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Contents

Party-Army Politics and the Origins of the Chinese 2013 ADIZ <i>Matthew Kim Sullivan, Georgetown University</i>	4
Contraceptive Coercion: Family Planning and Population Policy in Nasser-Era Egypt <i>Madeline Smith, University of Pennsylvania</i>	36
The Philippines Mystery: Rodrigo Duterte's Popularity <i>Hyung Jun You, Loyola Marymount University</i>	53
Divergent Outcomes: Examining the Efficacy of Sanctions in Achieving U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in Iran <i>Adam Mohsen-Breen, Harvard University</i>	79
The Use of Victor-Victim Historical Narratives in Chinese Nationalist Discourse <i>Raquel Leslie, Harvard University</i>	105
About the Cornell International Affairs Review	134

PARTY-ARMY POLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE 2013 ADIZ

MATTHEW KIM SULLIVAN¹

INTRODUCTION

The year of 2013 was an eventful year for Chinese foreign policy. In the fall of 2013, China announced its New Silk Road Economic Belt and its New Maritime Silk Road projects. Xi Jinping's speeches that year indicated that Xi Jinping envisioned that China would take a positive leading role in Asia-Pacific community.² Ironically, in the midst of its diplomatic proclamations, China also announced the inception of an Air Defense Identification Zone that encompassed a swath of territory over the East China Sea including the disputed Senkaku (or Diaoyu) Islands. In short, this ADIZ requires foreign aircraft entering the designated area to notify Chinese authorities of their approach.³ Some experts have suggested that the Chinese created the 2013 ADIZ to assert a new political order in the East China Sea.⁴ However, there are many inconsistencies in the formation and execution of the ADIZ that make this assertion improbable. For example, a 2014 U.S. China Commission report stated:

An ADIZ allows China greater flexibility in asserting sovereignty over its ECS claims in a manner that does not controvert international

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² Jinping Xi, *The Governance of China* (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2014). 315-329, 360-367, 378-396.

³ "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," Xinhua News Agency, November 23, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911635.htm.

⁴ Michael J. Green, "Safeguarding the Seas: How to Defend Against China's New Air Defense Zone," *Foreign Affairs*, December 2, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-12-02/safeguarding-seas>.

conventions. The ADIZ is an expansion of China's attempt to exert legal and administrative control over the Senkaku Islands. Having issued a number of measures to assert de jure governance over disputed maritime regions, China now has laid an additional legal foundation intended to justify control of contested airspace.⁵

Yet, since there is no internationally legitimate basis for the installation of an ADIZ, nor are states legally required to comply with ADIZ protocol, it seems unlikely that the ADIZ substantially increased China's de jure power over the sea zone.⁶ In addition, while Chinese military presence in the East China Sea has increased since the establishment of the ADIZ, there is little evidence that indicates this military buildup is a direct result of the installation of the ADIZ.⁷ Furthermore, it appears that Chinese planners established the ADIZ despite its international unpopularity and its apparent lack of resolve to enforce its claims.⁸ China's ADIZ was denounced by many countries including the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Japan.⁹ International criticisms of the ADIZ include:

1. The ADIZ could be seen as a move to aggressively revise the regional order in the East China Sea.¹⁰
2. China failed to consult with other governments prior to establishing the zone.¹¹

⁵ Kimberly Hsu, "Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China Greater Flexibility to Enforce East China Sea Claims" (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 14, 2014), <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20ADIZ%20Staff%20Report.pdf>.

⁶ David A. Welch, "What's an ADIZ?: Why the United States, Japan, and China Get It Wrong," *Foreign Affairs*, December 9, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2013-12-09/whats-adiz>.

⁷ Michael Pilger, "ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the South China Sea, and Implications for the United States," Staff Research Report (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2, 2016), 6.

⁸ Pilger, "ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the South China Sea, and Implications for the United States," 4.

⁹ Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ)," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 40 (February 3, 2014),

¹⁰ Michael J. Green, "Safeguarding the Seas: How to Defend Against China's New Air Defense Zone," *Foreign Affairs*, December 2, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-12-02/safeguarding-seas>.

¹¹ Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification

3. China is attempting to assert control over the controversial Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
4. The 2013 ADIZ provocatively overlaps ADIZs already established by other states.¹²

In fact, several states have flown military aircraft over the zone in protest against the China's move.¹³ What makes this move even more peculiar is that it is inconsistent with other diplomatic and soft power goals the CCP was promoting in foreign affairs. During 2012-2014, some of these included the Belt and Road project,¹⁴ the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 'commitment to peaceful development' with other Asian states,¹⁵ and its desire to promote economic cooperation.¹⁶ In truth, the ADIZ does very little to augment Chinese de facto or de jure control over Northeast Asia. This leads us to wonder why the Chinese decided to establish the 2013 ADIZ, despite the fact that it had little strategic or intrinsic value and was inconsistent with other diplomatic agendas. Experts have proposed several possible explanations, which are explained below

Explanation I: Chinese Leaders Were Under Increased Nationalistic Pressure

Some scholars have suggested that competing nationalism in East Asia has pressured the Chinese foreign policy and military establishment towards increasingly provocative rhetoric and actions, such as the ADIZ.¹⁷ China's colonial legacies and historic resentments inform and reinforce contemporary insecurities of national sovereignty and security; and many of China's territorial

Zone (ECS ADIZ)," 11.

¹² Hsu, "Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China Greater Flexibility to Enforce East China Sea Claims," 2.

¹³ Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ)." 12.

¹⁴ Jinping Xi, "Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt: September 8, 2013," in *The Governance of China* (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 315–19.

¹⁵ Jinping Xi, "China's Commitment to Peaceful Development: March 28, 2014," in *The Governance of China* (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 290–289.

¹⁶ Jinping Xi, "Work Together for a Better Asia Pacific: October 7, 2013," in *The Governance of China* (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 378–88.

¹⁷ Michael J. Green, "Safeguarding the Seas: How to Defend Against China's New Air Defense Zone," *Foreign Affairs*, December 2, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-12-02/safeguarding-seas>.

disputes, particularly with Japan, are fueled by this nationalism.¹⁸ These scholars argue that domestic nationalism played the defining role in the creation of the ADIZ; however, nationalism does not adequately explain this specific course of action, nor does it explain the PLA's inflated role in the establishment of the ADIZ.

Explanation II: China Made a Miscalculation in Either its Decision or Implementation

Other analysts suggest that the ADIZ was, in essence, a “mistake.” In an article in the *Diplomat*, Zheng Wang speculates that faulty communication within the CCP foreign policy and defense apparatuses could have led to rash decision-making from senior policymakers resulting in the ADIZ.¹⁹ This belief is rooted in the difficulty and sluggishness that Chinese policymakers experience coordinating their foreign policy and military bureaucracies owing to the lack of a strong unifying national security apparatus.²⁰ In addition, other scholars imply that the Chinese decision-makers misunderstood what the ADIZ is and what it can be used for,²¹ since the ADIZ both failed to increase Chinese security and stability in the East China Sea and failed to give China tactical benefits in territorial disputes.²² This theory essentially posits that the CCP leadership simply did not foresee the diplomatic consequences of the ADIZ, and would help explain the implementation failures and the lack of resolve in enforcing the zone. However, the notion that China made a mistake or miscalculation does not adequately explain why did the ADIZ, as a military solution, eventually emerged as the most dominant course of action. Additionally, this explanation does not account for why the CCP refused to either correct or distance itself from its misstep upon receiving international backlash. In fact, after the announcement, both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to publicly support the ADIZ and brush off criticisms from foreign governments and media despite this loss of face.

¹⁸ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

¹⁹ Zheng Wang, “China’s Puzzling ADIZ Decision Making,” *The Diplomat*, December 18, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-puzzling-adiz-decision-making/1/2>.

²⁰ Alice Miller, “The PLA in the Party Leadership Decision-making System,” in *PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 59–82.

²¹ David A. Welch, “What’s an ADIZ?: Why the United States, Japan, and China Get It Wrong,” *Foreign Affairs*, December 9, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2013-12-09/whats-adiz>.

²² Welch, “What’s an ADIZ?: Why the United States, Japan, and China Get It Wrong.”

Explanation III: The ADIZ was Designed to Reconcile Party-Army Interests and Goals

Finally, the most compelling theory argues that the installation of the ADIZ was a part of Xi Jinping's attempts to cultivate loyalty within the PLA by aggressively addressing the security and political concerns of the Chinese military establishment.²³ By 2013, events in the East China Sea pressured Party leadership to turn towards the hard power component of their coercive diplomacy. This meant that the CCP needed a loyal and advanced military in order to pursue their political goals. By bolstering and supporting the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the CCP is also reasserting the fact that the PLA likewise needs CCP leadership to legitimize its mission. The relationship between the CCP's political goals and the PLA's institutional interests as an explanation for the decision-making behind the 2013 ADIZ was alluded to in scholarship by Nan Li,²⁴ but was not thoroughly explored in great detail.

The Argument

This paper advocates for the Party-Army relations explanation, but also asserts that because of China's expanding foreign policy objectives, and because of its entrenched security dilemmas surrounding its territorial disputes, the relationship balance shifted in favor of the senior-level decision-making which permitted the establishment of the ADIZ. Unlike the army it would have been difficult for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) to advocate its interests without a perceived security threat against China. In other words, the loosely-enforced 2013 ADIZ is a result of a combination of internal and external dynamics, namely rising tensions in the East China Sea region that inflated the PLA's influence as political actors. When PLA and Central Military Commission (CMC) elites attempted to capitalize on external pressures facing China's national security elites, the CCP submitted to the institutional

²³ Nan Li, "Top Leaders of the PLA: The Different Leadership Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 33–53.

²⁴ Nan Li, "Top Leaders of the PLA: The Different Leadership Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 33–53.

interests of the PLA. This paper first discusses the theory and history behind the Chinese party-army relationship. Second, it defines the PLA's institutional interests and demonstrates how these interests shifted between 2012 and 2014. The third and fourth section brings forth evidence of the increasingly powerful influence the institutional interests of PLA, particularly the PLAAF, brought to bear in 2013. The fifth section elaborates on the regional political context that catalyzed the Chinese military establishment's surge in influence.

DESCRIBING THE PARTY-ARMY RELATIONSHIP

This essay postulates that the main force behind the establishment of the ADIZ is the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA is the main military apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party's foreign policy. Scholars often describe this unique relationship between China's military and civilian leaders as a 'Party-Army' relationship, which means that senior PLA officers belong to the CCP and that the PLA is designed to serve the CCP, not the state of China. This essentially means that the PLA's fate is intrinsically tied to the Party, and that the Party's interests are prioritized over institutional ones.²⁵ With that said, as CCP leaders become more invested with their foreign policy interests, China's defensive parameters will shift outward and the Party will find itself increasingly reliant on the military establishment to support CCP goals. As a result the defense establishment, while politically constrained, will have more leverage to lobby for their institutional interests.

Several scholars have written about the decision-making power and chain of command that results from the complex relationship between the PLA and the CCP. Isaac Kardon and Phillip Saunders state that the PLA can be described as an interest group of the CCP whose influence is defined by its complex relationship with Party leaders and their political agendas.²⁶ The PLA's interests are primarily "institutionally-derived," largely focusing on the appointment of military personnel, the future direction of Chinese defense policy and the allocation of defense spending.²⁷ As a result, the PLA has become more professional. The

²⁵ Isaac B. Kardon and Phillip C. Saunders, "Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 33–53.

²⁶ Kardon and Saunders, "Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group," 33–53.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 37-38.

interests between the military and Party bureaucracies have diverged as the PLA interests have become less personalized and more specialized.²⁸ With that said, the PLA does not generally act as an autonomous institution, and while it may lobby for political concessions via the CMC, the PLA technically remains subordinate to the Party. This subordination has experienced cycles of faltering and reinforcement of loyalty towards the CCP since Mao first stated, “The Party controls the gun; the gun must never be allowed to control the Party.”²⁹ The un-professionalization of the PLA must be emphasized because the CCP relies on the military to back party control in times of crisis, both during internal unrest and conflicts with foreign entities. The absence of a subordinate, devoted military would mean almost certain extinction for the Party.

There are, above all, two major assets that the CCP needs from the PLA. First, the CCP desires a military that is equipped with a modern arsenal and the required technical expertise to make the most efficient use out of this arsenal. It is important to understand that the PLA, as a military institution, has specialized knowledge in warfare which the CCP cannot gain anywhere else. As Kardon and Saunders state, “Secrecy about military capabilities and operations and the PLA’s ability to tightly censor information helps insulate many military issues from civilian scrutiny, even by government officials with security clearances.”³⁰ Furthermore, is possible that the PLA may choose guard its activities and expertise so jealously, in part, because such information gives them decision-making power. Moreover, “few Chinese academics or civilian think-tanks have the expertise or standing to write knowledgeably about military issues, and those who do are usually restricted to the very limited information limited in the public domain.”³¹ Civilian leadership knows that it is in their national security interests to maintain robust military spending and develop long-range strike capacity. This concern was reflected when Xi Jinping stated, “We will enhance our combat readiness through full-scale combat simulation exercises, and reinforce the belief that as soldiers our mission is to fight, and as officers our mission is

²⁸ Kardon and Saunders, “Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group,” 37-38.

²⁹ Ellis Joffe, “Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect,” *The China Quarterly*, no. No. 146 (June 1996), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/655470>, 303-306.

³⁰ Kardon and Saunders, “Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group,” 42.

³¹ Isaac B. Kardon and Phillip C. Saunders, “Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group,” in *PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 42.

to lead our men to victory. We must train our troops strictly and provide rigid criteria for real combat, modernize our armed forces, and enhance their capacity to fulfill diverse military tasks.”³² Because of the military’s monopoly on in-demand military expertise, it may significantly guide discussion regarding the military’s role and priorities in national security decision-making.

The second criteria that the CCP expects from the PLA is total obedience to the Party. As mentioned before throughout China’s modern history the PLA are more often than not the defining factor that allows the communist party to survive in times of political turmoil. Scholars point towards the 1960s Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident as being decisive crucibles for PLA allegiance toward the Party.³³ In each case, the communist leadership was able to reassert control over the PLA, but at serious costs.³⁴ Alice Miller states, “...it is not hard to imagine crises and stresses that provoke doubts among the leadership about the system’s effectiveness or that provide opportunities for members of the oligarchy to subvert it.”³⁵ This is why Xi Jinping has been adamant that ideological doctrine remains an integrated part of a soldier’s training. He states,

We must uphold the Party’s leadership of the armed forces. This is central to the nature and mission of the armed forces, the future of socialism, the enduring stability of the Party, and the lasting peace of the armed forces. In our efforts to strengthen our armed forces we must treat theoretical and political education as our first priority of our officers and soldiers, and the whole armed forces will follow without hesitation the commands of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission at all times and under all conditions.”³⁶

This is essentially the same message that Mao Zedong stated some 74 years and

³² Jinping Xi, “Build Strong National Defense and Powerful Military Forces: December 8-10, 2012,” in *The Governance of China* (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 240–241.

³³ Ellis Joffe, “Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect,” *The China Quarterly*, no. No. 146 (June 1996), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/655470>, 305-307.

³⁴ Andrew Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

³⁵ Alice Miller, “The PLA in the Party Leadership Decision-making System,” in *PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 82.

³⁶ Jinping Xi, “Build Up Our National Defense and Armed Forces: November 16, 2012,” in *The Governance of China* (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 238.

ten days earlier when he proclaimed, “Every Communist must grasp the truth, political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.”³⁷ Like Mao and Deng before him, Xi Jinping understands that the very fabric of the CCP’s grip on a single, cohesive China relied on a military bureaucracy that was unquestionably loyal to the Party. Xi Jinping has both “curried favor” with the military through his hardline approach to foreign policy, and has also shown resolve in disciplining the PLA, which is indicated by CMC calls for reform and anti-corruption trials targeting certain high-ranking PLA generals.³⁸ In one November 2013 PLA meeting, a politburo official stated, “...it is imperative to ensure Party’s absolute leadership over the military, ensure being able to win battles and perform missions, and ensure that the people’s army will never change its color.”³⁹ In addition to military enforcement of social stability, an obedient PLA is foundational to the Party’s national security agenda. Chinese strategic thought remains convinced that China’s borders are vulnerable to hostile states, and that the country faces territorial incursions and loss of sovereignty without a strong military.⁴⁰ The military is therefore considered essential to the CCP’s credibility towards the Chinese people in having the capability to maintain control over a stable and secure China. The evolving role of the PLA will be further discussed further in the essay.

The indispensability of the PLA means that the civilian leaders of the CCP must cede greater institutional decision-making to the military leadership. This means that commanders have a level of autonomy when executing decisions. Strictly military decisions are made by the Central Military Commission, which acts as a liaison between the military and civilian leadership. Alice Miller

³⁷ Zedong Mao, “Problems of War and Strategy,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, 2004, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm.

³⁸ Nan Li, “Top Leaders of the PLA: The Different Leadership Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi,” in *PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 128-131. See also: “CMC Leaders Participate in Thematic Meetings of Democratic Life in PLA Major Units,” *People’s Daily*, October 18, 2013, <http://en.people.cn/90786/8429055.html>.

³⁹ “CMC Leaders Attend PLA’s Party Building Meeting,” *China Military Online*, November 11, 2013, <http://en.people.cn/90786/8452256.html>.

⁴⁰ J. Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 2012, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-08-16/how-china-sees-america?page=show>.

has made the observation that through the CMC organizational structure, the Party and the PLA have managed to strike a balance between the need for PLA representation and the need to keep PLA decisions focused on the military and not influencing broader CCP politics.⁴¹ Yet, by 2012 the PLA began participating in a wider scope of national security and foreign policy activities.⁴² Research by Eric Hagt indicates that the twenty-first century rise of China has allowed the PLA to take more initiative in military diplomacy, such as the PLA's leading role in the military-to-military dialogues that deescalated a 2010-2011 Sino-Indian border dispute.⁴³ This is reflected by the 2012-13 Defense white paper which states,

Deepening security cooperation and fulfilling international obligations, China's armed forces are the initiator and facilitator of, and participant in international security cooperation. They uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, conduct all-round military exchanges with other countries, and develop cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party. They promote the establishment of just and effective collective security mechanisms and military confidence-building mechanisms.⁴⁴

What this research indicates is that the PLA has been proactive in promoting its own agenda both by working with the CCP via the CMC, as well as by communicating with foreign counterparts directly (or indirectly in the case of the ADIZ).

The mechanisms that link the CCP with the PLA and the extent PLA advocates are successful at pushing their agenda are difficult for scholars to

⁴¹ Alice Miller, "The PLA in the Party Leadership Decision-making System," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 73, 79.

⁴² "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2012," Annual Report to Congress: (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2012), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf.

⁴³ Eric Hagt, "The Rise of PLA Diplomacy," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 237.

⁴⁴ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2012," Annual Report to Congress: (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2012), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf.

accurately identify and measure because of the lack of transparency in the Chinese decision-making process. However, based on the research and scholarship that does exist, we can conclude that that—unlike a totally professional military—the PLA tends to exert more sway in policymaking when the CCP needs the military’s expertise and obedience. During twentieth-century crises, the PLA would occasionally have sudden bouts of disproportionate power which would then require a rebalance to the civil-military relationship.⁴⁵ In contemporary times, PLA influence is more likely a result of more gradual CCP policy changes. With that said, because the CCP sees the PLA as an integral part of its expanding security interests, the CCP (and the CMC) must, at the very least, demonstrate a willingness to cater policy towards certain actors within the not-so-professional force, particularly the navy and the air force, in order to win over their obedience and loyalty.

INTERESTS OF THE PLA

The question remains; what are the interests of the People’s Liberation Army? As stated before, the current equilibrium between the PLA-CCP means that the interests are generally institutional. The primary institutional objective of the PLA is to expand and enhance its capability to fulfill Chinese foreign policy objectives. These include maintaining influence in defense industries and research and development, increasing defense resources and funding, and increasing PLA control over their own defense budget.⁴⁶ Moreover, the PLA wants to be recognized for its importance to the CCP foreign policy. Kardon and Saunders state,

The PLA’s role in winning the Chinese civil war and its status as a party-army provide a continuous basis for demanding prestige and respect from CP leaders. Military leaders want respect for the importance of

⁴⁵ Ellis Joffe, “Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect,” *The China Quarterly*, no. No. 146 (June 1996), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/655470>. 305-307. Andrew Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁴⁶ Isaac B. Kardon and Phillip C. Saunders, “Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group,” in *PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 47.

the PLA mission and expect deference to the officers and men responsible for carrying it out. This concern is not only symbolic, but substance: the desire for respect extends into a desire for acknowledgement of the PLA's professional expertise and right to speak authoritatively on military matters, in both public and private settings.⁴⁷

In other words, they want the CCP leadership to pay attention and promote the contributions of PLA missions, especially in national defense and territorial integrity. This section asserts that PLA interests shifted by 2012-2013, intensifying its resolve in enforcing Chinese maritime sovereignty. This is reflected by the change in tone between the 2010 and 2012 State Council white papers on national defense. The 2010 white paper places a higher emphasis on promoting peaceful development and insuring "social harmony and stability" than it does on asserting territory, which is mostly in reference to cross-strait relations.⁴⁸ However, in the 2012 defense white paper, sovereignty and territorial integrity play a much larger role in the paper's strategy and duties for national defense. As a report from CNA suggests, the 2012 report prepares China for a slightly more pessimistic outlook on international relations that emphasizes China's maritime disputes.⁴⁹ While the 2012 white paper still indicates some concern for the stability of China, especially along its borders, by centering its paper on border, coastal, and airspace security, the Chinese military apparatus announces a new prioritization of military strength and assertiveness in its stance towards territorial disputes with China's neighbors. This policy shift is also reflected by two U.S. Department of Defense reports to Congress on the growth and capabilities of the Chinese military. In 2012, the DOD assessment stated the following,

In 2011, Taiwan remained the PLA's most critical potential mission, and the PLA continued to build the capabilities and develop the doctrine necessary to deter the island from asserting its sovereignty; deter, disrupt, or deny effective third-party (including the United States) intervention in

⁴⁷ Kardon and Saunders, "Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group," 45.

⁴⁸ "China's National Defense in 2010" (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, April 2, 2011), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2010.htm>.

⁴⁹ Daniel M. Hartnett, "China's 2012 Defense White Paper: Panel Discussion Report," CNA China Studies (Center for Naval Analysis, September 2013), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/CCP-2013-U-005876-Final.pdf.

a potential cross-strait conflict; and defeat Taiwan forces in the event of hostilities.⁵⁰

This seems to suggest that senior Chinese policymakers were more focused on Taiwan as a threat than on territorial dispute with other neighboring states. Party leaders perhaps viewed the PLA, including the PLAAF, as serving as leverage in their cross-strait diplomacy. It is clear from the 2012 State Council Paper and the 2013 DOD assessment on Chinese military capabilities⁵¹ that the PRC-Taiwanese relations remained a priority in Chinese strategic outlook. However as mentioned before, territorial disputes with Japan began to seriously come to CCP attention by early 2013.

The 2013 DOD assessment indicates that by 2013, China's territorial disputes with Japan greatly intensified after Japan began maneuvering to legally claim the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (despite being aware of conflicting Chinese claims).⁵² Because Japan's actions are, in the minds of Chinese military and civilian elites, violations of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the leadership must produce a strong response. Failure to adequately answer to foreign encroachments could result in a severe loss of face for both the CCP leadership and the PLA commanders, whose historical legitimacy is derived from its duty towards the preservation of the Chinese people and Chinese sovereignty. In light of the 2012-2013 controversies, the Party felt pressured to enhance the PLA's role in Chinese foreign policy issues to placate its domestic audience and reestablish itself as the legitimate, unchallengeable authority over China. It was in the context of the 2012 white paper on national defense and the expanding PLA mission in which the 2013 ADIZ was born.

GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE PLA AIR FORCE

Evidence indicates that the CCP wanted holistically increase the volume and the efficiency of its military force. This is reflected by the overall steady

⁵⁰ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2012," Annual Report to Congress: (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2012), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf, 2-3.

⁵¹ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," 4.

⁵² "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," 3.

increases in the PLA budget,⁵³ as well as its continuous research and development of military technology that enhances China's strike capabilities. More specifically, the PLA Army can no longer be the disproportionate focus of the PLA as it traditionally was during the Twentieth century. Chinese planners have realized that a modern military requires an effective 'blue-water' navy and an air force that balances offensive and defensive purposes. This section specifically looks at the gradual evolution of the PLAAF because of its role as primary coordinator of Chinese air defense and enforcer of air sovereignty, which would include the 2013 ADIZ.

A 2012 essay on the PLAAF influence on policy making states, "As a result of bureaucratic politics, an analysis of missions divided between air force and other services does not suggest that the PLAAF's role and influence are likely to change in the future..."⁵⁴ PLA's traditional emphasis of the ground forces, as well as competition from the PLA Navy, still inhibit the PLAAF from taking a dominant voice in PLA and national security policy. However, both the State Council defense white papers as well as U.S. Department of Defense reports suggest that general modernization efforts between 2010 and 2013 have allowed the PLAAF to make strides in increasing its capabilities as well as its purview of military influence. This mandate, alongside the fact that one of the CMC vice chairman positions has been occupied by a succession of air force generals, demonstrate that the PLAAF is seen by Chinese policymakers as a crucial element to Chinese national security plans.

The changing tone between the 2010 and the 2012 white papers on defense not only demonstrates a general increase in attention to China's territorial disputes in Chinese national security, but also implies a greater role for the PLAAF. The 2012 paper on defense strategy stresses the importance of the PLAAF and Chinese air security stating,

The PLAAF is the mainstay of national territorial air defense, and in accordance with the instructions of the CMC, the PLAA, PLAN and PAPF

⁵³ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," Annual Report to Congress: (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 45.

⁵⁴ Xiaoming Zhang, "The PLAAF's Evolving Influence Within the PLA and upon National Policy," in *The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012), 86.

all undertake some territorial air defense responsibilities. In peacetime, the chain of command of China's air defense runs from the PLAAF headquarters through the air commands of the military area commands to air defense units.⁵⁵

Admittedly, the 2010 white paper also states that the "PLAAF is the mainstay of national territorial air defense..."⁵⁶ In both the 2010 and the 2012 paper, the role of the PLAAF is elaborated in the papers' general descriptions on the PLA's forces and respective duties. However, unlike the 2010 paper, the role of the PLAAF is further elaborated in a separate paragraph on the role air defense plays in "defending national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity."⁵⁷ This most likely indicates that by 2013, as China's eastern theater territorial disputes intensified, the CCP's view on the role of defending airspace played a more prominent position than it did in previous years. While this mandate of responsibility (over PLAN or PLAAF) may seem to be an obvious choice, once again this must be considered in the context of a military that has glorified the historic role of its ground forces.

The 2013 Department of Defense assessment of the PLA also indicates that the role of the PLAAF and its subsequent political influence in national security policymaking, increased after 2010. The 83-page 2013 assessment discusses a number of "special topics" that the 43-page 2010 report does not. Two of these special topics concern PLAAF matters: the development of PLAAF stealth aircraft and the development of national integrated air defense systems. According to the report, China hopes that in developing aircraft with stealth technologies it may increase its regional military power in terms of its strike capabilities and projection.⁵⁸ The incorporation of stealth aircraft and anti-stealth aircraft capabilities could be used to for a multitude of offensive and

⁵⁵ "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces" (Information Office of the State Council, April 16, 2013), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2012.htm>.

⁵⁶ "China's National Defense in 2010" (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, April 2, 2011), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2010.htm>.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," Annual Report to Congress: (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). 66.

defensive missions beyond China's borders.⁵⁹ The 2010 report also discussed China's interest in stealth technology; however, the DOD's more acute interest in these advances in 2013 may indicate a growing concern for the fruition of Chinese technological aspirations. These investments in stealth fighter technology demonstrates a determined interest in correcting some of the imbalances discussed by Zheng Xiaoming's 2012 critique of PLAAP role in Chinese national security.⁶⁰

The second PLAAF special topic that the reports discusses is the development of an Integrated Air Defense System designed "to defend key strategic cities and borders, territorial claims, and forces against threats from the air," particularly from precision-strike weaponry.⁶¹ According to the report, this IADS is a "multilayered system" that would employ a number of different anti-aircraft measures such as batteries and surface to air missiles.⁶² In addition, the IADS is developing early warning aircraft and platforms and a C4ISR network, which can target enemy aircraft and missiles and enhance communication as well as the responses between different units and weapons systems.⁶³ The development of the IADS reflects China's growing concern for the defense of its territorial integrity and air sovereignty. Moreover, the report implies that the PLAAF is a leader in this defense system with some support from the PLA navy.⁶⁴ CMC investiture in projects such as the IADS and the research and development of aircraft that use an advanced level of technology demonstrates that 1.) by 2013, the PLAAF was beginning asserting its presence in Chinese national security goals; 2.) the completion of such systems might very well have further positive effects on the CCP's perception of the PLAAF as a valuable, if not absolutely necessary independent asset.

What the China State Council white papers and the U.S. DOD assessments of China's combat-readiness show is that from 2010-2013, China showed signs of

⁵⁹ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," 66

⁶⁰ Xiaoming Zhang, "The PLAAF's Evolving Influence Within the PLA and upon National Policy," in *The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012). 87-89.

⁶¹ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," Annual Report to Congress: (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 66.

⁶² "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," 67.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 66-68.

attempting to increase its military capacity to assert Chinese territorial claims, both maritime and airspace. While China's military interest in modernization and high-tech warfare stems back well before the 2010s,⁶⁵ new arguments with Japan over old territorial disputes, as well as the presence of a new, assertive General-Secretary, the PLA had further incentives to accelerate its institutional interests in both expanding their role and their military might. Furthermore, DOD reports show that within these evolutions, the PLAAF (which had suffered from historic neglect) now stood to gain a vital place in the PLA's renewed sense of purpose to protect the Party and the Chinese people from foreign violations of Chinese sovereignty. By 2013, the PLAAF was on the receiving end of greater attention and patronage from military and civilian elites.

PARTY-ARMY POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF A SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA

As stated before, this paper puts special emphasis on the role of party-army relations in Chinese national security decisions, but changes in this relationship do not occur in a vacuum outside of external politics. Rather a security dilemma has reshaped the party-army relationship. M. Taylor Favel argues that there are three directions the PLA may lobby CCP policymakers toward regarding CCP stances on territorial disputes: the PLA may push for new territorial claims, for an expansion of regarding pre-existing Chinese territorial claims, or a more aggressive foreign policy approach advocating and enforcing territorial claims. Using Favel's premise, the ADIZ is a result of PLAAF attempts to pressure the CMC and CCP into a new means of enforcing Chinese airspace claims.⁶⁶ In fact, Favel and Shinji Yamaguchi claim that PLA commanders, such as Lanzhou District Airforce Commander Zhu Qingyi, were pushing for an ADIZ years before 2013.⁶⁷ However this failed to pass during the Hu Administration.

⁶⁵ Paul H.B. Godwin, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949-1999," in *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949*, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (New York: Routledge, 2015).

⁶⁶ Taylor M. Favel, "The PLA and National Security Decision-making: Insights from China's Territorial and Maritime Disputes" (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2015), 250-252.

⁶⁷ Shinji Yamaguchi, "Briefing Memo: The Foreign Policy of Xi Jinping's Administration and The Establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone" (The National Institute for Defense Studies News, September 2014), http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2015/east-asian_e2015_03.pdf.

⁶⁸What accounts for the timing of the East China Sea ADIZ? The answer is that in 2012-2013, Japan and China were engaged in a territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This is a maritime territorial dispute between China and Japan that flared up in 2012 and in 2013, but it has its roots in claims dating back to the early 1900's.⁶⁹ Although these islands hold little intrinsic value, they do have strategic value, and more importantly, political value. When Japan decided to nationalize these islands,⁷⁰ the CCP found itself scrambling to legitimize its historic territorial assertions in the region, salvaging Party legitimacy. Because of this external stimulus the CCP automatically found itself at a new equilibrium with the PLA, in which the PLA had an improved position to leverage their institutional interests. In other words, the CCP's increased need for military power loyal to the CCP mission meant that the CCP had to become more acquiescent to PLA lobbying and offered them an opportunity to assert more decision-making clout. Requests and ideas, especially those that have been floated by military generals, were more likely to be approved.

By early 2013, the Chinese Communist Party began to believe that its neighbors, particularly Japan, were challenging an order that safeguarded Chinese territorial claims. The Sino-Japanese dispute over control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has a legacy that stretches well beyond 2012. Scholars like M. Taylor Favel argue that, "Before September 2010, China had pursued a largely passive approach to the dispute over the Senkakus. Indeed, China sought to minimize attention to the dispute."⁷¹ His research suggests that People's Daily and PLA Daily articles mentioning the dispute only increased in number after 2012.⁷² Moreover, he also argues that military engagement in the area was kept to a minimum during

⁶⁸ Yamaguchi, "Briefing Memo: The Foreign Policy of Xi Jinping's Administration and The Establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone."

⁶⁹ For more information on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute: "How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties." BBC News, November 10, 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>.

⁷⁰ Michael Green et al., "Senkaku Islands Nationalization Crisis," Counter-Coercion Series: (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2017), <https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-senkaku-nationalization/>.

⁷¹ Taylor M. Favel, "The PLA and National Security Decision-making: Insights from China's Territorial and Maritime Disputes" (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2015), 265.

⁷² Favel, "The PLA and National Security Decisionmaking: Insights from China's Territorial and Maritime Disputes," 264-266.

this time,⁷³ although other scholars have made cases that would dispute the latter point.⁷⁴ Regardless, neither the 2008⁷⁵ nor 2010 State Council white papers on defense mention China's territorial disputes with Japan at all; yet, 2012's paper published in April 2013 does. This strategic change, as well as their strong allergy to international pressure,⁷⁶ indicate an escalation of China's stance towards Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after the Japanese government 'purchased' them in September 2012.

The dispute between Japan and China had become a security dilemma⁷⁷ in which both governments felt the need to take preventative measures. For Japan, perceiving pressure from the Chinese, this meant taking control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Even if Japan felt justified in claiming legal jurisdiction over the islands in 2012, doing so removed any strategic ambiguity that remained between Japan and China regarding the legal stance of this territory. The removal of this strategic ambiguity was a problem for the CCP leadership. The Party had long since proclaimed these islands to be Chinese territory, albeit they could either emphasize or de-emphasize this claim based on its overall strategic relations with Japan.⁷⁸ Once Japan further committed itself to its claims in September 2012, China lost the option of divorcing the Senkaku Island disputes from its foreign policy towards Japan.

It is essential to comprehend that the Party cannot afford to appear to be making territorial concessions to a foreign power without a strong objection, especially to state like Japan, whose relationship with China carries enormous

⁷³ Taylor M. Fravel, "The PLA and National Security Decision-making: Insights from China's Territorial and Maritime Disputes" (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2015), 265.

⁷⁴ Michael J. Green, "Safeguarding the Seas: How to Defend Against China's New Air Defense Zone," *Foreign Affairs*, December 2, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-12-02/safeguarding-seas>.

⁷⁵ "China's National Defense in 2008" (Information Office of the State Council, January 20, 2009), http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm.

⁷⁶ "Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China" (State Council Information Office, September 26, 2012), http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043212.htm

⁷⁷ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic199080.files/Readings_for_October_16_/Christensen.IS.99.pdf.

⁷⁸ J. Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, *China's Search For Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 123-126.

historic baggage. Since China's conception in 1949, the Party's legitimacy was based on the prosperity and security of a unified Chinese society. Thus societal stability, economic growth, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty are unconditional foundations of CCP legitimacy. Any internal or external obstacles to these goals are a challenge to the CCP's authority in the eyes of both the Party and the Chinese people. Thus, after 2012, the CCP came under enormous public pressure to strongly condemn Japan and to take measures against further alleged violations of Chinese sovereignty. For the CCP, this security dilemma meant that it felt the need to refocus its military efforts on defending Chinese-claimed sea zones and airspace in order to maintain the legitimacy of the Party. The CCP knows that their overall obligation to Chinese society may only be satisfied through a PLA that is loyal, efficient, and equipped for modern warfare. On the other hand, during this time, the CCP was not necessarily ready to gear up for outright armed conflict. In such an escalation, China would risk facing the brunt edge of the U.S. military in addition to the Japanese Maritime Defense Forces. This would not have been in its interests, which often emphasized economic growth and overseas investment opportunities.⁷⁹ By investing in the PLAN and PLAAF, and supporting their initiatives to build up China's coastal defenses—initiatives such as the 2013 ADIZ—the CCP is giving these military organizations attention and recognition. At the same time, the CCP leadership needed to avoid escalating the dispute into a crisis that might have had serious consequences for China. And in this sense, the ADIZ satisfied this objective.

As this was a military policy, it was the Ministry of Defense—acting as the face of the military apparatus—that publicly announced the installation of the ADIZ and issued informative briefings that were meant to justify the government's stance. These statements explained that the ADIZ was perceived as a necessary measure to insure air space safety and security and to defend Chinese airspace sovereignty by “avoiding misunderstanding and misjudgment.”⁸⁰ These public MOD statements attempt to portray China's ADIZ as legal and rational international behavior. MOD spokesmen have even indicated that the ADIZ was

⁷⁹ For further indication of the broader economic and political goals of the CCP and Xi (2012-2014) see below: Xi, Jinping. *The Governance of China*. Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2014.

⁸⁰ Yansheng Geng, “Statement by Defense Ministry Spokesman Geng Yansheng on China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),” Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, December 3, 2013, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/dhfkbsq2/>.

a tactical success for China, stating, “Actually, since the announcement of the East China Sea ADIZ, a majority of civil aviation companies with their air routes traversing the area have reported flight plans to China’s civil aviation department, including some airlines of Japan.”⁸¹ These statements serve not only to implicitly endorse the ADIZ, but also back the PLA’s vision of a ‘safe’ way to exercise China’s right to defend its territorial integrity. Of course, by promoting the ADIZ, the MOD is also promoting the PLAAF that coordinates and enforces it, thus bolstering the overall prominence of the air force.

Interestingly, the Defense Ministry is not the only department that is promoting the ADIZ. The aftermath of the ADIZ inception brought forth a tirade of questions, concerns, and criticism for other states. In all of these cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was delegated the task to promote the ADIZ and defend it from foreign criticism. Through a series of statements between November 25, 2013 and February 8, 2014, the MFA spokesperson responded to criticism from Japan, the United States, and Australia reasserting the Defense Ministry’s comments that the ADIZ was a legal and responsible measure to insure the security of China’s air space.⁸² In addition, on numerous occasions, the spokesperson indicated that the ADIZ was a response to direct threats to China’s air security in the East China Sea, and characterized ‘right-winged forces’ in Japan as underminers of East Asian peace and stability.⁸³ Indeed, these statements are public promotions of the ADIZ and the PLA’s mission to uphold CCP’s dedication towards national sovereignty; however, there is another aspect that is interesting about this series of MFA comments. Like many other governments, the diplomatic establishment and military establishment may find themselves competing with each other for policy-setting sway over senior-

⁸¹ Geng, “Statement by Defense Ministry Spokesman Geng Yansheng on China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).”

⁸² Lei Hong, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on the Japanese Leader’s Improper Comments on the Establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone by China,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, December 15, 2013, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t1109028.htm>.

⁸³ Ibid.

- Gang Qin, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on US Comments on China’s Establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, November 25, 2013, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t1102056.htm>.

most CCP officials. Hagt points out that the PLA's growing influence in national security policymaking is demonstrated by the occasional divergence between the stances of the PLA and the MFA on certain policy issues.⁸⁴ In a sense, the MFA's statements could also be interpreted as acknowledgment and deference to the PLA's authority and expertise in such matters. And through these statements, one might infer that the PLA has emerged as the dominant policy-setting voice in CCP national security goals.

This CCP endorsement is vital to the sacred CCP-PLA relationship. Certainly, advancing Chinese military power will produce some tangible strategic advantages for China. With that said, what was significant about the ADIZ was not that it produced measurable benefits to Chinese national security, but that it represented a change in the party-army balance of power. As both David Welch⁸⁵ and Michael Green⁸⁶ correctly show, the 2013 ADIZ neither gave China leverage in its territorial dispute with Japan, nor did it establish the legitimacy of Chinese claims. And for that matter, as mentioned before, China completely failed to enforce the ADIZ when countries—ignoring protocol in protest—flew their planes over the zone. The ADIZ had little effect on China's ability to fulfill security objectives. Yet, the ADIZ was not irrational. In the eyes of Chinese policymakers, the ADIZ's practical security objectives were simply of secondary importance to its political objectives. The 2013 ADIZ was established in a larger context of military activities, in which the CCP was attempting to show the PLA, including the PLAAF, that the military institutional interests matter. And by showing the PLA respect for its mission in the service of the Party, it is at the same time reminding the PLA to remain unquestionably loyal and obedient to the CCP's national security policies and authority.

⁸⁴ Eric Hagt, "The Rise of PLA Diplomacy," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 238. David A. Welch, "What's an ADIZ?: Why the United States, Japan, and China Get It Wrong," *Foreign Affairs*, December 9, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2013-12-09/whats-adiz>.

⁸⁵ David A. Welch, "What's an ADIZ?: Why the United States, Japan, and China Get It Wrong," *Foreign Affairs*, December 9, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2013-12-09/whats-adiz>.

⁸⁶ Michael J. Green, "Safeguarding the Seas: How to Defend Against China's New Air Defense Zone," *Foreign Affairs*, December 2, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-12-02/safeguarding-seas>.

COUNTERARGUMENTS

Some scholars may argue that this paper ignores public opinion and the rise of nationalism in Party-Army decision-making. Certainly nationalism and public opinion do play a role in how both the CCP and the PLA perceive its constituent interests, as both derive legitimacy from serving the Chinese people. Sometimes, popular opinion further incentivizes both of these institutions towards certain policies, such as a hardline stance towards China's historic adversaries, or stronger CCP disciplinary measures against corruption in the PLA, business, or provincial leadership. However, the choice to establish the 2013 ADIZ, as opposed to a different course of action, is not likely a direct result of a major "push" by popular opinion.

Other critics of this argument might point toward Xi Jinping's assumption of power in 2012 and argue that his more adept control over the PLA (versus Hu Jintao's) is the main reason for the pivot in party-army relations, not the territorial disputes,⁸⁷ and this explains the differences between the 2010 and 2012 national security strategies. This essay does not dispute Xi Jinping's role in China's pivot to a more assertive foreign policy, nor does it deny his more confident position in party-army relations. Rather, it argues that because of the evolving capabilities of the PLA and because of a rise in China's perceived challenges to its sovereignty, Xi Jinping had greater incentive to take a more assertive role in party-army politics. The PLAAF was a notable beneficiary because of its inevitable role in coastal defense.

CONCLUSION

When analysts, pundits, and journalists talk about Chinese political advances in the Pacific, they often attempt to directly look at the resulting strategic outcome. Was it effective or not? Was it positive or negative? The problem with this approach is that it assumes that the Chinese State Council, the military establishment, and the CCP were acting as a perfect, singular decision-maker. But in reality, these organs cannot function as a unitary actor. Even though the

⁸⁷ Nan Li, "Top Leaders of the PLA: The Different Leadership Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 136-131.

Party is deferred to as the final political authority over Chinese policymaking, it is supported by powerful bureaucracies that have entrenched institutional interests. Party-Army relationship theory is important to understanding Chinese decision-making because it affects how Chinese defense and security policymakers define success and failure.

The 2013 ADIZ faced overwhelming international criticism and defiance from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Yet, China has not opted for vigorous enforcement of its ADIZ.⁸⁸ One might argue that this represents a coercive diplomatic and strategic defeat rather than a victory. However, to the CCP, the ADIZ's strategic and diplomatic result may not matter as much as its implications regarding the Party's relationship with internal bureaucracies. Likewise, while many reports and analyses have attempted to predict the possibility of a second ADIZ covering the South China Sea, such predictions are too difficult to make. As with the 2013 ADIZ, the decision to implement a SCS ADIZ would inevitably calculate the complex and perpetually shifting dynamics of the CCP-PLA relationship. Admittedly, to those of us who are not privy to the cabals of the PLA and CCP leadership, this 'unknown' factor remains too elusive and, for all practical purposes, incalculable for prediction.

This essay makes the argument that the installation of the ADIZ in November 2013 was authorized and endorsed by the CCP in order to cater to influential PLA institutional interests. After the Japanese government took unilateral actions regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, to senior Party members, China's territorial disputes were no longer merely a question of China's interstate relations but were now an existential matter of Chinese unity. The Party needed to show that it still maintained absolute control of Chinese sovereignty, even if it was contested by foreign powers. Because of the CCP's sensitivity to the escalation of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma surrounding their territorial disputes, the incentive to acquiesce and endorse PLA policies that would reflect PLA institutional interests substantially increased. Chinese governmental statements that announce, justify, and support the 2013 ADIZ further reflect the "conditional-compliance" relationship between the CCP and the PLA. By defending Chinese sovereignty,

⁸⁸ Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ)," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 40 (February 3, 2014), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/03/chinese-views-and-commentary-on-east-china-sea-air-defense-identification-zone-pub-54399>.

the PLA is seen as fulfilling an important duty in the service to the CCP and the Chinese people. Moreover, these statements demonstrate a shift in policy-setting weight from the other foreign policy-related institutions to the PLA and CMC. With that said, while the CCP requires the PLA's military expertise and power, as well as its unquestionable loyalty, in order to reinforce Chinese sovereignty, CCP backing of the ADIZ also works to fetter PLA interests to the overall CCP mission towards Chinese people.

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States of America, November 25, 2013. <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t1102056.htm>.

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CONTRACEPTIVE COERCION: FAMILY PLANNING AND POPULATION POLICY IN NASSER-ERA EGYPT

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INTRODUCTION

A woman's access to family planning methods and her ability to decide when she is ready to have children are important for both physical and mental well-being and benefits the future of her community, as healthy women are the bearers of the next generation. However, family planning programs of the Nasser regime in post-1952 Egypt – implemented during an era of intense restructuring and state-building following the end of British colonial rule – undermined reproductive freedom and transformed a seemingly individual matter into a concern of the state and foreign bodies as Egyptian and American officials sought to combat population growth. The coercion seen in these programs evoked criticism, suspicion, and opposition across the population as the regime, in conjunction with foreign organizations, embarked upon a vigorous program of social reform.

Throughout Nasser's regime, the family and the individual increasingly become the target of state interventions and reforms that sought to establish a new modernity. A chief concern of the regime was the nation's rapidly growing population due to high fertility and low infant mortality rates, which was seen as an issue of developing countries that placed Egypt at a disadvantage. The regime's commitment to social reform and the restructuring of a socialist nation placed population control at the forefront of Nasser's concerns, which led to the implementation of a vigorous family planning program in 1966, as stipulated by the 1962 *Charter for National Action*, a document outlining the emerging plan

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for the formation of an Arab Socialist state.² Such efforts brought reproduction, fertility, and contraception into the public realm; women soon became objects of population policy and were given little platform to voice their opinion on, while family planning became a national concern and the use of birth control emerged as a duty of citizenship.

The Nasser-regime family planning program was met with avid support from many, including physicians, American non-governmental organizations, and of course, governmental figures concerned with ameliorating the perceived “backwardness” of Egyptian society. However, many conservative and religious groups argued that family planning should be an individual choice within the boundaries of marriage, but not one inspired by self-interest or promiscuity, with a chief complaint being that the state’s family planning initiatives were overly focused on distribution of contraception, rather than education of women and families.³ This article will begin by introducing the rise and development of aid programs in post-colonial Egypt and analyze the origins of family planning initiatives during the Nasser regime following the implementation of the 1962 Charter for National Action. In doing this, I will examine the role that foreign beneficiaries, namely American organizations such as the Ford Foundation’s Population Council, had in Egyptian state programs. Subsequent sections will discuss the reactions said campaigns caused across the country – in the form of suspicion and criticism – through the lense of social and religious stigma surrounding contraceptive use in Egypt. Finally, I will discuss the importance of women’s health as an individual endeavour that should be driven not by force or political duty, but by education and encouragement of women across socio-economic divides to seek services and make informed decisions free of coercion.

To support my argument, I draw from contemporary literature, as well as literature produced during the Nasser regime that reflects the opinions of both scholars and those who spoke out against state family planning programs. In addition, I incorporate demographic data on contraceptive use and population published by the United Nations and other sources in order to analyze the trends and effectiveness in family planning methods following the implementation of

² Bier, Laura. “”The Family Is a Factory”: Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt.” *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 404-32.

³ Ali, Kamran Asdar, *Planning the Family In Egypt : New Bodies, New Selves*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002.

these programs.

THE NASSER REGIME AND THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF POPULATION POLICY

Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power on July 23, 1952, following a nearly bloodless military coup and overthrow of the monarchy. Though Egypt's status as a British protectorate was dissolved in 1922 following nearly forty years of British imperial rule, the British had maintained a strong grip over the Egyptian monarchy and continued to play a decisive role in Egyptian politics.⁴ Nasser and the "Free Officers" – armed with the goal of ruling for the people, rather than the wealthy elite – seized control of the government, forced the king to abdicate, and established a Republic for the first time in Egypt's history.

The Nasser regime can be conceptualized and separated into three distinct phases spanning his nineteen years in power. The first stage of the military regime, lasting from 1952-1956, operated with the intention of restructuring the government to create a mobilized, independent, and industrialized society.⁵ Following the abolition of the monarchy and establishment of the new Republic of Egypt, Nasser began to replace the traditional political elites with men of more specific trades, such as officers, engineers, economists, and technocrats. Along with this reassignment of power came new agrarian reforms that undermined the existing economic superiority of wealthy capitalists and redistributed land to small landowners. The second stage began in 1956, with Nasser's official appointment as President.⁶ This period coincided with the Suez Crisis, and thus political goals spanning these years were focused on economic planning and industrial reform. By the beginning of the third stage, beginning in 1961, the military regime had already nationalized most all banks, heavy industry, and insurance, while key economic processes were now state-owned.⁷ This created a program of centralized control, management, and ownership that placed the state machine at the center of every decision, rather than the people. With

⁴ Mansfield, Peter. *Nasser's Egypt*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965, 40.

⁵ Abdel-Malek, Anouar. *Egypt; Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change Under Nasser*. [1st American ed.] New York: Random House, 1968, iix-xi.

⁶ "Timeline: Egypt's 1952 revolution." *Gulf News, United Arab Emirates*: 24 July 2013. Infotrac Newsstand, Accessed 5 Dec. 2017.

⁷ Abdel-Malek, Anouar. *Egypt; Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change Under Nasser*. [1st American ed.] New York: Random House, 1968, xv.

rudimentary restructuring and financing taken care of, Nasser turned to focus his efforts on a new program of social reform whose main goal was to increase and support advancements already made in the nationalization of industry and power of the state. The third stage of the regime, spanning six years from 1961-1970, will be the focus of this paper, as it was during those years that the *Charter for National Action* – outlining a series of initiatives to form an Arab Socialist state, including family planning policies – was conceived, drafted, and put into motion.

On June 30th, 1962, Egypt's National Congress for Popular Powers approved President Nasser's *Charter for National Action*, introducing a new direction for national growth that was clearly outlined with specific methods and aims for achieving such goals.⁸ This doctrinal document was composed of ten chapters addressing topics including the necessity of revolution, true democracy, social reform, and foreign policy. Of these sections, eight dealt with domestic affairs and immediate problems facing Egyptian society. This confirms Nasser's priority of internal growth and expansion through economic, ideological, social, and political means, rather than through foreign policy. For the purposes of this analysis, I will focus on Section VII of the Charter, titled "Production and Society."

The seventh section of the Charter focuses on the means by which production and society interrelate, in which production includes agriculture, hydraulics, consumer-good industries, mining, and quarrying. Production emerged as the true test of dynamic Arab power; Nasser considered it the key to ending underdevelopment and national struggle, and used it to compare the nation's success to more industrialized states. However, the Charter states that the task of production is threatened immensely by population growth, which constitutes the "most dangerous obstacle" facing the Egyptian people in their drive towards raising the standard of production in an effective and efficient way.⁹ In order to overcome such an obstacle, Nasser stipulates methods of organizing the family along scientific lines in conjunction with increasing production:

While the attempts at family planning with aim of facing the problem of the increasing population, deserve the most sincere efforts supported by modern scientific methods, the need for the most rapid and efficient drive towards the increase of production necessitates that this problem should be taken into consideration in the process of production, regardless of the effects which may

⁸ The Revolution In Twelve Years, 1952-1964. Cairo: Information Dept., 1964, 12.

⁹ Nasser, Gamal Abdel, Draft of the Charter, May 21, 1962. [Cairo], 1962, 53.

result from the experiment of family planning.¹⁰

Though the above section only offers two brief phrases regarding family planning with rather indirect wording, it is the first governmental endorsement of contraception in Egyptian history.¹¹ While historically significant, the language of this section alters the perceived purpose of birth control. Rather than being a way to create healthy women and happy families, acting as a tool of female empowerment, birth control is identified as a way to combat population growth and benefit the prosperity of Egyptian industry. Essentially, the ability to control, or limit, the birth rate directly corresponds to the profitability of industry, agriculture, and the state's economy.

Chapter VII of the Charter also addresses the place of foreign aid in Egyptian social growth, and states that "foreign aid, regardless of source, is accepted in order of priority as follows: unconditional aid, unconditional loans, and finally, foreign investment for limited periods."¹² In this case, foreign aid was viewed as a sort of tax on countries with colonial pasts, as a way to compensate for past exploitation of peoples. This discussion will become relevant in later sections that address the place of foreign beneficiaries in family planning policy.

THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS ON CONTRACEPTIVE POLICY AND DISTRIBUTION

The nature of population policy in Egyptian policy changed over the course of the early 20th century. At the time of draft of the charter, the population was increasing by nearly 2.5% annually – a significant increase over the 1.41% rate noted in the 1947 census.¹³ The first discussion of population policy occurred in the late 1920s; however, King Ahmed Fuad I blocked reforms that could be seen as reducing the country's large peasant population in favor of a pro-natalist policy. Again, in the 1930s and '40s, reformers in Egypt and abroad began to raise concern about the rapidly increasing population, though

¹⁰ Nasser, Gamal Abdel, Draft of the Charter, May 21, 1962. [Cairo], 1962, 53.

¹¹ Horton, Alan W. "The Charter for National Action of the UAR: A Résumé of the Complete Document." *Northeast Africa Series* 4, no. 5 (July 1962): 16.

¹² *Ibid.*, 15.

¹³ Bier, Laura. "'The Family Is a Factory': Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt." *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 407.

this discussion manifested itself only in brief debates and did not inspire any policy change. After the Free Officers established the military regime in 1952, the state saw a large population as an indicator of military power.¹⁴ It was not until Nasser's presidency and subsequent implementation of social reform that any population policy was introduced.

The Nasser regime's new approach to population control was in part inspired by foreign bodies, notably American organizations. Following the end of World War II, U.S. policymakers began expressing their concern over the containment of communism and focusing on the economic and social atmospheres of countries in the Global South – especially those that had recently gained independence from European colonialism. The United States feared that rapidly growing populations in these countries would cause social, political, and economic destabilization of their developing post-colonial government that would leave these countries more susceptible to communist influence and disrupt the balance of power.¹⁵ This concern inspired the creation of many organizations, such as the International Planned Parenthood Foundation (IPPF), and the Population Council of the Ford Foundation.

The international organizations that operated in Egypt during the Nasser era fell into three categories: international donor agencies, such as the World Bank and United States Agency for International Development (USAID); private donors; and NGOs, such as the IPPF.¹⁶ NGOs held a particularly influential position in the realization of Nasser's family planning policy, since they provided technical information to educate government officials and direct services, such as access to contraception.

While NGO's in theory have the strategic advantage of being free from the interests or constraints of a particular governmental agency, it is important to acknowledge that discussions on their autonomy are often polarized, with some arguing their greatest advantage is their independence from national governments,¹⁷

¹⁴ Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998.

¹⁵ Bier, Laura. "“The Family Is a Factory”: Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt.” *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 408.

¹⁶ Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998, 7.

¹⁷ Esman, Milton. *Management Dimensions of Development Perspectives and Strategies*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1991.

and others pointing to the concept that NGO's are "dependant on governments for funding, while governments have come to depend on these NGO's as 'delivery vehicles,'"¹⁸ Though seemingly contradictory, these viewpoints both hold true. In the case of Egypt, the porosity of NGOs to multiple actors, including USAID, which funded many Egyptian NGO's and was launched in 1961 just prior to the initial discussion of state planning policy, offered the U.S. a global platform to intervene with population growth.¹⁹ At the same time, it is important not to conflate the reach and interests of American NGO's and the U.S. government—it was rather that high ranking government officials and those in control of various foreign aid initiatives shared similar goals, as argued by Dr. Maha M. Abdelrahman in her discussion on the politics of NGOs in Egypt.²⁰

Many of these NGOs were IPPF affiliates, such as the Egyptian Family Planning Association (EFPA). The EFPA initiated family planning efforts as early as 1961. However, it was not until 1966 that Egypt's National Family Planning Program was officially launched, signaling the creation of 1,991 clinics in governmental health bureaus, rural areas, and combined maternal-children's health centers. By 1968, the policy's operational base had grown to 2,631 clinics, which served over 230,000 women.²¹ These clinics functioned through the Egyptian Ministry of Health, but received much of their funding from private donors, including the partnership between the Ford Foundation and the Population Council (PC). The Ford Foundation funded the PC through a series of grants and planted offices in Cairo that served to oversee the distribution of contraceptive devices and monitor programs. The Population Council, whose headquarters were located in New York, possessed the medical and demographic specialists necessary to advise the Ford Foundation in return.²² This joint partnership funded a series of initiatives in Egypt throughout the 1950s, 60s,

¹⁸ Saxby, John. "Who Owns Private Aid Agencies?," in Sogge et al. *Compassion and Calculation. The Business of Private Foreign Aid*. Chicago: Pluto Press, 1996, 36.

¹⁹ Ben Néfissa, Sarah. *NGOs and Governance In the Arab World*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2005. 171

²⁰ Abdelrahman, Maha M. *Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs In Egypt*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2004.

²¹ H.K. Topozada, "Progress and Problems of Family Planning in the United Arab Republic," *Demography* 5, no. 2 (1968): 592-94.

²² Baron, Beth. "The Origins of Family Planning: Aziza Hussein, American Experts, and the Egyptian State." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 42.

and 70s, which stressed the medical side of family planning and promoted research on new technologies, rather than the education of women and families.

During the first few years of family planning efforts, clinics focused on the distribution of oral contraceptives, diaphragms, and condoms, as opposed to injections or IUDs, which were still considered experimental. An early request to the Population Council from Egypt was for 12,000 diaphragms and 12,000 foam tablets in 1958.²³ However, American organizations and individuals, notably the PC's demographics director W. Parker Mauldin, began to push IUDs as "more modern," despite their developing credibility and tendency to cause bleeding and infection due to the insertion process. A decision to offer cash incentives to physicians who favored IUDs over other methods sparked a controversy amongst Egyptians and Americans alike. However, the system was approved and adopted in 1965, and IUDs continued to be the favored device amongst clinics.²⁴ IUDs provide passive contraception after an initial activation event, and can be effective for several years at a time. While they are the right choice for many, they eliminate the participation of the female subject when utilized under coercive conditions, such as those seen in government-run clinics where education was not the focal point. Even though women were not forced to get IUDs, I argue that a lack of knowledge, explanation, and discussion surrounding the clinics' distribution of IUDs at such high volumes indicates the contraceptive's coercive usage. On the other hand, pills, diaphragms, and condoms can be utilised at the discretion of the woman, thus giving her more autonomy over her own reproductive decisions. In addition, active forms of birth control can be stopped at any point (such as when a woman is ready to become fertile again). American organizations' extreme push for IUDs reflect their interest in halting population growth over the health and reproductive freedom of women.

SOCIETAL RESPONSE: CONTESTATION AND UNCERTAINTY

In this section, I discuss two distinct societal responses which are critical in analysing the Egyptian public's view of the family planning policy – one that comes from a more culturally traditional perspective, and one that comes from a

²³ Mauldin, W. Parker, PC Office Memorandum, "Family Planning Activities in Egypt," June 30, 1958

²⁴ Baron, Beth. "The Origins of Family Planning: Aziza Hussein, American Experts, and the Egyptian State." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 42.

feminist perspective. While a woman's fertility was viewed with social acceptance and respect in Egyptian culture, contraceptive use often incited fears of sterilization and was criticized for undermining the purpose of marriage in Islam, which is to create a nurturing family and raise children.²⁵ For many, childbirth is a celebrated event and reflects upon the health of both a woman and her marriage, and a successful pregnancy can fulfill a perceived feminine duty and continue a father's name. This opinion is reflected in the literature of Shaykh al-Azhar Muhammed Shaltout, a professor at al-Azhar University during the Nasser regime, who identified state sponsored family planning as "repugnant to the natural law of the universe, which is for growth."²⁶ Furthermore, in a predominately agrarian society where marriage was considered an economic necessity, children were an economic asset due to their ability to help with labor and care for their elders; thus, a large measure of the status of women was derived from her childbearing potential.²⁷ For couples who held this religious and cultural sentiment close to heart, birth control and Egypt's vigorous family planning programs would be at intense odds with their values.

On the other hand, many women saw the program as an attack on their autonomy and ability to make informed decisions regarding their fertility. While Egyptian feminist activist groups did not outwardly criticize the state's approach to population control, they emphasized the importance of education as an integral component of a family planning program, in contrast to the state's focus on distribution. The role of educating women was taken on by several female activist groups operating in Egypt, who, through the first few decades of the family planning policy sought to educate women and their partners in making informed decisions surrounding birth control. One of the most influential proponents of these programs was Aziza Hussein, an Egyptian diplomat and population expert. In 1966, she worked with Egyptian officials in developing the family planning policy and founded the Family Planning Association in 1967.²⁸

²⁵ Bier, Laura. "'The Family Is a Factory': Gender, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt." *Feminist Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 424.

²⁶ Quoted in Badran, Margot. "Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt Laura Bier." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 10, no. 2 (2014): 134.

²⁷ El Hamamsy, Laila. "Belief Systems and Family Planning in Peasant Societies". SRC Reprint Series. 1958

²⁸ Talhami, Ghada. *Historical Dictionary of Women in the Middle East and North Africa*.

While Hussein and other women's organizations supported programs grounded in community building from a social angle, government officials stressed a medical approach that they saw as more effective in meeting their goals of state-building and modernization. Hussein was eager to collaborate with the state in order to create a private family planning program that would supplement the state's public programs, and merge the social and medical aspects of family planning.²⁹ Female reformers such as Hussein initially held an influential position in advocating birth control distribution and family planning policies, and shared goals of decreasing population growth through work with foreign beneficiaries; however, they were eventually overpowered by the state's intense focus on increasing distribution, rather than education and thus had little platform to voice their dissent with the trajectory of such programs. Also voicing a disappointment with the lack of educational initiatives was Soha Abdel Kader, who in the Report on the Status of Egyptian Women from 1900-1973 presented to the Ford Foundation in Cairo, argued that the program, conducted through 3,000 health facilities had "failed to communicate the concept of family planning in its broad sense to the public and has met with least success in the peasant communities."³⁰ This assessment further indicates the shared sentiment amongst educated females, who viewed regime's inability to successfully implement the program a result of its focus on having many facilities rather than advancing women's health and population control by education.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: POPULATION THROUGHOUT THE 20TH CENTURY

While Egypt saw a temporary decrease in growth rate throughout the 60s, the population underwent a drastic and continuous increase from 1975-1990, reaching its peak at 3.1 percent in 1980.³¹ This pattern was likely the result of a less active family planning program throughout the 70s following the end of Nasser's presidency. After the October War of 1973, the government released an official population statement and 10 year plan; however, its objectives quickly fell

Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2012, 173, ProQuest Ebook Central.

²⁹ Baron, Beth. "The Origins of Family Planning: Aziza Hussein, American Experts, and the Egyptian State." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 42.

³⁰ Abdel Kader, Soha. *A Report On the Status of Egyptian Women, 1900-1973*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Social Research Center, 1973, 55.

³¹ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition*

to the sidelines. The policy merely reiterated what had already been noted twenty years prior regarding the impending doom of an increasing population, and the plan placed several tasks ahead of demographic goals, including an increased standard of living, mechanization of agriculture and industry, and improving education.³² Without any clear objectives and a lack of commitment from officials, this program was not sustained or pursued in any vigorous fashion. In 1980, the Egyptian government released a second policy, the “National Strategy Framework for Population, Human Resource Development, and the Family Planning Program,” which outlined clear goals and numerical targets.³³ Reflecting on shortcomings of policies from previous decades, the plan put a greater emphasis on citizens’ freedom to participate in family planning. Population control became a paramount policy objective for many countries such as India and China in the 1990s, and, as a result, the United Nations coordinated an International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994. Following this conference of global leaders, Egypt created a consolidated Ministry of Health and Population,³⁴ which indicated the government’s increasing emphasis on population control among national interests.

In recent years, Egypt has seen a continuation of birth control usage amongst married couples, though the population growth rate continues to fluctuate without a clear or consistent decrease. Among a group of reproductive age women sampled from neighborhoods near family planning clinics, 93 percent expressed support for family planning measures, while only 40 percent were currently practicing contraception.^{35,36} From an international standpoint, the focus of UN Population Fund (UNFPA) projects in Egypt has shifted from family planning to a broader concept of reproductive health that includes the

³² Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998, 24.

³³ National Population Council. *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS), 1992 preliminary report*. Cairo: 1993.

³⁴ Jain, Anrudh, ed. *Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico*. New York: The Population Council, 1998, 25.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

³⁶ According to a 2015 report published by the UN on trends in world contraceptive use, the world average rate of contraceptive use is 64%. Throughout the continent of Africa, this rate is 33% and in North America 75%.

needs and rights of youth, however, most field programs in Egypt continue to focus their efforts on family planning for married women alone. There have been some efforts by the UNFPA to address youth reproductive health featuring advocacy and education with the goal of raising awareness and encouraging dialogue.³⁷ Clear objectives and a willingness to educate and empower women are the most important factors in a successful state population policy. While government engagement is crucial for access to family planning, reproductive health should be a personal endeavour driven by educated and informed decisions; I argue that if family planning programs had emphasized education so that women were empowered to make decisions about their bodies and their families, these programs would have had the additional effect of recognizing women's equal citizenship. The battle over the country's population policy and future family planning programs – and, in turn a successful relationship between the Egyptian state and its female citizens – relies heavily on a strong, long-term commitment to recognizing and sustaining these factors.

CONCLUSION

The family planning programs implemented throughout the Nasser regime should have granted women a new role in Egyptian society as political bodies; by endorsing contraception as the chief form of population control, Egyptian officials inadvertently began to assert the fact that women held the autonomy to control and, in turn, remediate what was deemed the greatest threat to Egyptian industry and upward growth. Had the efforts of female reform groups – focused on the empowerment of women and their reproductive choices – been successful, a different future may have been possible. However, as I demonstrate, the program implemented by the state was not sufficiently grounded in social impact and community building, which undermined the state's goal of social growth and upward momentum. Although aimed at the realisation of prosperity and well-being of the people, the promises outlined in the charter and the goals of growth as a whole were beyond the scope of the regime's abilities and were left unaddressed. The understanding of reproductive freedom as an individual endeavour empowers women and allows them the autonomy to become active participants in their

³⁷ Khalil, Tawhida, Juliette Boog, and Rania Salem. "Addressing the Reproductive Health Needs and Rights of Young People since ICPD: The Contribution of UNFPA and IPPF, an Egypt Country Evaluation Report," 2003, 9.

own lives and society as a whole. Through this historical analysis, I show how reproduction can be seen as a matter of nation building as well as a means of participation and redefined citizenship. Unfortunately, in Egypt, reproduction was not considered through the lens of individual freedom and was instead a missed opportunity for the advancement of women in Nasser's Egyptian society.

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THE PHILIPPINES MYSTERY: RODRIGO DUTERTE'S POPULARITY

HYUNG JUN YOU¹

ABSTRACT

Rodrigo Duterte won the Philippine presidency with a promise to violently crack down on drug dealers and drug users. Throughout his election campaign, he has threatened to bypass the judicial process and target anyone associated with drugs, especially the poor. As of 2018, 12,000 Filipinos have been killed due to his war on drugs. It is the poor that are suffering the most from human rights abuses as the police rarely crack down on drug users in middle- and upper-class neighborhoods. However, Duterte remains popular in the Philippine, across the entire socioeconomic spectrum. Given his questionable human rights track record, how is this possible? I argue that Duterte enjoys high popularity among the poor precisely because of his drug policy, the rising nationalist sentiment, and his enthusiasm for federalism. I will also present policy suggestions for the governments of the United States and the Philippine on how they can help put an end to Duterte's war on drugs.

INTRODUCTION

Since taking office as president of the Philippine, Rodrigo Duterte has encouraged the Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippine to kill off all drug dealers and users with no judicial process. During the campaign trail, he threatened to take the law into his own hands by saying, "Hitler massacred three million Jews. Now, there is three million drug addicts. I'd be

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happy to slaughter them”.² Despite his unusual rhetoric, Duterte won the election with more than 40 percent of the vote.³ Before becoming president, he had been the mayor of Davao for over twenty years. Throughout his term as mayor, he ordered numerous extrajudicial killings of drug offenders by embracing a vigilante group called the Davao Death Squad, or DDS.⁴ This group, under the guidance of Duterte, carried out targeted killings against ‘serious criminals’. The DDS have assassinated more than a thousand people since Duterte entered the mayoral office in 1988.⁵ At present, after two years of Duterte’s presidency, more than 12,000 Filipinos have become victims of government sponsored extrajudicial killings.⁶ However, it is the lower class Filipinos who are suffering the most from human rights abuses since the police do not target middle- and upper-class citizens, even though some of them are drug users themselves.⁷ Despite this, Duterte remains popular among low income citizens, with an approval rating of 78 percent.⁸ How is Duterte able to maintain such high support given his policies that target the poor?

In this paper, I argue that Duterte remains popular among the lower income population because of his hard stance against drugs, the rise of nationalism in the Philippine, and his support for federalism. Using information gleaned from public surveys, past literature, and media reports, I show how Filipinos are willing to vote

² “Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte in quotes,” BBC News, September 30, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36251094>.

³ Mark Thompson, “The Early Duterte Presidency in the Philippines,” in *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 35, no. 3 (2017), 4.

⁴ Gina Apostol, “Meet Rodrigo Duterte: The Filipino Trump, Turned Up to 11,” *Foreign Policy*, May 09, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/09/meet-rodrigo-duterte-the-filipino-trump-turned-up-to-11/>.

⁵ Clare Baldwin and Andrew R.C Marshall, “As death toll mounts, Duterte deploys dubious data in ‘war on drugs,’” *Reuters*, October 18, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/philippines-duterte-data/>.

⁶ Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2018: Philippines Events of 2017,” *Human Rights Watch*, 2017, accessed January 03, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/philippines>.

⁷ Human Rights Watch, “The Killing Squads: Inside the Philippines’ ‘War on Drugs,’” *Human Rights Watch*, March 02, 2017, accessed August 02, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/02/killing-squads-inside-philippines-war-drugs>.

⁸ PulseAsia, “March 2017 Nationwide Survey on the Performance and Trust Ratings of the Top Five Philippine Government Officials,” *Pulse Asia Research Inc.*, March 2017, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://www.pulseasia.ph/march-2017-nationwide-survey-on-the-performance-and-trust-ratings-of-the-top-five-philippine-government-officials/>.

for a strongman candidate who disregards human rights and liberal democratic values.⁹ To stem the tide of Duterte's war on drugs, the United States can use its economic and diplomatic influence to put pressure on him and his associates. The Philippine Congress, Justice Department, and Ombudsman Office can start building a case against Duterte so that he can be prosecuted in a court of law.

The organization of this paper is as follows. In the first section, I present a historical overview of Duterte's past human rights abuses and a brief summary of the 2016 Philippine presidential election. Following this overview, I discuss the existing explanations as to why Duterte remains popular. Next, I present my own findings: that he remains popular because of his drug policy, rise of nationalist sentiment, and his support for federalism. Based on these findings I conclude the paper with policy solutions for the U.S., U.N., and the Philippine government on how to deal with Duterte's human rights abuses.

I. DUTERTE'S WAR ON DRUGS

Rodrigo Duterte's faulty human rights track record dates back to 1988 when he became the mayor of Davao, the biggest city on the island of Mindanao. When he became the mayor, the city was a hub for illegal drug trafficking, and was known as the "murder capital", due to extremely high murder rates.¹⁰ Before becoming the mayor, he was a city prosecutor and gained fame by going after corrupt police officers and politicians. Throughout his tenure, Duterte painted the politicians as corrupt individuals who needed to be rooted out, choosing himself as the man for the job.

Duterte built his image as a hardliner against crime. Local human rights activists claim that Duterte's extrajudicial killing policy started during his second term, somewhere in the mid 1990s.¹¹ While Duterte has no direct link with

⁹ Sources were gathered from PulseAsia Research Inc, Social Weather Stations, The Philippine Statistics Authority and Human Rights Watch.

¹⁰ William Branigin, "Davao Known as Philippines' 'Murder Capital,'" The Washington Post, August 08, 1985, accessed August 02, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/08/08/davao-known-as-philippines-murder-capital/ce938055-0f5d-451c-9420-c2da95277dad/?utm_term=.3b2fd053a4af.

¹¹ Human Rights Watch, "License to Kill", Human Rights Watch, July 13, 2017, accessed August 02, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/03/02/license-kill/philippine-police-killings-dutertes-war-drugs>.

the vigilante group DDS, he did encourage vigilante killings and bragged about personally killing a drug dealer himself. Moreover, he is known amongst the public as “The Punisher.”¹²

Actions by vigilante groups has led to high casualties among innocent civilians and people with minor criminal offenses.¹³ As a mayor, Duterte has been accused of sanctioning killings against petty criminals, such as a fourteen-year-old boy who stole a cell-phone.¹⁴ On the campaign trail, he presented Davao as an example of how he transformed the “murder capital” into a prospering city, with a rising middle class. He promised to expand the policy he initiated in Davao onto the national stage.¹⁵

Duterte’s policies, however, targeted the poor. Most of the victims of his anti-drug campaign were people in the low-income bracket, as they had the least amount of capital, which translated to a weak ability to influence his campaign.¹⁶ However, drug users come from all economic classes.¹⁷ According to news sources, drug users that were not in the low-income bracket usually got a warning from the police and were not persecuted with the same intensity.¹⁸ This was part of the reason why the middle- and high-income classes supported Duterte, because they received special treatment barred from the poor.¹⁹

Despite Duterte’s war on the poor, he ultimately won the presidency. His faulty human rights record was widely reported by the media. Duterte himself had presented clear intention to continue the drug policy that had harmed the poor as exemplified when he said, “Forget the laws on human rights. If I make

¹² Baldwin, *Reuters*.

¹³ Floyd Whaley, “Rodrigo Duterte’s Talk of Killing Criminals Raises Fears in Philippines,” *The New York Times*, May 17, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines.html>.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, *License to Kill*.

¹⁶ Jocelyn R. Uy, “Davao Rich Bankrolled Rody,” *Inquirer News Davao Rich Bankrolled Rody Comments*, June 09, 2016, accessed March 28, 2018, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/789788/davao-rich-bankrolled-rody>.

¹⁷ Rappler, “EXPLAINER: How Serious Is the PH Drug Problem? Here’s the Data,” *Rappler*, August 27, 2016, accessed April 05, 2018, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/144331-data-drug-problem-philippines>.

¹⁸ Baldwin, *Reuters*.

¹⁹ Aries A Arugay, “The Philippines in 2016: The Electoral Earthquake and its Aftershocks,” *Southeast Asian Affairs* 2017, no. 1 (2017), 287.

it to the presidential palace, I will do just what I did as mayor”.²⁰ Therefore, it was surprising when Duterte won the presidency and received support from across the entire socioeconomic spectrum. Furthermore, he still remains popular among the poor, even though they are the direct victims of his gruesome anti-drug campaign. In the following sub-section, I discuss how the 2016 presidential election created a condition for Duterte to win by analyzing each candidates’ policy stance and personality traits.

2016 PHILIPPINE ELECTION

The 2016 Philippine election started out with Manuel Amanita Roxas II running against four other candidates: Jejomar C. Binay, Grace Poe, Rodrigo Duterte, and Miriam Defensor-Santiago.²¹ Roxas’ political resume was impeccable. He served in both the Lower House and Upper House, and held cabinet positions in three administrations, including under Benigno Aquino III. He had an Ivy League education and he was handpicked by Aquino III to continue his legacy. Roxas portrayed himself as a reasonable successor to Aquino III and tried to take advantage of the incumbent’s high popularity.²² In early polling, Roxas had high public approval rates and because of Aquino III’s popularity, it seemed that he was going to easily win the election. Roxas also spent the most on campaign advertisements, spending P774 million (\$15 million), and had a vast connection with traditional political powers, such as the Catholic Church.²³ However, Roxas proved to be a bad campaigner. While his performance in presidential debates was strong, he failed to connect with the people at his campaign rallies.²⁴ His close association with Aquino III proved to be a liability, as it meant that he was held accountable for Aquino III’s scandals

²⁰ “Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte in quotes”, *BBC News*.

²¹ Miriam Defensor-Santiago was diagnosed with cancer in 2014. Even though she officially registered as a candidate, she did not campaign much and passed away before the election.

²² Ronald D Holmes, “The Dark Side of Electoralism: Opinion Polls and Voting in the 2016 Philippine Presidential Election,” *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 35.3 (2017), 18.

²³ Arugay, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 281; The Manila Times, “Roxas Top Ad Spender,” The Manila Times Online, January 05, 2016, accessed March 28, 2018, <http://www.manilatimes.net/roxas-top-ad-spender/237958/>.

²⁴ Holmes, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 31.

as well.²⁵ He started to slip in the polls as he championed to continue Aquino III's legacy.²⁶

As Roxas's support started to decline, other candidates were eager to capitalize on the fact but they found themselves also engulfed in scandals. Binay quickly gained traction among lower-income people with his pro-poor populist agendas, but was swept away by numerous allegations of corruption. One allegation involved his son who became the subject of a government investigation due to an accusation that he purposely overpriced a public project in Makati City.²⁷ As media reports piled on, Binay had a difficult time fending off these corruption charges and thus spent most of his campaign defending his son and his actions rather than promoting his agendas. Another candidate, Grace Poe, was also caught up in scandal. She enjoyed relatively high support among Filipinos but the issue of her citizenship became a big obstacle, going all the way to the Supreme Court.²⁸ The Supreme Court upheld Poe's case in March 2016, but by that time many Filipinos questioned Poe's qualification to be president.

Rodrigo Duterte entered the presidential race late and even when he did, he was not seen as a serious contender. However, by early 2016, the polls started to shift in his favor.²⁹ Duterte built his political career outside of Manila and became the first president to be from a Mindanao island.³⁰ Instead of relying on traditional sources of political power during his campaign for money and public influence such as local elites and the Catholic Church, he organized a grassroots campaign fueled by volunteers and active social media users.³¹ He stood out against the other candidates, who were viewed as traditional elite

²⁵ Aquino III's most controversial scandal was the Priority Development Assistant Funds scam, also known as the pork barrel scandal, that involved twenty-eight members of Congress. However, the administration only investigated those who were his political enemies, which led the public to believe that he was using this scam to rid of opposition legislators instead of coming up with meaningful reforms.

²⁶ Holmes, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 31-32.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

²⁸ She became an American citizen in 2001 and renounced her U.S. citizenship in 2010. However, the Philippines has a 10-year continuous residency requirement to be a president.

²⁹ Holmes, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 21.

³⁰ Mindanao island is the poorest island in the Philippines, with poverty incidence rate above 35 percent. All of the past presidents in Fifth Republic of the Philippines were either born in Manila or from wealthier regions in the country.

³¹ Arugay, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 286.

politicians. Duterte took advantage of that sentiment and soon turned around the entire 2016 election by inserting himself center-stage. While other candidates struggled to find a good campaign message, Duterte's campaign platform was simple: drugs, drugs, drugs. His strong message to eliminate the prevalence of drugs in the Philippine by using the same method he used in Davao was influential among many people, especially towards the people in the low-income bracket who were victims of illegal drug trade.³² Duterte's stark remarks towards the United States made many nationalists happy and his call for federalism resonated with those outside of Manila, especially the poor. Duterte's populist campaign style and rhetoric was also favored by the poor. He constantly attacked traditional "elite" politicians by saying they were out of touch with common people and did not shy away from using swear words to criticize them, earning him the nickname, "trash-talking mayor".³³

Despite the late start in the presidential race, harsh rhetoric, and a dismal human rights record against the poor, Duterte gained support from all socioeconomic spectrum and won the election.³⁴ He has kept true to his campaign pledge by expanding the war on drugs, resulting in 120,000 dead low-income citizens. However, Duterte's approval rating among the poor is high at a consistent figure above 70 percent.³⁵ If his anti-drug policy is particularly harmful towards the poor, then why are they still supporting him?

II. ECONOMIC ARGUMENT

Scholars, such as Eric Vincent Batalla and some Western journalists have claimed that Duterte remains popular among the poor because of his populist

³² Nicole Curato, "Politics of anxiety, politics of hope: penal populism and Duterte's rise to power," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 35, no. 3 (2017), 99.

³³ Duncan McCargo, "Duterte's mediated populism," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 38, no. 2 (2016), 188.

³⁴ PulseAsia, "April 2016 Nationwide Survey on the May 2016 Elections," Pulse Asia Research Inc., April 26, 2016. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3b9qPFV1cRDUG5WanNMbFE4bFk/view>.

³⁵ Pulse Asia, "December 2017 Nationwide Survey on the Performance and Trust Ratings of the Top Philippine Government Officials and Key Government Institutions," Pulse Asia Research Inc., December 2017. Accessed March 29, 2018. <http://www.pulseasia.ph/pulse-asia-researchs-december-2017-nationwide-survey-on-the-performance-and-trust-ratings-of-the-top-philippine-government-officials-and-key-government-institutions/>.

economic agenda.³⁶ When examining the Philippine economy by using GDP growth, the state of the economy seems strong. The country's GDP has grown steadily at an average rate of 4.7 percent a year since 1992, and under Aquino III in particular, the average yearly GDP growth was 6.1 percent.³⁷ During Aquino III's administration, the country's score on the Corruption Perception Index has improved, along with its credit ratings, which led to an increase in foreign investment.³⁸ Despite the growing economy, Aquino III did not go far enough to address the poverty issue in the Philippine. While the poverty level has gone down, it has only decreased by two percent during his term and has not followed the general booming economic trend.³⁹ Even though the country has elected populist candidates before, such as Joseph Estrada, and reformists, such as Arroyo, all of them have failed to deliver their campaign promises of major reform. Aquino III was elected on a promise to lead a clean government, and through clean governance, his administration was going to be more efficient at reducing poverty.⁴⁰ His good governance strategy did not succeed, as his administration got caught up in numerous scandals and the poverty level has remained the same. With that broken promise, the poor turned towards Duterte, a strongman candidate who was outside the traditional political dynasty, which meant that he was less likely to be swayed by big business donors. Duterte was the poor's last hope to root out massive corruption in the government and implement his pro-poor economic agenda. Even though he never outlined the specific details of his economic policy, the poor believed that because of his background and connection with the poor, he would naturally lean toward an economic policy that was more favorable to the poor.⁴¹

³⁶ Eric Vincent C Batalla, "Divided Politics and Economic Growth in the Philippines," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 35 (2016), 161; Richard C. Paddock, "Becoming Duterte: The Making of a Philippine Strongman," *The New York Times*, March 21, 2017, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-president-strongman.html>; McCargo, *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 186.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 167.

³⁸ Maria Elissa Jayme Lao, "The Philippines in 2015: Slowly, on the Straight and Narrow," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2016), 267.

³⁹ Batalla, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 164.

⁴⁰ Teehankee, *Journal of Developing Societies*, 305.

⁴¹ McCargo, *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 186-187.

The problem with the economic argument is threefold. First, the economy was not the main focus of Duterte's campaign. His focus was on eliminating drugs and rooting out government nepotism. Duterte often linked illegal drug trade and use as an economic issue. When asked about his economic platform as a candidate, he said, "Before a city or province can really prosper, you have to establish order. So that the investors would be coming in, comfortable in their thoughts that there would be no corruption, that they are safe, and that their businesses will prosper".⁴² Duterte's rhetoric was that by killing off drug dealers, putting away drug users, and cracking down on illegal drug trade, small businesses could operate free from fear, leading to increase in foreign investment.⁴³ Duterte also shifted the political conversation to drugs and crime, which was part of his campaign strategy. Before he entered the race, the majority of Filipinos were concerned about the inflation, jobs, and healthcare.⁴⁴ A few months after Duterte had entered the race, he successfully shifted the people's attention to rising crime and drugs.⁴⁵ Second, when he did release his economic plan, it was vague and similar to the incumbent's policy. The very first point in his 10-point socioeconomic agenda was, "continue and maintain current macroeconomic policies, including fiscal, monetary, and trade policies".⁴⁶ Duterte wanted to continue Aquino III's economic policy, and his other nine points were not typical of a radical populist agenda. He called for an increase in foreign investment, free trade, and increased infrastructure spending. Some of his points did call for a fairer tax code and a better social safety net, but his policies lacked detail and were not that different from other candidates' economic platforms.⁴⁷ Third, there already was a populist presidential candidate who advocated for major economic reform and whose campaign promised more economic benefit for the poor, Jejomar Binay. He was known for his advocacy of welfare policies, such as free health care and his effort to eliminate income taxes for

⁴² Pia Ranada, "Duterte to Businessmen: Davao City Is My Exhibit A," Rappler, January 14, 2016, accessed April 11, 2018, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/119074-rodrigo-duterte-davao-city-exhibit-a>.

⁴³ Curato, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 99.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁴⁶ GMA News and Public Affairs, "Duterte's economic team reveals 10-point socioeconomic agenda," GMA News Online, June 20, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/economy/570703/duterte-s-economic-team-reveals-10-point-socioeconomic-agenda/story/>.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

low paid workers.⁴⁸ He was known by the public for his pro-poor agenda while Duterte was primarily known for cracking down on drug dealers and users. Even though Binay was never popular among middle- to high-income earners, he remained popular among the poor until the very end of his term.⁴⁹ If low-income wage earners had supported candidates just based on their economic agenda, Duterte should not have enjoyed strong support from the poor.

III. DRUGS, RISE OF NATIONALISM, AND FEDERALISM

To explain Duterte's popularity among the poor, we must look at other factors besides his economic agenda, which is not that much different from the previous administration. In this section, I discuss Duterte's drug policy, nationalist sentiment, and the Philippine unitary government that is unfavorable for the poor, to explain his popularity.

I argue that Duterte is popular among the poor because of his willingness to crack down on drug dealers and users, unlike any other presidents before him. As previously mentioned, Duterte never tried to hide his poor human rights records, and the Philippine media widely reported on his controversial anti-drug policy. He even encouraged violence when he campaigned around Manila's Tondo slums as illustrated when he said, "If you know of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself as getting their parents to do it would be too painful".⁵⁰ Even though his rhetorical style was unconventional, it managed to get his political message across to many voters. He had a passionate dislike of drugs, and many Filipinos believed that he would follow through because of his work in Davao. Those in the low-income bracket knew that there was going to be an increase in random searches by the police, as well as more law enforcement presence. However, many Filipinos, including the poor, approved of his anti-drug policy because of their personal experiences with drugs, and the negative impact drugs had on their families and communities.⁵¹ They recognized that illegal drugs were a serious problem and a contributor to the continuous cycle of poverty. Other

⁴⁸ Nicole Curato, "Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and the New Terms of Philippine Populism," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 47, no. 1 (2016), 3.

⁴⁹ Arugay, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 281.

⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch, *License to Kill*

⁵¹ *Arugay, Southeast Asian Affairs*, 287.

presidents before Duterte did not use as many resources and political capital to combat drug use.

Even though crime in general was trending downward, Duterte greatly exaggerated drugs and crime data to stoke fear among the public.⁵² This fear-driven method worked well amongst middle- and high-income earners. Under Aquino III's administration, crime rate decreased more than 20 percent but the crime level was still higher than its surrounding neighbors, such as Thailand and Cambodia.⁵³ The low-income voters were willing to give up their civil rights in exchange for security, which they viewed as a critical stepping stone out of poverty.⁵⁴ With other candidates, they were not willing to make such a compromise. Duterte, however, received the votes of the poor because he painted the picture of an imminent breakdown of society due to drugs, and presented himself as the only leader who could prevent it. This dichotomous rhetoric was what kept Duterte popular and it is also the reason why he still is. Moreover, many Filipinos welcomed his strong rhetoric because they thought that he was going to strike fear into drug dealers and force them to come out from the shadows.⁵⁵ For Western readers, it is difficult to imagine anyone trading away his or her own fundamental human rights in exchange for security. However, human rights in the Philippine do not enjoy the same status they do in more advanced liberal democratic countries. Human rights are viewed as a right for those who can afford them.⁵⁶ Given the ubiquity of this notion among the poor, they presumed they would not lose much by supporting Duterte for president. The poor never enjoyed the same political and civil rights as those in middle- and high-income brackets, but what they lacked was security.⁵⁷

Duterte also remains popular among the poor because of the rise of nationalism across the Philippine and his ability to use that nationalist sentiment to rewrite the Philippine foreign policy playbook. The recent resurgence of nationalism

⁵² Curato, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 100.

⁵³ Baldwin, *Reuters*; Nation Master, "Countries Compared by Crime Crime Levels. International Statistics," NationMaster.com, accessed March 29, 2018, <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Crime/Crime-levels>.

⁵⁴ Arugay, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 288.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 286.

⁵⁶ Carolina G Hernandez, "The Philippines in 2016," *Asian Survey* 57, no. 1 (2017), 139.

⁵⁷ Pauline Eadie, "The Philippines, Duterte, and the Undeserving Poor," IAPS Dialogue: The Online Magazine of the Institute of Asia & Pacific Studies, April 03, 2017, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/02/21/the-philippines-duterte-and-the-undeserving-poor/>.

had been brewing among many Filipinos for some time.⁵⁸ The history of the Philippine is heavily riddled with domination by colonial powers. Filipinos had to live under Spanish rule, then became an American colony, and during WWII, were subjugated by imperial Japan. After gaining independence, many Filipinos rightly felt that they were still under the heavy influence of the United States. The former colonizer has dictated many of the Philippine's foreign policy stances and even domestic economic policies.⁵⁹ Past presidents, such as Fidel Ramos, Corazon Aquino, and even Ferdinand E. Marcos pursued economic and foreign policy agendas that were friendly to the U.S. To this day, there are U.S. naval bases in the Philippine despite the efforts of previous Filipino politicians to get rid of them.⁶⁰ However, with recent aggression from China, specifically ignoring the United Nations rulings and building man made islands in the South China Sea, Aquino III's administration accepted a new military agreement with the United States that leaned in favor of U.S. interests.⁶¹ Many Filipinos long to be fully independent from foreign influence and they view continued American military presence as unfair and humiliating to their country.⁶² Enter Duterte.

Duterte ran an anti-foreign influence campaign, which appealed to the public. At one point, he publicly showed contempt towards the U.N. and the U.S. by calling then-President Obama, a "son of a bitch."⁶³ He voiced support for separating from the U.S. both economically and militarily by railing against EDCA and making \$24 billion worth of funding and investment deals with China.⁶⁴ When the U.N. accused the administration of violating basic human rights on the basis of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which

⁵⁸ Julio C Teehankee, "Duterte's Resurgent Nationalism in the Philippines: A Discursive Institutional Analysis," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 35, no. 3 (2017), 71.

⁵⁹ Julio C Teehankee, "Duterte's Resurgent Nationalism in the Philippines: A Discursive Institutional Analysis," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 35, no. 3 (2017), 72-73.

⁶⁰ Emily Rauhala, "With China pressing south, U.S. ships return to the Philippines' Subic Bay," *The Washington Post*, May 06, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/with-china-pressing-south-us-ships-return-to-the-philippines-subic-bay/2016/05/05/6ce6750a-1139-11e6-a9b5-bf703a5a7191_story.html?utm_term=.339dfce05e85.

⁶¹ The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) gives the U.S. military access to five Philippine bases and the U.S. can build their own facilities as well.

⁶² Teehankee, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 83-85.

⁶³ Human Rights Watch, *License to Kill*.

⁶⁴ Arugay, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 289-290.

the Philippine signed in 1986, Duterte responded by threatening to leave the U.N. ⁶⁵He said, “I will prove to the world that you are a very stupid expert.”⁶⁶ Many Filipinos do not see his rhetoric as degrading towards the country’s international standing. Instead, they are view it as standing up to American imperialism and powerful international organizations.⁶⁷ As of 2018, Duterte has not visited the United States, nor has he shown any interest in doing so. Instead, Duterte has forged an independent foreign policy strategy.

As part of that new strategy, Duterte began a pivot toward China, a radical break with decades of pro-U.S. policies.⁶⁸ Throughout the campaign, he regularly disagreed with mainstream foreign policy experts and other presidential candidates by signaling his intent to forge closer ties with China while keeping them at bay in the South China Sea.⁶⁹ By doing this, Duterte showed to Filipinos, the Chinese and the world that he was not going to be held hostage by the status quo. Instead, the Philippine was going to pursue its own independent foreign policy, free from American influence or that of any other foreign power. He demonstrated his willingness to have an independent foreign policy by visiting China in 2016, where he announced closer economic ties with China.⁷⁰ After this highly publicized meeting, Chinese authorities granted Filipino fishing boats rights to catch fish in the disputed sea area, which satisfied nationalists who wanted better, but perhaps not cosy relations with China.⁷¹ According to recent polling data from Social Weather Stations, Duterte secured a 15 point increase in foreign relations approval ratings among low-income Filipinos between September 2017 and December 2017.⁷² In that period, Duterte announced a major investment deal with China in

⁶⁵ Karen Lema and Manuel Mogato, “Philippines’ Duterte threatens to quit U.N. after drugs war censure,” Reuters, August 21, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-un-idUSKCN10W05W>.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Teehankee, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 82.

⁶⁸ Arugay, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 290.

⁶⁹ Germelina Lacorte, “Duterte Tells China: Build Us a Railway and Let’s Set aside Differences for a While,” Inquirer Global Nation Duterte Tells China Build Us a Railway and Lets Set aside Differences for a While Comments, February 26, 2016, accessed March 29, 2018, <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/137093/duterte-tells-china-build-us-a-railway-and-lets-set-aside-differences-for-a-while>.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 290.

⁷¹ Ibid., 290; Lacorte, Inquirer Global Nation; Teehankee, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 85.

⁷² Social Weather Stations, “Fourth Quarter 2017 Social Weather Survey: Net Satisfaction Rating

the Philippine telecommunication market and met with President Trump during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.⁷³ His aggressive effort to have an autonomous foreign policy is a welcome sign for many Filipinos, especially the poor.

Duterte also enjoys high popularity among the poor because of his advocacy for federalism, which will devolve power from the capital city, Manila. The idea of Filipino federalism is not new. When the constitution for the First Republic was being drafted there were calls to divide up the country into three to ten federal states.⁷⁴ Support for federalism was popular among Filipinos because the country is made up of several big islands. Giving more power to federal states would have made governing more localized. However, because of the impending fight with the Americans, people agreed that unifying the country was crucial. This led to many resources and power being concentrated to the area around the capital city.⁷⁵ In 1935, a new constitution was drafted when the Philippine became a commonwealth of the United States. Naturally, the new constitution was modeled after the American one, with a few key differences such as a unitary system of government, as opposed to the federal system of the U.S.⁷⁶ The new constitution further concentrated power in Manila and in the central government, instead of providing more local autonomy. After Marcos' ouster from the Presidency in 1986, the new government formed a commission to draft a new constitution. This was the last time the Philippine could have adopted federalism, but those who wanted major reforms failed to get their voices heard. There were other prevailing issues such as land reform, military

of the Duterte National Administration Rises to Record-high "Excellent" 70," Social Weather Stations, January 17, 2018, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20180117160545>.

⁷³ Andreo Calonzo, "Duterte Invites China to Enter Philippine Mobile-Phone Market," Bloomberg.com, November 20, 2017, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-20/duterte-invites-china-to-enter-philippine-mobile-phone-market>; Richard C. Paddock and Felipe Villamor, "Duterte Warms to Trump, but Keeps His Focus on China," The New York Times, November 12, 2017, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/world/asia/trump-duterte-philippines-killing.html>.

⁷⁴ Elyzabeth F Cureg, and Jennifer F. Matunding. "Federalism Initiatives in the Philippines", 178.


⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 178.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 179.

base rights, and presidential emergency powers.⁷⁷ The newly drafted constitution ended up being similar to the 1935 version, but the issue of federalism did not fade away among Filipinos. In 1991, Congress passed the Local Government Code, which was supposed to expand the authority of local governments, but its implementation has been mediocre.⁷⁸ This attempt to decentralize did not work, as local governments still lacked resources and had little say in tax collection.

The idea of federalism is especially popular among the lower classes because they see it as the right path to bridge the income gap. Stronger local government would be able to distribute resources more effectively across the country and improve transportations and education systems, resulting in significant benefits for those in the low-income bracket.⁷⁹ A federal system would also allow local governments to enact their own tax code without being required to give up most of their resources to the central government.⁸⁰

The issue of unequal wealth distribution becomes clear from the fact that the majority of poor Filipinos live outside of the Manila region (see Figure 1).⁸¹ Because of the extreme wealth gap, people living outside of the capital region call the central government, “imperial Manila.”⁸² This illustrates the disconnect



⁷⁷ Ibid., 180.

⁷⁸ Timberman, *Journal of Democracy*, 138.

⁷⁹ Jose V Abueva, “Towards a Federal Republic of the Philippines,” *Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines* 27 (2001), 1.

⁸⁰ Marlon Ramos, “Only federalism will bring lasting peace, says Duterte,” *Inquirer News Only federalism will bring lasting peace says Duterte Comments*, November 30, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/849221/only-federalism-will-bring-lasting-peace-says-duterte>.

⁸¹ Cai U. Ordinario, “MAP: The poorest provinces in PH,” *Rappler*, September 25, 2013, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://www.rappler.com/business/27276-poorest-provinces-philippines>.

⁸² Gideon Lasco, “Imperial Manila,” *Inquirer Opinion Imperial Manila Comments*, December

between the central government and the problems of the poor. Having been a mayor of Davao, which is located at the poorer southern end of the Philippine, Duterte knows personally the disadvantage of the current unitary form of government. He has publicly endorsed federalism on the campaign trail and promoted it as a way to reduce poverty.⁸³ For low-income Filipino's, Duterte's unapologetic endorsement of federalism was a welcome change from traditional candidates who did not specifically address a major change in government structure. Duterte was viewed as a true anti-establishment candidate who could bring real change. He invoked "imperial Manila" during campaign speeches when he said, "It [a unitary system] is an excuse for them to hang onto power in Imperial Manila. They have always been there in one single office, running the Philippine".⁸⁴ Duterte also built his political career outside of Manila, while all past presidents and most presidential candidates started their political career in the capital and this background made his statement on federalism all the more authentic in the eyes of the poor. He was not pushing for federalism just to gain votes, but because he knew the pain inflicted by unitary system and genuinely wanted to enact change. His public statements on the current form of government resonated with the sentiment of Filipinos living in poverty. Duterte never released a detailed economic plan, but proposed federalism as a plan to deviate from the status quo and spread wealth across the country. Even though many candidates offered change from the status quo, Duterte was the only one who called for a radical shift to federalism in order to bridge the ever-widening income gap.

IV. CONCLUSION

Duterte remains popular among low-income Filipinos because of his anti-drug policy, strong nationalist sentiment, and his advocacy for federalism. Even though it is mostly the poor that are being deprived of their fundamental human

28, 2015, accessed March 29, 2018, <http://opinion.inquirer.net/91545/imperial-manila>.

⁸³ Pia Ranada, "Duterte: Federalism allows regions to keep most of their income," Rappler, March 07, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/124985-duterte-federalism-regions-income>.

⁸⁴ Agence France-Presse, "Duterte looking to destroy 'Imperial Manila'," Inquirer News Duterte looking to destroy Imperial Manila Comments, June 28, 2016, accessed August 02, 2017, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/792839/duterte-looking-to-destroy-imperial-manila>.

rights, to them, human rights are a luxury that they cannot afford. Another notion that the poor find appealing is that the Philippine, under federalism, will witness the spread of wealth across the country instead of having resources concentrated around Manila. Although many candidates have called for federalism in the past, Duterte was the only one who strongly advocated for it in the 2016 election. The Philippine has a long history of being colonized by foreign powers and even today many feel that the U.S. has too much influence over the country. Duterte's stance against the U.S. and the U.N. shows that he is willing to stand up for the interests of the Philippine. He is viewed as a true anti-imperialist. Duterte's political style, which called for governance with discipline was also popular among the poor because they were tired of seeing corrupt elite politicians staying in office. Duterte delivered an effective campaign message to bring back order and eliminate drugs. Even though the people in low-income brackets were going to be affected the most by human rights violations, drug use was a problem for them too. Duterte's strong energy and determination continues to pay off, as he manages to get approval ratings of 78 percent among the people below the poverty line while bodies of dead drug users are being laid out in the slums. The United States, the United Nations, and the Government of the Philippine should not stand idle while Duterte is implementing his controversial anti-drug policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S., THE U.N. AND THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

The international community should put pressure on Duterte's administration to be more transparent about his drug war and urge him to end it. Imposing economic sanctions on the Philippine will only backfire, as it would hurt working-class Filipinos, especially the poor. Recognizing Duterte's stance on drugs as one of the reasons he remains popular and knowing that the common perception in the Philippine is that human rights are luxury rights, the international community should not enact sanctions that will hurt working-class Filipinos. These policies would only persuade workers to support Duterte. Therefore, more targeted sanctions and policies should be implemented.

First, the U.S. State Department and the Treasury Department should work together to come up with a list of the names of those who hold high positions in Duterte's administration. Those individuals would include some military officers and government officials who have links to the anti-drug campaign, such as the chief of the Philippine National Police, Ronald dela Rosa. The list should also

include those who have significant financial connections to Duterte. With that set of names, the State Department and the Treasury Department can enact targeted sanctions and freeze their assets. The sanctions should remain in place until Duterte recognizes that his drug policy is unsustainable and starts to roll back his policy. Second, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) should cease military training exercises with the Filipino army or ban officers who are tied to the drug war from participating in those exercises. The DOD should also restrict sales of arms and military hardware to the Philippine because the equipment can be used to aid Duterte's drug war.⁸⁵ The DOD and the Philippine armed forces have a close relationship, and pressure from the DOD could make Philippine military personnel less inclined to participate in Duterte's drug war. Third, the U.N. Human Rights Council should open up an investigation on Duterte's drug war. However, this seems very unlikely since the Philippine is on the Human Rights Council.⁸⁶ Also, any investigation by the U.N. will be seen as foreign political influence by the Filipinos.

There should also be a domestic effort to investigate the president. The Philippine Congress should open their own investigation into Duterte and his anti-drug policy, which has resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings. First, they should hold hearings and start collecting data and statements from victims' families. They should also pressure the Department of Justice to nominate an independent prosecutor with no ties to the administration to start building a case against those who are linked to extrajudicial killings. The police chief should be the main focus of the investigation because he has most likely sanctioned these killings. By going after high officials, more government functionaries might come forward with information in exchange for reduced or no jail time. To effectively gather testimonies from the victims' families and government officials, the Department of Justice should offer a witness protection program.

⁸⁵ The U.S. provided \$127 million worth of military aid to the Philippines armed forces in 2016, which was part of the EDCA. This aid package included small arms sales, which were used in Duterte's war on drugs. For more detail, see Manuel Mogato, "As Alliance Wavers, U.S. Says Gave Philippines Big Annual Defense Aid Boost," Reuters, December 23, 2016, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usa/as-alliance-wavers-u-s-says-gave-philippines-big-annual-defense-aid-boost-idUSKBN14C0QA>.

⁸⁶ Unlike the Security Council, each member in Human Rights Council has equal voting power. Since many nations in the council has faulty human rights record, such as the Philippines and China, it is unlikely the council will pass a resolution to investigate Duterte.

Duterte's staunch critics in the Senate, including journalists, are afraid to go after him because of his threat of government investigation against them.⁸⁷ By gathering testimonies and data, Congress can build a case for an impeachment, if there is a case to argue that Duterte has committed an impeachable offense. Even if he does not get impeached, once out of office, he can be tried as a civilian at a later time. In the end, he needs to be held accountable. Second, the Philippine Ombudsman Office should also investigate the police, military, and government officials who are linked to extrajudicial killings. If the Ombudsman Office wants to show that human rights are not just reserved for the rich, they should start prosecuting human rights abusers regardless of their level of income. Also, if the Department of Justice offers a proper witness protection program, the Ombudsman Office can start a public awareness campaign to encourage the victims' friends and families to come forward and report on government abuses.⁸⁸ After Duterte's presidency ends, the Philippine Congress, Department of Justice, and the Ombudsman Office can work together to bring a case against him. If Duterte and his allies go unpunished, future presidents will follow Duterte's precedent and grotesquely abuse their power. Third, Congress can pass legislation to put more funds into drug treatment centers and harm reduction services. By increasing funds to drug treatment centers, Congress is providing a long-term solution to curb drug usage. Congress can also invest more funds into the prison system, which badly needs expansion due to overcrowding. While this solution does not address Duterte's drug war directly, prison conditions in the Philippines are unacceptable, with local prisons ranking as third most overcrowded in the world.⁸⁹ Since Duterte took office, the number of prisoners has only increased. The current prison conditions are inhumane and Congress should lead their reform.

The concern is that Rodrigo Duterte will enter history books as an unpunished individual. He might have earned enough votes to be the president, but that should not exempt him from crimes against humanity. The U.S. State, Treasury, and Defense Departments should target specific individuals who are tied to extrajudicial killings. The Philippine Congress should work alongside the Department of Justice and the Ombudsman Office to build a future case against

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch, License to Kill.

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch, License to Kill.

⁸⁹ Andrew R.C. Marshall, "Philippines drug war turns a teeming jail into a haven," Reuters, November 08, 2016, accessed July 30, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-prison-idUSKBN13320W>.

Duterte so when the day comes to arrest him, the facts will overwhelm the public's opinion. By showing that human rights apply to everyone and that human rights abusers are punished with the same seriousness as for any other crimes, the Filipino public will have more faith in human rights, and will think twice before electing a leader with a poor human rights record.

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DIVERGENT OUTCOMES: EXAMINING THE EFFICACY OF SANCTIONS IN ACHIEVING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN IRAN

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INTRODUCTION

Iranian sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries have been in place since Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, which saw the ouster of the United States-backed secular Shah and his replacement with a regime that has blended democratic and theocratic elements into a complex governing structure. The revolution and accompanying events, including the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, marked the beginning of a new phase of US-Iranian relations. In stark contrast to the previous decades of cooperation between the US government and the pre-revolutionary Iranian Shah, relations are now characterized by enmity and antagonism. These tensions have largely been motivated by Iran's nuclear development program and its role as a state sponsor of terrorism as designated by the United States.

US foreign policy objectives oppose two major Iranian activities: (1) its nuclear development program and (2) its role as a regional sponsor of terrorism. Since the revolution, the international community has expressed concern regarding Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.² As I will examine in greater detail in the body of this essay, this fear has played a significant role in determining US policy towards Iran, specifically with regard to sanctions. In addition, of paramount

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² "Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables", 2015. 6.

concern to Western interests has been Iran's pursuit of an expanded sphere of influence in the Middle East through its involvement in regional conflicts. To accomplish this, Iran has provided financial and ideological support for friendly proxy groups and militias throughout the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. These patronage relationships play a crucial role in Iran's pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, and have triggered significant conflicts in the region, including between the Iraqi government and the Islamic State and the ongoing Syrian civil war. Iranian patronage significantly shaped other countries' policies towards Tehran and precipitated many of the inflection points in the relationship between Iran and the United States. These include the United States' 1993 designation of Iran as a State Sponsor of Terror and the 2010 comprehensive sanctions imposed by the US on Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps – the first time the US has sanctioned parts of a nation's armed forces.³

In response to these central foreign policy concerns, the United States, between 1979 and 2013, imposed a barrage of sanctions on Iran and led a coalition of international allies to do the same, which resulted in profound economic and diplomatic isolation for Iran. Through these sanctions, Iranian banks were severed from the international financial network, trade with Iranian businesses and individuals was cut off, and investment in Iran's crucial energy sector was effectively stalled.⁴ A European Union oil embargo reduced Iran's oil exports to less than half of its peak of 2.5 million barrels per day, constituting serious damage to the Iranian government's ability to cover expenditures. In addition, Iran experienced inflation of up to 50%, and suffered a 5% contraction in its economy in 2013, demonstrating the far-reaching consequences of the sanctions. These changes did significant damage to the Iranian economy and its international reputation, effectively characterizing Iran as a rogue state and forcing it to become accustomed to economic isolation. Importantly, these sanctions cause significant tolls on the Iranian economy and regime, crippling business and development in Iran and causing multiple domestic challenges for Iran's government.⁵

³ "Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables", 2015. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵ Kenneth Katzman, "Iran Sanctions", 2013. 53.

Due to their damaging effects, one must consider to what degree the sanctions have secured Iranian compliance with regard to the United States' two central foreign policy concerns. Further, as the sanctions on Iran were some of the most far-reaching and debilitating in history, the ultimate results are significant from an international relations perspective. Theoretically, they should provide answers regarding the potential effectiveness and utility of economic sanctions. In addition, the US has diplomatic and security interests in understanding the sanctions' effects given the outsize role that Iran plays in determining the course of events in the Middle East, the world's most tumultuous and strategically important region over recent decades.

The multilateral sanctions on Iran carry a mixed legacy regarding the US's two central foreign policy concerns. First, with regard to Iran's nuclear development program, the 2016 JCPOA effectively secured Western interests by assuaging expressed US concerns over the nuclear development program for the next ten to fifteen years. In short, the sanctions played a major role in determining this successful foreign policy outcome for the United States. Second, however, in terms of Iran's patronage of proxy groups and militias throughout the Middle East, sanctions have had essentially no effect in deterring these activities, as Iran continues to gain influence and counter US objectives in the region. In this essay, I will examine these paradoxical outcomes in greater depth and analyze why sanctions contributed to success in the case of Iran's nuclear program, while they were unable to do so in the case of Iranian support for regional terror groups.

First, the paper will discuss the context leading up to the 2016 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which demonstrated how sanctions were able to contribute to a nexus of incentives to produce a favorable outcome for US foreign policy interests. Then, the analysis will turn to Iran's sponsoring of regional proxies and why sanctions were unable to produce a similarly favorable outcomes for the US. The essay concludes with a synthesis of these divergent results and a coherent explanation of the logic governing such sanctioning activities.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Before examining the US sanctions on Iran in particular, it is necessary to analyze the relevant existing literature regarding the utility and effectiveness of economic sanctions.

At their core, economic sanctions are coercive mechanisms utilized in interstate conflict, and imposed by an aggrieved state in order to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. While the goals of sanctions can vary, their essential purpose is to restore a state of normalcy in interstate relations by preventing a target state from engaging in aggrieving activities. Scholar Court Golumbic and his co-author Robert Ruff describe this process as: “the deliberate withdrawal of normal economic relations between a sanctioning governmental body and a target country, government, entity, or individual in order to coerce the target to modify its behavior in a manner consistent with the sanctioning body’s foreign policy objectives.”⁶ Therefore, economic sanctions are characterized by their departure from “normal” relations between two states, with the intention of instituting a negative incentive for undesired action. Kern Alexander, a professor at the University of Illinois, expands upon this definition, arguing that economic sanctions should primarily be viewed as “corrective measures” for a perceived injustice or shirking of obligation from sanctioned state to sanctioning state. Further, he argues that sanctions are primarily intended to “remedy inequity and re-establish fairness” in relations between states. Thus, the success of sanctions should be determined primarily by their ability to restore the status quo ante between the sanctioning and sanctioned parties.⁷

In addition to their role as coercive mechanisms, sanctions function simultaneously as a means of communication, characterizing the activity of a sanctioned state as contrary to international norms or the interests of a particular state, and identifying a course of action that would be sufficient for sanctions relief. This alternative role of sanctions is described by Alexander in *Economic Sanctions*: “A state’s decision to impose sanctions may be motivated by the objective of defining the content of a norm, the breach of which justifies imposing the sanction.”⁸ As a result, the means of analyzing the utility of sanctions is twofold, as described by United Nations scholar Helmut Volger in *The Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations*: “[Sanctions] are meant to demonstrate to the respective state the disapproval of the international community and to change, through their coercive pressure, its peace-endangering behavior. At the same time,

⁶ Court E. Golumbic; Robert S. III Ruff, “Who Do I Call for an EU Sanctions Exemption”, 2013. 1009.

⁷ Kern Alexander, “Economic Sanctions Law and Public Policy”, 2009. 59.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

there is a preventive effect: the target state – as well as others – is to be deterred from further incriminating acts.”⁹ Therefore, the scope of economic sanctions is larger, from an international relations perspective, than simply deterring one state’s particular course of action. Instead, the communicative role of sanctions extends beyond the sanctioned state, and is intended to discourage further states from engaging in similar peace-endangering action.

Further, sanctions can play an important role in deterring military conflict in fraught geo-political confrontations, since they impact the status quo without direct military engagement. As research scientist Daniel McCormack and his co-author, IE University professor Henry Pascoe describe, sanctions can be utilized against an adversary’s military, in order to “offset adverse shifts in relative power,” and thus impact the military calculus of a sanctioned state.¹⁰ While sanctions must be sufficiently destructive to a target’s military power in order to achieve certain benefits, sanctions should seek to underwrite peace between states, adding to the utility of sanctions in particularly fraught international conflicts.

From the United States perspective in particular, sanctions carry particular weight due to the unique role of the United States as an international superpower and financial center of the international community. As a result, the US government possesses particularly great power to assert its economic and security interests through sanctioning, a tendency described by Alexander in *Economic Sanctions*. In effect, Alexander argues that the US government is able, due to international reliance on the US dollar and financial system, as well as its considerable “military might,” to exert “a particular type of hegemony,” or strategic dominance of another state, by parlaying this influence into multilateral economic sanctioning regimes.¹¹ This framework replaces typical political calculus in target nations by imposing a reversed system of incentives, thereby attaching negative economic incentives to activities deemed counter to US interests, and providing relief for desired behavior.

REVIEW OF PAST ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

US sanctions against Iran have been in place since the 1979 Iranian Revolution when President Jimmy Carter responded to the Iranian hostage

⁹ Helmut Volger, “A Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations”, 2010. 623-627.

¹⁰ Daniel McCormack and Henry Pascoe, “Sanctions and Preventive War”, 2015. 1713.

¹¹ Kern Alexander, “Economic Sanctions Law and Public Policy”, 2009. 51.

crisis, which saw the capture and detainment of American diplomats in the American embassy in Tehran. President Carter did so with an executive order seizing Iranian property in the US.¹² Since then, a litany of measures have gone into effect sanctioning various Iranian businesses, individuals, military entities, and the government as a whole, constituting a patchwork of sanctioning activities administered by both the executive and legislative branches of the US government.¹³ In addition to these US-based sanctions, the EU and UN both have implemented robust sanctioning regimes since 2006, which have contributed to Iran's increased isolation in conjunction with additional US sanctions prior to the 2016 JCPOA nuclear agreement.¹⁴ Between 1979 and 2005, the United States issued a variety of sanctions in response to various Iranian transgressions of international norms and military activities, which had important effects in setting the foundation for more robust future sanctioning efforts. These foundational sanctions included the addition of Iran to the Designated State Sponsors of Terror list in 1983, triggering a host of related sanctions, as well as the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, which limited investment in Iran's energy sector.¹⁵ In addition, a series of executive orders prevented all American investment in and business with Iran.¹⁶

Following the breakdown of talks between the EU and the government of Iran upon Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election to the Iranian presidency in 2005, the EU and UN imposed a series of sanctions on Iranian ability to develop nuclear and ballistic missiles. These sanctions had the effect of cutting Iran off completely from the international financial system. These efforts were imposed in conjunction with sanctions of increased severity and scope imposed by the United States, including the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010, which sanctioned Iran's gasoline industry and any financial institutions connected to Iran's nuclear development program or support of regional terrorism.¹⁷ In addition, a series of executive orders¹⁷ over this period strengthened restrictions on Iran's energy sector, as well as increasing provisions for preventing

¹² "Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables", 2015. 3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

Iranian workarounds through money-laundering and sanction evasion. Thus, by the time of the JCPOA agreement in 2016, Iran had borne the brunt of a strong international sanctioning effort, crippling both its economy and its ability to engage with the international community economically and diplomatically.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM: OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES, AND REASONS

First, it is important to consider the United States' foreign policy objectives behind sanctioning activities targeting Iran's nuclear development program. Since the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, the United States has sought to prevent Iran from creating a weapon of mass destruction through economic sanctions on its nuclear development program, as well as various sanctions intended to prevent Iranian capacity to procure the necessary materials to produce a nuclear weapon.¹⁸ This concern is reflected in the bill's text, which prevents any transfer of goods to Iran, "wherever there is reason to believe that such transfer could contribute to that country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or advanced conventional weapons."¹⁹ However, U.S. concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program have continued, as demonstrated by the text of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010. In the bill's preamble, Iran's nuclear program is still referred to as the central concern of an expanded sanctions regime, classifying Iran's nuclear program as a "serious and urgent" threat, and stating that the United States would "do everything possible—diplomatically, politically, and economically—to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability."²⁰ Thus, it is evident that Iran's nuclear program has remained at the forefront of United States foreign policy objectives in regards to Iran,

With regard to Iran's nuclear program, the United States' sanctioning activities have played a prominent role in paving the way for a meaningful and comprehensive stalling of nuclear development. The sanctioning regime, pieced together through various US unilateral sanctions, EU sanctions, and UN Security Council Resolutions, was intended to cut off all ability for the Iranian government to produce a nuclear bomb, through material constraints on its nuclear development infrastructure and financial constraints on all mechanisms within Iran that could

¹⁸ "Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables", 2015. 3.

¹⁹ Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992

²⁰ Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010

fund its nuclear development program. However, this achievement did not come until the majority of this sanctions regime was waived, in exchange for Iranian nuclear concessions in the form of the 2016 JCPOA., negotiated between Iran and a US-led international coalition, known as the “P5+1.”²¹

Specifically, as Harvard University scholar Dr. Gary Samore notes, the provisions of the JCPOA prevent Iran from producing fissile material for any nuclear weapons, at all of its declared nuclear facilities, for at least ten to fifteen years.²² This constraint significantly limits the Iranian nuclear program through multifaceted constraints on various means of nuclear weapons production, including the enrichment of plutonium and uranium. Before the JCPOA, had the capacity to enrich both of these materials to levels necessary for weaponization.²³ These physical limits on Iran’s nuclear development program are the most significant pieces of the agreement, as they provide robust ability to address any known ways of Iranian nuclear development for the entire fifteen year course of the deal. In addition, the JCPOA addressed the possibility of Iranian development of a nuclear weapon in covert facilities, albeit with some logistical restrictions due to the covert nature of these development sites.

In effect, the JCPOA provides for a robust international monitoring regime, in which Iran is subject to repeated checks by international monitoring services on its nuclear infrastructure, for the duration of the agreement.²⁴ This monitoring regime effectively discourages Iran from engaging in covert development activities, or pursuing nuclear development outside of the allowed limits on production of fissile material by increasing the likelihood that any attempted development in covert facilities would be detected by international monitors. Also important to note in the JCPOA is the ability for the US and its coalition partners in the JCPOA to pursue whatever course of action is deemed necessary if any of these conditions is violated, including the possibility of a military strike to Iran’s vulnerable nuclear facilities.²⁵ In sum, these measures largely prevent Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon over the fifteen year period, at which point if Iran has complied successfully, the deal’s provisions will be

²¹ P5+1 refers to the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia.

²² Gary Samore et. al., “The Iran Nuclear Deal - A Definitive Guide”, 2015. 7.

²³ Ibid., 4.

²⁴ Ibid., 7.

²⁵ Ibid., 28.

“sunsetting,” or phased out.

Simultaneously, the JCPOA provides significant economic incentives for the Iranian government, enabled by the robust international sanctioning regime that preceded the agreement. Upon completion of Iran’s nuclear commitments, all UN sanctions on Iranian nuclear development are lifted according to the provisions of the deal. In addition, the most damaging of the EU and US sanctions on Iran’s financial and energy sectors will be lifted with the promise of more comprehensive sanctions relief on “Transition Day,” or after Iran has complied with the deal for eight years.²⁶ This relief from sanctions, while complicated particularly from the US perspective due to the patchwork nature and overlapping authorities of the US sanctions, offers important economic incentives for a regime that has been severely limited by intense sanctioning activity in the past. Indeed, *The Iran Nuclear Deal - A Definitive Guide* argues that “foreign investors are lining up as Iran begins laying the groundwork for economic reintegration,” demonstrating the perceived economic benefits for private companies eager to do business with Iran, given its need for foreign direct investment and involvement in international financial markets.²⁷

Further, as critics of the JCPOA would note, the US commitment to lift the most damaging of secondary sanctions for the first eight years of the deal relies upon repeated presidential certifications of Iranian compliance with the strictures of the nuclear deal. As a result, particularly in the face of bellicose statements on Iran from the recent US presidential administrations, many are concerned that this empowerment of the executive branch to undermine the JCPOA could carry severe implications on the legitimacy and long-term viability of the deal. Indeed, Brookings Institute scholars claim that the US president maintains the ability, under the auspices of U.S. domestic law as well as through the “snapback” provision present in the JCPOA, which allows for the US to unilaterally re-impose sanctions in response to Iranian non-performance of JCPOA commitments.²⁸ In addition, given the nature of the JCPOA as a non-binding international commitment, the US executive branch could simply retreat from the deal outside of the framework of the JCPOA.

However, abuses of power by the executive branch would likely carry

²⁶ Gary Samore et. al., “The Iran Nuclear Deal - A Definitive Guide”, 2015. 58.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

²⁸ Lawfare. “Can President-Elect Trump “Dismantle” the JCPOA? It’s Complicated.”

damaging consequences, both in undoing the painstaking diplomatic progress required to formulate the agreement, as well as undermining the primary US foreign policy goal of a denuclearized Iran. Further, unilateral retreat from the JCPOA on the part of the United States would endanger the multilateral coalition of sanctions that preexisted the nuclear deal, ostensibly reducing the “bite” of such sanctions were the United States unable to mobilize the same coalition of European states to retreat from the deal as well. Therefore, not only would the United States lose the benefit of hard-earned leverage afforded by the JCPOA in inspecting and monitoring the Iranian nuclear program, but it would also face the likely consequence of a weakened sanctioning regime unable to sufficiently deter Iranian nuclear capability and development. In sum, while critics may argue that the threat of unilateral withdrawal weakens the effectiveness of the JCPOA, US presidential administrations would likely be deterred from such action by the various negative consequences.

Thus, when considering the impact of the US and international sanctioning regime with regard to US concern for Iran’s nuclear program, the sanctions were largely effective, in that they precipitated the JCPOA — the most meaningful international agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program since the failed 2003 EU negotiations. The JCPOA has provided an important opening in US-Iran relations, and has the potential to transform a zero-sum game between the two states into a mutually-beneficial agreement. The deal rewards Iran both economically and diplomatically for comportment with international laws and treaties on nuclear non-proliferation, and allows for a recalibration of interests within Iran favoring engagement with the West over pursuit of an isolation economy. However, the decision of Iran to enter nuclear talks, and agree to the conditions of the JCPOA, was by no means a foregone conclusion due to economic hardship or imminent regime collapse within Iran. Rather, the sanctions sufficiently adjusted the internal domestic calculus of policymakers within Iran, encouraging them to pursue engagement in accordance with pre-existing domestic political trends. Specifically, the sanctions operated in conjunction with domestic economic and political opportunities within Iran in order to make a nuclear concession an attractive course of action for the Iranian government. As a result, the US sanctions were able to achieve their intended results with regard to the Iranian nuclear program through the signing of the JCPOA. However, The future of this deal remains predicated upon the ability of

the US and international community to continue providing sufficient incentives for Iran to decline to develop a nuclear weapon.

With regard to these economic incentives, economic mismanagement under the rule of the theocratic left political faction under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad contributed to a recalibration of economic interests within Iran in the years prior to the JCPOA with rampant inflation and other economic hardships, causing Iranians to become disenchanted with the current regime. In his work, Stanford University professor Abbas Milani claims that the policies of former Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were “disastrous” and “ill-conceived,” both with regard to “basic fundamental choices about basic social and economic organization,” as well as his advocacy of the poor through redistributive economic policies.²⁹ According to Milani, Ahmadinejad’s government contributed greatly to economic hardship and discontent in Iran over his tenure, having “spent the entire windfall revenue from oil price increases” and “depleted the currency fund set up to protect the government when the price of oil falls.”³⁰ These policies have been coupled with equally damaging diplomatic missteps, as what Milani calls Ahmadinejad’s “willful insolence,” and contempt for engagement with Western powers, having contributed to Iran’s increased isolation on the scale of international diplomacy.³¹ It is thus no wonder why Ahmadinejad was swept aside in a landslide election by an unprecedented factional coalescence electing Rouhani.

Harvard University professor Dr. Payam Mohseni argues that sanctions and the damaged reputation of the theocratic faction’s ability to rule during Ahmadinejad’s tenure contributed to a coalescence of values to more pro-West and pro-engagement policies.³² Indeed, Mohseni argues that public disagreement with Ahmadinejad’s policies, “bolstered the growing alliance and similarity in positions” among integrationist camps in Iran. Such public condemnation allowed for convergence among political elites on foreign policy positions as well as economic positions.³³ As a result, economic and diplomatic isolationism became a less appealing political position within Iranian domestic politics, and Iranian political operatives capitalized on this growing public convergence through

²⁹ Abbas Milani, “Pious Populist”, 2013.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Payam Mohseni, “The 2016 Iran Parliamentary Elections”, 2016. 13.

³³ Ibid., 13.

increased willingness to engage with the United States, in order to reap previously unavailable economic rewards.

Further, Mohseni argues that this convergence of interests has the potential to offer distinct political rewards from the perspective of domestic Iranian politics to those who engage in productive engagement with the West, particularly the United States. Through the moderate Iranian president Rouhani, Mohseni argues that Iranian politicians “are playing a nuanced game,” attempting to gain access to global markets and diplomatic benefits through engagement with the West in the form of the JCPOA nuclear deal, “all while key tenets of Iranian foreign and revolutionary policy remain in place.”³⁴ This “nuanced game” emphasizes the degree to which Iranian incentives are shaped to a large degree by internal cost-benefit analyses of political benefit and an increase in ability to pursue key objectives domestically. In effect, this agreement constitutes an effort by Iranian policymakers to capitalize on a domestic and political moment of convergence, facilitated both by the Ahmadinejad regime and the ability of the JCPOA to offer distinct fiscal benefits to an Iran willing to negotiate, thus allowing for tangible reward and credibility to be attributed to Rouhani’s regime. However, this strategy is inherently tenuous because the cost-benefit analysis of Iranian politicians is contingent upon the ability of this agreement to deliver tangible economic rewards in exchange for nuclear concessions. Mohseni affirms this characteristic, arguing that “the strength of Rouhani’s hand and his ability to deliver economically will be the most fundamental determinant of how the future politics of the coalition proceeds.”³⁵ Thus, the efficacy and long-term success of the current factional alignment within Iranian politics towards greater engagement and negotiation with the West is predicated upon an uncertain “determinant”: the economic rewards provided by a lifting of sanctions, which would signal to the Iranian populace that negotiation with the West can produce tangible rewards and would encourage further efforts in other contentious areas of Iranian policy making.

Supplementing the aforementioned internal political calculus is the economic landscape of Iran, which could reap great financial benefit by opening to foreign direct investment and the global financial market. Despite having

³⁴ Payam Mohseni, “The 2016 Iran Parliamentary Elections”, 2016. 3.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

lived in a heavily sanctioned and isolated state, Iran's populace is young, educated, and eager to engage with Western commodities through increased access facilitated by lifted international sanctions. Indeed, one expert considers Iran a "treasure island" with regard to its untapped financial market, and has been called the "number one market in the Middle East" by a large margin in terms of video game consumption.³⁶ In addition, faster internet speeds in Iran, coupled with the fact that "over half of Iran's 80 million population has access to a smartphone," bodes well for Western video game and technology companies investing in Iran.³⁷ Further, Iran's populace is well-positioned to take advantage of such increased foreign involvement and economic openings, as "Iran has no shortage of skilled software engineers or artists," due to the nation's high level of youth and education. Thus, there exist tangible economic benefits for increased engagement between the West and Iran, with the potential for the JCPOA to usher in a mutually beneficial financial engagement.

However, by no means was this agreement forced, as the economic crisis in Iran was hardly existential, even considering many of the misguided policies proposed by Ahmadinejad. Under the Ahmadinejad administration, the Iranian government undertook significant additions to social welfare policies in order to address the populace's economic concerns. While social justice and welfare had long characterized the Iranian post-revolutionary state, the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the empowering of the theocratic left faction of Iran in 2005 made justice and redistributive policies a central concern of his administration and used such endeavors to consolidate public support for his rule. Dr. Payam Mohseni argues that "[t]he electoral victory of Ahmadinejad accordingly tilted the regime toward the theocratic left, reemphasizing the slogans of social justice and revolutionary values."³⁸ Further, these policies were enacted in significant ways, both during Ahmadinejad's tenure and that of his successor, President Hassan Rouhani. One such endeavor was the establishment of the Basic Insurance Fund, which sought to provide universal health coverage for Iranian citizens in 2011.³⁹ This plan was made more robust by Rouhani in 2014, who made notable

³⁶ Vit Sisler, "Digital Heroes: Video Games and Identity Construction in Iranian Video Games", 2013.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Payam Mohseni, "Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political Economy of Regime Transformation.", 2016. 57.

³⁹ Ibid.

additions— increasing coverage and registering uninsured individuals.⁴⁰ Kevan Harris takes this observation further in *Social Welfare Policies and the Dynamics of Elite and Popular Contention*, noting that Iran’s social welfare sector has performed incredibly well, given its context under sanctions: “The government has maintained a generous system of subsidies for food, medicine, and fuel at huge cost – about 10% of the GDP – that benefits the poor as well as the non-poor ... The impact of these programs on the poor in terms of more education, better health, and lower fertility has been dramatic.”⁴¹ In effect, despite its context of incredibly heavy sanctions and isolated economy, Iran has been able to develop an expansive and effective social welfare apparatus which has performed exceptionally over time, given the Iranian government’s commitment to such redistributive policies and care for the poor. This internal ability to manage economically as an isolated and sanctioned state underscores the degree to which US and international sanctioning efforts only constituted one part of a nexus of incentives for the Iranian government to engage in discussions regarding its nuclear program.

IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL PROXIES: OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES, AND REASONS

The second defining concern of US foreign policy objectives has been the desire to end Iran’s sponsoring of regional proxy groups. This component of Iranian foreign policy has been particularly salient in US-Iran relations, due to Iran’s utilization of foreign proxy groups and militias throughout the Middle East to exercise influence over regional affairs and counter US hegemony in the region. This patronage relationship extends throughout significant theaters for international conflict in the Middle East, including Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, all of which feature heavy involvement by Iran-backed militias or political groups.⁴² These patronage relationships facilitated by Iran include financial support for proxy group activities as well as strategic military and ideological training, facilitated primarily by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, a state military entity

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Kevan Harris, “Social Welfare Policies and the Dynamics of Elite and Popular Contention”, 2016. 7.

⁴² Payam Mohseni and Hussein Kalout, “Iran’s Axis of Resistance Rises”, 2017. 3.

parallel to the conventional army.⁴³ Thus, Iran's patronage for regional proxy groups carries important stakes for Western interests in the Middle East.

This fear of patronage for international terror organizations has played a significant role in the imposition of US sanctioning activities since the Islamic Revolution, most clearly demonstrated in various Executive Orders which sought to cut off Iran's regional terrorism activities, as well as in the text of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010 that sought to cut off funding to the IRGC, which orchestrates Iranian sponsoring of external proxies. This concern is reflected in the bill's preamble, which states: "The illicit nuclear activities of the Government of Iran, combined with its development of unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles and its support for international terrorism, represent a threat to the security of the United States."⁴⁴ As emphasized by this preambular clause, Iranian sponsorship activities throughout the region are perceived by the United States as a significant threat to regional stability, as well as to Western security interests in the Middle East.

Despite the various attempts by sanctioning regimes to stop these activities, Iran's regional patronage activities continue to have a significant impact in major theaters of international conflict throughout the Middle East today, underscoring the degree to which Iran's sponsorship of international proxies continues to impact Western interests in the Middle East. Indeed, a 2013 Congressional Research Service report indicated that "sanctions do not appear to have materially reduced Iran's capability to finance and provide arms to militant movements in the Middle East,"⁴⁵ indicating that Iran continues to exert its influence throughout the Middle East despite the sanctions regime imposed on it pre-JCPOA. This impact is demonstrated by the Iranian involvement in three defining international conflicts in the contemporary Middle East: Iran's support for Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, Iran's patronage of the Popular Mobilization Forces militias which overthrew ISIS in Iraq, and Iran's support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

First, Iran continues to play a significant role in Syria's Civil War through its support of Bashar al-Assad's regime, which is fighting to maintain power against an increasingly fractured rebel insurgency. Specifically, Iran has supported President Assad's regime since the Syrian opposition's initial 2011 uprisings and

⁴³ "Iran's Revolutionary Guards." 2013.

⁴⁴ Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act of 2010

⁴⁵ Kenneth Katzman, "Iran Sanctions", 2013. 51.

has gradually increased its role in the Syrian Civil War.⁴⁶ This support has consisted not only of diplomatic support for President Assad's government and direct military support and weapons provision, but also the recruitment of foreign fighters to protect Assad's regime.⁴⁷ This support aims to preserve Syria's institutions and the "status quo ante," in line with the IRGC's motive of fostering an "axis of resistance" throughout the Middle East, in order to protect Iranian national security and its regional interests from Western efforts to undermine.⁴⁸ Further, Iran has been critical in funding and mobilizing a broad coalition of "pro-regime foreign fighters" throughout the Middle East, including Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, precisely the international sponsoring of terrorism that US sanctions were intended to deter.⁴⁹ The dichotomy between US interests in Syria and those of Iran are clear in this case as well. While, as the BBC reported in 2015, the United States has provided limited funding for "moderate" oppositional militias in Syria, Iran's patronage has funded opposing interests, providing critical support for the Assad regime in the face of Western consternation.⁵⁰

Second, following the collapse of Iraq's military in 2014, Iranian-backed militias have become integrated into Iraq's state security apparatus and Iranian interests have gained significant influence in the Iraqi government. This has occurred under the auspices of the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF, which are essentially a loose and decentralized grouping of Iran-sponsored Shiite militias operating in Iraq.⁵¹ Since Iraq's legislative branch formally incorporated the PMF into Iraq's military in 2016, these Iranian-backed militias have played a significant role in key governmental challenges within Iraq, securing land on behalf of the Iranian government during a recent Kurdish bid for independence, and forming a crucial part of the US-led coalition that expelled ISIS from its

⁴⁶ Aniseh Tabrizi and Raffaello Pantucci, "Understanding Iran's Role in the Syrian Conflict", 2016. 3.

⁴⁷ Aniseh Tabrizi and Raffaello Pantucci, "Understanding Iran's Role in the Syrian Conflict", 2016. 3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁹ Ilan Berman, "Nuclear Deal Fallout: The Global Threat of Iran", 2017. 10. In the citation, indicate that this is a congressional testimony.

⁵⁰ "Syria Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand", 2015.

⁵¹ "Iraq parliament passes law legalising PMF Shia militias.", 2016.

Mosul stronghold. ⁵²These efforts are particularly significant, given the role of Iraq as a key stage for US regional and security interests. Council of Foreign Relations Fellow Ray Takeyh argues that Iran has utilized the disorder in Iraq created by the 2003 US invasion and toppling of Iraq's secular Ba'athist regime in order to "project its power" and make "further inroads" in Iraq, thereby fostering a weak client state friendly to Iranian interests.⁵³

Finally, Iran maintains strong ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon, which offers it intimate connection with and influence in the actions of one of Lebanon's most significant political and military players. Middle East Research and Information Project scholar Lara Deeb, in *Hizballah: A Primer*, notes that Iran helped to foster Hezbollah's nascent movement since the 1980s, in the wake of Israeli occupation and attacks on Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War. Deeb describes the dynamics of this patronage relationship, noting that Iran has helped to train and arm the militia since the 1980s and continues to provide it with military aid and limited access to rockets and arms, while Hezbollah has grown to be a prominent political movement and provider of social welfare services within Lebanon.⁵⁴ In addition, Deeb writes that Hezbollah regularly consults with Iranian leaders and publicly considers Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to be its "marja," or spiritual leader.⁵⁵ Roschanack Shaery in *Iran, the Vatican of Shiism?* adds that, at the behest of Iranian funding, Hezbollah is also able to provide a "network of social services" within Lebanon, which "has earned it a major role as an advocate for the disadvantaged Shi'i population."⁵⁶ Thus, through Iranian patronage and support, Hezbollah has developed into a legitimate and major player within the Lebanese state, affording Iran a powerful partner in achieving its regional interests. This relationship is particularly significant in underscoring Iran's ability to underwrite interests counter to the United States through extraterritorial patronage, given Hezbollah's expressed desire for the destruction of Israel, a US partner and ally in the region.

Given the significant Iranian role in many of the Middle East's defining conflicts, sponsoring terrorist groups and regional proxies often counter to Western

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ray Takeyh, "The Nuclear Deal Fallout: The Global Threat of Iran", 2017. 3. Indicate that this is a testimony to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs?

⁵⁴ Lara Deeb, "Hizballah: A Primer", 2006.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Roschanack Shaery, "Iran, the Vatican of Shi'ism?", 2004.

interests throughout the region, it is evident that the various sanctions intended to cut off Iran's role as a state sponsor of external proxies have not succeeded. Why, then, have sanctions been able to play a role in achieving US interests with regard to Iran's nuclear program, yet have not been able to do so with regard to Iran's support of terrorism? Because (1) Iran's foreign policy strategy was born out of a unique mix of Iranian financial constraints due to its sanctioned context, (2) its acute sense of national insecurity, and (3) the desire of the IRGC and Supreme Leader Khamenei to "export the revolution" ideologically – thus, sanctioning serves only to deepen and entrench these foundational incentivizing forces, rather than providing incentives for an alternative course of action.

First, the material constraints on Iran's economy due to sanctions have played an important role in incentivizing the regime's support of regional proxies. Through the crippling sanctions regimes imposed by the United States, EU, and UN between 1979 and 2016, which completely prohibited engagement with Iran's financial and energy sectors, as well as the blacklisting of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran's foreign policy has been forced to operate on a paltry budget in comparison to its regional neighbors.⁵⁷ Further, stringent financial sanctions specifically targeted the ability of Iran to build up a conventional military. For example, due to the 1984 State Sponsor of Terror designation imposed by the US, as well as subsequent unilateral Arms Non-Proliferation Acts and a 2007 UN Security Council Resolution, Iran's ability to acquire conventional weapons systems and deal in arms has been severely limited by sanctioning restrictions.⁵⁸

Second, Iran is acutely conscious of perceived threats to its national security, particularly by the United States, through both the threat of direct invasion as well as the utilization of Western allies in the region. University of South Florida professor Mohsen Milani corroborates this profound sense of insecurity with regard to the threat of the US pursuing regime change, arguing that "Tehran's top priority is the survival of the Islamic Republic as it exists now," in the face of Tehran's view of the United States as an "existential threat." Indeed, Milani argues that Iran's foreign policy is largely shaped by this perception of existential threat from the US, and thus much of Iran's foreign policy decisions

⁵⁷ "Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables", 2015. 8.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

can be read through this lens of threat perception.⁵⁹ This fundamental insecurity is further reflected by the makeup of Iran's military forces, particularly in the Persian Gulf, described by Anthony Cordesman in *Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz*. Cordesman notes that Iran has built up an array of unconventional weaponry and forces in the Gulf, including civilian ships and light arms, in preparation for the contingency of "asymmetric war" in the region. Further, Cordesman, referencing Israeli military intelligence, characterizes the Iranian regime as revealing a "defensive mindset with an intention to deter against an attack," further reflecting the Iranian fear of invasion from its Gulf neighbors, as well as by an "asymmetric" force such as the United States.⁶⁰ Thus, it is evident that Iran possesses an acute awareness of its own vulnerability to attack, both from the United States and from its militarily superior regional neighbors and competitors.

Third, Iran's hardline faction remains committed to "exporting" the revolutionary ideals of the Islamic Revolution, through intervention in foreign contexts and support of foreign proxies. This process, as described by Naval Postgraduate School professor Afshon Ostovar, is primarily inspired by Iran's desire to preserve its own revolution, through collaboration with "like-minded armed groups" in order to deter against foreign antagonism. As Ostovar describes, this belief in exporting the revolution forms the "ideological and moral bases" for Iranian involvement in foreign countries, thereby creating an important impetus for Iranian foreign policy to continue to pursue this course of action.⁶¹ Further, as Farideh Farhi and Saideh Lotfian argue in *Iran's Post-Revolution Foreign Policy Puzzle*, post-revolutionary Iran has viewed its role in the region as "global in scope", and has been intimately concerned with changing the perceived "hierarchical world order" characterized by Western hegemony in the region; a view that was formalized into the Iranian Constitution as well.⁶² Thus, there exists a significant ideological impetus for the exportation of the Islamic Revolution, and support for regional proxy groups that share Iran's revolutionary ideals.

Given these three fundamental pressures shaping Iranian foreign policy, it is no surprise that sanctions have been unable to impact the regime's foreign

⁵⁹ Mohsen Milani, "Tehran's Take: Understanding Iran's US Policy", 2009.

⁶⁰ Anthony Cordesman, "Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz", 2017. 5.

⁶¹ Afshon Ostovar, "Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards", 2016. 104.

⁶² Farideh Farhi and Saideh Lotfian, "Iran's Post-Revolution Foreign Policy Puzzle", 2012. 6.

policy calculus in concordance with Western interests. Indeed, Iran's foreign policy of "revolutionary internationalism," given Iran's context as a sanctioned regime, serves as a calculated maximization of Iran's interests under these three fundamental incentivizing forces. First, with regard to the fiscal constraints imposed by sanctioning, revolutionary internationalism and patronage of friendly foreign proxies serves as a cost-effective and potent foreign policy strategy for Iran. According to Council of Foreign Relations Fellow Ray Takeyh 2017 statement to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Iran spends between 3.5 and 16 billion dollars annually, or between 0.9 and 4 percent of GDP on its support of foreign proxies.⁶³ In comparison to US allies in the region and neighboring antagonistic states Saudi Arabia (7.98% GDP) and Israel (5.69% GDP),⁶⁴ Iran is accomplishing the same foreign policy goals at a much lower price tag than these states. Further, it is evident that Iran's foreign policy strategy is able to accomplish significant elements of Iran's foreign policy objectives despite the reduced price tag. As General Joseph L. Votel testified to the US Senate Armed Services Committee in 2017, Iran's financing of foreign elements and the expansion of its "malign influence" throughout significant conflict zones in the Middle East pose "the greatest long-term threat to US interests" in the region.⁶⁵ Given Iran's expressed goals of countering US containment of its influence in the region, it is clear that Iran's low-cost, high-effectiveness foreign policy strategy is accomplishing its goals of pursuing regional hegemony thus far.

Second, given United States attempts to contain and isolate Iran's regional influence, revolutionary internationalism affords Iran an unparalleled ability to pursue its interests abroad and counter the perceived threat of isolation by the United States. Dr. Payam Mohseni affirms the utility of revolutionary internationalism in *Axis of Resistance*, arguing that regional geopolitical crises in the Middle East offer Iran a solution to the "existential" threat of the United States and its regional partners,⁶⁶ as Iran is able to take advantage of crisis-induced power vacuums and extend its regional hegemony. General Votel corroborates this interpretation of Iranian strategy, arguing that Iran primarily operates within the "gray zone", where instability and threat can be exploited to

⁶³ Ray Takeyh, "The Nuclear Deal Fallout: The Global Threat of Iran", 2017. 11.

⁶⁴ "Country Comparison: Military Expenditures", 2012.

⁶⁵ General Joseph L. Votel, "The Posture of U.S. Central Command", 2017. 28.

⁶⁶ Payam Mohseni and Hussein Kalout, "Iran's Axis of Resistance Rises", 2017. 7.

comport with Iranian foreign policy interests. This tendency has culminated in an expansive sphere of influence throughout prominent regional stages of conflict, as General Votel testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee this March: “[Iran’s] forces and proxies oppose U.S. interests in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and seek to hinder achievement of U.S. objectives”.⁶⁷ Given this ability to influence events in a variety of regional conflicts important to US interests, Iran’s role as a regional hegemon can be understood as intentional destabilization, undermining US interests in conflicts in order to prevent its own destruction by a unified force of the United States and its regional allies.

Finally, Iran’s patronage of regional proxies, both ideologically and financially, offers it an increased capacity to insert its ideological agenda across the region, accomplishing the goal of domestic hardliners to “export the revolution” across the Middle East. Specifically, through its involvement with regional proxies, Iran is able to ensure that its revolutionary rhetoric and ideology spreads throughout the Middle East, cementing its role as both a geostrategic and ideological regional hegemon. This process of ideological insertion throughout the Middle East is most clearly evidenced by Iran’s intimate relation to foreign proxy Hezbollah, which Deeb argues has resulted in Hezbollah’s official statement of religious emulation of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.⁶⁸ This emulation carries significant consequences in the on-the-ground realities of Hezbollah and Iran’s influence throughout the region, as evidenced by Tabrizi’s description of Hezbollah as “an appendage of the revolutionary aspect of the Iranian regime,” thus demonstrating the degree to which Iranian revolutionary ideals can tangibly influence the actions of their proxies.⁶⁹ As a result, Iran’s ideological influence becomes “tantamount to control” for its foreign proxies, resulting in an increased ability for Iran to alter the course of events and assert regional hegemony in its immediate surroundings.⁷⁰

CONCLUSION

In summary, while sanctions played a significant role in accomplishing US foreign policy objectives with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, viewing sanctions

⁶⁷ General Joseph L. Votel, “The Posture of U.S. Central Command”, 2017. 27.

⁶⁸ Lara Deeb, “Hizballah: A Primer”, 2006.

⁶⁹ Aniseh Tabrizi and Raffaello Pantucci, “Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict”, 2016. 28.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

as the only reason for Iranian concordance with US objectives is reductive and ignores the tenuous balance of domestic politics within Iran that allowed for the landmark JCPOA agreement in 2016. This limited efficacy of sanctioning activity is further demonstrated by the inability of coercive sanctions to force Iran into compliance with US foreign policy objectives regarding Iran's support of foreign proxy groups in the Middle East. These divergent outcomes suggest that US sanctioning policy should take into greater account the internal domestic institutions and trends in countries targeted by sanctions rather than imposing debilitating one-size-fits-all economic sanctions without regard for the domestic context of the target nation. In other words, economic sanctions should not be used as a universal solution to a wide range of diplomatic issues. Thus, in the case of Iran, sanctioning regimes functioned in a somewhat paradoxical manner, incentivizing behavior in concordance with US interests with respect to the Iranian nuclear development program, while simultaneously producing conditions incentivizing destabilizing behavior with respect to Iranian foreign policy. As a result, while economic sanctions can be useful tools of diplomacy, their utility should be viewed as a means of influencing a nexus of incentives, used to shift domestic calculus to incentivize concordance with US foreign policy interests. Policymakers should remain aware of domestic political and economic trends within target countries, in order to ensure that sanctions will not result in serious and unintended consequences, and to maximize the effectiveness of sanctioning regimes.

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勿忘国耻

THE USE OF VICTOR-VICTIM HISTORICAL NARRATIVES IN CHINESE NATIONALIST DISCOURSE

RAQUEL LESLIE¹

INTRODUCTION

Collective memory and the political use of history serve very important functions both within Chinese society and in China's interactions with other foreign powers. Internally, historical memory plays an integral role in the formation of group membership and identity. Key historical events that a social group highlights define what it means to belong to that group, who the group's enemies may be, and how the group behaves in conflict situations. Externally, national history also provides a common thread that ties together generations across time, including those that have not taken part in certain traumatic events themselves, in order to raise nationalist sentiment.

Since the twentieth century, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tactfully utilized historical memory as a tool to both maintain its legitimacy at home and mobilize the population against its imperialist foes. The invocation of nationalism for political purposes has a long history within China, with the Nationalists utilizing it as a tool to mobilize the masses before the establishment of the CCP. The so-called "Century of Humiliation", referring to the period in which China suffered major invasions at the hands of imperialist powers like Great Britain and Japan, generated a discourse of national humiliation that continues to shape Chinese identity politics and provides the "master narrative" of modern

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Chinese history.² However, there is significant variation in the ways in which the CCP has utilized historical memory throughout the twentieth century. Mao Zedong, for example, grounded the legitimacy of the CCP in its triumph over imperialism in the 1940s and the closure that this victory brought to the Century of Humiliation. The historical narrative that he promoted in the 1950s to 1970s centered around China's decline and suffering in modern history as caused mainly by internal corruption among China's own feudal or capitalist rulers, prompting him to rally the masses through bottom-up, grassroots mobilization. Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, however, the Party faced a devastating legitimacy crisis due to a weakened faith in Communism among the people. In order to prevent the collapse of the regime, Chinese officials identified patriotic education as the solution, employing a more top-down approach by targeting the younger generation with narratives about the suffering and humiliation of the imperialist era in Chinese history. Moving away from Communist and Maoist narratives, national patriotism became the C.C.P.'s ideological tool of choice.

This paper seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the C.C.P.'s attempts to influence the politics of identity through historical memory, particularly by using patriotic education to redirect the public's energies and attention in a direction that proves beneficial for the prosperity and legitimacy of the party-state. How does nationalism ebb and flow throughout modern Chinese history as a result of the C.C.P.'s manipulation of historical memory? How do the state's motives at a given point in history affect the way it chooses to shape national historical memory? Is the C.C.P. replicating the same methods, and how effective are they? Or have these strategies changed – if so, why? These findings will shed light on the role that historical issues will continue to play in the future landscape of China's foreign relations. My analysis is anchored in the rhetoric of national humiliation generated by the party in regards to the Century of Humiliation. Specifically, I will examine the CCP's patriotic education campaign, manifested in official history textbooks and gaokao exams, as a means to assess the content of the messages promoted by the C.C.P. over time, as well as the success of these ideological indoctrination efforts.

My analysis is two-pronged: first, I seek to compare Maoist era propaganda

² William Callahan, "History, Identity, and Security: Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China," *Critical Asian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2006):187.

surrounding national humiliation with the post-1990s patriotic education campaign – both aimed at shoring up regime legitimacy by controlling collective memory – to determine how and why rhetorical strategies employed internally by the CCP changed over time. Externally, I will then contrast the CCP’s efforts to shape historical memory and nationalistic sentiment by focusing on specific historical events in the national humiliation discourse, namely the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the Nanjing Massacre, in order to reveal how external, foreign relations motives may determine the different patriotic education strategies that the state uses to shape historical memory. While most scholars researching this field exclusively focus on the role of historical memory in Sino-Japanese foreign relations, I seek to take a more nuanced approach by introducing a comparison using the United States as a counter case in order to illustrate how differential foreign relations can affect historical discourse. The shift between “victor” and “victim” narratives in the portrayal of key historical events helps to understand the CCP’s motives behind manipulating historical memory. Rather than relying heavily on sensitive historical grievances as a method of constructing nationalism, the “victor” rhetoric that characterizes China’s attitude towards its relations with the US effectively glorifies triumphs in order to mask China’s insecurities about US hegemony and reassure itself that it can compete as a global power. I suggest that the victimization narrative prevalent in discourse about Japan is ultimately more dangerous because of its capacity to mobilize negative nationalist sentiment, posing a serious threat to the future of the Sino-Japanese relationship. China’s overreliance on the victimization narrative not only delegitimizes its claims as a rising power capable of competing with the US, but it also obstructs the path towards improved relations with Japan. A re-construction of Chinese nationalism that breaks free of the victor-victim dichotomy is therefore necessary to resolve the historical tensions that constrain Chinese foreign policy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Historical Memory and National Identity

Historical memory both acts as a frame that influences a group’s perception of events as well as a motivating factor in times of conflict. Historical memory influences a group’s interpretation and understanding of the outside world, often leading actors to “endow a group with certain motives and to interpret the world

through frames defined by those motives”.³ Additionally, the socially shared images of the past produced through historical memory and transmitted inter-generationally can foster cohesion and a sense of nationalism within a given group that can be called upon in times of conflict. Zheng Wang points out that leaders often try to evoke memories of past traumas to justify hostility towards out-groups, reshaping national memory in times of identity crisis to reinforce a sense of community. Beyond this, political leaders at times even manipulate memories to portray a certain story or encourage a specific way of thinking, thereby promoting versions of events that meet their political needs. For example, a history of victimization reinforced by the state “can help build a group’s self-esteem as the group members begin to see themselves as the progeny of a long line of survivors”.⁴ The CCP uses China’s Century of Humiliation, a reinforcement and perpetuation of the history of victimization narrative, as a political tool used to direct the people’s criticism away from domestic corruption and towards foreign enemies.

The Century of Humiliation

In traditional Chinese thought, the Chinese believed that they lived in the central kingdom of *tianxia* – a culturally defined community comprised of civilizations rather than nation-states – in which Chinese civilization was considered to be universal and superior. Unlike the Western international system – one that emphasizes military and economic strength, competition, and territorial expansion – the *tianxia* system focused more on soft power such as culture, morality, and harmony.⁵ This system was based on a common historical heritage and shared beliefs rather than nationalism and the modern concept of the nation-state.

It was the war defeats and unequal treaties China suffered during the Century of Humiliation that finally “awakened” Chinese consciousness of nation-statehood. In this sense, Chinese nationalism can be understood as a result of Western imperialism, in the historical context of the “100 years of

³ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 24.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

national humiliation”.⁶ Many foreign powers took advantage of China’s weakness during this period by forcing the nation to sign a series of devastating agreements following military defeats, thereby allowing countries like Russia and Japan to secure Chinese territory and carve out their respective spheres of influence. By forcing China to pay large amounts of reparations, open up ports, and cede lands, these foreign powers severely strangled China’s development. Moreover, foreign imperialist aggression dramatically transformed the very fabric of Chinese society, one that had once been based upon community and family harmony. With China having been forced to open up to globalization and Western capitalism, Chinese rural life subsequently declined, migrants headed to cities, and the organization of community life began to crumble as China descended into warlordism following the fall of the Qing.

The major foreign invasions that China faced during the Century of Humiliation include the First Opium War, the Second Opium War, the Sino-Japanese War, the invasion of the allied forces of eight countries, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and the Anti-Japanese War. According to the official Chinese history narrative, the Opium War in 1840 was the starting point from which China began to “degenerate from an independent country into a semi-colonial country,” at a time when the British Navy forced China to open its doors to foreign invading traders and Western capitalism.⁷ The Chinese government began to utilize symbolism to remind the people of atrocities committed by foreign powers during the Second Opium War, in which French and British forces joined together against the Qing dynasty and destroyed the Yuanming Yuan royal palace outside of Beijing. After 1949, the Chinese government decided to leave the ruins “as is” in order to remind future generations about Chinese suffering under the influence of imperialism and foreign aggression. Wang highlights that the site is “an icon of national humiliation that is a testament to both the Chinese civilization and foreign barbarism...the ruins have become a physical reminder of what the Chinese historical memory remembers as Western hostility and the ‘rape of China’”.⁸

⁶ Peter Hays Gries, “Chapter 5: Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today” (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 112.

⁷ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 50.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 53

Perhaps the greatest humiliation suffered by China during this period was its defeat by Japan, namely the first Sino-Japanese War from 1894-1895. This defeat is especially consequential because it shifted the Sino-Japanese relationship from one of equal footing to Japanese superiority. Forcing many Chinese to reconsider their nation's place in the world, the military defeat exposed the idea that the *tianxia* system was no longer viable, and that China was now a weak state in danger of collapse. In 1915, the Japanese government put forth its contentious "Twenty-One Demands" to Yuan Shikai's warlord government, demanding extensive economic and commercial rights throughout Chinese territory. Yuan Shikai's acceptance of a modified version of the demands on May 9th outraged the Chinese people and laid the foundations for the second Sino-Japanese War. May 9th was commemorated as an official holiday in China called "National Humiliation Day," with the phrase "Never Forget National Humiliation" coined in Chinese newspapers and social discourse. The Twenty-One Demands therefore became a primary driver of China's first nationalist movement and the search for a new national identity.

The Chinese continued to suffer defeat at the hands of the Japanese, culminating in Japan's capture of Nanjing and the ensuing Nanjing Massacre or "Rape of Nanjing" in 1937. It was not until the United States dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the Japanese finally surrendered and the Century of Humiliation was supposedly drawn to a close. Official sources also declare that the Communist victory in 1949 marked the end of the Century, given that "the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists was over, foreign influence had been driven from the mainland, and socialism had defeated capitalism".⁹ Peter Hays Gries asserts that Chinese resistance to foreign invasions was not only in defense of their territory, but also to preserve Chinese culture and tradition. Before 1840, the Chinese held a Sinocentric view of Chinese civilization as universal and superior, yet "with each new humiliation, the Chinese lost a bit of their national myth of greatness".¹⁰ The international system that Western powers forced upon China during the Century of Humiliation fundamentally decentered Chinese views of the world, challenging their perceived universality and superiority of Chinese civilization.

⁹ Peter Hays Gries, "Chapter 5: Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today" (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 119.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 117.

Shaping Chinese Nationalism

Chinese national identity is to a significant extent a product of evolving and contested narratives about China's national past. Shunji Cui conceptualizes the beginning of nationalism in China as a response to the expansion of European influence into East Asia in the 19th century. While culturalism rather than nationalism permeated traditional thought in imperial China, the shift from culturalism to nationalism was accompanied by a strong sense of victimization and humiliation, as symbolized by China's defeat in the Opium War with Britain in 1840-1842. Thus from the start, Chinese nationalism was "strongly associated with a reactive sentiment against imperial expansionism".¹¹ When the Chinese borrowed the concept of nationalism from the West, it was to defend China from foreign invasion and to gain independence; instead of being closely associated with ideas of democracy and human rights, nationalism gained a more negative and reactive sense in China.¹² Friedman (1994) describes this type of nationalism as "anti-imperialist nationalism", while Xiao (1996) refers to it as the "reactive-defensive type" because it arose in response to specific issues and has little to do with abstract ideas or ideologies.¹³

Taking a different approach, Peter Hays Gries presents two common views on the impact of the Century of Humiliation on Chinese nationalism, namely pastism and presentism. Pastism asserts that the past determines the present; for instance, Chinese anger at its early victimization at the hands of Western imperialists may predetermine Chinese revisionism in the 21st century. Presentism offers the opposite perspective, positing that historians and nationalists writing in the present determine the past. Paul Cohen illustrates this point, arguing that Chinese historians "draw on [the past] to serve the political, ideological, rhetorical, and/or emotional needs of the present".¹⁴ For example, the People's Daily sought to combat Western sanctions in reaction to the post-Tiananmen massacre and garner popular nationalist support by commemorating the 90th anniversary of the

¹¹ Shunji Cui, "Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China's Relations with Japan," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 25, no. 2 (2012): 204.

¹² *Ibid.*, 205.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 205.

¹⁴ Paul Cohen, "Remembering and Forgetting National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China," *Twentieth-Century China* 27, no. 2 (2002): 2.

Boxer Rebellion, publishing numerous articles describing the brutality of foreign soldiers that marched on Beijing in 1990.¹⁵ Synthesizing these two approaches, Gries argues that the Century of Humiliation is “neither an objective past that works insidiously on the present (pastism) nor a mere invention of present-day nationalist entrepreneurs (presentism). Past and present, instead, exist in an interactive relationship...mutually constituted through constant dialogue about their relationship to one another”.¹⁶ William Callahan expands on this thought, arguing that national humiliation plays an integral role in the construction of citizenship and national identity in China. The Century of Humiliation provided the motivation and momentum needed to spur a national consciousness-raising or “awakening” movement in China, in which historical events of national humiliation such as the first Sino-Japanese War and the Twenty-One Demands became symbols of China’s identity building and the rise of nationalism.

Historical Memory in Sino-Japanese Relations

Many scholars have written extensively on the critical role of historical memory in Sino-Japanese relations, particularly China’s long-standing posture of antagonism towards Japan. Stories of the war atrocities committed by the Japanese against China during the Century of Humiliation continue to haunt the relationship more than sixty years after the end of World War II, with the younger generation learning about events such as the Anti-Japanese War from their grandparents, history classes, museums and historical sites, and propaganda materials. Wang argues that this constant emphasis on remembrance has left many “sensitive historical symbols between the two countries, and these symbols can be ‘reactivated’ deliberately or unintentionally and can cause major tensions or even conflicts between the two countries,” as seen in the massive anti-Japanese protests that broke out in April 2005.¹⁷

Some intellectuals like Ma Licheng, a well-known editorial writer for

¹⁵ Peter Hays Gries, “Chapter 5: Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today” (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 114.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹⁷ Zheng Wang, “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China,” *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (2008): 204.

the People's Daily, have publicly criticized what is seen by some as the excessive nationalism that has characterized attitudes towards Japan, arguing that "China should cease to dwell so much on past injuries and, instead, concentrate on its future partnership with Japan".¹⁸ Nevertheless, Sino-Japanese relations have continued to deteriorate, and have entered a period often described as "economically hot but politically cold".¹⁹ On one hand, official relations between China and Japan have improved over the past three decades. The two countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of the normalization of China-Japan relations in September 2002, and the 2nd anniversary of their 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 2003. From an economic viewpoint, trade between the two countries reached a record high of \$167.8 billion in 2004; China became Japan's largest trading partner when imports from China exceeded those from the United States in 2002, while Japan became one of the biggest investors in China, second only to the US.²⁰ However, Sino-Japanese relations in the political and security spheres have remained quite tense. For example, Japan publicly identified China as a military threat for the first time in its 2004 defense guidelines, while Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signaled China's intention to oppose Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2005. That same year, serious anti-Japanese riots broke out in numerous Chinese cities, leading many analysts to believe that Sino-Japanese relations had reached an all-time low since the normalization of 1972.²¹ Chinese and Japanese attitudes towards each other also took a turn for the worse: a Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) survey in the fall of 2002 indicated that "only 5.9 percent of Chinese respondents believed that the Chinese and Japanese people are 'very close' or 'close' to each other, whereas 43.3 percent felt that the two people are 'not very close' or 'not close at all'".²² Furthermore, opinion polls conducted in both Japan and China in 2002 indicated that a majority of Chinese and Japanese citizens felt that the relations between their nations were not good.

Such deterioration of the Sino-Japanese relationship can be largely

¹⁸ Shunji Cui, "Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China's Relations with Japan," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 25, no. 2 (2012): 200.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 201.

²⁰ Jin Qiu, "The Politics of History and Historical Memory in China-Japan Relations," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2006): 26.

²¹ Shunji Cui, "Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China's Relations with Japan," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 25, no. 2 (2012): 206.

²² Jin Qiu, "The Politics of History and Historical Memory in China-Japan Relations," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2006): 27.

attributed to issues related to history and its role in the rise of nationalistic sentiment. According to Cui, “the processes of reconstruction and representation of historical memory have played a major part in the shaping of identities and forming the nature of nationalism in both countries”.²³ The way in which the CCP in particular has constructed and represented collective memory has played a decisive role in China’s strategic approach to Japan.

However, the focus of much scholarly work on the political use of historical memory in China typically surrounds the Sino-Japanese relationship in isolation. In this paper, I seek to complicate this matter by juxtaposing the role of historical memory in Sino-Japanese relations with that in Sino-US relations, in order to compare the CCP’s rationale for constructing historical narratives for differing political aims. This comparison serves to reveal a greater nuance in the CCP’s invocation of nationalism than solely the “victim narrative” prevalent in the Sino-Japanese relationship. By analyzing China’s patriotic education campaign and the use of textbooks and gaokao exams as vehicles for exporting national historical narratives, I seek to determine the underlying motives and subsequent consequences of the CCP’s shifts between promoting “victor” and “victim” narratives. While China experienced an internally-focused temporal shift from the use of “victor” narratives in Maoist era propaganda to “victim” narratives in the patriotic education campaign launched in the mid-1990s, my use of Japan and the US as comparison cases will reveal that the victor-victim distinction plays a critical role in Chinese foreign relations as well.

ANALYSIS I

Shifting Historical Narratives Amidst a Legitimacy Crisis

The political usage of the humiliation narrative can be traced back to the founding movement of the PRC. Callahan asserts that national humiliation was part of the construction of citizenship and national identity in the Republic of China, with the phrase “never forget national humiliation” (*wu wang guochi*) having been popularized in newspapers since 1915.²⁴ Pre-Mao republican era

²³ Shunji Cui, “Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China’s Relations with Japan,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 25, no. 2 (2012): 203.

²⁴ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 76.

writings on the Century of Humiliation focused on the concept of victimization, drawing upon images of China as a raped woman in reference to the invasions it suffered at the hands of foreign imperialist powers. However, Gries notes that the “Rape of China” theme faded after the Communist victory in 1949. In fact, Gries points out that during Mao’s time, China’s national history and the national humiliation narrative were not employed by the CCP as a major ideological tool or source of legitimacy for the party. For example, the memory of the anti-Japanese War had virtually disappeared from public space in China, and records of the National Library of China indicate that there were no books on the subject of “national humiliation” published in China between 1947 and 1990. Kirk Denton also asserts that the historiography of the Nanjing Massacre was consciously suppressed during the Maoist period.²⁵

Instead, it was the official communist ideology that was crucial to the institutionalization of the CCP’s legitimacy. Gries argues that “theories of historical materialism, class struggle, and scientific socialism provided a comprehensive conceptual framework of moral justification for the new party-state,” with Mao tactfully contextualizing Marxism in terms of China’s traditional ideal of a Confucian society based on harmony and unity.²⁶ Gries outlines several reasons for the CCP putting aside national humiliation narratives during this period of time. Firstly, the CCP “made class distinction rather than ethnicity the foundation of political identity,” using class struggle theory to explain the Chinese revolution, foreign imperialism, and Chinese civil wars. Rather than placing the blame on foreign invasions, China’s decline and suffering in modern history were said to be primarily caused by internal corruption and the incompetence of the feudal and capitalist rulers in the Qing dynasty. According to Gries, the concept of nationalism would have also contradicted Mao’s idea of an “international” communist revolution. Furthermore, “victory” was a key word in the CCP’s claims to legitimacy, a narrative intended to mobilize popular support; the CCP’s propaganda machine taught that it was under Mao’s brilliant leadership that the party ultimately emerged victorious and gained national independence. A rhetoric of national humiliation clearly would have contradicted these victor narratives. Mao-era propaganda also highlighted the heroism of the anti-feudal, anti-

²⁵ Peter Hays Gries, “Chapter 5: Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today” (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 115.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 116.

imperialist masses in “throwing off their chains and repelling foreign invaders”.²⁷ From the founding of the CCP to the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the CCP claimed legitimacy on the grounds of “changing China’s weak country status and reviving its central position on the world stage,” with the party setting aside the concept of nationalism and the memory of humiliation.

Following Mao’s death in 1976, however, the CCP faced a legitimacy crisis, in which the official communist ideology began to lose credibility. The “Three Beliefs Crises” emerged after the Cultural Revolution: a crisis of faith in socialism, a crisis of belief in Marxism, and a crisis of trust in the party.²⁸

The Patriotic Education Campaign

In reaction to the bankruptcy of Marxist and Maoist ideologies, there was “a felt, if unstated, need on the part of the Chinese government to come up with a new legitimating ideology to burnish the rapidly dimming luster of the original Marxist-Leninist-Maoist vision”.²⁹ It was in this context that in the early 1990s, the Chinese government realized that history education on national humiliation could be an effective device for the regime to re-legitimize its rule and inspire nationalism. A China Youth Daily article published at the time asserted that “in order to prevent the possible disintegration of Chinese society, China must base itself firmly on nationalism which would provide the basis for its national cohesion (*ningjuli*) and political integration”.³⁰ Ideological education, therefore, became the primary strategy that the CCP would use to handle its legitimacy crisis, particularly because patriotic education in particular “stressed the role of the communist state as the bearer of China’s historic struggle for national independence and therefore reinforced CCP authority”.³¹ The CCP began to move away from communist narratives, reviving national humiliation

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 116.

²⁸ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 78.

²⁹ Paul Cohen, “Remembering and Forgetting National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China,” *Twentieth-Century China* 27, no. 2 (2002): 4.

³⁰ China Youth Daily, “Sulian jubian zhihou Zhongguo de xianshi yingdui yu zhanlue xuanze,” China Youth Daily, 9 September 1991.

³¹ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 97.

discourse and introducing patriotism as the new ideological tool of choice. This allowed the CCP to reassert its claim to legitimacy by stressing the suffering and humiliation that China had experienced at the hands of foreign imperialist powers like Japan, exemplified by events like the Nanjing massacre of 1937.

Officially launched in 1994, the patriotic education campaign was not so much one of reeducation as of redirection. Namely, it was an effort to redirect young people's anger away from the party and domestic issues and back to foreign problems. Paul Cohen highlights the fact that a sizable majority of the Chinese population in the 1990s had been born after 1949, and had therefore never directly experienced the imperialist aggression portrayed in national humiliation discourse. Patriotic education provided the ideal opportunity to reintroduce these individuals "to the imperialist past, to re-experience its bitterness and shame".³²

Although the campaign began in the early 1990s with the intent of targeting young students in particular, it has gradually evolved into an institutionalized nationwide mobilization. Beyond formal education in the classroom, the Party's 1994 "Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education" also proposed a multimedia campaign of patriotic education activities that set the state's entire propaganda machine in motion, taking place not just in schools, but also in museums, film, television, popular magazines, newspapers, and national holidays. Beijing has "creatively used history education as an instrument for the glorification of the party, the consolidation of the PRC's national identity, and the justification of the political system of one-party rule by the CCP... skillfully utilizing China's humiliating past to arouse its citizens' historical consciousness and to promote social cohesion".³³ Not only representing a major shift in Beijing's identity politics, the campaign very directly allowed for the party's survival in the post-Cold War and post-Tiananmen eras.

Textbook Reform

History textbooks in particular play a central role in the construction and reproduction of national narratives, often used by the state as "ideological tools

³² Paul Cohen, "Remembering and Forgetting National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China," *Twentieth-Century China* 27, no. 2 (2002): 2.

³³ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 116.

to promote a certain belief system and legitimize an established political/social order”.³⁴ Textbooks have the capacity to convey a uniform and even official version of what the leadership wants the youth to believe, therefore textbooks serve as major components in the construction and reproduction of national narratives.

A critical component of the patriotic education campaign involved the revision of history curriculum. The Official People’s Education Press published new history textbooks, including a new characterization of China’s modern history, for both middle and high schools in 1992 – one that emphasized the “bullying and humiliation” of Chinese people under foreign powers. According to Wang, the new textbooks repeated the CCP’s typical interpretation of Chinese history: “if not for the CCP’s successful revolution and sacrifice, China would still be a weak and divided country”.³⁵ However, rather than emphasizing a class struggle narrative as the Chinese ruling regime had done in the past, the textbooks approved after 1992 focused on the struggle with outside forces. In other words, the patriotic education campaign featured a major narrative change from “victor” to “victim” narratives, in which “the ‘traditional’ historical narrative that had previously focused on tales of Maoist and socialist triumphs was significantly reduced” and in its place was “a new historiography that emphasized China’s century of suffering and humiliation due to incessant foreign invasions and oppression”.³⁶ Wang asserts that the traditional “victor” narratives had not been useful in cultivating the young generation’s antagonistic attitude towards China’s own enemies like Japan, at the same time making them less appreciative of the Communist revolution and the CCP’s role in changing China’s fate and ending national humiliation. Because most schools in China are run by the state, they provided the ideal social institution through which the CCP could transmit national narratives about the past.³⁷ Modern and contemporary Chinese history has become a required core course in high school since 1992, with the Ministry

³⁴ Ibid., 103.

³⁵ Ibid., 79.

³⁶ Shan Windsript, “A Modern History of Forgetting: The Rewriting of Social and Historical Memory in Contemporary China, 1966-present,” *Quarterly Journal of Chinese Studies* 1, no. 4 (2013): 64-65.

³⁷ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 97.

of Education exercising direct authority over educational content and teaching methods. Wang provides the official narrative of modern Chinese history presented at the beginning of the teaching guidelines for the new high school history course:

Chinese modern history is a history of humiliation in which China gradually degenerated into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society; at the same time, it is also a history that Chinese people strived for national independence and social progress and persisted in their struggle of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. It is also a history of the success of the New-Democratic Revolution under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

This type of “education on national humiliation” has become one of the most important subjects in the national education system, an initiative that continues to bolster the legitimacy of the CCP through the manipulation of collective memory.

From “Victor” to “Victim” in History Textbooks

In order to test the validity of these claims about revisions in history curriculum as a result of the patriotic education campaign, I identified passages in Chinese textbooks and gaokao exams as primary sources to present evidence of this narrative change from the “victor” narrative of the Maoist era to the “victim” narrative of the post-1990s period. Firstly, examples of the emphasis on class struggle that Mao promoted prior to 1976 can be found in the politics section of the 1963 gaokao exam. One excerpt conceptualizes imperialism within a class struggle framework, asserting that “As long as imperialism still exists in other countries, there exists an international class struggle. The imperialists not only carry out political subversion and military aggression against the socialist countries, but also infiltrate and erode the socialist countries ideologically and culturally”.³⁸ The original Chinese text is below:

②在国外：只要帝国主义还存在，就存在着国际范围内的阶级斗争。帝国主义不但要对社会主义国家进行政治颠覆和军事侵略，而且还会从思想上、文化上对社会主义国家进行渗透和侵蚀，阴谋实现社会主义内部的“和平演变”。

³⁸ 1963 Colleges and universities enrollment unified national examination (gaokao), Political section.

The portrayal of the Anti-Japanese War in particular has dramatically transformed over time. Prior to patriotic education, the CCP depicted the Anti-Japanese War in Marxist terms, describing Japanese workers and peasants as fellow victims of militant imperialists. Significant emphasis was also placed on internal and class conflict between the CCP and KMT; in the early 1980s, history textbooks “provided detailed descriptions about KMT corruption and impotence along with its nonresistance policy” and also “purported that the anti-Japanese War was fought solely by Communist troops”.³⁹ However, the narrative of the Anti-Japanese War was revised in the mid-1990s, with the emphasis now placed on the international and ethnic conflict between China and Japan. For example, one college entrance exam prep book dives into extensive detail on the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the seizure of occupied land following the Anti-Japanese War, blaming the colonialization of Chinese society on imperialists’ division of China into “spheres of influence”.⁴⁰

Likewise, the depiction of modern Chinese history in historical texts transformed from a story of class struggle to one of national humiliation and the Chinese struggle for liberation from foreign powers. In accordance with the national humiliation narrative, the 2007 Guangdong volume of the history *gaokao* exam posits that scholars advocate the interpretation of Chinese modern history as a “process of the Chinese people’s resistance to imperialism and feudalism”.⁴¹ One Grade 8 Chinese history textbook published in 2006 presents a similar victimization narrative, writing that the founding of the People’s Republic of China opened up a new era of Chinese history, whereby China “ended more than a century the history of humiliation in which the country was enslaved but ultimately became an independent country...From then on, the Chinese people have ‘stood up’ as the masters of the country” and “expanded the forces of peace, democracy and socialism in the world and inspired the struggle of oppressed people and nations for liberation”⁴²:

³⁹ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 212.

⁴⁰ Tianmin Feng and Shaowen Wang, “Li Shi ed. *Xin Bian Quan Guo Cheng Ren Gao Kao Fu Dao Cong Shu*,” (Beijing: Guang Ming Ri Bao Chu Ban She, 1999): 104.

⁴¹ 2007 Colleges and universities enrollment unified national examination (*gaokao*), Guangdong volume.

⁴² Shi Jie Li Shi (Beijing: Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She, 2008): 7.

中华人民共和国的成立开辟了中国历史新纪元。从此，中国结束了一百多年来被侵略被奴役的屈辱历史，真正成为独立自主的国家；中国人民从此站起来了，成为国家的主人。

新中国的成立，壮大了世界和平、民主和社会主义的力量，鼓舞了世界被压迫民族和被压迫人民争取解放的斗争。

Furthermore, numerous textbooks published after the mid-1990s use a rhetoric of victimization to describe the Opium War and the havoc it wreaked upon the development of Chinese society. In describing the series of unequal treaties that the Qing government was forced to sign after the Opium War, a college entrance exam textbook emphasizes the importance of understanding the humiliation narrative: “Only by grasping the main content of these unequal treaties can we analyze the harm they exerted on the Chinese nation. This is the only way to understand how China has gradually reduced itself to semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. The treaties undermined China’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity”⁴³:

辟商埠及其它特权等四方面。只有掌握了主要内容，才能分析它的危害和对中华民族所带来的巨大灾难。也只有这样才能明了中国是如何一步步沦为半殖民地半封建社会的。《中英南京条约》及其附件的签订和鸦片战争均给中国造成极大的危害和影响，但其具体内容又有所不同，前者破坏了中国的独立和领土完整，增加了中国人民的负担，破坏了中国的关税自主权和司法权，扩大了资本主义国家的侵略权

The excerpt goes on to highlight how capitalist countries dumped their commodities into China in vast quantities, undermining the self-sufficient natural economy of China and causing the dissolution of the feudal economy.

However, a critical component of the victimization narrative is an emphasis on how the Chinese ultimately persevered in the struggle for liberation. The same textbook also includes a section that describes an anti-tobacco campaign led by Lin Zexu during the Opium War, in which he defended the interests of the nation against attempts by British colonialists to plunder China’s wealth. The textbook

⁴³ Tianmin Feng and Shaowen Wang, “Li Shi ed. Xin Bian Quan Guo Cheng Ren Gao Kao Fu Dao Cong Shu,” (Beijing: Guang Ming Ri Bao Chu Ban She, 1999): 101.

portrays this as a “victory of the Chinese people against smoking” that “cracked down upon foreign invaders and showed the strong will of the Chinese people to resist foreign aggressors”.⁴⁴ The concept of the Chinese having “shouldered the dual revolutionary task of opposing aggression and anti-feudalism” is a common theme amid the renewed “victim” narrative.

ANALYSIS II

Differential Use of Historical Narratives in Foreign Relations

Although this victor-victim narrative shift is clearly prevalent in the period between Mao-era propaganda and after the launch of the patriotic education campaign, this distinction is not just temporal – the historical narrative employed by the CCP also varies in response to foreign relations. This is best exemplified by the case studies conducted by Peter Hays Gries on the endurance of the Mao-era victor narrative in Chinese writings about the Korean War, compared to the reemergence of the victim narrative in recent anti-Japanese discourse. He points out that beyond simple variation in time accounting for the use of either “victor” or “victim” narratives in internal Chinese discourse, external foreign policy is an equally decisive factor in the CCP’s manipulation of historical memory. Gries presents an interesting argument for the reasoning behind the CCP’s differentiated use of historical narratives in its relations with the United States and Japan in particular, asserting that “insecurity about growing American power may explain why writings about the U.S. have clung to the victor narrative, while increasing confidence about a rapidly developing China’s ability to take on Japan may explain why popular nationalists in China have embraced a victim narrative about China’s past conflicts with Japan”.⁴⁵

Evoking Glorious “Victories” in Sino-U.S. Relations

To begin with the idea of heroism in Sino-U.S. relations, the Korean War marks the end of the Century of Humiliation for many Chinese people as well as

⁴⁴ Tianmin Feng and Shaowen Wang, “Li Shi ed. Xin Bian Quan Guo Cheng Ren Gao Kao Fu Dao Cong Shu,” (Beijing: Guang Ming Ri Bao Chu Ban She, 1999): 105.

⁴⁵ Peter Hays Gries, “Chapter 5: Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today” (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 123.

the birth of New China. While official sources frequently declare that the period ended in 1945 with Chinese participation in the Allied victory over Japan, many Japanese and Westerners instead assign victory to the U.S. when the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁴⁶ The Communist victory in 1949 was also not completely satisfying in the fact that Taiwan and Hong Kong had yet to be returned to Chinese control. However, victory over the U.S. in the Korean War could be construed as something special; the perception of victory in this battle, therefore, plays a central role in the self-confidence of many Chinese nationalists. Gries points out that “several of the Chinese narratives about Korea were written during the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1996), when many Chinese acquired the self-esteem to take on and defeat the United States”.⁴⁷ Drawing upon proud narratives of past “victories” over the United States, like in Korea or Vietnam, can therefore help create the confidence necessary for possible future Sino-U.S. conflicts.

Gries asserts that Mao’s need to disparage the U.S. as a “paper tiger” revealed an anxiety about American power that still persists today. In the 1950s, Mao referred to the American military as the “world’s number one military power” yet claimed that the Chinese people defeated it by “relying on their own strength,” completely dismissing North Korean contributions to the Korean War and asserting that China won on its own.⁴⁸ As tensions with the United States rise today, Chinese nationalists continue to evoke glorious “victories” over the U.S. in the past and draw upon this pride in order to meet present-day challenges in foreign relations. In the case of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996, the Chinese leadership responded to the U.S. sending an aircraft carrier to Taiwan following People’s Liberation Army (P.L.A.) missile exercises directed at the island by declaring that “China has dealt with the US on more than one or two occasions. What was the outcome? The United States was defeated on every occasion”.⁴⁹ Additionally, popular nationalist Xi Yongjun and Ma Zaizhun called upon similar imagery of victory in their 1996 *Surpassing the USA*: “On the Taiwan question, Americans have forgotten the enormous losses they bitterly suffered on the Korean battlefield and in ...Vietnam...China is strengthening, and the myth of American invincibility

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 119.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 119.

⁴⁹ Peter Hays Gries, “Chapter 5: Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today” (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 120.

has already been shattered”.⁵⁰

Portrayal of The Korean and Vietnam Wars in Textbooks

As with the temporal shift in victor-victim narratives from the Mao era to the patriotic education campaign, I again used textbooks and gaokao exams as primary sources to identify evidence of the depiction of Chinese “victories” over the United States in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Firstly, there are elements of fear over the rise of US hegemony in depictions of the Korean War. In a high school history book on “Twentieth Century War and Peace” published in 2007, the text warns against the United States’ efforts to expand its interests in East Asia and “further promote its own hegemon policy around the world and step up the siege of the socialist camp”.⁵¹ However, the textbook then employs a rhetoric of victory and courage in its description of China answering the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.)’s call for military support. In order to resist U.S. imperialism, “safeguard national security,” and aid the D.P.R.K. in its fight of “socialist resistance,” the C.C.P. Central Committee Political Bureau and the Central Government “made careful consideration to decide to form a Chinese People’s Volunteer Army on October 19, 1950, under the leadership of Commander Peng Dehuai”.⁵² One passage of a Grade 8 Chinese history textbook encourages students to reflect on the heroism of the Volunteer Army, writing “The People’s Volunteers Army fought shoulder to shoulder with the North Korean army and civilians and emerged countless epic war heroes in bloody battles with their enemies. Do you want to know their heroic deeds?”.⁵³

A few pages later, the textbook credits the victory of the Korean War to these soldiers: “In the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, the Chinese People’s Volunteers Army carried forward a high degree of patriotism and revolutionary heroism. Because of their heroic fighting with North Korean soldiers and civilians, in July 1953 the United States was forced to sign the Armistice Agreement. The people of China won the war against aggression. The Chinese People’s

⁵⁰ Ibid., 120.

⁵¹ 20 Shi Ji De Zhan Zheng Yu He Ping (Beijing: Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She, 2007): 106.

⁵² Ibid., 107.

⁵³ Zhong Guo Li Shi (Beijing: Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She, 2008): 7.

Volunteers returned triumphantly”.⁵⁴ In order to establish a sense of superiority and victory over the adversary, the high school history textbook on “Twentieth Century War and Peace” published in 2007 declares that “the Korean War... broke the myth of the invincible U.S. military...the imperialists’ attempt to stifle the riches of the Asian countries through wars had failed utterly”.⁵⁵ Finally, the teacher’s guide for the Grade 8 Chinese history textbook provides a teaching objective on the Korean War lesson, instructing teachers to present the following storyline: “The just struggle against aggression not only safeguarded the security and independence of China and the D.P.R.K., but also encouraged the liberation struggle of the oppressed nations in the world, severely attacked the U.S. policy of aggression and expansion, and greatly enhanced the international status and prestige of New China”⁵⁶:

1950年10月，中国人民志愿军高唱着这首战歌，奔赴朝鲜前线。他们为了抗美援朝、保家卫国，与朝鲜军民并肩作战，在与敌人浴血奋战中涌现出无数可歌可泣的战斗英雄。你知道他们的英勇事迹吗？

运用多媒体等手段播放《中国人民志愿军战歌》和影片《上甘岭》片段，让学生感受志愿军战士的豪迈、热情、坚强的决心和英勇顽强的抗争精神，深刻体会志愿军战士所表现出来的爱国主义、国际主义和革命英雄主义精神，他们不愧为“最可爱的人”。抗美援朝是一场伟大的反侵略的正义斗争，既保卫了中朝两国的安全和独立，也鼓舞了全世界被压迫民族的解放斗争，沉重打击了美国的侵略扩张政策，极大的提高了新中国的国际地位和国际威望。

Likewise, the portrayal of the Vietnam War in *gaokao* exams and history textbooks follows the same pattern of evoking glorious “victories” over the United States. In the politics section of the 1965 *gaokao* exam, the answer key suggests that students present two core ideas in response to the question of why the “victory of the Vietnamese people in the struggle against the United States is significant for

⁵⁴ Zhong Guo Li Shi (Beijing: Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She, 2008): 13-14.

⁵⁵ 20 Shi Ji De Zhan Zheng Yu He Ping (Beijing: Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She, 2007): 108.

⁵⁶ Zhong Guo Li Shi, Ba Nian Ji (Beijing: Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She, 2006): 15.

national salvation and victory over U.S. imperialism”: “1. The war of aggression in Vietnam by the U.S. imperialists is unjust, reactionary, barbarous, and extremely unpopular; 2. The struggle of the Vietnamese people for resisting the United States and saving the nation is not only for the purpose of safeguarding its own sovereignty but also for defending socialism. It has won the sympathy and support of the people of the world, especially the support of 650 million Chinese people, for the revolutionary interests of freeing the oppressed nations”.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the high school history textbook on “Twentieth Century War and Peace” invites students to question the motives of the United States in launching yet another war in Asia after the Korean War, asking “Why, then, do Americans go all the way to Asia to fight? What is the impact of the failure of the United States in Vietnam on this as well as the international situation?”.⁵⁸ While many U.S. citizens perceive the Korean and Vietnam Wars as senseless tragedies, many Chinese see them as unqualified victories over a potentially threatening foe.

Victimization in Sino-Japanese Relations

The Century of Humiliation remains a contested narrative revolving around two competing yet coexisting storylines: the “victor” narrative continues to be more prevalent in nationalist accounts of Sino-American relations, while the “victim” narrative is more commonly employed in writings about Japan. What explains this difference? Gries asserts that it is more than just the fact that the Chinese have suffered more at the hands of the Japanese than at the hands of the United States; past wars with Japan and the U.S. actually hold very different meanings for Chinese nationalists today. Events such as the “Rape of Nanjing” and other WWI atrocities must be understood “in the context of a centuries-old Chinese view of the Japanese as subordinate within a Sino-centric world order”.⁵⁹ Hence, the notion of Chinese victimization at the hands of “little brother” Japan is tied to strong feelings of injustice. While the Chinese emphasize heroism and past “victories” over the U.S – whether in Korea or Vietnam – to build confidence

⁵⁷ 1965 Colleges and universities enrollment unified national examination (gaokao), Political section.

⁵⁸ 20 Shi Ji De Zhan Zheng Yu He Ping (Beijing: Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She, 2007): 110.

⁵⁹ Peter Hays Gries, “Chapter 5: Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today” (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 123.

about possible future conflicts with the US in the face of an expanding American hegemony, it may be that Chinese citizens “no longer fear Japan as they fear the U.S.” and can “engage in a new anti-Japanese ‘victim-speak’ that allows them to express long-repressed anger at past injustices”.⁶⁰

I assert that the victimization narrative prevalent in the Sino-Japanese relationship is more dangerous because of its capacity to mobilize nationalist sentiment in a way that threatens the possibility of reconciliation in the future. The controversy surrounding history education and the revision of history textbooks is not just an issue in China but in East Asia more broadly; Japan is guilty of the same manipulation of historical truth.⁶¹ In fact, the Japanese Education Ministry approved a new junior high school textbook titled *Atarashii rekishi kyokasho* (New history textbook) written by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (J.S.H.T.R.) in April 2005, a publication that sparked immediate outrage in Asian countries like China. According to critics, the textbook presented “a distorted and self-serving account of Japan’s colonial and wartime activities” that sought to minimize Japan’s culpability for its wartime actions.⁶² Four days after the textbook was approved, an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Chinese demonstrators marched to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, throwing stones at the facility. The next day, 20,000 protesters marched in two cities in the southern Guangdong province, and protesters attacked a Japanese department store in Shenzhen. After this two-week period passed, Wang writes that anti-Japanese protests had broken out in over ten Chinese cities, with demonstrators chanting slogans like “Japan Must Apologize to China,” “Never Forget National Humiliation,” and “Boycott Japanese Goods”.⁶³ The 2005 protests were the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations in China since the two countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1972, and the largest protests against any country since 1999 when the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

In Japan, many people connect China’s anti-Japanese sentiments with Chinese history education, including Japanese foreign minister Nobutaka Machimura who accused Beijing of using the patriotic education campaign as a

⁶⁰ Peter Hays Gries, “Chapter 5: Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity Today” (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 124.

⁶¹ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 205.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 206.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 207.

means of indoctrinating China's students with a biased view of the past. In reality, however, both countries utilize a mix of both "victor" and "victim" narratives in their history textbooks to account for their past conflicts. While Chinese textbooks provide detailed accounts of the wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese, Wang points out that "such content is downplayed in most Japanese textbooks... instead, the Japanese versions tend to associate the war with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the air raids on Tokyo".⁶⁴ According to Saburo Ienaga, Japanese textbooks have taught generations of children that war is glorious since the 1920s, revealing the government's reluctance to portray wartime events in a "detailed and critical manner".⁶⁵ When two countries describe the same historical events in different ways in their respective history textbooks, these discrepancies can lead to serious misunderstandings in their bilateral relations. Sensitivity to history is particularly prevalent in countries with a long history of conflict like Japan and China, and leads to disputes over the accuracy of the portrayal of historical events. These create a "source of new conflicts between old enemies".⁶⁶

The "Rape of Nanjing": Debating Historical Truths in Textbooks

One of the most contentious historical episodes between China and Japan is the Nanjing Massacre. For Chinese people, the "Rape of Nanjing" is a national trauma that continues to haunt Sino-Japanese relations today. The official Chinese estimate is that 300,000 people were executed by the Japanese military after they conquered the city in December 1937; this is also the figure that Chinese students have been taught in their history textbooks. The official middle school history textbook provides very descriptive accounts of how the Japanese forces executed people on a massive scale and disposed of their bodies. However, Wang points out that there is no mention of the Nanjing Massacre in the 2005 version of the history textbook published by the JSHTTR, with only one passage referring to the event:

⁶⁴ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 207.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 208.

In August 1937, two Japanese soldiers [and] one officer were shot to death in Shanghai. After this incident, the hostilities between Japan and China escalated. Japanese military officials thought Chiang Kai-shek would surrender if they captured Nanking [Nanjing], the Nationalist capital; they occupied that city in December. But Chiang Kai-shek had moved his capital to the remote city of Chongqing. The conflict continued.

Editors of the textbook added a footnote that makes the only direct reference to the Massacre, albeit at very ambiguous one: “At this time, many Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded by Japanese troops (the Nanking Incident). Documentary evidence has raised doubts about the actual number of victims claimed by the incident. The debate continues even today”.⁶⁷ Further research by Wang indicated that only two of the seven middle school textbooks used in Japan in 2002 gave numbers for the controversial death toll of the Nanjing Massacre, while others used more ambiguous terms such as “many” or “massive” to describe the casualties. Because the revised Japanese textbook casts doubts on China’s claim of the number of casualties in Nanjing, Jin Qiu highlights that many Chinese believe that the changes in the textbooks indicate that Japan “lacks a minimal objective attitude on the issue of history” and has not learned lessons from its past”.⁶⁸ However, Qiu also points out that the Japanese government continually downplays the issue, explaining that because the textbook in question is only one of several approved textbooks, it does not necessarily represent the official Japanese view on history. In another light, the textbooks revisions can also be viewed as “the government’s response to the recent surge of nationalism in the country, especially among young Japanese. The continuing decline of Japan’s economy in recent years has begun to shake the confidence that the Japanese have had in their government and country in the postwar era,” therefore “glorification of the country’s imperial tradition may work as a psychological remedy to the public”.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 209.

⁶⁸ Jin Qiu, “The Politics of History and Historical Memory in China-Japan Relations,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2006): 27.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

CONCLUSION*Policy Implications: Towards a Discourse of Peace?*

Rising nationalist sentiments as a result of the contentious use of victimization narratives pose a serious threat to the future of Sino-Japanese relations. Scholars have voiced similar criticisms of the CCP's manipulation of historical memory through the patriotic education campaign. In January 2006, Yuan Weishi, a professor of philosophy at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, published an article entitled "Modernization and History Textbooks" in the weekly supplement of the China Youth Daily, in which he accused the government's history text of feeding students "fake pills" and "fostering blind nationalism and close-minded anti-foreign sentiment".⁷⁰ In particular, Yuan cited the accounts of the burning of the Yuanming Yuan and the Boxer Rebellion to argue that the official history textbook published by the People's Education Press provided a one-sided account of historical events. Although party officials quickly responded to the publication of the article by replacing the chief editors of the magazine, the implications of Yuan's point are worth considering. While evoking a sense of nationalism helped the CCP to replace the discredited communist ideology in the 1990s, there remains a danger that rising nationalist sentiment "may cause a serious backlash or even undermine China's attempts to cultivate the image of a responsible power" in accordance with its "peaceful rise" strategy.⁷¹ While, on one hand, it is in China's best interests to promote social and political stability through sustained economic growth – an objective best achieved through good relations with Japan and the US – this goal is not easily reconciled with antagonistic nationalist discourse based on a clear distinction between "we" against the "other".⁷² Despite Beijing's wishes to improve relations with Japan, its foreign policy remains constrained by history-related factors.

It is the very construction of Chinese nationalism that limits the CCP's flexibility in its foreign relations. China's "overreliance on history to provide national legitimization could challenge the ability of any Chinese government

⁷⁰ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 78.

⁷¹ Shunji Cui, "Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China's Relations with Japan," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 25, no. 2 (2012): 206.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 206.

to satisfy its own people or to engage easily internationally”.⁷³ China’s repeated deployments of its own historical weaknesses and victim identity are not only incongruent with the reputation it is attempting to build as a rising power catching up to the United States, but actively impede progress in the improvement of its relations in East Asia. Due to the anti-Japanese nature of Chinese nationalism, Cui asserts that Beijing has created a barrier that makes any significant compromise or historical reconciliation in its dealings with Tokyo very difficult to achieve. A reframing of Chinese nationalism – a conceptualization that does not rely so heavily on the victor-victim dichotomy – must serve as the first step that China must take on the path to resolving the historical issues that remain a source of tension in its foreign relations. Unless the CCP accepts the responsibility to guide public opinion towards Japan in a more positive direction, public antagonism rooted in unresolved historical problems, especially among the young generation, will remain a primary obstacle to the development of bilateral relations. Whether Beijing undertakes yet another historical narrative shift from one of victimization to one of peace remains to be seen.

⁷³ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation : Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 208.

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