzenstein
 Department of Government

Professor Isaac Kramnick
 Department of Government

Professor David Lee
 Department of Applied Economics
 and Management

Professor Elizabeth Sanders
 Department of Government

Professor Nina Tannenwald
 Brown University

Professor Nicolas van de Walle
 Department of Government

Sarah Maxey
 PhD Candidate
 Department of Government

Wendy Leutert
 PhD Candidate
 Department of Government

Joe Florence
 PhD Candidate
 Department of Government

Whitney Taylor
 PhD Candidate
 Department of Government

Michael Allen
 PhD Candidate
 Department of Government

Hajra Hafeez-ur-Rehman
 Masters Candidate
 Cornell Institute for Public Affairs

Cornell International Affairs Review, an independent student organization located
 at Cornell University, produced and is responsible for the content of
 this publication. This publication was not reviewed or approved by, nor
 does it necessarily express or reflect the policies or opinions of,
 Cornell University or its designated representatives.

The Cornell International Affairs Review is indexed in the EBSCO Host

NICHOLAS STIEG
Cornell University
Arts and Sciences, 2015
Co-President, CIAR

LUCIUS ELLIOTT
Cornell University
Arts and Sciences, 2015
Co-President, CIAR

The publication of our Fall 2014 journal marks the end of another exciting semester for the Cornell International Affairs Review. Consistent with our organization's mission, we have engaged with the student community both at Cornell and elsewhere to facilitate a undergraduate driven discourse on pressing issues in global affairs.

Summer 2014 was simultaneously an exciting and worrying time in the international arena. Our return to campus followed the Russian occupation of the Crimea, ISIS' emergence in the Middle East, and increased media sensationalism over the ebola virus. Thus, just prior to our recruitment meeting at the start of the semester, someone pointed out to me that it should be very easy for us to recruit students to our banner. They were right. Our online blog, *The Diplomacist*, hired a large selection of new writers, ranging from Cornellians to students at the American University and the University of Notre Dame, and our club's ranks swelled with students keen to discuss and learn about these issues from their peers. The website itself continues to go from strength to strength, thanks to the collaborative efforts of undergraduate students, and it has been a pleasure to manage it for the last three years. Although it is sad to part with it, I am fully confident that Demetri Papageorgiou, the new editor, will do a wonderful job, having worked with him for the last two years.

However, although our online presence is significant, and constitutes a large part of our society, we are also proud of the events we organize on campus, and of the privileges afforded to our members by the Einaudi center, who have been instrumental in this club's success. This semester we have had two events on ISIS, one with Colin Wellborn, a Cornell student with five years experience of Special Ops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the second a panel discussion with Professors Oren Barak, Elizabeth Sanders and John Weiss. Further, we have had weekly student presentations, where students present and discuss issues that they believe are particularly worthy of note, and have co-sponsored and advertised for various other talks and panels on campus. Through the Einaudi center's munificence our members have had to opportunity to meet and question celebrated intellectuals and political figures such as Francis Fukuyama, President Grimsson of Iceland and Song Sang-Hyun, president of the International Criminal Court.

In closing, I would like to thank Frederik Logevall, Heike Michelson and the rest of the Einaudi center for their invaluable guidance and support. I would also like to thank the ISB, who enabled this Gala to go ahead, and my fellow e-board members - Lucas, Jessie, Coco, Gabby and finally Nick, who has been in this organization as long as I have, and has been a wonderful co-President. It has been a privilege to work with you all. As Nick and I prepare to say goodbye to CIAR, and to Cornell as a whole, we look forward with optimism to the emergence of a new set of leaders for this organisation, and are confident that they will enable our organization to remain a hub for international affairs, both here and elsewhere. I hope you enjoy the journal.

COCO XIAO
Cornell University
Arts and Sciences, 2016
Editor In Chief, CIAR

With this issue of the Cornell International Affairs Review, we continue to expand upon the tradition of excellence that CIAR has upheld since its establishment. This has been an exciting semester in current affairs, and the submissions reflect the sheer variety and scope of events around the world. From analysis of street art to discussions of economic future, the following articles stood out in exemplifying the multifaceted nature of global concerns. They not only deal with the political and theoretical perspectives of events but also with the underlying socio-cultural and normative aspects of the actors involved.

We begin with Madelynn Green's article that analyzes the relationship between graffiti in the streets and the political responses of the citizens. Using the East End of London as her focal point, she illustrates the dynamic medium of public display in the people's attempt to reclaim a neighborhood through this duality of aesthetic and political expression.

Next, Jessica Blusiewicz examines the efficacy of the whistleblowing structure and the safety afforded within the Intelligence Community. Presenting previous legal cases of whistleblowers, she offers a possible interpretation of Edward Snowden's actions—an alternative path he could have gone.

The next two articles examine issues related to international organizations. Ryan Rosenberg demonstrates that the lack of effective civil society and political mobilization in Bosnia will prevent significant political movement towards Europeanization, despite any economic discomforts caused by Croatia's EU accession. James DeTemple evaluates the USAFRICOM in its implementation of U.S. policy toward Africa, including its applicability in refining U.S. regional security strategy, addressing security issues and building African security capacity.

Finally, the last two articles deal with the increasingly complex nature of economic structures and possibilities. Kelsey Annu-Essuman's essay looks at the current nature of transactions in the grey market for cyber materials and argues for the need to increase the security of the system. Finally, President Grimsson discusses the necessity of harnessing the environment to build a prosperous economy in the 21st century.

The diversity of these subjects also reveal the extent of interconnections among them. Today, the field of international affairs is linked more than ever in our globalized world, and occurrences continents away have profound implications for us. We invite you to join our contributors as they further this understanding.

I would like thank our graduate and junior editors for all their help in compiling this issue. I also want to thank the Einaudi center and the SAFC, along with all the writers, without whom none of this would be possible. I would also like to thank my fellow e-board for a great semester. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends whose support has made this all possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A BEAUTIFUL MESS

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL GRAFFITI IN THE
CONTEMPORARY CITY

Madelynn Green

University of Notre Dame

7

THE CASE OF EDWARD SNOWDEN

A DIFFERENT PATH

Jessica Blusiewicz

University of Virginia

18

INCENTIVE, SHOCK, OR NEITHER?

THE IMPACT OF CROATIAN ACCESSION ON BOSNIA'S EU
NEGOTIATIONS

Ryan Rosenberg

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

29

U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

APPLICATION OF U.S. AFRICA COMMAND SIGNALS AFRICA'S
INCREASING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

James DeTemple

Columbia University

36

AN ANALYSIS ON THE REGULATION OF GREY MARKET CYBER MATERIALS

Kelsey Annu-Essuman

Yale University

47

ICELAND'S CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY

A ROADMAP TO SUSTAINABILITY AND GOOD BUSINESS

Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson

President of Iceland

55

A BEAUTIFUL MESS

THE EVOLUTION OF
POLITICAL GRAFFITI IN
THE CONTEMPORARY CITY

MADELEYNN GREEN

University of Notre Dame

In the late 1990's the spray-painted name "Banksy" began accompanying stenciled images throughout the cities of London and Bristol, England. Taking inspiration from the anarchic messages of punk music and hip-hop graffiti popularized by New York City youth, infamous street artist Banksy began writing traditional graffiti as a teenager and eventually transitioned into image-based street art. His stenciled images were provocative, political and sharply criticized capitalism, CCTV, consumerism and war. In 2003, Banksy was at the center of global attention when he painted an image on the West Bank wall in Gaza Strip that ingeniously criticized Israel's policies towards Palestine. Banksy often culture jams by subverting advertisements, material goods or even currency to proliferate his political views. In 2004 he managed to hang a doctored Mona Lisa that depicted her with a smiley face in the Louvre. In the same year he replaced 500 Paris Hilton CDs with altered versions that read "Every CD you buy puts me even further out of your league" and printed his own satirical money with the image of Princess Diana and the headline "Banksy of England".

Banksy's street art as well as his international stunts have made him popular at prestigious auctions. Christina Aguilera bought a Banksy work for £25,000 and his silkscreen print of Kate Moss sold at Sotheby's for £54,000. Be-

cause of Banksy, street art has entered the realm of high art and become extremely lucrative for those who had succeeded in the craft; in 2007, a Banksy work received a record £102,000 at auction. The unprecedented influence and commercial success of Banksy has broad implications for urban art in the contemporary city. While graffiti has traditionally been highly controversial, the advent of iconographic street art has opened new platforms for international youth to creatively express sociopolitical discontent and ultimately increased public officials' tolerance of illegal urban art.

In his analysis of Banksy's street art, cultural geographer L. Dickens calls modern street art "post-graffiti" and argues that tagging "as the core component of graffiti writing, is increasingly being replaced by 'street logos'; a shift from typographic to iconographic forms of inscription." Schacter, an ethnographer, further examines the contemporary function of street art, and after interviewing street artists, concludes that street artists ultimately seek "alternative ways of approaching public space" to make "meaningful connection to their surroundings" in pursuit of artistic expression that aims to "re-affirm the city as a place of social discussion." In an impersonal metropolitan environment, street art is a manner through which individuals reclaim territory in spaces where organic meaning and identity are obscured by logos, sociopolitical oppression

WHILE GRAFFITI HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL, THE ADVENT OF ICONOGRAPHIC STREET ART HAS OPENED NEW PLATFORMS FOR INTERNATIONAL YOUTH TO CREATIVELY EXPRESS SOCIOPOLITICAL DISCONTENT

or consumerism. This study aims to determine the sociopolitical motivations and implications of urban graffiti's most recent incarnation, street art, in London and in a broader international context.

Street art, or post-graffiti, is ubiquitous on the surfaces of public and private spaces in the East End of London, making it one of the graffiti capitals of the world. Walking down a dingy street, one can see the aesthetically stunning and highly visible artwork by street artists from all over the world that are often left intact by the authorities. Doors to closed businesses and public road signs are "bombed" with stickers carrying witty phrases or cartoon images. Plastic figures and cardboard cutouts of characters are up as if the streets were a gallery. Yet, rather than being perceived as purely depreciative to the area, as was hip-hop graffiti in New York City in the 1970's and 80's, street art appears to be a phenomenon that has improved the aesthetic appearance of the traditionally gritty environment of the East End and is perceived as comparatively less controversial.

The international explosion of street art in global metropolises including London, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, New York, Berlin, Paris and Barcelona legitimizes the question of the effect street art has on sociopolitical conditions. Street artists in the East End frequently mock political figures and society; doctored images of Presi-

dent Obama and Queen Elizabeth II and comical critiques of materialism appear on East End walls. At the same time, seemingly arbitrary images, posters, text, stickers and paintings take up wall space. Observing the aesthetically focused graffiti in the East End reveals that much contemporary urban art supplants literal text with visually striking iconography. This emphasis on iconography has facilitated the commercialization of street art, broadened its international audience and made it more acceptable to authorities.

In contrast to the commercial success and official tolerance of street art, traditional graffiti has been less institutionally accepted. Graffiti's close ties to groups with lower socioeconomic status and Black and Latino youth has made it historically provocative. The word "graffiti" often evokes images of urban squalor and crude scrawls on dilapidated buildings or idle trains. Archetypally, a graffiti writer is a disenfranchised youth that rebels against society by spray-painting their name to claim unique space in the society that makes him or her feel invisible. In sociology, the broken windows theory asserts that markers of urban disorder, such as graffiti and broken windows, escalate over time to increased violent crime in society. This theory influences New York City's strict anti-graffiti legislation and further characterizes graffiti and street art as anti-social vandalism. Traditional

STREET ART BY BANKSY THAT THE LONDON BOROUGH OF CAMDEN COUNCIL OPTED TO PROTECT WITH PLEXIGLASS



hip-hop graffiti was born when youth in New York City and Philadelphia developed the practice of graffiti writing. For early graffiti writers, it was a way to claim gang territory, but many simply wanted to claim symbolic space in an alienating metropolis that systematically marginalized them. Early graffiti tags were simple; the writer's name followed by their house number. "Tracy168" was one of the most well known New York City tags. The motivating factor for youth was to "get up", or have many pieces on the streets as possible. More advanced forms of graffiti such as "pieces", short for masterpieces, the complex works done on subway trains, and "throwups", large, stylized letters, were also prevalent.

Hip-hop graffiti began to disseminate from the East Coast of the United States as the visual component of hip-hop culture in the late 1970's, when European graffiti artists began writing graffiti in hip-hop style. French street artist Blek le Rat began spray painting stencil images of small rats and army tanks on Paris streets in the early 1980's after visiting New York in 1971 and witnessing the large amount of graffiti in the city. Blek began spraying New York style graffiti in France but soon began using stencil art, eventually popularizing stencil street art in Europe. As one of the first street artists, Blek's artistic skill and emphasis on aesthetics aided in the succinct articulation of sociopolitical

grievances. A turn away from the traditional, text-based roots of stencil graffiti, which has its origins in the protest stencils utilized by Latin American student groups in the 1960's and Italian fascist propaganda during the Second World War, Blek's street art focused less exclusively on critical typography, but primarily on seemingly arbitrary images. Blek's iconic images of rats and tanks influenced other European street artists, drew a new distinction between graffiti and street art, and popularized a post-modern function for graffiti: to interact with and enhance the built environment.

Unlike the hip-hop heritage of urban art in New York, urban art in England has strong roots in the rebellious punk rock scene of the 1970's. Lesser-known English punk group Crass, in between belting out anarchic tunes such as "Demoncrats" and "Banned From the Roxy" (quite literally), made spray paint stencils. These text-based stencils were mainly used for spreading the band's anti-consumerism and anti-establishment ideologies. Crass aimed to self-advertise and shock people out of perceived state-enforced political complacency. Putting graphic magazine collages and black stencils on the state's property were acts of rebellion. Crass was not the only punk band to integrate art and music to critique sociopolitical conditions. Successful punk rock band, The Clash, in the do-it-yourself tradition, put stencils on band



A PUNK VERSION
OF PRESIDENT
OBAMA CREATED I
N THE EAST END
BY GEE STREET ARTIST

t-shirts and leather jackets. These punk-crafted stencils did not go unnoticed. Jef Aerosol, one of Paris' first generation of street artists, was influenced by The Clash's stencils and began illegally spray-painting stencils in the early 1980's. It was only after street art's humble beginnings in British punk rock culture that the hip-hop graffiti style of New York—block letters, tags, and colorful “wildstyle” pieces, would become prevalent on London facades. Because the Internet was not available to expose English youth to photographs of the tags and pieces that adorned New York, this transmission of visual culture was not immediate. While hip-hop graffiti gained popularity amongst Philadelphia gangs as early as the 1960's, it was not until the early 1980's that hip-hop style graffiti became widely practiced in England. Fade2, an early London graffiti writer, reflects on the nature of graffiti in his country and claims “graffiti in this country has come like a model, an airplane model. It's come here already built. Graffiti in America has taken years to develop, all the styles like wildstyle and bubble lettering. Over here we haven't added anything to it apart from brushing up on a few techniques”

Ultimately, graffiti evolved in England to an entirely new form of urban art. Since the 1990's and the rise of Banksy, street art has been a popular mode of expression in London. The East End of London, traditionally the dangerous and impoverished area of London, attracts

prominent street artists from all over the world to put up incredible pieces of art. As a witness to this phenomenon, it is prudent to trace the socioeconomic and political precedents for the abundance of street art in East London and examine the sociopolitical consequences street art has had on the formerly marginal space. In contrast to the grandeur of London's West End—home to Buckingham Palace, Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parliament—the East End of London has historically been viewed as “wrong-side-of-the-tracks London”. The close proximity of the East End Boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Hackney to the River Thames made the area suitable for industrial activities and trade. The 1827 opening of the St. Katherine Docks, a commercial harbor in the bustling Port of London, provided the area's population with port industry work. The Docklands, the colloquial title of the southern half of the Borough of Tower Hamlets, sustained two docks in addition to St. Katharine's and as a result received a large influx of foreign immigrants seeking work in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The arrival of these Jewish and French Huguenot immigrants intensified the problem of over-crowding. The industries also lessened the cleanliness and aesthetic appeal of the East End; tanneries and other pollution-heavy industrial trades spewed exhaust fumes and made the area generally undesirable. Poor sanitary condi-

STENCILS BY CRASS.
THE CENTER STENCIL READS
“FIGHT WAR NOT WARS,
DESTROY POWER NOT PEOPLE”



tions and overcrowding led to rampant disease; a cholera outbreak took over three thousand lives in 1866. Disease and poverty were synonymous with the East End and Jack the Ripper, the infamous serial killer, who allegedly disemboweled East End prostitutes in 1888. These events added to the mystique and perceived danger of London's lesser end. Tragedy would continue to strike the embattled East End Boroughs of Hackney and Tower Hamlets even into the mid-twentieth century. Targeted for its industry and proximity to three major docks in the Port of London, the East End was particularly damaged by the World War II Blitz in 1940 and 1941. The East End suffered the first of London's major bomb attacks on September 7th, 1940 and would continue to be pummeled with bombs for months. The East End District of Bethnal Green alone saw over 21,700 homes damaged. Post-blitz, the East End experienced severe population decline as many abandoned its virtual ruins; between 1931 and 1951, the population of Bethnal Green decreased by 46 percent from 108,194 to 58,353. Bethnal Green, historian T.F.T Baker chillingly observes, “Bombing had one beneficial effect in clearing slums”.

Another post-Blitz phenomenon was the emergence of warehouse studios and galleries in the East End. After the Blitz, comparatively lower rents and the general undesirability of the East End allowed penny-wise artists and gal-

lerists to easily convert disused industrial spaces into galleries and studios. SPACE studios were opened by two artists near the old St. Katherine Docks in 1968 and provided studio spaces to prospective artists, increasing the concentration of artists in the East End and helping develop the East End's identity as a space for artists. Other temporary studio buildings following the model of SPACE studios were established in the East End, including ACME studios in 1972 and Chisenhale Artplace in 1980. As of 2012, there were 35 studio rental buildings throughout East London that provided studio spaces to approximately 940 artists. Remarkably, almost 3,000 artists occupied the waiting lists for these highly desirable studio spaces in 2013. Even still, an untold number of artists make work in their homes or other impromptu creative spaces. The studio rental model exists throughout England, yet in 2012 over 25 percent of all buildings dedicated to renting studio space were located in the East London boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Greenwich, Newham and Waltham Forest. The World War II destruction of the East End and its long history of poverty and urban decline contributed to the affordability of its real estate in the late 20th century. Artists, traditionally a demographic with unstable or little income took advantage of these decaying, economical spaces as platforms for creative exhibition and aided in transforming negative perceptions of the East

*ARTISTS, TRADITIONALLY A
DEMOGRAPHIC WITH UNSTABLE
OR LITTLE INCOME TOOK ADVANTAGE
OF THESE DECAYING, ECONOMICAL
SPACES AS PLATFORMS F
OR CREATIVE EXHIBITION*

End.


Today, the East End is a regenerating area with rising housing costs, shifting racial demographics and abundant street art. According to London-based street artist Pure Evil, the East End is experiencing rampant gentrification; old buildings are being torn down and replaced by new flats and businesses. Because of this regeneration, it makes sense for street artists to paint on dilapidated, underused buildings that will be torn down anyway. Often, street artists can simply ask a building owner if they can paint on their building. The owner will usually say yes because it adds a unique flair to their building that may attract customers. Some street artists are even hired to put up work because of the appeal of street art. Pure Evil also noted that police are less vigilant when it comes to street art in the East End. The area already is riddled with street art and it goes up at such frequency that it is time-consuming to constantly remove it. Authorities also recognize the aesthetic and economic value of free public art.

Famous for his enigmatic paintings of cartoon rabbits, Pure Evil makes a living by representing street artists through his self-titled gallery. He recruits street artists, brings them indoors and aids them in selling their canvases. Pure Evil Gallery displays works from international and local street artists in a tiny, bright gallery space. The lower level of the gallery pur-

posefully resembles a rubble-ridden alleyway with dim lights and a soundtrack of haunting classical music. Pure Evil Gallery is just one of several galleries in the East End that focuses on showing and selling work done by street artists. With street artists, such as Shepard Fairey, the creator of the iconic tri-color image of Obama, moving from the streets to the galleries and achieving fame, street art has become a lucrative practice. Following a similar format to advertising, putting up a decent piece can get an artist noticed by the public and allow that artist to sell his product to a willing audience in a gallery space. It is ultimately up to the discretion of the artist to “sell out” or remain faithful to the streets.

In contrast to the social disorder that researchers claimed graffiti could cause, street art, with fewer adverse class and race implications, has not hampered economic development in the East End. Following the global recession in 2008, a cluster of technology and media companies including Cisco, Facebook, Google and Vodafone established headquarters in Shoreditch, an East End neighborhood. In 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron declared this development “Tech City” and encouraged other tech-focused companies to establish headquarters there. The development of Tech City after the global recession of 2008 has ultimately encouraged greater economic growth in the East End.

*THIS PAINTING
OF A WOMAN
JUXTAPOSED WITH
GARBAGE AND
GRAFFITI SCRAWLS WAS
INSPIRATION FOR THE
TITLE OF THIS PAPER*



Observing the East End, transition is evident. I witnessed an elderly Bangladeshi man make curry in his storefront window and simultaneously observed a twenty-something year-old hipster grab coffee in an independent café. A colorful and intricate piece of street art by world-renowned C215 appears next to a dilapidated park. Rotting bags of garbage and scribbled graffiti on grubby buildings lie across the street from BOXPARK Shoreditch, a new “pop-up” shopping complex that was constructed from train cars and sells generously priced clothing from trendy clothiers.

Brick Lane, nearly empty during the day, is transformed into a festering ground for nightlife on Friday and Saturday and a bustling area of commerce on Sunday, the day of the Brick Lane Market. During which, blue-collar families sell inexpensive fruit while independent designers sell t-shirts for £35. There is a curious juxtaposition of lifestyles in the East End. On one end of the cultural spectrum lies a diverse traditional working-class, while the other end is characterized by a controversial gentrification and a gradual influx of untraditional residents, largely students and middle to upper class, white Britons. Brick Lane, which simultaneously functions as the high street of the East End’s Bangladeshi community and prime real estate for street artists, could be an anthropological case study on its own. Walking the street’s course from north to south, Brick Lane progressively transitions from a blend of curry houses, council

estates and convenience stores to recently opened thrift shops, newer housing developments, and cafes blasting bass and peddling £4 lattes. Brick Lane’s transition point is the Old Truman Brewery, a gargantuan brick building that was once London’s largest brewery. Since the 1990’s the brewery building has been repurposed as “East London’s revolutionary arts and media quarter.” Walking north on Brick Lane past this bohemian mecca of office space, energetic bars and clothing boutiques, one can see how Brick Lane transforms.

Public officials’ tolerance of street art has been apparent in recent controversy surrounding the removal of illegal urban art. In its official graffiti policy, The Council of the East London Borough of Hackney states that it possesses no authority to remove graffiti on buildings not owned or managed by the Hackney Council. A nod to the broken windows theory, the policy states “graffiti has a major impact on people’s perceptions of crime levels in a community. It is illegal, antisocial and diminishes the local environment.” This policy means that graffiti removal for the majority of buildings in the Borough of Hackney is completely dependent upon the actions of the property owner or manager. The Council offers a graffiti removal service should private individuals or business owners request it—but for a fee. If building owners do not remove graffiti, they are served with a graffiti removal notice. This notice informs owners that if graffiti is not removed from their property within



*STENCIL PORTRAIT
MADE IN THE
EAST END BY FRENCH
STREET ARTIST C215*

14 days, council authorities will cover it with a fresh coat of paint and the owners must foot the bill.

This policy was the subject of controversy when, in 2010, world-renowned Belgian street artist ROA painted a black and white rabbit on the side of The Premises Studios and Café. The recording studio/cafe combination received a graffiti removal notice from Hackney Council, despite the owner granting permission for ROA to paint a rabbit on their property. The forced removal of a piece of art that beautified a dingy street sparked outrage; over 2,000 people signed a petition demanding that the 12-foot tall rabbit remain intact. Because of the widespread public support for ROA, Hackney Council reversed its decision and allowed the rabbit to remain. By launching public campaigns in support of street art, Hackney residents pledged support for the controversial art form and encouraged the Borough's council to reconsider its indiscriminate graffiti policy. Hackney council stated "whilst it is not the council's position to make a judgment call on whether graffiti is art or not, our task is to keep Hackney's streets clean". Since graffiti as an umbrella term encompasses two distinct branches of illegal urban art: traditional graffiti and street art, which are typographic and iconographic, respectively, judging the aesthetic and cultural value of urban art invites controversy. Tension between "old guard" urban art and more recent forms of public expression including stencils, paste-ups, paintings, and even yarn installations has made simply painting over illegal public art highly controversial. Street art has aided officials' legitimization of urban art and created new modes for encountering city space and articulating sociopolitical positions.

This tension between traditional hip-hop graffiti and street art has been contested in a well-publicized conflict between late graffiti writers King Robbo and Banksy. In the London Borough of Camden, a wall underneath a canal bridge was the home of a large tag done by King Robbo in 1985 that read "King Robbo." In 2009, Banksy stenciled a street art image of a man putting wallpaper over the decades-old tag. This sparked a cycle of each person painting the other's work and debate over which style was more legitimate. Banksy's symbolic painting over traditional graffiti implies a new, decorative, role for urban art in cities and a transition from hip-hop graffiti practiced by disenfranchised youth to street art done by older, less diverse groups. The debate over graffiti and street art is even relevant to elected officials, who are responsible for protecting the images of city spaces. In 2010, to quell arguments over definitions of art and vandalism, the London Borough of Sutton held a vote for residents to determine if a piece by Banksy should be covered over, in accordance with borough graffiti policy. In all, nearly 90 percent of respondents voted in favor of keeping the piece. Nevertheless, the building owner eventually remo-

ved Banksy's piece because vandals had purposefully tagged it. This concrete example of street art's greater legitimacy means that, globally, individuals are turning to the respected medium and ultimately redefining traditional graffiti.

This paper has thus far traced the evolution of street art in the East End and explored how street art has increased official tolerance of illegal urban art. The East End's regeneration and gentrification has not been hindered by street art. It's abundant, dilapidated buildings and traditional image as grimy and dangerous, influenced street artists to paint there. The mystification and ongoing gentrification of the East End has defined it as a creative, increasingly affluent and developing space. Simultaneously, street art has softened officials' intolerance of illegal urban art and opened new paths for individuals and groups to express political, social and economic grievances on public walls.

Demographic measures reflect the growing popularity and affluence of the East End—the population of Tower Hamlets grew by 18 percent between 2001 and 2010 and is expected to grow faster than the whole of London for the next 11 years. Street art is an illegitimate form of artistic expression, thus street artists choose to put up work in similarly illegitimate spaces—perceived countercultural areas removed from greater affluence. Following this assertion, once a space becomes "dead" for artists, meaning gentrified and transformed by a more affluent populace, artists

GRAFFITI IS AN UMBRELLA TERM THAT ENCOMPASSES TWO DISTINCT BRANCHES OF ILLEGAL URBAN ART: TRADITIONAL GRAFFITI AND STREET ART

will move outside of that space. When will the East End exit this ongoing transition stage? Or, will it ever? At the present, there is no perceptible mass exodus of street artists from the East End; field observation in January 2013 and again June 2013 revealed an increase in the amount of art on the streets. As rents rise—central Hackney rents increased by 21 percent between 2010 and 2012, alien high-rise residencies appear in the East End, East End districts increasingly become known to Londoners as insufferable hipster enclaves, and art galleries even move westward to less expensive real estate, will street artists seek less gentrified spaces to put up street art? Even if street artists cease putting up work in the East End in search of fresher walls, the effects of street art on the East End's aesthetic appeal and global perception have thus far been largely positive; one East End resident remarked that many residents are drawn to the space because of its street art and that tourists are drawn to the area because it has essentially become an outdoor gallery. Bourgeoning economic development in the area has made it a desirable space, thus the buildings of old are being torn down and replaced by more costly housing, restaurants and boutiques. Transition is apparent in the East End, where dilapidated buildings are juxtaposed with modern shops frequented by younger (and hipper) demographics.

The advent of street art has, in many ways, depoliticized urban art, specifically in Western co-

A GENERATION OF DISILLUSIONED
YOUTH HAVE USED STREET ART
AS A MEANS OF PUBLIC
POLITICAL EXPRESSION.
NOW, POLICYMAKERS CAN SIMPLY
WALK DOWN THE STREET TO GAUGE
POPULAR OPINION

ntexts where socioeconomic gaps and social instability are less severe. My analysis of urban art in Salvador, Brazil, a space with severe socioeconomic disparity, revealed that street art and hip-hop graffiti that confronts feminism, corruption and racial and economic inequality are more common. These political images and texts are paradoxically juxtaposed onto favela slums; one month before the 2014 World Cup, graffiti writers in Salvador expressed resentment by writing “Menos copa, mais educação” (Less world cup, more education) and “Copa global? Para quem?” (World cup? For who?) on public walls.

A similar case of socioeconomic and political chaos inciting political graffiti was observed in Spain and Greece, two of the European countries most affected by the global recession. From 2008 to 2013 Spaniards experienced crippling economic recessions. These financial crises have had serious consequences for Spanish youth, including unprecedented unemployment, home foreclosure and widespread cynicism towards government. In response, many young activists and artists haven taken to the city walls, armed with spray cans, to protest the growing lack of opportunity and government corruption. By using the compelling medium of street art, youth are able to express their disillusionment directly onto city streets. A generation of disillusioned youth with limited economic and career prospects have used street art, instead of hip-hop graffiti, as a means of public political

expression. Now, policymakers can simply walk down the street to gauge popular opinion.

Geographer David Ley, in “Artists, Aestheticization, and the Field of Gentrification” (2001) discusses how an influx of conventional artists in Toronto neighborhoods, over time, unintentionally changed the areas from spaces of near or total poverty to affluence. Ley describes this phenomenon as “the movement of a product, and indeed a place, from junk to art and then on to commodity.” In a similar manner, the evolution of urban art from “junk to art and then on to commodity” has sophisticated it as a language for voicing dissent and transformed it into a valuable art commodity. This observation is relevant to the East End, notable for its street art, and other international up-and-coming neighborhoods where street art is highly visible during and after the regeneration process. Williamsburg in Brooklyn, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg in Berlin, The U Street Corridor in Washington D.C., Wicker Park in Chicago and Rio Vermelho in Salvador, Brazil are international examples of neighborhood regeneration being complemented by street art and public officials, in many instances, tolerating street art to appease residents and boost tourism. Ultimately, the commodification of street art and its ability to aid in the transformation of formerly dilapidated spaces unearths a new, contemporary function for street art. Street art, with its focus on images and artistry, has become a primary mode of public expression in international

A STENCIL OF GANDHI
CREATED IN THE EAST
END BY AN ANONYMOUS
ARTIST



up-and-coming neighborhoods where street art is highly visible during and after the regeneration process. Williamsburg in Brooklyn, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg in Berlin, The U Street Corridor in Washington D.C., Wicker Park in Chicago and Rio Vermelho in Salvador, Brazil are international examples of neighborhood regeneration being complemented by street art and public officials, in many instances, tolerating street art to appease residents and boost tourism. Ultimately, the commodification of street art and its ability to aid in the transformation of formerly dilapidated spaces unearths a new, contemporary function for street art. Street art, with its focus on images and artistry, has become a primary mode of public expression in international metropolises and a global language for citizens to articulate sociopolitical criticisms all the while expressing individual artistry.

This research was made possible by the generous support of the Nanovic Institute for European Studies, The Center for Undergraduate Scholarly Engagement and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame

INTRODUCTION

Legitimate whistleblower or traitor? While the public continues to debate which of these titles most aptly describes former National Security Agency (NSA) employee Edward Snowden, a movie set to start filming in January 2015 attests to the continuing fascination with the man at the center of the controversy.¹ Some consider his revelations “courageous” and call for granting him asylum,² but an increasing number of Americans, as many as 60 percent in a late 2013 ABC News poll, view his unauthorized disclosures as damaging to US security, a jump of 11 percent within a year.³ Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of respondents who believe Snowden harmed US security interests also believe he should be punished; however, public opinion on the whole has been divided along an almost even split as to whether Snowden should face such prosecution.⁴ Despite this split, the fact remains that he leaked classified information by circumventing the protected whistleblowing structure within the Intelligence Community (IC). Well aware of his contractual obligations, Snowden still decided to disclose evidence, in an unauthorized and very public way, indicting the NSA for overstepping its lawful bounds.⁵ The efficacy of this whistleblowing structure is difficult to evaluate because the public only knows when the whistleblowing system

fails. I argue, however, although a relatively recent development, the protection afforded by the Inspector General and legislation to whistleblowers within the Intelligence Community exists and retains the capacity to protect employees and their information in cases similar to Edward Snowden’s situation.

The paper proceeds with an overview of the history of legislation and case law regarding whistleblowing in the IC. Analysis of three separate whistleblowing cases follows, illuminating the contemporary legal protections afforded to such whistleblowers. The final section consists of the argument that Edward Snowden, the most recent high-profile whistleblower, is fully culpable, in the legal sense, for his actions given the recourses he decided to ignore.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

After the government scandals of the 1970s and 1980s, like the Watergate break-in and cover up and the Iran-Contra scandal, trust between the government and the public reached a nadir, causing Congress to call for investigative commissions and to pass several pieces of legislation intended to enhance government accountability and transparency. These reforms included explicit protections for whistleblowers, defined as those federal

THE EFFICACY OF THIS
WHISTLEBLOWING STRUCTURE IS
DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE BECAUSE
THE PUBLIC ONLY KNOWS WHEN THE
WHISTLEBLOWING SYSTEM FAILS

employees who “[make] a disclosure evidencing illegal or improper government activities.”⁶ However, most of the subsequently passed pieces of legislation included exceptions for agencies, like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and NSA, that make up the Intelligence Community. Employees within this special community are subject to signing non-disclosure agreements,⁷ and can be threatened with job termination, security clearance revocation, fines, and time in prison should they be found guilty of disclosing sensitive information in an unauthorized way.⁸

LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW

One statute used to inflict such punishment, the Espionage Act of 1917, prohibits those entrusted with national security secrets “with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation,” from taking and communicating information related to national defense.⁹ The statute also includes clauses that could be used to prosecute those who publish such information, but no such charges have arisen in recent cases.¹⁰ Furthermore, whistleblowers can suffer from retaliatory actions and personal consequences because of their decision to raise concerns.

In addition to these threats, potential

whistleblowers in the IC must contend with a recent Supreme Court decision that limited the opportunities for them to voice their concerns. In *Garcetti v. Ceballos*, the Supreme Court ruled, “When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”¹¹ When applied to members of the Intelligence Community, employers can argue that keeping national security secrets is a part of these official duties, preventing whistleblowers within the IC from stepping forward under protection provided by the First Amendment.¹² Instead, the venues and protection available to whistleblowers, like Snowden, within such agencies stem from the offices of Inspectors General, Congressional legislation, and recently, a presidential directive.

The Office of Inspector General provides the most robust legitimate outlet for public employee concerns and dissent about programs within the Intelligence Community. Currently, “every significant federal agency charged with national security responsibilities...has an inspector general,” who is generally charged with acting as an oversight mechanism for the secretive IC, but these offices differ in their statutory or Agency-appointed origins. The aptly named Inspector General Act of 1978 created

WHEN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES MAKE STATEMENTS PURSUANT TO THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES, THEY ARE NOT SPEAKING AS CITIZENS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PURPOSES, AND THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT INSULATE THEIR COMMUNICATIONS FROM EMPLOYER DISCIPLINE

thirteen statutory Inspector Generals (IGs) for executive departments, but excluded the CIA, which had a non-statutory IG, from needing one.¹⁴ However, after the Iran-Contra scandal came to light, Congressional reports contended that the non-statutory office lacked enough power to provide proper oversight, and on December 30th, 1989, the position became statutory.¹⁵ The NSA Inspector General, in contrast, remained an Agency-appointed position, resembling the CIA inspector of old rather than enjoying status as presidentially-appointed, until this year.¹⁶ In the most recent Intelligence Authorization Act, which was signed into law on July 7th, 2014, Congress made the IGs for both the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) and the NSA statutory positions.¹⁷

Mirroring the purposes given for other IG offices, the statutory CIA IG was established to “create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently inspections, investigations, and audits relating to programs and operations of the Agency... [and to] detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations...”¹⁸ The legislation empowers employees with “urgent concerns” about Agency activities to submit such concerns to the Inspector General, or to the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees directly under certain conditions and protects such

employees from punitive action if the concerns were raised in good faith.¹⁹ The IG must determine if the concerns merit further action, and within a short time frame relay “particularly serious or flagrant” problems to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who must in turn report the concerns to the Congressional intelligence committees.²⁰ However, the act also includes a provision permitting the DCI to prohibit the IG from investigating concerns if such a ban is deemed “necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.”²¹

While the powers enjoyed by the offices of Inspectors General render them “the most powerful and feared internal government watcher,”²² Congress deemed more explicit protection for whistleblowers necessary because employees did not feel adequately protected from reprisals.²³ According to an overview of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) of 1998, “the risk of reprisal perceived by employees and contractors of the Intelligence Community for reporting serious or flagrant problems to Congress may have impaired the flow of information needed by the intelligence committees to carry out oversight responsibilities.”²⁴ Protection for whistleblowing federal employees did exist through the Whistleblowing Protection Act (WPA) of 1989, but it explicitly exempted

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN AN UNPRECEDENTEDLY TOUGH STAND AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY LEAKS



employees within the Intelligence Community from its protection.²⁵ Accordingly, Congress passed the ICWPA with the rationale that “an additional procedure should be established that provides a means for such employees and contractors to report to Congress while safeguarding the classified information involved in such reporting.”²⁶ However, a former federal field solicitor, Robert J. McCarthy, noted that the act “does not actually protect whistleblowers against reprisal. Instead, it simply authorizes employees of intelligence agencies to bring matters of ‘urgent concern’ to congressional attention through the Office of Inspector General...any disclosure to someone other than the IG would be illegal under the Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–799.”²⁷

In light of the number of high profile leaks in recent years, Congress has attempted to overcome the gaps in protection extended to members of the Intelligence Community because enhanced protection ensures that concerns flow through legitimate channels.²⁸ The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 actually increases the number of agencies excluded from the original legislation, but it protects employees if they “are not the first person to disclose misconduct; disclose misconduct to coworkers or supervisors; disclose the consequences of a policy decision; or blow the whistle while carrying out their

job duties.”²⁹ A recently submitted bill, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, mandates that no employee should suffer adverse consequences for bringing a concern to the attention of the appropriate directors, IGs, or congressional intelligence committee members.³⁰ Powers exercised by the Executive Branch mirror this concern with protecting IC employees. In 2007, President Obama sign Presidential Directive 19, which forbade practices like firing whistleblowers for their authorized disclosures, presented an IG panel as an alternative method of disclosure, and mandated the establishment of remedies like compensation for employees subjected to such retaliatory action, with other stipulations focusing on implementing WPA-like procedures within the IC.³¹

However, in conjunction with this move to protect whistleblowers, the Obama Administration has taken an unprecedentedly tough stand against national security leaks. In just 17 months, the President outstripped every previous president in investigating and seeking redress against leakers,³² and while he professes admiration for whistleblowers in general, he promised an aggressive pursuit of leakers involved in national security matters.³³ Despite the aggressive stance, the success rate of such prosecutions has been minimal, particularly as compared with the number of leaks that



THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION FOR INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

remain unprosecuted because the associated court proceedings may reveal even more classified information and are often politically controversial.³⁴ Furthermore, as demonstrated by the Administration's insistence on using the Espionage Act of 1917 to bring many of its charges, "the relevant laws are old and vague, making prosecution difficult."³⁵

CASE COMPARISONS


Despite these shortcomings, the government has charged several employees within the Intelligence Community with making unauthorized disclosures over the years, including Frank Snepp, Thomas Drake, and most recently, Edward Snowden. In each of these three cases, the employee eschewed the authorized methods of disclosure, albeit for differing reasons, and suffered for their decisions, both professionally and personally. Furthermore, these public servants were not working for a foreign power but rather, at least ostensibly, made their disclosures with the aim of educating the public about failures within the IC. Both Frank Snepp and Thomas Drake suffered the consequences of their decisions to go public outside of the authorized structure, but the question remains as to what will happen to Snowden.

FRANK SNEPP: UNCLASSIFIED BUT UNAUTHORIZED

The case of Frank Snepp represents the consequences members of the IC face when they violate their contractual employment obligations by circumventing the information dissemination process, but without disclosing any real national secrets. Snepp was a CIA officer active during the Fall of Saigon who quit the Agency and decided to write a book about the events that occurred there and the intelligence failures that led to them.³⁶ Upon entering the Agency, he signed an agreement that he would not disclose classified information in an unauthorized manner or publish any information without submitting it to the Agency's prepublication review board.³⁷ However, he published his book, *Decent Interval*, without conforming to the Agency's review process, purportedly because other former CIA agents had gotten away with it and not because he feared undue censorship.³⁸ Snepp, though, was subsequently sued by the Department of Justice on behalf of the CIA.³⁹

In *Snepp v. United States*, the Supreme Court ruled that Snepp had violated the trust bestowed on him by the CIA as indicated in his employment contract.⁴⁰ Despite the fact that his book did not disclose classified information, the Agency believed and the courts ruled that "a former intelligence agent's publication of

THOMAS DRAKE SERVED AS A SENIOR EXECUTIVE AT THE NSA, BUT HE BECAME DISILLUSIONED WITH HIS EMPLOYER



unreviewed material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the published information is unclassified," citing foreign intelligence sources who ceased cooperating with the CIA out of concern for the Agency's ability to keep secrets.⁴¹ Accordingly, the Court ordered that Frank Snepp be stripped of the proceeds from *Decent Interval*, which would be put into a constructive trust, and that he be forced to submit all publications, barring cookbooks or garden works, to the CIA's prepublication review process.⁴² Snepp contends that he received such a sentence because the CIA "set out to chill all potential whistle-blowers by seeking severe penalties against [Snepp] without any proof of damage to anybody."⁴³ However, the fact remains that Snepp violated his employment agreement and suffered the proscribed consequence because he did not attempt to use the Agency's authorized methods of disclosure before informing the public of unclassified information.

THOMAS DRAKE: "THE NUCLEAR OPTION"

On the other hand, the government charged Thomas Drake with retaining classified information and leaking it to a reporter.⁴⁴ Drake served as a senior executive at the NSA, but he became disillusioned with his employer

after witnessing what he deemed wasteful and illicit activity by the NSA.⁴⁵ He allegedly served as a source to Diane Roark, an aide on the House Intelligence Committee, who shared his concern about government wastefulness.⁴⁶ Their concerns centered on Drake's favored NSA project, *ThinThread*, which was scrapped for an apparently less effective and more expensive program.⁴⁷ Drake also raised concerns about the NSA's alleged abandonment of constitutional safeguards against collecting information on innocent Americans without a warrant.⁴⁸ He reportedly mentioned his concerns about the constitutionality of the NSA program to his boss and the NSA's general counsel while Roark attempted to contact Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist through informal channels, but Drake never explicitly filed a report for the Inspector General related to this concern about constitutionality.⁴⁹

Developers of the *ThinThread* program filed a complaint about government wastefulness with the Pentagon's Inspector General in September of 2002, and although Drake did not put his name on the complaint, he allegedly served as a key source of information.⁵⁰ The resulting IG report was classified as secret, but one news source contends that it spawned two criminal fraud inquiries despite the fact that Drake never saw an impactful response to the complaints.⁵¹ In 2007, FBI agents raided the



THE EDWARD SNOWDEN SITUATION REMAINS A SORE SPOT BOTH FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE BROADER OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE INFORMATION REVEALED BY SNOWDEN WAS HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND ITS RELEASE GRAVELY HARMED AMERICAN INTERESTS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN PARTICULAR, AND INTERSTATE RELATIONS

homes of the three developers, along with Roark and Drake, and in Drake's case the investigation culminated with the charge that he violated the Espionage Act and could be sentenced to up to 35 years in prison.⁵² The other developers and Roark have never faced charges in connection with the incident.

Some contend that the Drake case and its associated investigations represent attempts to repress whistleblowers in the IC, but the final outcome may point to a victory for whistleblowing. Because of their signatures on the IG report, the program developers, "became targets...[in] 'the most severe form of whistleblower retaliation'" one activist had ever seen.⁵³ Another news report argues that Drake "first tried the sanctioned methods -- going to his superiors, inspectors general, Congress. Finally, in frustration, he turned to the 'nuclear option': leaking to the media."⁵⁴ However, this latter account omits the key details that Drake never initiated an IG complaint about the warrantless data acquisitions, only indirectly participated in an IG report about government waste which spawned action, and did not raise his concerns to Congress through the protected methods of disclosure, choosing instead to rely on a congressional aide to go through indirect channels.⁵⁵ Drake argues that he had to use these unauthorized methods of disclosure because the formal channels of complaint were not

as impactful as they should be,⁵⁶ but others think he was just a disgruntled Washington bureaucrat who endangered national security when he did not get his way.⁵⁷ Whatever his real motives were, the government dropped all charges against Drake except a misdemeanor for exceeding the authorized use of a government computer;⁵⁸ he was sentenced to one year of probation and 240 hours of community service.⁵⁹ The government's case against him "collapsed" because the NSA refused to divulge compromising details about its programs for an investigation⁶⁰ and the pieces of information recovered from his possession were either unclassified or quickly declassified,⁶¹ leading to what one pro-whistleblowing activist called "a victory for national security whistle-blowers."⁶² Moreover, as he decided to leak beginning in 2006,⁶³ his frustration with the system preceded, and probably inspired, the most recent reforms introduced by Presidential Directive 19 of 2007 and the WPEA of 2012.

EDWARD SNOWDEN:
THE CURRENT SPOTLIGHT

Against this backdrop, the Edward Snowden situation remains a sore spot, both for the Intelligence Community and the broader Obama Administration. Snowden was a contractor working for the NSA who took top-

secret information from his work and fled the country, releasing the information to reporters around the world.⁶⁴ Drake contends that his experience with perceived persecution within the NSA may have influenced Snowden's decision to run straight to the press,⁶⁵ but the parallel omits the fact that Snowden, in a strictly legal sense, could have enjoyed the protections added by the Presidential Directive 19 and the WPEA.⁶⁶ Unlike the other two cases, however, there is no doubt that the information revealed by Snowden was highly classified and its release gravely harmed American interests, the Intelligence Community in particular, and interstate relations. As of June 2013, the Department of Justice charged Snowden with three felonies, each carrying a penalty of as many as 10 years in prison, for "conveying classified information to an unauthorized party, disclosing communications intelligence information, and theft of government property."⁶⁷ However, he reportedly remains in Moscow, Russia, asking the international community to help persuade the US to drop spying charges against him.⁶⁸

With important public debate stemming from his disclosures and some heralding his efforts as heroic, Edward Snowden represents an area of ambiguity in the traitor-hero dichotomy in the minds of many. He shed light on NSA programs that have many Americans calling for reforms, even leading Secretary

of State John Kerry to say, "some NSA spying went too far."⁶⁹ However, he blatantly violated the terms of his security clearance and employment contract, applicable even though he served as a contractor, and severely undercut US national security interests, while never attempting to channel his dissent through authorized whistleblower structures like the IGs or Congress before jetting off in a dramatic attempt to seek asylum abroad.

In the world of shadows populated by the Intelligence Community, the question arises if the public would have ever known about the extent of the NSA programs had Snowden followed protocol. While the public debate has been constructive, the way in which it was brought about has not been as salutary. As one leader in the intelligence community speaking about the CIA testified to Congress, "The issue is really perceptions. And if our intelligence assets around the world, particularly cooperating intelligence organizations, perceive that the CIA has no control over the information which is given it...our intelligence assets will dry up."⁷⁰ As this testimony reveals, the IC must protect its secrets to do its job, and leakers like Snowden can catastrophically undercut the US ability to protect its interests.

In fact, members of the House Intelligence Committee described a classified Pentagon report that revealed Snowden's

TO MANY, ALLOWING SNOWDEN TO WALK AWAY FREELY RISKS CAUSING EVER MORE LEAKS TO SPRING AS POTENTIAL WHISTLEBLOWERS FOLLOW SNOWDEN'S EXAMPLE OF RUNNING STRAIGHT TO THE PRESS AND THOSE SEEKING TO GARNER SIMILAR LEVELS OF GLOBAL FAME WITNESS A LIGHT SENTENCE FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

disclosures damaged U.S. efforts “not just against terrorism, but cybercrime, human trafficking, and weapons proliferation.”⁷¹ Because, as one description of the report notes, “Most of the estimated 1.7 million classified documents that Snowden copied from NSA computers involve U.S. military operations,” his disclosures will cost the U.S. government billions of dollars to mitigate the damages done to those operations according to the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.⁷² Others put the number of documents he leaked closer to the thousands, but either way Snowden leaked massive amounts of information that did not relate to his concerns about NSA surveillance on Americans. Fred Kaplan, after reviewing a documentary about Snowden, writes, “Judging from Snowden-derived stories in *The Guardian* and *The Washington Post*, some of these documents also detail NSA intercepts of email and cellphone conversations by Taliban fighters in Pakistan; assessments of CIA assets in several foreign countries” among other things.⁷³ A story by the National Public Radio’s *All Things Considered* program reveals that divulging such information might have led terrorists to change their communication tactics, much like Osama Bin Laden did after he learned the IC was tracking him.⁷⁴ With these costs in mind, the whistleblowing structure afforded Snowden another path for disclosure, one that would have

certainly been less costly to American security interests.

If Snowden brought his concerns, which certainly warranted even more attention than the bureaucratically charged issues highlighted by the IG report related to the Drake case, to the Inspector General, the IG would have had to follow protocol and investigate. George Ellard, the NSA’s Inspector General, argues that such an investigation would have shown that the NSA was within the parameters of the law.⁷⁵ However, Snowden could also have reported his concerns directly to the Congressional intelligence committees who then should have exposed the alleged abuses properly, and addressed them, without gratuitously undermining US security.

Certainly, the possibility always exists that the authorized channels could fail to address fully the concerns of a whistleblower. Drake contends that his case provides an example of such a failure of whistleblowing channels to bring real attention to a problem. However, earlier this year, Ellard publicly stated that the NSA’s complaints hotline receives an estimated 1,000 submissions per year and that “[the NSA] has surprising success in resolving the complaints that are brought...”⁷⁶ Ellard is far from an unbiased source, but his insights shed light on the existence of an active whistleblowing structure. Perhaps using the authorized channels, first the NSA IG and then

THE CONTROVERSIAL CASE OF EDWARD SNOWDEN LED TO PROTESTS BOTH CONDEMNING AND SUPPORTING HIS ACTIONS



the Congressional committees, would not have engendered the rich public discussion about the balance between privacy and security. Furthermore, as the recent move to make the NSA IG a statutory position shows, the whistleblowing structure has been strengthened in the wake of Snowden’s disclosures. However, Snowden did not even try to disclose his concerns through the very channels designed to handle this type of issue, and that is where many qualms about his actions lie.

At the present, the Obama Administration will be under pressure to sew up the festering Snowden case. To many, allowing Snowden to walk away freely risks causing ever more leaks to spring as potential whistleblowers follow Snowden’s example of running straight to the press and those seeking to garner similar levels of global fame witness a light sentence for international recognition. The sheer amount of information made public by Snowden should overcome any concerns that more details must be revealed to prosecute him; enough information is probably already out in the open to sustain an investigation. The Administration’s position that Snowden must return to the United States and face trial remained unchanged earlier this year.⁷⁷ Snowden sealed his own fate when he decided to eschew the legislative and presidential protections for whistleblowers by disclosing highly classified information.

These protections for whistleblowers exist, and while they could function imperfectly at times, they at the very least deserve a chance to work. Whatever its previous failures, the whistleblowing structure would have insulated Snowden from prison time and would have saved him from self-imposed exile.

While the whistleblower protection structures have only grown in fits and starts through legislation and presidential directive, such protection does exist and could have been used by Edward Snowden. Employees within the IC were largely excluded from the protections afforded by the WPA and the later ICWPA has been deemed largely ineffective, but the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act passed in 2012 has sought to overcome some of these gaps. The recently passed Intelligence Authorization Act of 2014 prohibits retaliatory action against legitimate whistleblowers, and Presidential Directive 19 affirmed this mandate while presenting another method of authorized disclosure. The real powerhouse in the whistleblower structure, however, is the office of Inspector General. Although Frank Snapp did not enjoy these recently introduced protections, he suffered consequences because he decided to disregard his contractual obligations since others had, too, not because he feared censorship. Thomas Drake also did not benefit from the most recent reforms when

*“HE WHO SACRIFICE FREEDOM
FOR SECURITY DESERVES NEITHER.”
IN THE CASE OF SNOWDEN, THIS
QUOTATION RINGS HOLLOW AS COULD
HAVE RAISED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT
VIOLATIONS IN THE NAME OF
SECURITY THROUGH THE AUTHORIZED
METHODS OF DISCLOSURE*

he began leaking information. Although he claims to have used the legitimate methods of disclosure before “going nuclear,” he never made a robust attempt to file an IG report directly. Edward Snowden, who could have benefitted from the WPEA and Presidential Directive reforms, decided instead to leak top-secret classified information to the press. In speaking about his experiences, Snowden is apt to quote Benjamin Franklin, stating, “He who sacrifice freedom for security deserves neither.” However, in the case of Snowden, this quotation rings hollow as could have raised his concerns about violations in the name of security through the authorized methods of disclosure. Instead, he never reportedly engaged his superiors, the appropriate IG, or Congress, and he must suffer the prescribed consequences for his actions.

INCENTIVE, SHOCK, OR NEITHER?

THE IMPACT OF CROATIAN ACCESSION
ON BOSNIA’S EU NEGOTIATIONS

RYAN ROSENBERG
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

ABSTRACT

What are the prospects for European Union accession in Bosnia, a country with a legacy of ethnic conflict and malfunctioning democracy? How might the accession of Croatia to the European Union affect this process? This paper analyses the current state of Bosnian politics through the lens of EU accession and considers the political and economic impact of Croatian accession. A lack of incentive for Bosnian politicians to implement the governmental changes needed for Europeanization—the process of adopting European rules—has created a stagnant and intransigent political climate, one made more difficult by the Bosnian bureaucracy. Ethnic divisions hard-wired into the Bosnian political system by Article IV of the Dayton Agreement make the political costs of Europeanization and institutional reform much higher than those associated with the continuation of ethnicity-based parliamentary politics. However, Croatian accession (and the associated process of leaving the Central European Free Trade Agreement) will cause changes to the Bosnian economy, which heretofore has relied heavily on free trade with Croatia through CEFTA. A significant shock to the Bosnian economy caused by Croatian accession could trigger a political response, making Europeanization a viable alternative to the status quo. In order for the economic impact to be translated into politics, there must be an

engaged populace willing to push for reform and translate their desire for Europeanization into a political force. Ultimately, I argue that the lack of effective inter-ethnic civil society and political mobilization in Bosnia will prevent significant political movement towards Europeanization, despite any economic discomforts caused by Croatia’s EU accession.

INTRODUCTION

Recent protests have made this a tumultuous time to study Bosnian politics. Starting in Tuzla in early February and spreading quickly to the rest of Bosnia, the protests—the largest Bosnia has ever seen—decry government corruption, poor economic conditions, and mangled privatizations. Politicians, rather than confront the substance of the protestors’ allegations, have been quick to use the demonstrations to promote their own goals.¹

My research focuses on the origins of the stagnancy in Bosnian democracy and lack of progress towards EU accession. In this paper, I analyze the possible impact Croatian accession could have in pushing Bosnia towards the EU. I argue two points: first, that problems in Bosnia’s EU negotiations are due to a political structure that prioritizes staying in power and fosters corruption, and second, that Croatian accession will not change the status quo.

I draw on the external incentives model

*A SIGNIFICANT SHOCK TO THE
BOSNIAN ECONOMY CAUSED BY
CROATIAN ACCESSION COULD
TRIGGER A POLITICAL RESPONSE,
MAKING EUROPEANIZATION A
VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE
STATUS QUO*

of Europeanization and propose an additional section whereby politicians will only respond to external incentives if it is necessary to do so to continue holding political power.² The sources I use for this paper include academic studies of the region's politics, local and international journalism, and the EU's own reports on Bosnian progress towards accession.

The rest of my paper is divided into five parts: first, I briefly detail the creation of the current Bosnian political system and its practice. Second, I analyze the political obstacles to Bosnian accession and the success of recent negotiations between Bosnian politicians and the EU enlargement committee in overcoming those obstacles. Third, I examine the economic situation in Bosnia and the impact of Croatian accession to the EU on the Bosnian economy. Fourth, I determine to what extent the effect that Croatian accession has on Bosnia can be translated into politics.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To assess the likelihood of any of the previously discussed changes coming to pass, I use a model of external incentives focusing on EU conditionality, derived from what Sedelmeier calls "rational institutionalism".³ In theoretical explanations of Europeanization, rationalist frameworks derived from incentives and conditionality are contrasted with constructivist ones derived from models

of social learning and spreading norms.⁴ In examining the Bosnian case, a few factors stand out that make a rationalist model the more appropriate one to apply. Most prominently, the deep ethnic divisions in Bosnian society are not likely to be overcome through a brief process of socialization in the ten years that Bosnia has been listed as a potential EU candidate. Additionally, for social learning to take hold, citizens must be convinced to identify with the EU.⁵ That has not happened, with popular support for Europeanization being lukewarm at best.

Looking at the impact of Croatian accession through an external incentives model, it increased the cost of non-compliance with EU regulations in that if Bosnia does not comply, Bosnian farmers will not be permitted to sell most of their agricultural products in Croatia, their largest export market. As will be shown, however, Bosnian politicians have not made and are not likely to make any movements towards the EU as a result of Croatian accession. The reasoning for this is that they do not feel any significant political pressure to do so.

To explain why the February 2014 protests are not a portent of future effective civil society in Bosnia, I draw on studies of associational life in ethnically divided societies. In studying associations in divided countries, a distinction must be made between intra-ethnic association and inter-ethnic association. While the latter has been shown to reduce ethnic

violence,⁶ in societies that have much of the former but not of the latter, civil society can serve to only enhance ethnic cleavages and presents opportunity for political mobilization along those cleavages, even if overall associational activity is high.⁷ This cleavage scenario is what has happened in Bosnia; the primary method for politicians to gather political support is to appeal to ethnic nationalism in order to mobilize supporters from their own ethnic group. The protests that rocked Tuzla and the rest of Bosnia in February did not result in major political change and will not because they did not successfully bridge ethnic cleavages.⁸

Civil society is an essential element of liberal democracy because it provides a method for citizens to have their opinions heard in government. However, in Bosnia the weakness of inter-ethnic civil society has insulated the politicians from their constituents. Bosnian politicians do not respond to incentives based upon the good of the country because there is no widespread internal political pressure forcing them to do so. In order to address this situation within a rationalist framework, I propose a corollary to the external incentives model: leaders will behave rationally and follow external incentives if it is necessary to do so to retain power.

CREATION OF THE BOSNIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM



THE CITY OF SARAJEVO,
BOSNIA'S CAPITAL AND
LARGEST CITY

This section will examine the creation of the Bosnian political system and provide context for later discussions of ethnic protections within the Bosnian constitution. It is not an exaggeration to say that political problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be traced back to the country's founding. The Bosnian constitution was established in Article IV of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, commonly referred to as the Dayton Accords, which ended the conflict in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Because of the highly contentious nature of the Dayton peace talks, the Bosnian constitution, in order to get all major ethnic groups—Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims)—to sign on, was created as a deeply flawed document, a patchwork of compromises and appeasement. Accordingly, the political system established in Article IV of the Dayton agreement is a reflection of that process. The overriding purpose of the Bosnian constitution is to make sure that each of the "constituent peoples", as the three major ethnic groups are referred to, has tremendous constitutional protection from the other two.

PROBLEMS OF THE BOSNIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

So how, exactly, does this over-emphasis on equal representation manifest itself in the Bosnian political system? At a federal level, no legislation can be enacted by

SO DEEPLY IS THE POLARIZATION AND DIVISION INGRAINED IN THE BOSNIAN LEGISLATURE AND PRESIDENCY THAT BOSNIA IS UNABLE TO ENACT THE NOW SIX-YEAR-OLD STABILIZATION AND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT (SAA) THAT IT SIGNED TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR EVENTUALLY BECOMING A CANDIDATE FOR EU ACCESSION

WHILE NOT AS MUCH ATTENTION HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON SOLVING BOSNIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR EU ACCESSION, A TANKING ECONOMY WOULD SEVERELY HAMPER BOSNIA'S ATTRACTIVENESS AS AN EU CANDIDATE COUNTRY

the Bosnian legislature unless it is agreed to by at least one-third of each of the three ethnic groups represented.⁹ Bosnia has a tripartite presidency, where each member comes from a different majority ethnic group. In addition, any legislation or presidential action can be blocked for being, “destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniak, Croat, or Serb people.”¹⁰ Actions can also be blocked for being destructive towards the interest of an entity, which has been invoked numerous times by representatives of the Republika Srpska in order to protect entity-level powers. The net effect of the protections put in has been to make getting any sort of meaningful reform passed impossible, due to the Sisyphean task of crafting legislation that will appeal to three factions with very different, and occasionally contradictory interests.

So deeply is the polarization and division ingrained in the Bosnian legislature and presidency that Bosnia is unable to enact the now six-year-old Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) that it signed to provide a framework for eventually becoming a candidate for EU accession. It is unable to do so because it still has not met the preconditions for the agreement.

More specifically, it has not met the following precondition: implementing the Sejdic-Finci decision of the European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR). The Sejdic-Finci ruling declared that the Bosnian constitution is discriminatory because it does not allow anyone

who is not a Bosnian Croat or Bosniak living in the Federation or a Bosnian Serb living in the RS to hold office in the House of Peoples or the presidency.¹¹ This excludes the so-called “national minorities”—the minority groups in Bosnia such as the Roma or the Jews that are not constitutionally protected—as well as members of the three main ethnic groups living in the “wrong” entity. There has been no consensus on how to proceed with changing the constitution to comply with Sejdic-Finci due to a refusal by all sides to relinquish or diminish their powers. Sejdic-Finci has languished in the system for four years, still not in force and still holding up the SAA, all because the Parliament and the presidency cannot engender a compromise among the ethnic groups.¹²

Another condition that the EU has placed on Bosnian accession is the establishment of a mechanism to coordinate interaction with the EU and to ensure that EU regulations are distributed fairly to the entities. As with Sejdic-Finci implementation, the issue of establishing this coordination has become politicized and the difficult task of creating cross-ethnic support for coordination has all but stopped.¹³

However, while Sejdic-Finci implementation and establishment of a coordination mechanism are important topical concerns and certainly are major obstacles to Bosnian accession, to focus on them is to ignore the underlying problems with Bosnia's attempt to join the EU: namely, the fragmentation

and subsequent politicization that is endemic in Bosnian politics, and, more seriously, a political timeframe that is not conducive to significant changes. Bosnia has a federal government, two entity-level governments, and ten canton-level governments (cantons being the political divisions in the Federation). This swollen and complex bureaucracy leads to widespread fragmentation of legislation and authority, which causes problems in many sectors including the civil service and budget.¹⁴ Issues of fragmentation are difficult to address because of the varied interests of the different ethnic groups—Serbs want to maintain as much power as possible on the entity level because of their control over the RS, Bosniaks want power concentrated on the federal level to limit the RS's power, while Croats want powers devolved to the cantons because they have guaranteed control over half of the cantons. Fragmentation is also difficult to address because of a political timeline that de-incentivizes working towards impactful changes. With a two- or four-year electoral cycle, pushing for a six-year reform plan does very little to ensure re-election.

CROATIAN ACCESSION AND THE BOSNIAN ECONOMY

In this section, I look at the struggles of the Bosnian economy and potential pitfalls ahead due to Croatian accession. Compounding To compound the political stagnation harming

Bosnia's prospects for EU accession, the Bosnian economy is struggling as well. Bosnia's trade deficit rose 4.4 percent from the first half of 2011 to the first half of 2012,¹⁵ caused in part by stalled export growth.¹⁶ Unemployment also remained high, at 28 percent. The largest employer in Bosnia continues to be the public sector, which added jobs as private companies in agriculture and manufacturing lost jobs. There are also several signs that the political situation in Bosnia is harming its economic prospects. The delays to the state-level budget, which have occurred been happening regularly (every year)¹⁷, have begun to affect Bosnia's ability to enact a credible fiscal policy. Privatization of state-owned companies has not proceeded as planned, and weak rule of law and political corruption is destabilizing the business environment. While not as much attention has been focused on solving Bosnia's economic problems in order to prepare for EU accession, a tanking economy would severely hamper Bosnia's attractiveness as an EU candidate country. If politicians continue to ignore Bosnia's economic deficiencies, an already damaging situation could become much worse.

Now that Croatia has joined the EU, the Bosnian industries that had exported heavily to Croatia will have to change to conform to newly implemented EU standards for production and labeling. Forty-eight percent of Bosnian exports in 2012 were to Croatia, making this an urgent issue to address.¹⁸ Notably, this will affect any



THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RS, CURRENTLY LED BY MILORAD DODIK OF SNSD, HAS ADOPTED A HARDLINE POSITION ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPETENCIES

BOSNIA'S LACK OF CIVIC POLITICAL ACTIVITY RELATIVE TO OTHER POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO AN ABSENCE OF INTRA-ETHNIC CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION

product of animal origin, potatoes (which will not be ready for export to the EU until 2016), and industrial products.¹⁹ In order to make its products acceptable for EU export, Bosnia will have to coordinate a regulatory body to certify its production methods. However, the issue of food regulation has fallen victim to the fragmentation and politicization mentioned earlier; there are numerous agencies on various levels of government, all with different competencies.²⁰ Developing a unified system of regulation and labeling that the export industry requires will take cooperation among the Federation and the RS that has been rather rare in recent times. On the other hand, if politicians were to delay acting, it could cause serious consequences for a large portion of the Bosnian export industry.

POLITICAL EFFECTS OF CROATIAN ACCESSION

Given the potential for the poor economic situation to be exacerbated through political inaction, it makes sense to look at the potential political ramifications of such a failure. Who would be most hurt by a collapse in Bosnia's agricultural exports? Farmers, mostly, and the RS as a whole is much more dependent on agriculture than the Federation, by a factor of two.²¹ The government of the RS, currently led by Milorad Dodik of SNSD, has adopted a hardline position on the distribution of competencies, refusing to yield any additional powers to the

state-level governments and insisting that the RS should be allowed to exist as its own state.²² Given these parameters, it is not hard to forecast a scenario where the very intransigence Dodik and his party promote causes harm to the RS's economy, leading to political upheaval in the RS. This view is simplistic, as will be explored later, but not without use for showing how the current policies of Dodik and SNSD are unsustainable for a Bosnian state looking to join the EU.

Another potential consequence of Croatian accession has to do with increased migration and the upcoming census planned for October 2013. The census, which is to be the first in Bosnia since 1991, could potentially have significant consequences for the distribution of political power in Bosnia. If the census shows that people identifying as "other" (i.e. not Serb, Bosniak, or Croat) outnumber those who identify as Croatian, it will cast doubt on the whole system of constitutionally protected peoples and "national minorities". Making this prospect more likely is the increased appeal of emigration to Croatia for Bosnian Croats, who can freely immigrate to Croatia, where they would likely receive higher salaries and better health care.²³ A re-evaluation of the constitutional protection afforded Croatians in government could dovetail nicely with Sejdic-Finci implementation, but, again, would require agreement on the behalf of parties that have a vested interest in refraining from any sort of deal.

CONCLUSION

This article examines the impact of Croatian accession to the European Union on Bosnian politics, concluding that, despite the negative economic effects Croatian accession will have, no significant positive change in Bosnia's own EU negotiations will result. This is placed in the framework of a rationalist external incentives approach to Europeanization, which is expanded to include a requirement of sufficient domestic political pressure to ensure elites follow incentives and to prevent rent seeking. I find that the major cause preventing domestic political pressure on elites is lack of political mobilization. Using studies of civil society in ethnically divided countries, I conclude that Bosnia's lack of civic political activity relative to other post-communist countries can be attributed to an absence of intra-ethnic civil society organization, and that the anti-government protests started in February were doomed to fail because they did not unite Bosnian citizens across ethnic divisions.

INTRODUCTION

The formation and expansion of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) signals the increasing strategic importance of Africa to U.S. security interests, especially in light of the 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit on strategic relations. USAFRICOM is a U.S. geographic military command established in 2008 as a regional framework to address regional security issues in Africa, including contingency operations when necessary. This paper examines how U.S. policy toward Africa shapes the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and how the regional command itself serves as a mechanism for policy implementation. Accordingly, I examine the U.S. policy of promoting regional security and stability in Africa and the role of AFRICOM in implementing that policy as articulated in policy documents such as the U.S. National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, and other strategic guidance. It has been suggested that USAFRICOM represents the militarization of U.S. foreign policy; however, this paper argues that USAFRICOM serves only as an implementing mechanism for U.S. policy toward Africa, including U.S. security cooperation with African states and regional organizations in order to build indigenous security capacity in dealing with complex regional security issues. A separate command for Africa also underscores

U.S. commitment to the region, including developing contextualized approaches to regional security issues and thus strengthening U.S. policy credibility. Rather than marching to the beat of its own drum, USAFRICOM adheres to and informs strategic planning and strategy formulation of U.S. Africa policy originating with the U.S. national security planning process in Washington, DC. The paper concludes that USAFRICOM has been successful in implementing U.S. policy toward Africa, including its applicability in refining U.S. regional security strategy, addressing security issues and building African security capacity.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. has a responsibility to defend its security interests globally and be ready respond to emerging crises anywhere in the world at a moment's notice. The global U.S. military command and control structure divides the world into various geographic regions for the employment of U.S. military forces in support of the U.S. national security strategy. It is an international reality that reflects U.S. regional policies, including U.S. policy toward Africa. The relatively new USAFRICOM is one of six U.S. Department of Defense geographic commands – the U.S. Africa Command (Africa), U.S. Central Command (the Middle East), U.S. European Command (Europe), U.S. Northern Command (Canada, Mexico and the U.S.), U.S.

*THE FORMATION AND EXPANSION
OF THE U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
(USAFRICOM) SIGNALS THE
INCREASING STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA TO U.S.
SECURITY INTERESTS*



Pacific Command (the Asia-Pacific region) and U.S. Southern Command (Latin America and the Caribbean). USAFRICOM is a geographic command in a strategically important, rapidly changing and increasingly complicated region of the world that contains serious implications for U.S. security. This global structure underscores the stake the U.S. has in strengthening the international state system, including the ability to work on global and regional security issues as well as respond to emerging crises that may threaten U.S. and regional security. This structure not only enables U.S. crisis response options but also facilitates U.S. military engagement –“security cooperation”–with African states and regional organizations in order to improve regional security. Additionally, this structure enables regional familiarization, including U.S. access to forward operating locations in order to deal more effectively with security issues and emerging crisis in the affected regions.

By establishing USAFRICOM, the Pentagon addressed a “long-standing gap in its global structure,” according to Jendayi Frazer, then Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.¹ Although it may have only appeared to be an organizational change or realignment, this move reflected the need to build such regional expertise within the U.S. military, including a “structure to coordinate with the lead policy agency, State, and other civilian agencies.”² The U.S. Department of State also viewed the establishment of a separate

U.S. geographic military command for Africa as an integral part of U.S. policy toward Africa, and “welcomed the Department of Defense’s interest, resources, and participation in African issues”³

U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

Basically, the U.S. seeks a stable Africa using USAFRICOM as a regional framework to enable U.S. crisis response and build African security capacity in order to strengthen regional security, which has positive implications for U.S. security. U.S. policy toward Africa consists of the following objectives gleaned from U.S. policy documents, speeches, and statements, and general scholarship on Africa: strengthening state sovereignty; countering terrorism in the post-9/11 world; stabilizing fragile states; building the security capacity of African states and regional organizations, especially for peacekeeping; and humanitarian and disaster relief. U.S. policy toward Africa reflects recent historical developments in the region: the evolving threat of terrorism, particularly al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa, the increasing international pressure on the United Nations (UN), U.S. and regional organizations to stabilize fragile states and respond to humanitarian crises, such as the drought and famine in the Horn of Africa, and the increasing reliance on international peacekeeping for conflict resolution in the post-Cold War period. Indeed,

THE U.S. HAS BEEN PURSUING A REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY LARGELY BASED ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INCLUDING U.S.-AFRICA SECURITY COOPERATION, WHERE THE U.S. CAN HELP AFRICA SOLVE ITS OWN REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS BY DEVELOPING AFRICAN SECURITY CAPACITY

the Fund for Peace, a non-profit organization focusing on weak and failing states, warns in its 2014 Fragile States Index that approximately 30-40 African states remain at risk of becoming failed or failing states. This has implications for sustainable regional security and U.S. policy toward Africa.⁴ In response to these developments, the U.S. has been pursuing a regional security strategy largely based on crisis management, including U.S.-Africa security cooperation, where the U.S. can help Africa solve its own regional security problems by developing African security capacity.

Generally, the U.S. is working together with the UN, African Union (AU), regional organizations and African states to improve their responsiveness to regional crises in order to shape the global and regional security environment. That is especially true for peacekeeping, where the U.S. is “loathe” to participate in African peacekeeping missions, partly due to the ambiguous nature of peacekeeping and the serious problems facing contemporary UN peacekeeping.⁵ Indigenous African crisis response and peacekeeping capabilities not only relieve pressure on the U.S. to intervene in regional crises, but also strengthen the credibility, reliability and legitimacy of peacekeeping operations. Regional organizations can also be particularly effective at mobilizing resources and facilitating cooperation between African countries in affected regions. Additionally, such organizations can provide the regional expertise

necessary to increase the probability of success of peace interventions in Africa.

African states are playing an increasingly substantial role in UN, AU and regional organizations’ peacekeeping missions.⁶ According to the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, African states comprise ten of the top twenty UN member states contributing forces to UN peacekeeping missions. Moreover, African states and regional organizations “are starting to play a larger role in leading peacekeeping operations on the continent through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)” to stabilize Mali, which transitioned to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on July 1, 2013.⁷ MINUSMA originally included 14 troop contributing nations from Africa – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Sierra Leone – underscoring the importance of African involvement in regional peacekeeping operations.⁸ MINUSMA is currently authorized until June 30, 2015.⁹

Such peacekeeping operations in Africa strengthen implementation of the U.S.-Africa security agenda by accelerating the development of African security capacity in response to regional crises. U.S.-Africa security cooperation establishes an interdependent



THE CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND THEMES DISCUSSED AT THE 2014 U.S.-AFRICA LEADERS SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON, DC INCLUDED REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY

relationship where Africa gains recognition and increases its own security capacity to address regional security issues, while the U.S. leverages Africa’s security capacity for problems that may threaten U.S. security without getting involved in an endless series of conflicts and quagmires. Such interdependence is enhanced by collective security mechanisms, such as the UN, AU and regional organizations that enable regional cooperation on security issues, particularly peacekeeping, and humanitarian and disaster relief in Africa. The U.S. and Africa certainly share common strategic interests in advancing peace and security in the region. The 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit and prior U.S. presidential visits to Africa in 2013 and 2009 simultaneously underscore the convergence of U.S.-Africa security interests and signal increasing U.S. commitment to the region.

The contemporary issues and themes discussed at the 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, DC included regional security and stability. On the subject of establishing sustainable crisis response and peacekeeping capability in Africa, African countries expressed a strong interest in increasing their capacity to rapidly respond to regional crisis and producing durable peace in Africa.¹⁰ In response to such growing interest, the U.S. introduced the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, a new security plan to strengthen African crisis management that includes “investment of \$110 million per year

for 3-5 years to build the capacity of African militaries to rapidly deploy peacekeepers in response to emerging conflict.”¹¹ The partnership will be established initially with six African countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹² These African states will allocate forces and equipment to rapidly deploy in support of UN and AU peacekeeping operations in Africa.¹³ “We will join with six countries who have recently demonstrated a track record as peacekeepers: Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Uganda,” stated President Obama.¹⁴ “And we will invite countries beyond Africa to join us in supporting this effort because the entire world has a stake in peacekeeping in Africa.”¹⁵ This new regional security initiative underscores the importance of U.S. support for peacekeeping in Africa, including establishing an African rapid response mechanism and developing robust African peacekeeping capability to cope more effectively with emerging regional crises.

U.S.-Africa security cooperation has been a source of continuity in U.S. policy toward Africa. During his visit to Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania in 2013, President Barack Obama highlighted the importance of such cooperation on the basis of “a new model for U.S. engagement with Africa, supporting African-led solutions to security,” which exemplifies U.S. policy toward Africa.¹⁶ Rather than acting unilaterally, the U.S. prefers to work collaboratively with the UN, AU, regional organizations and African states to build



U.S. TRAINING PROGRAM WITH GHANAIAN TROOPS. THE U.S. HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR THE PERCEIVED MILITARIZATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

WITH 54 COUNTRIES, AFRICA WIELDS CONSIDERABLE, EVEN DECISIVE, INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM REGARDING GLOBAL ISSUES

consensus and find mutually agreed solutions to regional security problems. In 2009, Mr. Obama visited Ghana, where he outlined a similar approach calling for a “strong, regional security architecture” underwritten by indigenous African security capabilities with security assistance from USAFRICOM.¹⁷ President Obama emphasized that USAFRICOM was not focused “on establishing a foothold in the continent,” but on collaborating with the UN, regional organizations and African states on common security problems to promote stability in Africa.¹⁸

Notwithstanding, there has been criticism of the perceived U.S. focus “almost narrowly, on the so-called war on terror.”¹⁹ Some also criticize the perceived militarization of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. According to Emira Woods of the Institute for Policy Studies, “It is not only the continuation of the Africa Command started under George Bush, continued under President Obama, but we see, quite frankly, that—you know, the new announcement of a drone base in Niger. You see a steady flow of weapons into the region, the resistance of the administration to be a signatory on a UN arms trade treaty, recognizing that arms coming into the continent are what are fueling much of the conflict.”²⁰ USAFRICOM has also “unintentionally come to be regarded by many Africans as an unsettling militarization of U.S.-Africa relations which will only compound their continent’s multifaceted problems.”²¹ Several

think tanks in Washington, DC, specializing in African affairs have also expressed concern at the “continued marginalization” of Africa in U.S. foreign policy. However, the U.S. “is not looking to militarize Africa or maintain a permanent military presence,” according to National Security Advisor Susan Rice in remarks at the United States Institute for Peace as part of the 2014 U.S.-Africa Summit.²²

THE CREDIBILITY OF U.S. AFRICA POLICY

Although questions have been raised about U.S. intentions, President’s Obama’s message of Africa’s increasing strategic importance to U.S. security and the necessity for enhanced U.S.-Africa security cooperation to improve regional security reflect a core tenet of U.S. policy toward Africa. In order to be taken seriously, such policy depends on U.S. credibility regarding global and regional security issues. As the internationally-dominant state, the U.S. definitely has a stake in preserving and strengthening the international state system, including Africa, which acts as a restraint on the U.S. saying one thing and meaning another in terms of policy. According to Robert Jervis, “The desire to preserve the international system and the signals that lend it greater predictability will be more important when the actors value the system, prefer long-run over short-run gains, and have more common than conflicting

interest.”²³ With 54 countries, Africa wields considerable, even decisive, influence in international organizations. This is especially true within the UN system regarding global issues, such as, for example, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping, food security, water scarcity and strengthening international norms and standards of state behavior. U.S.-Africa strategic cooperation is required to make steady progress on these cross-cutting issues, which serve broad American security interests. African states also help constitute the building blocks of the international state system; therefore, strengthening state sovereignty in Africa across the board would increase system reliability thereby benefiting the U.S. Unquestionably, the U.S. has a stake in enhancing the territorial integrity, a well-established symbol of state sovereignty, of African states. Additionally, the region possesses natural resources, such as oil and strategic minerals, important to the U.S. economy. With so much at stake, promulgating a deceptive or erroneous U.S. Africa policy would certainly undermine U.S. credibility and diminish its global leadership position.

The U.S. Congress has also been instrumental in shaping U.S. security policy. Specifically, U.S. policy credibility is strengthened by examinations by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, including the Africa sub-committees of both chambers. U.S. Congressional testimony at hearings, for

example, on U.S. security cooperation in North Africa or support for peacekeeping in Somalia, leads to a better understanding of U.S. Africa policy by clarifying and putting policy into context. At the hearing on Somalia, for example, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, described the AU mission in Somalia “as the primary stabilizing force in Somalia” and a prime example of the success of the “Africa-led model” for regional peacekeeping, which underscored the importance of continued U.S. support for African peacekeeping capability.²⁴ Congress also convenes African, international security, and strategic experts for discussions in Washington to contemplate the causes, consequences and possible responses to instability in Africa as well as the policy implications. Strategic interaction sheds considerable light on U.S. policy toward Africa and the role of USAFRICOM in policy implementation, including refining its regional plans, strategies and operational capabilities. U.S. national security dialogue and scrutiny in this form also increase transparency and accountability of the U.S. government, thus increasing credibility.

THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND OTHER STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

U.S. Africa policy themes, objectives and regional security issues can be derived

*REGIONAL SECURITY ALSO
REQUIRES IMPROVING
UN PEACEKEEPING AND
HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER
RELIEF, PARTICULARLY IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*

from the U.S. National Security Strategy (grand strategy), the Quadrennial Defense Review (defense policy) and other strategic guidance crafted in Washington, DC, and underscore the role of USAFRICOM in implementing policy vis-à-vis acting independently or representing the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. National Security Strategy, for example, identifies dismantling al-Qaeda and its affiliates, including denying them safe haven and strengthening African partners in countering terrorism, as a top U.S. national security priority that has been incorporated into U.S. policy toward Africa.²⁵ The U.S. National Security Strategy also identifies failed and failing states, particularly in Africa, as a threat to U.S. security because of their potential to become terrorist safe havens and sources of regional instability.²⁶ Indeed, global terrorism has altered the basis of U.S.-Africa relations and added a new layer of complexity by the establishment of terrorist safe havens in fragile states that, if left unchecked, threaten American security, undermine regional security organizations and destabilize regions (and sub-regions) in Africa.

The Quadrennial Defense Review, a legislatively-mandated review of U.S. Department of Defense strategy and priorities, expands on the National Security Strategy by identifying key geopolitical trends, including the terrorist groups wielding power normally considered the prerogative of states and that of “chronically” fragile states undermining

the international state system.²⁷ According to the supplementary U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, issued in 2012, regional security not only relies on countering terrorism and stabilizing fragile states, but also requires the U.S. “to deepen its security partnership with African countries and regional organizations and their stand-by forces by expanding efforts to build African military capabilities through low-cost, small-footprint operations.”²⁸ Regional security also requires improving UN peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster relief, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁹ On Sub-Saharan Africa strategy, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, stated that USAFRICOM would “continue to develop military-to-military relationships with African countries” and build African security capacity,” including expanded peacekeeping operations.³⁰ The constitutive effects of such guidance on USAFRICOM is evident in its purpose, regional plans and strategies, command structures, regionally-tailored forces and operating bases.

THE ROLE OF U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

The role of USAFRICOM in implementing U.S. policy toward Africa can be readily derived from U.S. policy documents. Unquestionably, USAFRICOM implements policy guidance contained in the U.S. National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review,

*UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
BUILDS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES,
RESPONDS TO CRISIS, AND DETERS
AND DEFEATS TRANSNATIONAL
THREATS IN ORDER TO ADVANCE
U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND
PROMOTE REGIONAL SECURITY,
STABILITY, AND PROSPERITY*

U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa and other strategic guidance.³¹ U.S. policy toward Africa reflects a comprehensive approach, in which USAFRICOM works closely with the U.S. interagency, particularly the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. embassies in the region, as well as international partners as outlined in its mission statement: “United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.”³² Structurally, USAFRICOM serves as a “new model for interagency integration,” including leadership and staff from the U.S. Department of State and USAID, among other U.S. government civilian agencies, that have been integrated into the organizational command structure itself and work collaboratively with the military command and staff on regional security issues.³³ USAFRICOM also provides the advantage of having a crisis management organization accruing regional experience and thinking critically about Africa in security terms, including support for U.S. regional policy initiatives and strengthening its interface with African countries and regional organizations. Additionally, USAFRICOM includes the standard complement of subsidiary command structures, consisting of four service component

commands: U.S. Army Africa; U.S. Naval Forces, Africa; U.S. Marine Forces, Africa; and U.S. Air Forces Africa, as well as a joint theater special operations command, called Special Operations Command, Africa, that provide operational capabilities in the region.³⁴

U.S. Africa policy necessitated the establishment of a U.S. geographic military command for use as a regional framework to address regional security issues, all of which are reflected in the following four USAFRICOM cornerstones: (1) Engage with partners to deter al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and deny them safe haven; (2) work with African militaries and regional organizations to address African security concerns; (3) support humanitarian and disaster relief; and (4) protect U.S. interests by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations, including UN peacekeeping.³⁵ The USAFRICOM mission statement, purpose, and corresponding cornerstones follow coherently from U.S. security policy discourse on the increasing strategic importance of Africa. The correlation between strategic policy and USAFRICOM cornerstones enhances the credibility of U.S. policy toward Africa, especially the role of USAFRICOM in policy implementation. Such alignment also shows the constitutive effects of strategic policy and regional strategy on the shape of USAFRICOM for use as a mechanism in implementing policy.

Regarding support for African



THE U.S. AFRICA CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE (ACOTA) PROVIDES TRAINING FOR AFRICAN PEACEKEEPERS

peacekeeping, the U.S. “has trained more than 248,000 peacekeepers from 25 African states for UN and AU peacekeeping operations” through the U.S. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.³⁶ ACOTA is a program for building African peacekeeping capacity managed by the Office of Regional and Security Affairs within the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.³⁷ It was incorporated into the broader Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a U.S. Government-funded security program to enhance UN and regional peacekeeping.³⁸ ACOTA provides training for African peacekeepers, including “staff training and exercises for battalion, brigade, and multinational force headquarters personnel.”³⁹ ACOTA also provides logistics support and equipment for African peacekeeping.⁴⁰ USAFRICOM has proven to be instrumental in building African peacekeeping capacity under both the GPOI and ACOTA programs, which highlights the importance of USAFRICOM’s role in policy implementation.⁴¹

Integration at all levels of planning and implementation is essential to the development of sustainable regional crisis response and peacekeeping capability. USAFRICOM continues to play an advisory role for AU and regional organizations’ peacekeeping operations. USAFRICOM, for example, has enabled improvements in the integration of African peacekeeping forces into regional

organizations’ command and control structures. A case in point is the assistance provided by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), an operational headquarters of USAFRICOM, to the AU in establishing a Peace Support Operations Center at its headquarters in Ethiopia to communicate with deployed African peacekeeping forces, a core function of peacekeeping operations.⁴² This case further illustrates the importance of U.S. support for UN and regional organizations’ peacekeeping as contained in U.S. policy toward Africa.⁴³

CJTF-HOA security assistance also highlights the application of broad regional knowledge by USAFRICOM in response to regional security issues, including country-specific and regional contexts. CJTF-HOA conducts U.S. military engagement in the Horn of Africa from Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, the only permanent infrastructure in Africa. Such a minimal presence, or small footprint, has demonstrated the use of USAFRICOM as a cooperative mechanism as well as the importance of pursuing regional and multilateral approaches to resolving security problems across Africa. The U.S. also has security agreements for access to forward operating locations in Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Namibia, Sao Tome, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia for contingencies as well as to provide support for security cooperation plans and activities in the region.⁴⁴ Such operating bases ensure that USAFRICOM has the flexibility to respond to regional crises

AFRICOM HAS MADE STEADY PROGRESS OVERCOMING MUCH OF THE INITIAL RESISTANCE FROM AFRICAN STAKEHOLDERS THROUGH CAREFUL PUBLIC MESSAGING

while using the “small-footprint” approach outlined in U.S. defense strategic guidance for a tailored U.S. military presence in Africa.⁴⁵

SEVERAL COMMENTS ON USAFRICOM

In Africa, USAFRICOM has been received with mixed reactions. Some critics portray U.S. Africa policy and the expanding role of USAFRICOM as a form of U.S. hegemony or neo-colonialism that seeks to exploit one-sided North-South relations. Others may suggest that USAFRICOM’s priorities are too narrowly constructed: a pretext for extending the war on terror, marginalizing fragile states, and improving access to oil. However, AFRICOM has made steady progress, “overcoming much of the initial resistance from African stakeholders through careful public messaging, and by addressing most of the U.S. interagency concerns about the command’s size and proper role within the U.S. national security/foreign policy community.”⁴⁶ One option to address continued African skepticism regarding USAFRICOM would be to strengthen regional approaches to Africa’s security, as well as the security capacity of the AU and regional organizations, including the “African Standby Force and its five regional brigades through battalion and brigade-level exercises, command post exercises, and U.S.-supported peace training centers in each region.”⁴⁷ The new African Peacekeeping

Rapid Response Partnership may provide another useful mechanism for USAFRICOM to further incorporate contextualized approaches to regional peacekeeping. Additionally, USAFRICOM should consider working more closely with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations by leveraging the Pentagon and U.S. Department of State, including the U.S. Mission to the UN, in order to strengthen UN peacekeeping in Africa.

USAFRICOM could also use these relationships to inform regional security policy, strategy and discourse on Africa both inside and outside of the UN system, particularly regarding international partners and policy institutes. While this option looks good on paper, the U.S. has been criticized by some for “AFRICOM’s weak security concept, and the African continent’s marked preference for collective security systems built around its regional organizations and the UN.”⁴⁸ However, that does not necessarily mean that regional security structures or evolving regional security architecture would not be more useful in managing regional crises and complex security issues.

Another option would be to move USAFRICOM headquarters from its current location in Stuttgart, Germany, to Washington, DC. Such a move would signify the increasing strategic importance of Africa to U.S. security, thus enhancing U.S. credibility in the region. This is particularly true since there is some resistance

*THE U.S. CAN HELP AFRICA
SOLVE ITS OWN REGIONAL
SECURITY PROBLEMS BY
CONTINUING TO DEVELOP
A BROAD, LONG-TERM
COOPERATIVE SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA*

to positioning a USAFRICOM headquarters in Africa.⁴⁹ It would also address regional security issues more effectively by leveraging expertise at the U.S. State Department, think tanks and other Washington-based intellectual resources, such as the United States Institute of Peace and the U.S. Department of Defense Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Consolidating these options and other policy initiatives into an all-inclusive package would strengthen U.S. Africa policy and strategy formulation and could be a useful template going forward.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. has been able to pursue a policy of fostering regional security and stability in Africa, including support for African-led solutions to regional security issues, by using USAFRICOM as a mechanism for policy implementation. Unquestionably, the U.S. can help Africa solve its own regional security problems by continuing to develop a broad, long-term cooperative security relationship with Africa, including the use of USAFRICOM as a regional framework for U.S. security cooperation with African states and regional organizations. The U.S. certainly has a stake in preserving and strengthening the international state system, including Africa, especially given its global leadership position. Such strategic cooperation should also dispel the myth regarding the possible militarization of U.S.

policy toward Africa.

U.S. policy toward Africa can be seen in U.S. policy documents, such as the U.S. National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, and other strategic guidance. The role of USAFRICOM in regional security issues in Africa can also be readily derived from such documents. U.S. policy toward Africa crafted in Washington has been instrumental in shaping USAFRICOM, including its purpose, regional plans and strategies, command structures, regionally-tailored forces and forward operating locations. Clearly, USAFRICOM has played a stabilizing role in the region, and changed perceptions to some degree by articulating its purpose to regional stakeholders, soliciting feedback, and aligning itself with U.S. Africa policy and objectives. Undoubtedly, USAFRICOM has helped build the security capacity of African states and regional organizations, especially for regional peacekeeping, and humanitarian and disaster relief. The continued success of U.S. policy toward Africa will depend on its applicability and credibility, including the appropriate use of USAFRICOM for policy implementation. It will also depend on USAFRICOM's ability to help shape U.S. policy toward Africa based on its cumulative experience in the region – and refining the rough edges of a regional strategy within which any U.S. regional command will inevitably be viewed.

AN ANALYSIS ON THE REGULATION OF GREY MARKET CYBER MATERIALS

KELSEY ANNU-ESSUMAN
Yale University

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper analyzes the grey market for cyber materials by evaluating the current nature of transactions within the market. This paper claims that vendors ought to be required to disclose information (to companies) on the vulnerabilities, exploits, and botnets that are sold. Analyses include:

a) Historical cases of weaponized cyber materials

b) Statistics on the costs associated with the grey market

c) Explanation of risks associated with unregulated grey market activity

Limitations to mandatory disclosure outlined in the paper include the:

a) Culture of anonymity within the market

b) Appeal of lucrative job prospects for hackers who rely on the secretiveness of the market

c) Perception of risks

Another overarching, key argument presented for non-regulation is the need for government agencies to preserve their access to tools of offensive warfare that are bought on the grey market.

In response to limitations, this paper finds that mandatory disclosure would, at minimum, allow software companies the opportunity to further pursue the protection of their systems and limit the risks of an unregulated

market. This paper finds that enabling software companies best serves the interest of overall security and does not completely undermine the ability for government agencies to purchase offensive mechanisms.

INTRODUCTION

The creation of the computer network system and its spread throughout the international realm has opened doors for new ways of gathering information as well as manipulating this information for both protective and malicious purposes. While the material stored within computer systems is often thought of as being privy to the user of that system and whomever the user decides to share their data with, the rise in cyber-attacks has proven otherwise. Cyber “crime” or “attacks”—the exploitation of Internet and, more generally, computer vulnerabilities in order to access and use private information—rose as personal data began being stored on system networks since the nascent years of the internet.¹ Policies such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986² and the proposed National Defense Authorization Act for 2014³ have establish(ed) guidelines for unauthorized tapping into the systems of the U.S. government as well as financial and commerce institutions. While cyber-attacks were initially thought of as a method used by individual or small bands of hackers attempting to access information for



WITH THE ONSET OF
LARGE-SCALE CYBER
ATTACKS, IT HAS BECOME
CLEAR THAT THE TITLE
OF “HACKER” IS NO
LONGER RESERVED FOR
INDIVIDUALS BUT EXTENDS
TO GOVERNMENTS AS WELL

THE MONETARY INCENTIVE FOR HACKERS TO SELL CYBER MATERIALS AND INFORMATION IS RELATED TO THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE CYBER REALM

personal use⁴, discussions of cyber-crime have shifted to the offensive mechanisms of hacking employed by governmental organizations. With large-scale attacks such as the Morris worm replicated in UNIX systems across the globe in 1988⁵ and, more recently, the infection of 30,000 Saudi Aramco (world’s largest oil producer) networks with a self-replicating Shamoon virus in 2012,⁶ it has become clear that the title of “hacker” is no longer reserved for individuals but extends to governments as well.

The rise in government probes into both domestic and foreign security systems reveals that while there is a significant amount of information to be gathered for important national security purposes, there is also a significant level of risk in the methodology of information gathering.⁷ Risks are exacerbated by the types of markets available for purchasing exploits and botnets or merely the information on system vulnerabilities that can be crafted into an exploit. The three forms of markets – the white market, grey market, and black market – all pose significant dangers in that they compromise the information of buyers, purchasers, and those who will be affected by the use of the cyber material being sold. This paper focuses on the clandestine and unregulated grey market where government authorities, defense organizations, and other pseudo-political groups are able to purchase their cyber material. Given the market’s secrecy, this paper argues that regulatory measures ought to be imposed on

grey market transactions. More specifically, vendors should be required to disclose the vulnerabilities and exploits to computer software companies (in this essay, synonymous with the term “manufacturers”) prior to making the information marketable to purchasers. Provisions for providing this information ought to be mandatory in an effort to ensure that companies have been given ample ability to secure their data and the data of their users. This suggestion is based on the notion that defensive measures of securing information ought to be prioritized over the potential to create offensive attacks using holes, or “vulnerabilities,” in security.


I begin by outlining the general functions of the grey market. Here, I explain the uses of the cyber materials—namely for offensive security tactics by government authorities and defense contractors. In describing the buyer-seller dynamic, I outline the effects of anonymity and monetary incentives on vendors within the market. I remark on the limitation these dynamics place on regulation. Following this, I explore the possibility of regulation through a previously advocated technique, professionalization, and the mandatory disclosure. In exploring regulation, I discuss the types weapons sold in the market and types of buyers. I narrow my analysis to the type of cyber-material predominately bought and sold in the market: zero-day exploits. My explanation of zero-day exploits includes the

risks associated with cyber materials being indiscriminately made available to all types of actors. Throughout my analysis, I consider concerns of feasibility. In discussing the merits of market regulation, I hope to demonstrate that regulation is essential to ensuring security for the systems vulnerabilities infect.

THE GREY MARKET ALLURE

A description of the grey market yields three features key to its function as an unregulated space: the culture of anonymity, the potential for large monetary gains, and (most relevant to government and defense agencies) the potential for gaining information necessary for offensive attacks. Anonymity—the confidentiality of actors and specific materials on the grey market—is a particularly important issue to both sellers, and most especially buyers. Understandably, agencies prefer to keep their purchases unknown to the general public, as their activity within the grey markets is part of national security intelligence and defense informational tactics.⁸ For example, the Grugq—an exploit broker—faced immense pressure and backlash in the form of decreased demand for his informational products after exposing in an interview⁹ the payments and customers he receives for cyber exploits. The nature of the market means that the threat of backlash and subsequently lost revenue undermines efforts to expose information and reinforces

the culture of anonymity. Secondly, individual hackers who discover system holes—be it at hacking conferences amongst colleagues and potential buyers or within the privacy of their home—can make upwards of 15% from their sales.¹⁰ The monetary incentive for hackers to sell cyber materials and information is related to the changing nature of the cyber realm. Perlroth and Sanger note, “Ten years ago, hackers would hand knowledge of such flaws to Microsoft and Google free, in exchange for a T-shirt or perhaps for an honorable mention on a company’s Web site”.¹¹ As cyber security is becoming more and more part of the U.S.’s national security discourse¹², authorities are seeking assistance from those with intimate knowledge of the hacking community. As a result of the changing face of cyber attacks, hackers are now being sought out by reputable states agencies such as the National Security Agency¹³ who have become “open advocates [of the hacker community], willing to buy technology, and fund research”,¹⁴ as their work is being demanded by the shifting nature of warfare and the intelligence agency. Initially, infiltrating the hacker community had its own challenges, particularly in the area of trustworthiness amongst hackers and governments. To mollify suspicions, transactions were based on a level of anonymity. This was necessary for hackers who had previously been targeted by government agencies and for governments who did not yet have the intelligence and expertise



CURRENTLY, INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE ONCE STIGMATIZED AS CRIMINALS ARE PARTS OF A LUCRATIVE MARKET THAT REINFORCES THE SPECIFICITY OF THEIR WORK

to verify information retrieved from hacking communities. Currently, individuals who were once stigmatized as criminals are parts of a lucrative market that reinforces the specificity of their work. This also means agencies are willing to pay more in order to remain atop of the demands of the shifting cyber tools, thereby reinforcing the effects of anonymity and monetary incentives.

While supply and demand in competitive markets would predict that the lucrative market for hackers would create an opposing market for researchers seeking to patch loopholes, this is not currently the case. Despite the work that some researchers do to uncover vulnerabilities and forewarning software companies of future breaches, these individuals are oftentimes not compensated for their work—even by large corporations such as Adobe and Apple¹⁵. In fact, independent hackers who sell their findings to grey market vendors make close to “10 or even 100 times” more than what researchers can receive for providing information to companies such as Facebook and Microsoft¹⁶, thereby creating an indisputable disincentive to assist companies. Efforts such as the “Hacker One” initiative by Facebook and Microsoft as well as the Texas-based Zero Day Initiative¹⁷ have attempted to amend the problems of compensation for disclosure by paying researchers \$300 to \$5,000¹⁸ for their knowledge of any malware, vulnerabilities, or exploits that will later be sold. On Hacker

One, discussions of vulnerabilities or “bugs” are made open on feeds that also list who have earned certain compensations or “bounties” for their contributions.¹⁹ Hackers can even ban together forming “teams” for exploring holes in systems and reporting back to Hacker One.²⁰ Yet, it is clear that any effort to require disclosure by hackers to companies would have to offer comparable monetary incentives to promote cooperation and avoid the risk of merely driving transactions even further underground into deeper spaces of anonymity such as the black market for cyber materials. Hence, international regulation within the hacker and cyber researcher communities is limited.

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AS REGULATION: A POSSIBILITY?

Within the grey market is a culture of indiscriminate transactional practices, which pose difficulties for requiring disclosure, beyond concerns of monetary incentives. Buyers and sellers that are not held accountable by outside standards are susceptible to equipping organizations with malicious intent with the products they need to carry out their actions. One suggestion to rectify this risk is to make the grey market sellers “official” by professionalizing their practices. Although this suggestion is more focused on changing the perception or connotation associated with the clandestine sale of cyber materials, professionalization would

AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGING FACE OF CYBER ATTACKS, HACKERS ARE NOW BEING SOUGHT OUT BY REPUTABLE STATES AGENCIES SUCH AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

involve setting normalized standards for the industry. The goal of professionalization would be to “regulate workers...enhance public trust...and enable compliance with regulatory requirement” among other goals.²¹ Presumably, this would involve standardizing requirements on the levels of schooling needed to enter the cyber security field, assessment of skills related to the industry and general career preparation/etiquette when handling personable, vulnerable information. Not only would standardizing the players of the market entail requirements for credentials such as certifications for hackers and required training for properly handling sensitive information, but it would also affect the way vendors presently operate by not screening their buyers. The well-known French organization Vupen, which specializes in identifying vulnerabilities to be sold for large sums (sometimes \$1 million),²² refuse to reveal their clientele.²³ By not screening buyers, Vupen and companies like it create the potential for maliciously intended agencies to gain access to their vulnerabilities without any pushback from regulatory practices.

Professionalization seems to be a more attractive option to naturally regulate grey markets because it involves altering the culture of the market. Yet, determining hiring practices, specifying types of skill sets, and giving guidelines for the type of education necessary to enter into these markets as a vendor or identifier of vulnerability are difficult tasks. In

this way, the capricious and blanketed nature of discovering vulnerabilities and creating exploits hinders professionalization. Hence, what works in one instance of uncovering and creating a potential exploit to be sold may not be sufficient or necessary to effectively identify holes in another scenario. The consistency of professionalized standards is, in fact inconsistent with the market itself.

Another suggestion, the one advocated in this paper, is to make transactions a liability for the seller.²⁴ If the seller is required to demonstrate proof (either via documentation or exchanges between the vendor and company) that the vulnerabilities and exploits being sold have also been given to the manufactures of the systems that the holes are within, then the risk of those vulnerabilities being given to anonymous buyers is mitigated, if not eliminated. The most salient issue surrounding anonymity, as mentioned before, is that the intention of the buyer is unknown. In the case where a company has been made aware that their systems could be compromised, the company could now be held liable for breaches and have the responsibility of pursuing measures to mend the breach. Intentions of buyers are then made irrelevant, since, regardless of who knows the vulnerability, the company is well informed on how to protect themselves and their users.

While the approach of liability is most beneficial in cases where the intentions are unclear, the viability of requiring disclosure of



THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WERE LATER REVEALED AS BEING THE INITIATORS OF THE CYBER-ATTACK, WITH 60,000 COMPUTERS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD

THE QUESTION OF THE NECESSITY OF REGULATION CANNOT FOCUS SOLELY ON CONCERNS OF WHO IS SELLING AND WHO IS PURCHASING

information from sellers of vulnerabilities is complicated by situations where the vulnerabilities can be used for preventative (offensive) purposes. Perhaps the most salient issue related to feasibility is the need to preserve avenues for cyber information gathering to be used in offensive activities. Government and defense agencies typically purchase cyber materials as tools for espionage and claim these practices as legitimate forms of warfare and, more benignly, national security. The offensive nature of espionage relies on the fact that the exploit is used to obtain information to help promote other security initiatives. Claims to the necessity of offensive attacks are difficult to counteract since the idea of offensive tools is not foreign to the realm of warfare. The case of Stuxnet illuminates a concern in providing governments with access to vulnerabilities on a private marketplace. Stuxnet, a zero-day weaponized computer program discovered in June 2010 by VirusBlokAda, was developed from codes exposing vulnerabilities in Windows systems.²⁵ The United States and Israel were later revealed as being the initiators of the cyber-attack, with 60,000 computers²⁶ in various countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, South Korea, China, and India being infected and over 60% of the worm infections taking place in Iran.²⁷ The sheer scale and global nature of the attack was not the sole reason for concern. Stuxnet disrupted the frequencies within centrifuges of Iran's nuclear facilities,

thereby becoming the "first industrial-sized" attack using malware. The intention was to isolate systems within Iran; however, the fact that 40% of the worm was replicated in other nations exposed risks related to collateral damage.

The concern, related to the idea of intentionality and anonymity, is that two subsets of users of the grey market—terrorist organizations and "rogue" governments – may have (or already do have) the same information as more favorable (or trustworthy) buyers. Furthermore, regulation, as during prohibition, can cause otherwise visibly detrimental actions to become less visible and transactions to occur in the "underground" black market. Having exploits and vulnerabilities in that market is potentially even more risky since knowledge of where these markets are and who is partaking in transactions is kept secretive, in addition to what is being sold. And, even more starkly different from the grey market, black-market cyber materials (oftentimes counterfeit)²⁸ are sold at cheap prices to attract purchasers who would be more inclined to buy from more secure vendors at the same price. Furthermore, materials are oftentimes counterfeit.

THE TRAJECTORY OF CYBER WARFARE AND PERCEPTION OF RISKS

Thus far, the focus of this paper has been on the actors of the grey market and the

risks associated with their participation. The question of the necessity of regulation cannot focus solely on concerns of who is selling and who is purchasing. Rather, there is also a question to be considered about what is being sold; and the main product on the line is one that has been linked to growing discussions on the future of cyber warfare: exploits. Zero-day exploits are known as the most detrimental compromises of software because they are classified as "unknown threats". Thereby, zero-days cannot be mended by anti-spyware or malware protections already in place within a system.²⁹ Sold on the "high-end" level of the grey market at "up to \$250,000,"³⁰ once a zero-day has infiltrated a system, the effects are immediate and system managers do not have time ("zero days") to reverse and patch the holes within the system.³¹ Zero-days are considered to be "weaponized" once they are used "to disrupt, disable, or destroy computer networks and their components."³² While zero-days are the most prevalent types of exploits to be weaponized, the information needed to transform a system into a botnet can also be found in the grey market. Specifically, a botnet is when hackers use malware to control systems remotely, thereby being able to access private documents and information stored on systems, as well as control commands with the computer(s).³³ These controls can be used for espionage or fraudulent purposes.

Cyber war has become more of

a catch phrase because of the prevalence of interconnected informational and communications technologies; yet, the perception of risk is a limiting factor in how willing individuals are or will be to abide by disclosure requirements. Currently, many still believe that cyber war is not imminent and that the manipulation of systems technology is confined to the realm of personal theft, such as identity thieves or clandestine government activity that ought to remain privy to the Department of Defense and National Security Association. Yet, the real concern surrounding cyber materials purchased in the grey market by ill-intended actors lies in the ability for information and communications technologies now to be used for targeting "electrical grids, food distribution systems, [and] any essential infrastructure that runs on computers."³⁴ Perceptions of risk matter in so far as hackers are individual members of these communities. They are also the ones who can create a culture within the hacking industry of either ambivalence towards the growing potential to cause physical damage or activism for safer methods of utilizing information for the sake of all those involved.

Companies who sell informational and technological material face enormous costs once their information is compromised. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) acknowledges these large costs in their 2007 and 2008 estimates of sums paid to retroactively rectify attacks against gaps in soft-

ware. INTERPOL notes, “The cost of cybercrime worldwide was estimated at approximately USD 8 billion. As for corporate cyber espionage, cyber criminals have stolen intellectual property from businesses worldwide worth up to USD 1 trillion” — larger than the budget of INTERPOL itself.³⁵ Similarly, Intel reports that the “US government alone spent \$25 million purchasing code vulnerabilities”³⁶ making it the largest spender on material for potentially offensive exploits in comparison to states such as Russia, China, and North Korea. While the U.S. government justifies their purchases through claims of using information for offensive attacks, it is unclear whether the same discretion can be trusted in the hands of other actors within the grey market, as mentioned above. Terrorist organizations are also able to purchase exploits and vulnerabilities, and the absence of external checks on their purchases means that they are unregulated in the most extreme sense and have the ability to weaponize vulnerabilities. Essentially, mandatory disclosure has the potential to minimize these costs by creating a safety net for software companies who have the human capital to invest in finding solutions to patch the holes in their software, but do not necessarily have information on where these holes are located.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this paper, I hoped to demonstrate the necessity for regulating the grey market of cyber materials. The value in regulating the grey market was based in the idea that informational security ought to be prioritized over offensive security measures that could be pursued by access to system vulnerabilities. Throughout this paper, it has become clear that these two intentions — securing information and pursuing offensive attacks — are not mutually exclusive. With cases such as Stuxnet, government agencies have used the vulnerabilities and zero-day exploits purchased from grey market vendors as a means of preventative action. Yet, the feasibility of requiring sellers to disclose information of their “products” is limited by the attractiveness of lucrative jobs in hacking as well as the

willingness of buyers and sellers in the grey market to impose regulations on their practices, as demonstrated by the stance of organizations like Vupen. Despite these limitations, it is necessary to consider mandatory disclosure as an option because of the real risks associated with maintaining a secretive market for cyber materials. These risks are amplified by the types of materials primarily sold in the grey market (zero-day exploits) and the types of buyers attracted to the market’s clandestine nature (organizations with potentially malicious intent). While government agencies argue the necessity of the grey market for purchasing offensive warfare material, the necessity to protect individuals ought to be valued over protecting an interest in maintaining a wide array of national security tools. Requiring the disclosure of vulnerabilities would enable companies to pursue security measures while not fully hindering buyers from purchase exploits and vulnerabilities on the grey market.

ICELAND’S CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY

A ROADMAP TO SUSTAINABILITY AND GOOD BUSINESS

ÓLAFUR RAGNAR GRÍMSSON
PRESIDENT OF ICELAND

President Grimsson studied economics and political science at the University of Manchester, and in 1970, became the first person in Iceland to earn a PhD in political science. In 1973, he became a Professor of Political Science at the University of Iceland. He was the University of Iceland’s first Political Science professor. He served as a Member of Althing (Iceland’s Parliament) from 1978 to 1983. He served as the Chairman of the People’s Alliance executive committee from 1983 to 1987. From 1987 to 1995, he was Leader of the People’s Alliance; during this time, he served as Minister of Finance from 1988 to 1991 and as a Member of Althing from 1991 to 1996. He assumed office in 1996, ran unopposed in 2000, was re-elected in 2004, ran unopposed in 2008, and was elected for a record fifth term in 2012. In 2013, he announced the formation of the Arctic Circle, an organization designed for the facilitation of dialogue among political and business leaders, environmental experts, scientists, indigenous representatives, and other international stakeholders to address issues facing the Arctic as a result of climate change and melting sea ice. He is Iceland’s fifth President. He received an award for Iceland’s sustainable energy and economic policies in his tour of Cornell. The following is an edited transcript of his lecture.

I am deeply honored to be here today and to speak about a matter which is very dear to my heart but which is also of fundamental importance to the future of our planet. But, let me first also recognize, as you mentioned this morning, when I paid my homage and expressed the gratitude from the people of Iceland to Cornell and to the people of your library for preserving here at the university the greatest collection of Icelandic books, old and new, some of them more than 500 years old, to be found anywhere outside of Iceland, and for more than 100 years this great university has preserved this collection and renewed it every year, and thus becomes the center of study and research and awareness on the great literary heritage of my country. This is not just of significance to Iceland, but the sagas written in Iceland in the 12th and 13th century when the rest of Europe used Latin, are indeed to western literature as temples and ruins and Athens and Rome are also to western civilization. So why this great university preserve this collection and uses it as a forum for research and discussion, you are not just honoring my own country, you are also preserving one of the most important legacies and pillars of the western civilizations. Let me again here today in this public hall thank the university for this extraordinary contribution and all the people alive and those who have passed away for having dedicated their lives for preserving the physical collection here at the

university.

So in a way it is both an honor and a privilege and also a reminder of our responsibilities that I come here today also to talk about the future of our shared planet not just to pay homage to what was done in my country eight or nine hundred years ago, but also to enter



PRESIDENT GRÍMSSON

*I COME FROM A COUNTRY
WHERE WE DON'T NEED
TO GO TO INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES TO REALIZE
THAT CLIMATE CHANGE IS
REALLY HAPPENING*

into a discussion with all of you on whether we can preserve the planet eight or nine hundred years from now, even one or two hundred years from now. We are all familiar with the debate about climate change. We are all familiar with the negotiations and the dialogues and the discussions and the political conflicts. When I sometimes say, I come from a country where we don't need to go to international conferences to realize that climate change is really happening. When the rest of the world looks at the planet increasingly in recent decades from space, and hopefully realizes that it's our planet together, from a distance without differences of boundaries between nations and countries.

Very few countries have had the privilege like we have had in Iceland to observe first hand both in our own country as well as in Greenland, our next door neighbor, that indeed the glaciers, the ice sheets, are melting at an extraordinary pace. We have studied our glaciers for more than 50 years, and we know that this one in just two years has disappeared recently in the way that it has grown smaller. So therefore, despite the international dialogue and discussions, we don't need to be convinced that something extraordinary is happening to our planet, and if you doubt it then you should visit Greenland, which has an ice sheet that is half the size of Western Europe and it is melting fast. If only a quarter or so of the Greenland's ice sheet melts and everything else stays the same, the global rise in sea level will be about two

meters, affecting almost every city in the world, and let's remember most of the big cities in the world are indeed coastal cities, so it is a serious challenge.

It is perhaps the most fundamental challenge of not just my lifetime but the lifetime of most of you who are young here today and therefore it is inevitable that we come together and try to find ways to deal with this. And there are roughly speaking three different approaches that can be taken. One was illustrated just a few days ago when president Obama and president Xi, together declared that the United States and China have reached an agreement which will gradually come into effects in the coming years with the reduction of CO₂ in this country and China declaring that from 2013, it will hopefully start to reduce its carbon output. This in my opinion, historic decision, historic declaration, almost landmark in international politics and it highlights one of three major approaches to the climate change problem, that countries can together, almost unilaterally agree on a target and a principle and declare to the rest of the world that they actually are going to do it. And if every country followed that example, we will perhaps be able to escape the negotiations in Paris next year.

That is the second approach that has turned out to be slow and difficult, and unfortunately not very productive. The approach of global negotiations from Kyoto onwards and although it keeps on moving like a slow train fo-

ward and hopefully will reach results. Even eternal optimists like myself do not have great hopes that through such international negotiations we will be able to solve the problem in time, because quite frankly, we had 20-30 years to take action. I have already been president for 18 years and I just mentioned that to illustrate to you this is relatively short time ahead of us to actually deal with this problem.

But there is a third way also, which is illustrated by the story of Iceland, and that is perhaps why I am speaking about it here today, not just because I am the president of the country and I like to speak about my country and part is fundamental element in the job description of being a president of Iceland, but because I believe that the story of Iceland in the last 40 or 50 years is a fascinating signpost, almost like a laboratory, an example of how we can execute the third method of preventing irreversible climate change by comprehensively transforming the energy system of our country.

Because climate change is fundamentally an energy problem. We all know that. The science is clear. The studies have been done. There's really no debate about that issue. If we really want to deal with it, we have to transform our energy systems and somehow I believe that if Iceland could do it, so can everybody else. When people visited my country today and they see the clean energy achievements which I will describe in a few moments, they somehow think it's been an easy journey, that's not true. If you look at Iceland behind this title which I have chosen to illustrate the road I am going to take that it's not really about energy, it's about the economy. It's about the economic transformation of the country to realize that to move from fossil fuel over to clean energy is fundamentally good business. It is fundamentally the road to prosperity and economic achievement and also safeguard against financial crisis in the future because as you might know, my country was hit very hard in 2008 when all the major banks actually collapsed. One of the main reasons why we are now perhaps that country in Europe that has succeeded best to deal with financial crisis is the comprehensive clean energy transformation in the previous decade.

But this has been done on, as I will illustrate, not on the basis on a grand plan, not on the basis of ambition or government policy on 30 or 40 years ago. It has been done though localized, bottom-up, profit-driven initiatives and actions taken by small towns, communities, different sectors, companies, and so on. But the end result is an extraordinary transformation. But it started in a country where the capital Reykjavik, about the time I was born, was every day under a black cloud of the smoke from the cold fires and the fossil fuel, where you could smell the energy every day, and everything you hand out in the air made it dirty. And that was the situation in my country. The coal depot was the largest part of the harbor and every week, the vessels came from Britain and Germany bringing coal to our country. It's not all that long ago, at least I kind of kid myself, I'm not very old.

And then, for centuries, we have used geothermal water, primarily to wash clothes. That was it. We went out where you saw warm water coming up, you put on some equipment, and as you can see, this 70-80 years ago. We can see it from the clothes the people wear, and they had been doing that for hundreds and hundreds of years. The only usage of this great energy resource was the clothes, occasionally perhaps you take a warm bath or so, but in terms of producing energy—zero. Nothing. And Iceland had been for centuries one of the poorest countries in Europe: a nation of farmers and fishermen struggling out there in the North Atlantic, barely surviving, being through most of the centuries only 40000-50000 people, about 100000 or so at the beginning of the 20th century, people who lived on open boats, worked in the fishing on elementary wage, tried to grow the crops and the hay to feed the cows and the sheep. So the beginning of this transformation into the leading example in the world in a clean energy economy came from a country which perhaps had the greatest odds against it being able to do so.

Then it all started, by the time I was born or so, by putting parts in mud streets, in the center of Reykjavik. Few houses in the beginning, then again, see from the dresses of the people in the picture. This is long time ago

in our minds, if you look at the style. That's how it began, house by house, street by street, district by district, town by town, city by city, until 30 or 40 years later, the entire country had been transformed. The city covered in black smoke or coal of the time I was born now waits all of you in this way: clean, fresh air, non-polluted, with great modern societies, fantastic lifestyle, one of the best lifestyles in the world, together with all the Nordic countries, where women and men live longer than in most other countries. A fantastic lifestyle in swimming pools and restaurants and everything else—one of the luxury places in the world, if you compare it to the rest of the continent.

And of course the statistics are quite fantastic, this is the percentage of renewable sources in energy production, together with Norway, Iceland ranks up there at almost 100 percent. I'm sorry to say that Sweden is far behind, and not to mention the United States. I mean, look at these columns, why on Earth is the United States so low? Remember again the pictures I just showed you about Iceland, the poor farmers and fishermen, the mud streets, the poverty, the grey docks. If anybody had told my parents by the time I was born that there country would be number one in clean energy achievements, nobody would have believed it. It would be a story of impossibility, but this is the reality. And here you can see the transformation, how the relative use on the smaller graphs shows how the coal which in the 1940 and until the 50s was a big part of the Icelandic energy gradually disappeared. Same with oil, and the growth in geothermal and hydro, and you see it on the larger picture also. So now we have the entire electricity production, and the space heating of the country, a rise to a renewable energy resources. And when we get enough electric cars, which I hope we will do in the next 10 or 15 years, we have a good chance of being the first country in the world where all the land-based activity will be run on renewable energy resources. A very strong signal to the rest of the world that it can, in fact, be done.

And now the energy companies, and the buildings and the centers have not only become locations to produce electricity or heat the houses, but also educational institutions, centers

of information, great tourist attractions. This is the building, the reception of all of the newest geothermal power plants, which receives every year about 20 percent of the tourists that come to Iceland. People who enter this power plant pay an entrance fee to see for themselves what a clean energy power plant actually looks like, and where we have young students teaching the tourists what this is all about. If somebody had even told me 10 years ago that it would charge people to enter a power plant and they would willingly pay about 30 dollars to enter the power plant and receive a tour, I would not have believed it.

But that's not the only occasion that illustrates how the growing tourist sector in Iceland is, to a strong extent, based on the clean energy transformation. You have the bore holes at different parts of the country, organized by our experts and engineers and geologists, and planned in such a way that the former comprehensive system that, although its bore hole collapsed perhaps 30, 40, 50 years, then you rest it for a while and you use the others, then you build a comprehensive system that can go on, and on and on. There you see the pipes bringing the steam and the water down to the power plant, which produces electricity, as well as sending hot water into the houses of our capital.

And of course hydro power as well is a big part of this transformation. Different in scale because that has been organized by the national power company whereas the geothermal transformation has been more locally based. But this is one of the major reasons why Iceland has become a strong and attractive location for some of the biggest companies in the world. Like this aluminum power plant, initially built by Swiss Alcoa, as another plant, in the Eastern part of Iceland. And it's worth mentioning that when Rea Tinto, following the fall of Lehman Brothers, stopped all global investments anywhere in the world, and remember Rea Tinto is one of the biggest companies in the world with operations in I think about 150 countries and terminated the entire field of global investments after the fall of the Lehman Brothers. But two years later, they took their first global investment position

after the financial crisis began, and that was the modernization of this plant in Iceland, where they invested half of million US dollars in the modernization of this plant. That time Iceland was still considered by many as example number one of a failed financial country, but that did not prevent Rea Tinto from modernizing the plant because they knew there was a long term access to renewable clean energy. And aluminum, produced in this way, leaves less carbon footprint than aluminum produced by most other companies in the world. So if you want to have an environmentally friendly electric car, where about half or so of the carbon footprint has already existed even more before you started for the first time, it's better to have the aluminum produced in this way. So, the investment decisions taken by these three global companies are a great testament to the in-built global competitiveness of a clean energy economy.

And now, in the last ten years, we have added to the data storage centers and I know it, don't I have to explain to the audience, the importance of data storage in the 21st century, and the extraordinary amount of energy which is required to enable us every day to conduct our research and dialogue and communicate with our friends. But you mightn't realize that about 40 percent of the running costs of the data storage center is the cooling. And, contrary to what most people think here Cornell on a cold day, the temperature in Iceland is reasonably balanced in the winter and the summer. So, in order to cool the data storage centers in Iceland, we simply open the window, so you let in the air in the winter and the summer. But they also run on clean energy, and it strengthened the market profile of those who are customers in keeping the data whether they are some of the famous car companies in the world or risk companies or others. They can tell their clients and customers that their data is stored without a carbon footprint. That is an important part of the combination of the 21st century IT technology as well as the clean energy economy.

You'll remember the picture I showed you before of the coal, smoke-covered city. Now look at this, this is another picture of Reykjavik today and on the graph, you see the reduction in

CO₂ emissions simply due to the space-heating from '61 to 2011. This is a remarkable job, not because it illustrates the Icelandic achievement, but primarily because in most countries in the world, including the United States and China, the country of President Obama and President Xi, there are enough low and medium geothermal energy resources to allow countries, cities and urban communities, to exactly travel the same road: to use the localized low and medium temperature geothermal resources to move away from electricity-driven, or CO₂-driven space heating and air conditioning over to locally based-geothermal energy. This graph is a reminder to all of you in the United States and as well the world to do the same. And as Professor Tester told me this morning, 25 percent of the total energy needs of the United States is for the heating and the air conditioning. A quarter of your energy requirements to match the transformation of the energy profile of this country alone not to forget China and the others, if you did the same thing, which you can like we house by house, street by street, district by district, town by town. So it is, in fact, an extraordinary transformation in a relatively short time of 30-40 years.

But as I said in the beginning, the driving motive was not ideology to save the planet, the driving motive was economic profitability to heat the houses and produce electricity in a cheaper, less costly, more effective way, to increase the standards of living of the people, to strengthen the fundamental basis of the economy. It was entirely a market-driven, profit-oriented road. Of course, along the route, we could make our contributions to saving the planet, but that was not the motive. It is perhaps my core message here today, that is makes economic sense to save the planet, and the sooner people discover that, the better. But that was only the beginning of the story to produce electricity and heat the houses, how we have multiple dimensions in our economy to illustrate the profitability of this transformation.

We have built greenhouse agriculture, many different parts of the country, producing tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, you name it, making our diet, of course, much healthier and reducing the likelihood of various diseases and

enable us to live longer. But also to help the tourists who come to Iceland to enjoy this extraordinary quality. And I have to tell you, the Icelandic tomatoes are much better than the ones you get here, for obvious reasons. The water is better, but the other is this environment completely without pesticides, completely without any earth, it is done in a way that there is zero possibility of some chemical contamination of other resources. And you only have to taste it once to realize.

But there are many other aspects to it, we also grow the bananas in the greenhouses. We have the proud record of having the largest banana plantation in Europe. Admittedly it's under glass in the greenhouses, but still the largest banana plantation in Europe, illustrating that through this energy resource, you can basically create any climate you want. But what has happened in the last five to six years is a very interesting transformation—the people who come to Iceland and visit the power plants and feel they are in a country with fresh air and clean energy, they also go to the greenhouses. They want to see the greenhouses. They want to witness how the tomatoes and the cucumbers grow.

So, I'll tell you the short story of a family, greenhouse farm, in the Southern part of Iceland: family of four or five people, husband and wife and their teenage kids. They have been growing tomatoes for about 15-20 years, they're extraordinarily good. But then the tourist companies started to bring people to look at the greenhouses and see how this was done and after three or four years of this, the family said "why don't we charge people?" And they did. But they kept on coming, paying again about 20 dollars to enter a greenhouse and see how we grow tomatoes. And then people started asking "can we taste them, do you make tomato soup?" So they established a restaurant. So the end of the story is, and the story is still progressing, last year 40000 tourists paid to enter the greenhouse of this one family, to experience how through clean energy you produce healthy food.

And they keep on coming and keep on paying. And it's extraordinary how we can charge them on many different levels to witness this. We can also give them some fish,

which is grown in fish farms where we use the geothermal water to heat up the ocean. And there will be a new one opening and start producing and slaughtering the fish in the beginning of next year. The fish they are producing 2000 tons a year in this one fish farm it's senical sole. Senico sole, as the name indicates, is a warm water fish. You don't need to be an expert to realize that, otherwise it wouldn't be called Senico Sole. And this fish farm is close to one of the geothermal power plants. When they made the deal with the power plant to take the water which before was the fallout water and simply went into the ground and take it to the fish farm and heat up the cold Atlantic Ocean and fool the fish. So the power company which before got zero income from this water that went down to the ground can now charge the fish farm for heating the Atlantic Ocean, 2000 tons a year from this company alone.

Then, of course, we come to the drying of fish product. Like almost every fishing nation in the world some decades ago, we through away the heads and the backbone. We just sold fillings here in the United States and elsewhere. And then 30-40 years ago, two fishermen on a boat said "why don't they use the geothermal heat to actually dry this stuff?" Then we can export it to Africa. Drying food is mankind's oldest method for preserving food, but takes a long time out in the air. But through the geothermal technology in a very simple way, you can dry in five days. And after that process, you put it into this Indian very primitive packaging and you export it to Nigeria where you can store it in any condition, even in the local streets, for up to two years, with zero infrastructure. And you can do this for meat, vegetable, fruits. I maintain it will be the single most important contribution to food security in the world if we did this on a global scale. Because about 20 percent of the food produced in the world get destroyed within a week or ten days, not because we waste it, but because there is not a method to store it, because the highly advanced Western way of freezing food and selling it in supermarkets in a frozen way is a luxury of the affluent part of mankind. The other billions on planet Earth can't do that, and if they did, it would cause major environmental problem for the rest of us.

So the only way forward is to dry the food, at least if we want to utilize 20 percent of what we actually produce instead of destroying it.

And this way how Iceland has shown freeing what we threw away before in this dried form to Africa, everybody makes a great deal of money on the way: the Icelandic fishermen, the fishing company, the power plant in Iceland, the ship that transports to the local vendors in Nigeria, the women in the streets—everybody gets a cut of this chain. To me, it's an extraordinary combination of a clean energy economy and a fantastic way to utilize and preserve the food that we produce. And let's just remember that in this whole debate about destroying the ocean resources which is one of the critical issues for mankind in this century, the big question is not just to preserve the fish stocks, but to make sure we utilize 99 percent of the volume of the fish we actually bring ashore. And I can assure you that this food in Nigeria two years after we dried the cod heads tastes fantastic. So, there are other ways also.

This is a company that started a few years ago on the basis of cutting-edge medical research by deciding to grow protein from Bali in greenhouses and sell it to medical institutions, medical research institutions which have used animal stuff before, but that was difficult for many different reasons. This is the first time in history that it is genetically produced in this way. And along the way, they found out that byproduct there was this EGF, which if you put it on your skin, it renews your skin. And now this product is being sold onboard Air France, Singapore Airlines, various other companies, and if you told the people who put the pipes in mud streets in Iceland that 50 years from then, they could compete onboard Air France, nobody would have believed that almost space-age contribution.

But it is a formidable example of how this clean energy economy also reaches into the cutting-edge medical research of the modern day, then of course the Blue Lagoon, which is one of the most famous locations around the world. Basically it's a spill-off water from a geothermal power plant, and we charge tourists 40 euros which is about 50 dollars to bath themselves in a spill-off water from a geothermal plant.

And the nature of the water and the chemicals is such that you feel great afterwards. And this year, 600000 or so, 700000 tourists, more than thrice the population on Iceland, pay 50 dollars per head to do this. But more remarkably when National Geographic decided two or three years ago to present 25 more remarkable places on planet Earth, Blue Lagoon was actually one of them. But the other 24 were all created by God almighty, they were phenomenon of nature, this was a spill-off water created by engineers and some clean energy technicians.

And also, let's not forget the role this has played in the universities, in our science, in our engineering departments, in the research, in the engineering companies that make great business both in Iceland and elsewhere on the basis of the know-how and the technology and experience that they have gathered. Now, this has become one of the great pillars of our research and university community as well as being one of the biggest parts in Iceland's role in the world. We established together with the United Nations University a few decades ago the United Nations Geothermal Training University in Iceland where we take young people who have finished their first degrees from Asia, Africa, and other parts of the developing world and give them a training in geothermal technology in Iceland. And as you can see on this map, this small country has now played a role in all these countries you see on the map in capacity-building and training for their clean energy sector. In China alone and in East Africa, the Icelandic training has been a major part in the transformation that is now taking place in the countries. And if Iceland can do that, a small country which a few decades ago was among the poorest in the world in matching with the great universities and institutions, the United States could do if it follow a similar path. This is a group of some of the graduates, came together in the Global World Geothermal Congress in Bali and it was in 2010, and it was a testimony to the global reputation that Iceland has achieved in this field. Just a few weeks ago, we beat every other country including Germany in the final voting to host the World Geothermal Congress in 2020—a formal recognition by the entire geothermal sector of the leadership that

Iceland played in this field. And I remind you again of the people who stood close to the pipes of this mud street in the '40s, and how it all began.

Then, let me say a few words about China and Africa. Sinopec, as you might know, is the second largest company in the world, the biggest energy company in China. And following a slow process that started more than 10 years ago, we have now in recent years engaged through Orka Energy, and Icelandic company with international participation, and Sinopec in the gradual transformation of Chinese cities, closing down the coal-powered heating stations and replacing them with locally-based geothermal heating systems. And the fascinating thing is Sinopec has now decided to make this, as you can see from their website, one of their prestige projects showing the way forward. And if the leading company in China in this field, the second largest company in the world, has decided to enter into that kind of historic-making transformation in cooperation with us in Iceland, it is also a signal that this transformation makes great economic sense. That the globally market-driven, profit-oriented way forward is indeed the path that China is taking in cooperation with us and is also being executed under the leadership of President Xi who understood this very early, Vice President, and supported this effort very strongly, both during the period as Vice President of China and presently now during his new Presidency. This is what we look like inside, as clean as a hospital operation room replacing the coal-driven power station that was there before. We are doing the similar drilling in Philippines where the Icelandic drilling company has been operating as well as in other parts of the world.

But then Africa, the poor continent, the great future, where the Rift Valley, the countries in East Africa has this extraordinary potential of energy transformation. We have trained through the United Geothermal Program many people from this part of the world, but what is most remarkable that one of the new geothermal global companies in Iceland Grekio Geothermal, with support from some American investments, has now recently finalized an agreement with the government of Ethiopia to build in Ethiopia

the largest geothermal plant in Africa, 1000 megawatts. Because of the involvement of American capital in this project, my colleague in the White House and his staff has decided to put this project in Ethiopia as exhibit number one of the success of the Obama power Africa policy, which is fine with us. We are perfectly happy to share the credit with the president of this country. But it somehow made me wonder "why don't we build a 1000 megawatts in the United States as well? Why do we have to go to Ethiopia to join hands in such a great project?" This will enable Ethiopia to become a net exporter of energy to their neighboring countries.

Another country in that part of Africa in the world Djibouti has joined the right policies and the project to become 100 percent clean energy, which will be a very important signal to the rest of the world to have together with Norway and Iceland, a small African country as sharing the number one global spot of a clean energy transformation. But then, of course, I often hear, after a tour like this, "yes you can do it in Iceland because you have these with volcanoes and earthquakes, you're sitting on this connection between continental plates, but in my country sits the question there, and unfortunately we is not as blessed as you are in Iceland." Well, you all know this picture of the planet Earth that's like a cheese, which remind us that the pinpoint inside planet Earth is in fact under every country in the world, every continent in the world, every ocean in the world. And we are only living in our very narrow top of almost like a very small face on top, so it's only a question of drilling and engineering and expertise, how to get to this heat. Of course, in some countries it's easier than others, but it has been demonstrated now all over the world that it can be done, given the drilling technology partly thanks to the oil industry in order to enable us to do it.

And may I draw your attention to the final statement that 0.1 percent of the stored heat inside our planet would satisfy the global energy consumption for 10000 years. So even if we just got a small percentage of all this, it would be a monumental transformation. Inside the United States, as Professor Tester have so often pointed

out in his and other experts' marking of geothermal potential of the United States, you can do this in many parts of the union, both to produce electricity as well as have space-heating and air conditioning, and don't let us forget that this is also a big part of the energy needs of this great country. Therefore, with the right policies, the road is open to the United States to utilize as we have done the heat which is also under the great United States of America. And therefore, to use the example of Iceland as the reference point, almost like a laboratory where you can see many different ways in which to become economically profitable and is also the foundation for more secure, prosperous economy.

And that is why in addition to the sun and the wind, these three basic forces of nature, the sun, the wind, the heat under the ground, are there for us to utilize in many fantastic ways. And we are, my dear friends, just in the early stages of this technological transformation because if you believe all the inventions and engineering discoveries have already been done, that is not true. This is a fascinating road for young scientists and experts to move forward and thereby discover, through this harnessing of these forces of nature, a new prosperous economic future not only for the country where you live in, but also for the planet. That is why this meeting, two days ago, on the Declaration is so important, that's why President Xi and President Obama have come together to show us that indeed you don't have to wait for the international negotiations, there's no longer an excuse if you look simply at the negotiating process, it counts each and every one of us, do it. That is also one of the fundamental lessons of my talk, you can do it in your house, in your district, in your town. And when we complain there is no action in our government to prevent climate change, we should look at ourselves in the mirror and ask ourselves, "why don't I stop in my neighborhood and my community?" Because the technology and the economic motive is already there.

So, as I illustrated and could do in greater detail, the story of the relationship between Iceland and China in this field in the last ten years is an extraordinary example of

how one of the smallest nations on the Earth and one of the largest nations on the Earth, far away geographically, culturally, historically, and economically, can come together in an effective transformation for clean energy future. And recently the Chinese leadership came to us and asked if we could help them map out building huge greenhouse farms in the Northern part of China, so they no longer have to transport the vegetable from the Southern part of China and could do away with the CO₂ emission and utilize, localize geothermic resources in the Northern part of China for their own food production. So, it has often made me wonder in the last 10 years coming often to this country even at hearing in front of the Senate Energy Committee, speaking to many leaders in many different administrations, why we can't have a similar cooperation in the United States. And that's why I think, well Cornell, can together with Iceland, help to bring the United States also forward on this extraordinary journey, so together we can realize that we can, through the clean energy economy, both help to save the planet and enter into a prosperous, fascinating, and strong economic future.

ENDNOTES AND IMAGE REFERENCES

A BEAUTIFUL MESS

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL GRAFFITI IN THE CONTEMPORARY CITY

Image Attributions

All Original Work by Author

Works Cited

“The Art Of Punk - Crass - The Art of Dave King and Gee Vaucher - Art + Music -MOCAtv” YouTube video, 12:17. Posted by “The Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles”, 18 June 2013. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubzKiomuUB0>

Batty, David. “East End Art Galleries Forced to Go West as Local Scene dies’.” *The Guardian*. 07 June 2012. Accessed January 2014.

Chalfant, Henry and James Prigoff. “England.” In *Spraycan Art*. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 7-13, 58-66.

Coleman, Jasmine. “Council U-turn in Row over ROA Graffiti Rabbit in Hackney Road.” *Hackney Gazette*, 10 Nov. 2010. Accessed Jan. 2014

Dickens, L. “Placing Post-graffiti: The Journey of the Peckham Rock.” *Cultural Geographies* 15.4 (2008): 471-80. doi: 10.1177/1474474008094317.

History. “East End - Land of the Cockney”. Accessed December 2013. <http://www.history.co.uk/study-topics/history-of-london/east-end-land-of-the-cockney>

“The Flows of Prosperity.” *The Economist*, 30 June 2012. Accessed December 2013

Fender, Leanne. “Entire Banksy Mural Removed by Wall’s Owners.” *Sutton Guardian*. 11 Nov. 2009. Accessed January 2014.

Field, Geoffrey. “Nights Underground in Darkest London: The Blitz, 1940–1941.” *International Labor and Working-Class History* 62 (2002): 13-14. doi: 10.1017/S0147547902000194

Foord, J. “The new boomtown? Creative city to Tech City in east London.” *Cities*, Vol. 33, (2013): 51-60. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.08.009>

Gabbatt, Adam. “ROA’s Graffiti Rabbit Faces Removal by Hackney Council.” *The Guardian*, 26 Oct. 2010. Accessed January 2014.

Green, C.N. “From Factories to Fine Art: The Origins and Evolution of East London’s Artists’ Agglomeration.” (PhD. diss., University of London 2001): 1968-1998. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.08.009>

Hackney Council. “Graffiti.” Accessed December 2013. <http://www.hackney.gov.uk/ew-graffi->

[ti-584.htm#.UsnWEmRDt2w](http://www.hackney.gov.uk/ew-graffi-ti-584.htm#.UsnWEmRDt2w)

Kelling, George R., and James Q. Wilson. “Broken Windows.” *The Atlantic*, 24 Oct. 2012. Accessed November 2013.

Ley, David, and Roman Cybriwsky. “Urban Graffiti As Territorial Markers.” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 64.4 (1974): 491-505. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8306.1974.tb00998.x

Ley, David. “Artists, Aestheticization, and the Field of Gentrification.” *Urban Studies* 40.12 (2003): 2527-2529. doi: 10.1080/0042098032000136192.

Manco, Tristan. *Stencil Graffiti*. New York, NY: Thames & Hudson, 2002. Print.

Mathieson, Eleanor, Xavier A. Tàpies, and Glenn Arango. “Banksy”, “C216”, “Invader”, “Swoon”, “Jef Aerosol”, and “Blek le Rat” in *Street Artists: The Complete Guide* (London: Grafito, 2009).

Millington, Val. “London 2012: What legacy for artist’s studios?” *Axis Webzine*, Autumn. Accessed March 2013. <http://www.axisweb.org/dlForum.aspx?ESSAYID=18066>

The Official Website of the City of New York. “Anti-Graffiti City and State Legislation.” Accessed January 2013. <http://www.nyc.gov/html/nograffiti/html/legislation.html>.

Pure Evil. Personal interview. 7 Jan. 2013.

Robbo vs Banksy- Graffiti Wars. Demand Media, 2012. YouTube. Demand Media, 11 June 2012. Web. 9 Nov. 2014.

Schacter, R. “An Ethnography of Iconoclasm: An Investigation into the Production, Consumption and Destruction of Street-art in London.” *Journal of Material Culture* 13.1 (2008): 35-61. doi: 10.1177/1359183507086217

T.F.T. Baker (Editor). “Bethnal Green: Building and Social Conditions from 1915 to 1945.” *A History of the County of Middlesex: Volume 11: Stepney, Bethnal Green* (1998): 132-135. *British History Online*. Accessed January 2014. <<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=22753>>

Thompson, Nick. “Why Gritty East End Is London’s Gold Standard.” *CNN*, 26 July 2012. Accessed January 2014.

Tower Hamlets Corporate Research Council. “Population: Key Facts: A Demographic Profile of the Tower Hamlets Population.” Ed. Lorna Spence. 4-10. Aug. 2011.

Tower Hamlets Council. “Borough Statistics: Ethnicity.” Accessed January 2014. http://www.towerhamlets.gov.uk/lgs/901-950/916_borough_statistics/ethnicity.aspx

Tower Hamlets Council. “Borough Statistics: Population Growth.” Accessed January 2014. Accessed 4 January 2014 http://www.towerhamlets.gov.uk/lgs/901950/916_borough_statistics/population

University of Portsmouth: *Vision of Britain Through Time*. “Reports of the 1951 Census.” Ac-

cessed January 2013. http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/census/census_page.

Waclawek, Anna. "From Graffiti to Post-Graffiti." *Graffiti and Street Art*. (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2011), 7-63.

Yelp. "Art Galleries London: Shoreditch, Bethnal Green, Hoxton, Islington." Accessed 2 January 2014. <http://goo.gl/Fi1GDG>. Map tool used to determine number of art galleries in the aforementioned districts.

THE CASE OF EDWARD SNOWDEN A DIFFERENT PATH

Image Attributions

"Barack Obama Readings Notes in the Red Room" by Official White House Photostream. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic via Wikimedia Commons.

"Flag of the United States National Security Agency" by Fry1989-Own Work. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported via Wikimedia Commons.

"T. Drake" by DancingHands56-Own Work. Licensed under Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported via Wikimedia Commons.

"Edward Snowden" by Laura Poitras/Praxis Films- screenshot of a film by Praxis Films. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported via Wikimedia Commons.

"Freiheit statt Angst 065" by Markus Winkler-from #FsA14 - Freiheit statt Angst 065. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic via Wikimedia Commons.

Endnotes

¹ Spitz, M., & Strobele, H. (2013, November 17).

² Joke Schrijvers, "Fighters, victims and survivors: constructions of ethnicity, gender and refugee-ness among Tamils in Sri Lanka." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 12.3 (1999): 308.

³ Clement, S. (2013, November 20).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ MacAskill, E. (2013, June 11).

⁶ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United State Senate. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (112-155; April 4, 2012).

⁷ Newcomb, T. (2001).

⁸ 18 U.S.C. § 798

⁹ Vladeck, S. I. (2007).

¹⁰ Snepp, F. (2013, July 3).

¹¹ GARCETTI v. CEBALLOS

¹² Sasser, J. (2006).

¹³ Sinnar, S. (2013).

¹⁴ Check, R. M., & Radsan, A. J. (2010).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Island Packet (2013, November 19). S.C. delegation pursuing NSA reforms.

¹⁷ Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, S. 1681, 113th Cong. §402 (2nd Sess. 2014).

¹⁸ 50 U.S.C. §403

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Goldsmith, J. (2012). p 95.

²³ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United State Senate. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (112-155; April 4, 2012).

²⁴ 5 USC app. § 8H

²⁵ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United State Senate. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (112-155; April 4, 2012).

²⁶ 5 USC app. § 8H

²⁷ McCarthy, R. (2012).

²⁸ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United State Senate. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (112-155; April 4, 2012).

²⁹ Blaylock, D. (2012, November 27).

³⁰ Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, S. 1681, 113th Cong. § (b)(4)(A)(B) (1st Sess. 2013).

³¹ Obama, Barack (2007). Presidential directive 19. National Security Presidential Directives.

³² Shane, S. (2010, June 11).

³³ Mayer, J. (2011).

³⁴ Goldsmith, J. (2012). p 220.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Bamford, J. (1999, July 18).

³⁷ Snepp v. United States, (1980).

³⁸ Bamford, J. (1999, July 18).

³⁹ Snepp v. United States, (1980).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Bamford, J. (1999, July 18).

⁴³ Snepp, F. (2013, July 3).

⁴⁴ Reuters (2011, June 10).

⁴⁵ Nakashima, E. (2010, July 14).

⁴⁶ Mayer, J. (2011).

⁴⁷ Nakashima, E. (2010, July 14).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Mayer, J. (2011).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Nakashima, E. (2010, July 14).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Mayer, J. (2011).

⁵⁴ Nakashima, E. (2010, July 14).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Drake, T. (2013, June 12).

⁵⁷ Nakashima, E. (2010, July 14).

⁵⁸ Reuters (2011, June 10).

⁵⁹ Bishop, T. (2011, July 15).

⁶⁰ Reuters (2011, June 10).

- ⁶¹ Mayer, J. (2011).
- ⁶² Reuters (2011, June 10).
- ⁶³ Nakashima, E. (2010, July 14).
- ⁶⁴ Maas, P. (2013, August 13).
- ⁶⁵ Drake, T. (2013, June 12).
- ⁶⁶ Giang, V. (2013, June 10).
- ⁶⁷ Gerstein, J. (2013, June 21).
- ⁶⁸ Snowden seeks world's help against charges. (2013, November 1).
- ⁶⁹ John Kerry: Some NSA spying went too far. (2013, November 1).
- ⁷⁰ Oversight Legislation: Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. (1987).
- ⁷¹ No amnesty for Edward Snowden: There's more to learn about the damage done. [Editorial]. (2014, January 27).
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Kaplan, F. (2014, October 17)
- ⁷⁴ Gjelten, T. (2013, September 20).
- ⁷⁵ Samuelsohn, D. (2014, February 25).
- ⁷⁶ Samuelsohn, D. (2014, February 25).
- ⁷⁷ Volcovici, V. (2014, January 26).

Works Cited

- Bamford, J. (1999, July 18). *Spy vs. Spies*. The New York Times. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from <http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/07/18/r>
- Bishop, T. (2011, July 15). Thomas Drake sentenced to probation. The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-07-15/news/bs-md-thomas-drake-sentencing-20110715_1_jesselyn-radack-thomas-andrews-drake-nsa-employee
- Blaylock, D. (2012, November 27). Government Accountability Project. President Signs Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) -. Retrieved November 30, 2013, from <http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/42-2012/2380-president-signs-whistleblower-protection-enhancement-act-wpea->
- Check, R. M., & Radsan, A. J. (2010). One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA's Inspector General. *J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y*, 4, 247.
- Clement, S. (2013, November 20). Most Americans say Snowden leaks harmed national security. The Washington Post. Retrieved November 21, 2013, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-most-americans-say-snowden-leaks-harmed-national-security/2013/11/20/13cc20b8-5229-11e3-9e2c-e1d01116fd98_story.html
- Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United State Senate. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (112-155; April 4, 2012). Text in Federation of American Scientists CRS database; Accessed: November 20, 2013.
- Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United State Senate. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (112-155; April 4, 2012). Text in Federation of American Scientists CRS database; Accessed: November 20, 2013.

Drake, T. (2013, June 12). Snowden saw what I saw: surveillance criminally subverting the constitution. The Guardian . Retrieved June 12, 2013, from <http://www.theguardian.com/commentis-free/2013/jun/12/snowden-surveillance-subverting-constitution>

GARCETTI v. CEBALLOS, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_473/ (last visited November 21, 2013).

Gerstein, J. (2013, June 21). Edward Snowden charged with 3 felonies. Politico. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/edward-snowden-charged-nsa-93179.html>

Giang, V. (2013, June 10). What whistleblower Edward Snowden should have done. Business Insider, n.v.. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from <http://www.businessinsider.com/what-whistleblower-edward-snowden-should-have-done-2013-6>

Gjelten, T. (2013, September 20). The effects of Snowden's leaks aren't what he intended. All Things Considered. National Public Radio. Podcast retrieved November 12, 2014 from <http://www.npr.org/2013/09/20/224423159/the-effects-of-the-snowden-leaks-arent-what-he-intended>

Goldsmith, J. (2012). *Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11*. WW Norton & Company.

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, S. 1681, 113th Cong. § (b)(4)(A)(B) (1st Sess. 2013).

Island Packet (2013, November 19). S.C. delegation pursuing NSA reforms. The Island Packet. Retrieved November 21, 2013, from <http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/11/19/2802454/sc-delegation-pursuing-nsa-reforms.html>

John Kerry: Some NSA spying went too far. (2013, November 1). BBC News. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24768717>

Kaplan, F. (2014, October 17). Edward Snowden exalted. From Slate. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved November 12, 2014, from <http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-wp-wp-slate-bc-kaplan17-20141017-story.html#page=1>

Maas, P. (2013, August 13). How Laura Poitras helped Snowden spill his secrets. New York Times. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/laura-poitras-snowden.html?pagewanted=all>

MacAskill, E. (2013, June 11). Edward Snowden: how the spy story of the age leaked out. The Guardian. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/11/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-profile>

Mayer, J. (2011). The secret sharer. The New Yorker, 46-57.

McCarthy, R. (2012). *Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers*. William & Mary Policy Review, 3, 184.

Milliken, M. (2014, November 10). Joseph Gordon-Levitt to play Edward Snowden in Oliver Stone film. Retrieved November 12, 2014, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/11/us-film->

Nakashima, E. (2010, July 14). Former NSA executive Thomas A. Drake may pay high price for media leak. *Washington Post*. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071>

Newcomb, T. (2001). In from the Cold: The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998. *Admin. L. Rev.*, 53, 1235.

No amnesty for Edward Snowden: There's more to learn about the damage done. [Editorial]. (2014, January 27). *Chicago Tribune*. Retrieved November 12, 2014, from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-27/opinion/ct-edward-snowden-amnesty-edit-0127-20140127_1_edward-snowden-u-s-debate-u-s-officials

Obama, Barack (2007). Presidential directive 19. National Security Presidential Directives.

Oversight Legislation: Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. 100th Cong. 2 (1987).

Reuters (2011, June 10). Thomas Drake, Ex-N.S.A. official, accepts plea deal in leak case. *New York Times*. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/us/11justice.html?_r=1&

Samuelsohn, D. (2014, February 25). NSA watchdog: Snowden should have come to me. *Politico*. Retrieved November 12, 2014, from <http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/nsa-inspector-general-edward-snowden-103949.html>

Sasser, J. (2006). Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National Security. *U. Rich. L. Rev.*, 41, 759.

Shane, S. (2010, June 11). Obama Takes a Hard Line Against Leaks to Press. *New York Times*. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/us/politics/12leak.html?th=&emc=th&pagewanted=p&_r=0

Sinnar, S. (2013). Protecting rights form within? Inspectors general and national security oversight. *Stanford Law Review*, 65(5), 1055.

Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S. Ct. 763, 62 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1980).

Snepp, F. (2013, July 3). Snowden and a muzzled free press. *CNN*. Retrieved November 30, 2013, from <http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/opinion/snepp-journalists-espionage/index.html>

Snowden seeks world's help against charges. (2013, November 1). *USA Today*. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/01/snowden-clemency-letter/3360961/>

Spitz, M., & Strobele, H. (2013, November 17). Give Snowden asylum in Germany. *New York Times*. Retrieved November 22, 2013, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/18/opinion/give-snowden-asylum-in-germany.html>

Vladeck, S. I. (2007). Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press. *Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev.*, 1, 219.

Volcovici, V. (2014, March 28). Edward Snowden won't return to U.S without amnesty, legal adviser says. *Reuters*. Retrieved November 12, 2014 from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/26/us-usa-security-snowden-idUSBREA0P0LG20140126>

INCENTIVE, SHOCK, OR NEITHER? THE IMPACT OF CROATIAN ACCESSION ON BOSNIA'S EU NEGOTIATIONS

Image Attributions

“Sarajevo Twilight” by BloodSaric-Own Work. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported via Wikimedia Commons.

“Milorad Dodik” by Demokratska Stranka DS-uploaded by BokicaK. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic via Wikimedia Commons.

Endnotes

¹ Mujanic; Sadik Ahmetović.

² Schimmelfennig.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Kelley; Kubicek; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier.

⁵ Kubicek; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier.

⁶ Varshey.

⁷ Berman.

⁸ Jukic.

⁹ Office of the High Representative.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹² European Union.

¹³ European Union.

¹⁴ European Union.

¹⁵ CEFTA Secretariat.

¹⁶ European Union.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ CEFTA Secretariat.

¹⁹ Rajčević.

²⁰ *The Economist*.

²¹ European Union.

²² b92.net.

²³ Ekinci.

Works Cited

Berman, Sheri. 1997. “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic.” *World Politics* 49: 401–29. doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0008.

Brussels, Belgium: CEFTA Secretariat, 2012. s.v. "CEFTA Trade Statistics Half Year Update." http://192.232.255.119/~cefta/sites/default/files/Cefta_trade_1h2012.pdf (accessed July 17, 2013).

"b92.net." Accessed July 17, 2013. http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?y=2012&m=08&dd=16&nav_id=81798.

The Economist, "economist.com." Accessed July 17, 2013. <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21573595-politicians-need-work-together-if-bosnia-join-european-union-balkan-dysfunction>.

Ekinci, Mehmet. "Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research." Accessed July 17, 2013. <http://setav.org/en/5-questions-croatias-eu-membership/opinion/6876>

EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Europa.ba." Accessed July 17, 2013. <http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/Default.aspx?id=74&lang=EN>.

European Union, "European Union." Accessed July 17, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/enlargement/countries/bosnia-herzegovina/profile_en.pdf.

European Union, "European Union." Accessed July 17, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/ba_rapport_2010_en.pdf.

European Union, "European Union." Accessed July 17, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/ba_rapport_2011_en.pdf.

European Union, "European Union." Accessed July 17, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/ba_rapport_2012_en.pdf.

Hayden R (2005) 'Democracy' without a demos? The Bosnian constitutional experiment and the intentional construction of nonfunctioning states. *East European Politics and Societies* 19(2): 226–59.

Howard, Marc Morj. 2003. *Civil Society and Democratization. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*. doi:10.1086/420676.

Jukic, Elvira. balkaninsight.com, "Fule Advises Bosnia to Emulate EU-Member Croatia." Accessed July 17, 2013. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fule-calls-for-progress-in-bosnia>.

Jukic, Elvira. balkaninsight.com, "Why Bosnia's Protest Movement Ran out of Steam." Accessed September 26, 2014. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/why-bosnia-s-protest-movement-ran-out-of-steam>

Kelley, Judith. 2004. "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions." *International Organization* 58 (03): 425–57. doi:10.1017/S0020818304583017.

Kubicek, Paul. 2003. *The European Union and Democratization. Europe and the Nation State*.

Mujanic, A. (2014, February 18). Who's Afraid of Milorad Dodik? Retrieved March 10, 2013.

O'Dwyer, Conor. 2012. "Does the EU Help or Hinder Gay-Rights Movements in Post-Communist Europe? The Case of Poland." *East European Politics*. doi:10.1080/21599165.2012.721094.

O'Loughlin, J. 2010. "Inter-Ethnic Friendships in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina: Sociodemographic and Place Influences." *Ethnicities* 10 (1): 26–53. doi:10.1177/1468796809354153.

Rajčević, Srđan. "Balkaninside.com." Accessed July 17, 2013. <http://www.balkaninside.com/croatia-is-accessing-the-eu-on-july-2013-what-does-that-mean-for-the-rest-of-us/>.

Sadik Ahmetović: Bojim se da je cilj protesta podjela Federacije BiH. (2014, February 9). Retrieved March 10, 2014.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy*. no. 4 (2004): 661–79.

Varshney, Ashutosh. 2001. "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond." *World Politics*. doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0012.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA APPLICATION OF U.S. AFRICA COMMAND SIGNALS AFRICA'S INCREASING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Image Attributions

"AFRICOM Seal" by Unknown Author. Work of U.S. Federal Government, permission in public domain via Wikimedia Commons.

"President Obama Participates in the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Family Photo" by U.S. Department of State by PD-USGov under Flickr. Work of employee or official in U.S. Federal Government, permission in public domain via Wikimedia Commons.

"U.S. Army Africa 'Train the Trainers' in Ghana 09" by US Army Africa from Vicenza, Italy. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic via Wikimedia Commons.

"ACOTA Training in Sierra Leone - Flickr - US Army Africa" by US Army Africa from Vicenza, Italy. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic via Wikimedia Commons.

Endnotes

¹ Frazer, J. (2008, February). AFRICOM: The American Military and Public Diplomacy. Speech presented at the Annenberg School of Communication, Program on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ The Fund for Peace. (2014). *Fragile States Index 2014*. Retrieved from <http://ffp.statesindex.org/>.

⁵ United States Institute of Peace. (2001). *Special Report on Peacekeeping in Africa*. Retrieved from <http://www.usip.org/publications/peacekeeping-in-africa>.

⁶ Warner, Lesley Anne. (2008). *Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should be a Priority for the United*

States. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/04/africa-priority-united-states>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ UN. (2014). MINUSMA Facts and Figures. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts>.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The White House Office of the Press Secretary. (2014). President Obama at Conclusion of the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. Retrieved from <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/text-trans/2014/08/20140806305230.html#axzz3EAaNfBIC>.

¹¹ The White House Office of the Press Secretary. (2014). Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa. Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-peacekeeping-africa>.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ African Summit Yields \$37 Billion in U.S. Commitment. (August 2014). Retrieved from <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2014/08/20140807305242.html?CP.rss=true#axzz3EAaNfBIC>

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Robinson, D. Obama Outlines Partnership Model with Africa. (June 30, 2013). Voice of America. Retrieved from <http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-outlines-partnership-model-with-africa/1692362.html>.

¹⁷ The White House Office of the Press Secretary. (2009). Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament. Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ PBS News Hour. (2013) Assessing the Substance and Symbolism of Obama's Africa Trip and Outreach. Transcript retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/july-dec13/africa2_07-02.html.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Mesfin, Berouk. (2009). The establishment and implications of the United States Africa Command: An African Perspective. Retrieved from <http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/the-establishment-and-implications-of-the-united-states-africa-command-an-african-perspective>.

²² The White House Office of the Press Secretary. (2014). Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice "Africa and America: Partners in a Shared Future." Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/30/remarks-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice-africa-and-america-partne>.

²³ Jervis, Robert (1970). *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The White House. (2010). National Security Strategy. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense. (2010). Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

²⁸ The White House. (2012). U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs. (2012). 2012 Posture Statement: Statement of General Carter Ham to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Retrieved from <http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/>

[article/8832/2012-posture-statement-statement-of-general-carter](http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/8832/2012-posture-statement-statement-of-general-carter).

³² U.S. Africa Command. (2014). Retrieved from <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command>.

³³ U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs. (2008). Senior Pentagon, State Department Officials Discuss Militarization of Foreign Policy at Congressional Hearing. Retrieved from <http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/article/6274/senior-pentagon-state-department-officials-discuss>.

³⁴ U.S. Africa Command. (2014). Retrieved from <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command>.

³⁵ U.S. Africa Command. (2014). Retrieved from <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/cornerstones>.

³⁶ U.S. Department of State. (2014). Fact Sheet: Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/203841.htm>.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² CJTF-HOA Public Affairs. (2011). African Union Stands Up Peace Support Operations Center. Retrieved from <http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/8479/african-union-stands-up-peace-support-operations-c>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Volman, D. (June 2008). AFRICOM: The New Military Command for Africa. African Security Research Project. Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. Retrieved from <http://concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project/?p=12>.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Defense. (2012). Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf.

⁴⁶ Brown, D. E. (2013, September 24). AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command. Letort Papers. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. Retrieved from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1164>

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Mboup, M. D. (2008), *The African Perception of the United States' Post- 9/11 Africa Policy and AFRICOM* (Master's Thesis). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 2008. Retrieved from <http://govwin.com/knowledge/africans-perception-united-states-post911/27401>.

⁴⁹ U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs. (2013), AFRICOM Leaders Discuss Command's Mission with Nigerian Journalists. Retrieved from <http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/transcript/10306/af-ricom-leaders-discuss-commands-mission>.

AN ANALYSIS ON THE REGULATION OF GREY MARKET CYBER MATERIALS

Image Attributions

"Cyber Security at the Ministry of Defence MOD" by Harland Quarrington. Licensed under the Open Government Licence v1.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

"Computer-Police" by Stijn.Berghmans-Own Work. Licensed under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication via Wikimedia Commons.

"Defense.gov Photo Essay" by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison. Work of employee or official in U.S. Federal Government, permission in public domain via Wikimedia Commons.

Endnotes

- ¹ Interpol, <<<http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime>>>
- ² 18 U.S. Code 1030 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers, <<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030>>
- ³ Subtitle D: Cyber-Related Matters, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, <<https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1960/text>>
- ⁴ See note 1
- ⁵ Cyber Timeline, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/Cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm>>
- ⁶ Page 81-83, The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco, <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2013.784468>>
- ⁷ Pg 5-6, 2013 Data Breach and Investigation Report, <file:///Users/kelseyannu-essuman/Downloads/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2013_en_xg.pdf>
- ⁸ Perlroth and Sanger, “Nations Buying as Hackers Sells Flaws in Security Code”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html?_r=0>
- ⁹ Greendberg, Andy, “Meet the Hackers Who Sell Spies the Tools to Crack Your PC” <<http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/21/meet-the-hackers-who-sell-spies-the-tools-to-crack-your-pc-and-get-paid-six-figure-fees/>>
- ¹⁰ Ibid
- ¹¹ See note 8
- ¹² The White House, Launch of the Cybersecurity Framework, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/12/launch-cybersecurity-framework>
- ¹³ See note 8
- ¹⁴ Rosenquist, “How Offensive Cyber Security is Changing the Industry” <<https://communities.intel.com/community/itpeernetwork/blog/2013/10/08/how-offensive-cyber-security-is-changing-the-industry>>
- ¹⁵ Menn, “U.S. Cyber strategy stokes fear of blowback”, <<http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/usa-cyberweapons-idINDEE9490AX20130510?type=economicNews>>
- ¹⁶ Stockton and Golabek-Goldman. “Curbing the Market for Cyber Weapons”, Pg 2-12 <https://classesv2.yale.edu/access/content/group/plsc125_s14/Readings%20-%20Week%25/2013%20-%20Golabek-Goldman%20-%20Stockton%20-%20Curbing%20the%20Market%20for%20Cyber%20Weapons.pdf>
- ¹⁷ Zero Day Initiative, <<http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/about/>>
- ¹⁸ See note 16
- ¹⁹ Hacker One, < <https://hackerone.com/feed> >
- ²⁰ Ibid
- ²¹ Pg 16-18, National Academies of Sciences, “Professionalizing the Nation’s Cybersecurity Workforce?: Criteria for Decision-Making”, <https://classesv2.yale.edu/access/content/group/plsc125_s14/Readings%20-%20Week%205/2013%20-%20Professionalising%20the%20Nations%20Cybersecurity%20Workforce.pdf>
- ²² See note 9
- ²³ Ibid
- ²⁴ See note 21
- ²⁵ Langer, <<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5772960>>
- ²⁶ Farewell and Rohozinski, Pg 23-30, “Stuxnet and the future of Cyber War” <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2011.555586>>
- ²⁷ Ibid
- ²⁸ See note 1

²⁹ PcTools by Symantec, “What is a Zero-Day Vulnerability” <<http://www.pctools.com/security-news/zero-day-vulnerability/>>

³⁰ Riley and Vance, “Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race”, < <http://www.businessweek.com/primer/articles/540-cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race> >

³¹ See note 29

³² See note 16

³³ See note 30

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ See note 1

³⁶ Rosenquist, “How Offensive Cyber Security is Changing the Industry” <<https://communities.intel.com/community/itpeernetwork/blog/2013/10/08/how-offensive-cyber-security-is-changing-the-industry>>

Works Cited

Bronk, Christopher and Eneken Tikk-Ringas, “The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco”. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol 55 no.2 April-May 2013, Pg 81-82. <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2013.784468>>

Farwell, James P. and Rafal Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War”. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol 53 no.1, February-March 2011. Routledge. Pg 23-30. <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2011.555586>>

Goldsmith, Jack. “Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies.” Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol 73, Issue 4, Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory. 11 Oct. 2013. Web. 1 March. 2014. <<http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3143&context=cklawreview>>

Greenberg, Andy, “Meet the Hackers Who Sell Spies the Tools to Crack Your PC (And Get Paid Six Figure Fees)”, Forbers, March 12, 2012, < <http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/21/meet-the-hackers-who-sell-spies-the-tools-to-crack-your-pc-and-get-paid-six-figure-fees/>>

H.R. 1960: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 113th Congress, 2013-2015. Text as of Jul 08, 2013. <<https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1960/text>> [Internet accessed on March 2nd 2014]

HackerOne < <https://hackerone.com/feed> > [Internet Accessed on February 27, 2014] International Criminal Police Organization. <<http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime>> [Internet accessed on March 1st 2014]

Langer, Ralph, “Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon.” IEEEExplore, Focus. May/June 2011. Web. 1 March 2014. <<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5772960&tag=1>>

Menn, Joseph, “Special Report: U.S. Cyberwar Strategy Stokes Fear of Blowback”, Reuters, May 10, 2013, <<http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/usa-cyberweapons-idINDEE9490AX-20130510?type=economicNews>>

Microsoft Safety and Security Center, “What is a botnet?”, <http://www.microsoft.com/security/resources/botnet-what-is.asp> [Internet accessed on February 27, 2014]

National Academies of Sciences, “Professionalizing the Nation’s Cybersecurity Workforce?: Criteria for Decision-Making”. The National Academies Press. (2013). Web. 7 Feb. 2014. Pg 16-18. <https://classesv2.yale.edu/access/content/group/plsc125_s14/Readings%20-%20Week%205/2013%20-%20Professionalising%20the%20Nations%20Cybersecurity%20Workforce.pdf>

Nato Review Magazine, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/Cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm>> [Internet accessed on February 24, 2014]

PcTools by Symantec, “What is a Zero-Day Vulnerability?”, <http://www.pctools.com/security-news/zero-day-vulnerability/> [Internet Accessed on February 27, 2014]

Pereloth, Nicole and David E. Sanger, “Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code”, 13 July 2013, The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html?_r=0>

Riley, Michael and Ashlee Vance. “Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race”, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 20 July 2011. Web. 3 March 2014. <<http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/540-cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race>>

Rosenquist, Matthew, “How Offensive Cybersecurity is Changing the Industry”, Intel, 8 Oct 2013. Web. 1 March 2014. <<https://communities.intel.com/community/itpeernetwork/blog/2013/10/08/how-offensive-cyber-security-is-changing-the-industry>>

Stockton, Paul and Michele Golabek-Goldman. “Curbing the Market for Cyber Weapons”. (2013). Pg 2-12. <https://classesv2.yale.edu/access/content/group/plsc125_s14/Readings%20-%20Week%205/2013%20-%20Golabek-Goldman%20_%20Stockton%20-%20Curbing%20the%20Market%20for%20Cyber%20Weapons.pdf>

The White House, “Launch of the Cybersecurity Framework”, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/12/launch-cybersecurity-framework>> 12 Feb. 2014. [Internet Accessed 17 Feb 2014]

U.S. Code § 1030 - Fraud and related activity in connection with computers. <<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030>> [Internet accessed on March 2nd 2014]

Verizon, “2013 Data Breach Investigations Report”, Pg. 6, <file:///Users/kelseyannu-essuman/Downloads/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2013_en_xg.pdf>. 2013. Web. 2 March 2014.

Zero Day Initiative < <http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/about/>> [Internet Accessed on March 2nd 2014]

ICELAND’S CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY A ROADMAP TO SUSTAINABILITY AND GOOD BUSINESS

Image Attributions

“Olafur Ragnar Grimsson - World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2011” by World Economic Forum. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic via Wikimedia Commons.

FRONT COVER

Image Attribute

“UN-Sicherheitsrat - UN Security Council” by Neptuul-own work. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported via Wikimedia Commons.

Any image unattributed are of public domain and were taken from Wikimedia Commons.

THE WORLD.
IN SMALL BYTES.

the
Diplomacist
diplomacist.org

The Diplomacist is a collaborative online journal borne of The Cornell International Affairs Review with writers from all over the country. The insularity of the modern media is blinkering our population, portraying events abroad as so foreign that they have little to no influence on our lives and thinking. At The Diplomacist we recognise this and see it as a deleterious social progression. We live in a global village, and it is the aim of The Diplomacist to give students a forum to convey their political opinions and interests on a global scale, outside the superficiality of the modern media.

Please visit our site at www.diplomacist.org. If you have any questions, comments, or are interested in writing for The Diplomacist, please contact our editor, Lucius Elliott, at: lae63@cornell.edu

Please send submission to chx2@cornell.edu. For the Spring 2015 issue, the deadline for submissions is February 28, 2015. Submissions should be approximately 3,000 words, but exceptions may be granted upon further discussion with the editor. Writers are encouraged to look at articles published in previous issues to get acquainted with the style of the CIAR. These can be found in electronic form on our website, www.diplomacist.org.

The Cornell International Affairs Review proudly presents the Cornell Political Forum Award for excellence in undergraduate composition. The Cornell Political Forum was founded in 1987 and ceased publication in the early 2000s. In recognition of the organizations' shared characteristics, Cornell Political Forum alumni have generously endowed an award to be presented by the CIAR in honor of an undergraduate writer whose work demonstrates insightful analysis and overall academic excellence. The recipient will be selected from each year's publication by a jury consisting of advisers to the CIAR and its executive board. We believe this award will encourage undergraduate writers to share their ideas with Cornell and the broader community.

In order to make a donation to our organization, you can visit Cornell University's Give to Cornell website (www.giving.cornell.edu). There, select option to give online under the designation of "Cornell University – Other". In the description, please specify that the gift is going to the Cornell International Affairs Review. If you would like assistance in planning your gift or preparing the paperwork for tax credit, you can also contact the Office of Trusts, Estates and Gift Planning (gift_planning@cornell.edu or 1-(800)-481-1865 and they can guide you through the process.

The Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, International Student Programming Board, Cornell Institute for European Studies, Department of Government, The Lencquesaing Family, The Pedraza Family, Michele Benton, Robert Andolina, Mitchell Alva, Sarah Eversman. We thank our contributors for their support.

MASTHEAD

Presidents	Nicholas Stieg, 2015 Lucius Elliott, 2015
Editor-in-Chief	Coco Xiao, 2016
Vice-President of Programming	Ryan Bisailion, 2016
Secretary	Jessie Weber, 2017
Head of Global Networking	Lucas Png, 2017
Junior Editors	Hannah Cashen, 2016 Danielle Sochaczhevski, 2015 Ju Jung-Lee, 2016 Yu Chen Xue, 2016
Events Staff	Kate Monson, 2016 Dallas Bennett, 2017 Ryan Bisallion, 2016 Eugene Zhelezniak, 2016 Gabi Balbin, 2015
Editor-in-Chief	Lucius Elliott, 2015
Associate Editors	Jacob Brunell, 2015 Demetri Papageorgiou, 2016
Staff Writers	Kwame Newton, 2016 Conna Walsh, 2015 Zihao Liu, 2016 Max Brashear, 2016 Ali Peterson, 2016 Yuchen Richard Wang, 2017 Puneet Brar, 2017