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Interstate

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Editor's Letter

All of us here at Interstate are proud to say that the long awaited Fiftieth Anniversary Issue is here at last. Firstly, I'd like to extend a big thank you to the authors of these articles for their contributions and patience while we compiled this very special issue. It has been both an honour and indeed daunting to be Managing Editor of such an important issue, and thus I would like to especially thank the editors who have worked with me in making this publication possible.

This has undoubtedly been a challenging year for Interstate, having to reinvigorate the interest of students in the academic journal after a few quiet years. I am sincerely grateful therefore to my colleagues Ciaran and Thanapat for their submissions to this very special issue, and of course to Meghan for her patience, diligence, and reassurance as I put this edition of Interstate together. I am equally grateful to Alex Hird for putting her trust in me to take over as Managing Editor of a journal which has and I hope will continue to enrich the experiences of students here at Aberystwyth University. It's been a pleasure, if not at times difficult, to edit and compile articles worthy to mark Interstate's fiftieth anniversary.

With it being the 50th Anniversary of Interstate, we here at Interstate wanted to be retrospective when looking towards some of the issues faced in international affairs today. With that, we hope you can look to previous issues of the journal and consider what issues remain pertinent, and what seems unthinkable to us which was to previous generations?

Interstate would also like to pay tribute to the memory of Commander Michael MccGwire, one of the journal's founders, who has died at the age of 91. Not only was Michael a Royal Navy Commander, he also took part in the D-Day landings during the Second World War, going on to head the Soviet Naval Intelligence Section for the British Defence Intelligence Staff at the height of the Cold War. It is truly inspiring to be continuing the work of such an incredible man, who lived a full and varied life before coming to Aberystwyth to study in 1967. It is with this sentiment that I hope to see Interstate continue for another 50 years with the support of the next generations of International Politics students here in Aberystwyth.

My deepest thanks go to Alex Hird, Meghan Smith, Thanapat Pekanan, Ciaran Kovach, David Clarke, and the contributors for all their hard work and support.

Diolch o galon,

Tirion Kerr

Introduction

50 years ago, November 1965, Interstate journal was created by a group of inspirational students, namely Lynton Jones and Ronald Webster at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. Both highly successful in their careers, the former is a chairman emeritus of Bourse Consult, a financial markets consultancy, and also a former of private secretary to a minister of state; the latter withdrew from his Finals to join the world revolution. Those were the days of the rise of Che Guevara, the Vietnam War, and student activism in Europe and America.

They suggested that the newly created Faculty of Economic and Social Studies should publish a magazine related to disciplines within the Faculty, and play a role not only as the publication of academic papers but also delivered speeches. The journal was named *'STATE'* for the first two issues in the academic year of 1965/1966 and concentrated on immigration and hanging, as well as deterrence, the United Nations, and Afro-Asia. During the process of the publications, the journal had been left to the Department of International Politics due to difficulties in coordinating such a venture on an inter-departmental basis. Later on, the journal's name had been changed from *'STATE'* to *'INTERSTATE'* in the academic year of 1967/68.

Interstate was at its peak in the late 1960s which can be seen from many editions being published in a year. The majority of articles were written by lecturers at Aberystwyth and some others by academics from other institutions. Moreover, the production was prolific and ambitious, resulting in the culmination of a Special Edition commissioned by the Federal Trust in 1972. Unfortunately, Interstate had been forced to publish only once per academic year because of the increase in costs of production in the early 1980s.

With the impact of Thatcher's government in 1979 on students' politics as well as the influence of Welsh Nationalists and Marxists in the Student's Union at UCW, Interstate became politicised and eventually demised in 1985. Later on in 1988, Interstate was re-established in a new A4 format. Interstate returned to its standard in the late 1980s, publishing two issues per year. This was considered as the magazine's reformation.

This special edition of Interstate marks the 50th year anniversary of this very special journal. The articles contained in this special edition reflect the journal's motto of *'Informed Controversy, Enlightened Concern.'* The aim of this volume is to celebrate 50th

year anniversary of the journal by putting forward new articles which are related to, and in reflection of past issues.

This volume is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1, *'Détente Studies in the Cold War International History: Questions (Un)Marked?'*, Poonkham argues that the study of Détente is less studied, or, relatively understudied when examined in comparison with other periods or processes of the Cold War, for instance, the origins, development, and transformation, crises, or the endings. In so doing, he further argues that four important questions of détente have yet to be settled in International History and IR disciplines, namely, the questions of meanings, time frames, sources, and motivations. This article can be considered as an extension of the article, *'Nixon: The Prospective Foreign Policy of Richard Nixon'*.[1] In this article, Ovendale touches lightly upon détente in that it speaks from an American point of view in strengthening the links with Western Europe, rather than pursuing a détente with the Soviet Union. Poonkham develops this observation by laying down a clear picture of the debates in Détente studies, not only from American perspectives

but also the Soviet Union and other non-western perspectives.

In Chapter 2, *'What were Mao's motivations for intervention in the Korean War?'*, Kovach argues that Mao's intervention in the Korean War in 1950 was motivated by a wide variety of realist reasons. These include intervening to support his allies in the communist bloc, protecting Chinese territorial security, advancing domestic goals and pursuing political goals in foreign policy. Kovach's arguments correspond with the article, *'Explaining China's Intervention in the Korean War in 1950'*, published earlier in 2014.[2] Zhou argues similarly with Kovach in terms of the security and the domestic concerns in China as reasons of intervening in the Korean War in 1950. The difference between the two authors is mainly that Kovach takes the realist arguments seriously in terms of what motivated Mao to intervene whereas Zhou also took individual leaders' ideologies into consideration as a motivation of intervention.

In chapter 3, *'How important is the notion of the 'civilising mission' to our understanding of British Imperialism before 1939?'*, Pekanan attempts to answer how the civilising mission is so important to our understanding of

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[1] Ovendale, 'The Prospective Foreign Policy of Richard Nixon', Interstate Journal of International Affairs, 2 (1968/1969)

[2] Zhou, 'Explaining China's Intervention in the Korean War in 1950', Interstate Journal of International Affairs, 1 (2014/2015)

British imperialism before 1939, arguing that racism and liberalism played important roles in underpinning British imperialism, the ideology indeed justifying reasons for conquering other countries. The arguments of this article resonate with the proposal of Rogers' article, '*The New Liberal Imperialism*', published by Interstate in 2003.[3] Rogers discusses the possibility of a universal empire which may be able to redress global disorder, injustice, economic disparities and insecurity. This article argues that the European Union is a cooperative empire which is founded on equality, democracy, liberal economic principles, and the rule of law. The model of such an empire is not a traditional empire per se, but it could be regarded as a club in which members need to fulfil the above criteria which the cooperative empire is based upon. Rogers' proposal of the new type of imperialism is an extension of the traditional empire Pekanan discusses in this volume. Ironically, both authors do mention liberalism as an essential means in building an empire.

In Chapter 4, *'It is sometimes said that governments should never talk to terrorists. What light does the Northern Ireland experience cast upon that question?'*, Kurylo argues that negotiations are necessary in mitigating conflicts between terrorists and the state, as can be seen from the success of negotiations in Northern Ireland. However, the question of whether when exactly the government should negotiate with terrorists is still unsettled. The only suggestion which can be inferred from the case of Northern Ireland is that negotiations are highly desirable when terrorists are not willing to act according to democratic rules. The reason why terrorism these days becomes more difficult to deal with might be because it became *'international'*. In an article, *'Terrorism as an International Institution'*[4], Sheehan argues that the co-operation of international terrorists is the same as that which leads states to co-operate in order to achieve common aims more effectively. As Sheehan argues,

'....Such alignments are to some degree self-perpetuating. The 'institutionalisation' of early ad hoc links proceeds from certain common experiences. As their vision of progress and their ruthlessness set them apart in their own countries, the experienced terrorist personnel become internationalists or mercenary.'

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[3] Rogers, 'The New Liberal Imperialism' in Interstate, Summer. 2003.

[4] Sheehan, 'Terrorism as an International Institution' in Interstate.no 2, 1978-79

Chapter 5 concludes with a former editor of Interstate, Paul Hagan, who revisits his article 'Just How Cordiale?' 12 years since its publication in the 2004 issue of 'Interstate'[5], examining the Anglo-French relationship a century on from the historic entente-cordiale. In the context of wider European security, these two countries remain best poised to deliver it. The issue still of course remains pertinent today as external threats continue and the UK's withdrawal from the European Union now looks certain. Hagan's introducing paragraph to his work. In 2004, a certain degree of division over the Iraq war persisted between the UK and France, but the potential remained. Today that tension has now given way to a newfound proximity, in particular in security terms, this was and remains quite apart from EU cooperation but will this newly-enhanced entente survive 'Brexit'?

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[5] Hagan, 'Just how Cordiale?' in Interstate, 2004, ISSUE 2 – EUROPEAN SECURITY: DIRECTIONS, CHANGES, CHOICES.

Détente Studies in the Cold War International History: Questions (Un)Marked?

Jittipat Poonkham[6]

'There was no official declaration of détente, no official starting points, no clear-cut end.'
– Jussi M. Hanhimäki[7]

Introduction

Détente is generally understood as a relaxation of international tension. However, there are many conceptions and characteristics of détente: superpower détente (such as 'Nixinger's, Leonid Brezhnev's or Mao Zedong/ Zhou Enlai's détente), European détente (such as Charles de Gaulle's détente and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik) and, to a lesser extent, small powers' détente. Détente connotes different things to different states (and statesmen) at different time. That is, it is one concept with many interpretations. The article examines the current state and status of détente studies in the Cold War international history and International Relations (IR) scholarship. It argues that the state of détente studies in the Cold War History, despite its ongoing research, is less studied, or even understudied, when compared to other periods or processes of the Cold War such as the origins, development and transformation, crises, or the endings.[8] As Vojtech Mastny observes, 'the "golden years" of détente in the early 1970s are the least researched period of the Cold War'.[9] Etymologically, the term détente comes from the French word 'détendre', meaning to release or lessen the tension on the archer's bow string as the arrow goes on its way.[10] Although détente literally means a relaxation or easing of tensions, contested and contestable debates are widely prevalent. These historiographical debates have revolved around a series of puzzles. In this article, I classify and survey merely four different, despite overlapping, kinds of puzzles: these include the definitions

and natures of détente, periodisation, sources, and motivations behind the origins and fall of détente. The article humbly aims as merely a *prolegomena* to détente studies.

The definition question

First of all, the nature, ontologies and meanings of détente. A historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. contends that 'Détente is an amorphous, not to say cloudy, subject, and like all clouds, susceptible to a variety of interpretations.'[11] Détente is an ambiguous, ill-defined, and flexible term. With regard to the nature of the term, détente is considered differently. The Soviet Union rarely used the term and preferred Lenin's concept of 'razryadka' or 'peaceful co-existence'. While US President Richard M. Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger had preferred the concept of détente, subsequently Gerald Ford, because of its lack of popularity since the Watergate crisis, avoided the term all together, and instead coined the phrase 'peace through strength'.[12] As Jussi M. Hanhimäki put it differently, 'There was no official declaration of détente, no official starting points, no clear-cut end.'[13]

For some, détente is a condition, representing a 'state of eased tension'. Others claim that détente can be defined as a strategy (a calculated relationship between the means and ends), or a specific historical era (a "period that was dominated by negotiations and diplomacy rather than confrontation and conflict"[14]), or, alternatively, a process. Many tend to concur that détente was the process of reducing tension between states, rather than the end product of such a reduction.[15] Henry Kissinger later asserted that détente was 'a continuing process, not a final condition', while Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko defined détente as a 'process of relaxation of tension, not an accomplished phenomenon or an entity which has already taken shape'.[16]

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[11] Quoted in Stevenson, *The Rise and Fall of Détente*, p. 1.

[12] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Revised Edition (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 604.

[13] Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013), p. xviii.

[14] Jussi M. Hanhimäki, 'Détente: A Three-way Discussion, Conservative Goals, Revolutionary Outcomes: The Paradox of Détente", *Cold War History,* Vol. 8: No. 4 (November 2008): p. 503.

[15] See Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013).

[16] Quoted in Stevenson, *The Rise and Fall of Détente*, pp. 9-10.

Some scholars assiduously asserted that because of a clash of definitions (and expectations) between two superpowers, détente was bound to fail right from the outset. It had precipitated the crisis and demise of détente by the end of the 1970s, and the 'second' cold war returned.[17] As Stevenson put it, 'each side has pursued détente in its own preferred sense, while rejecting détente in the sense preferred by the other; perceptions of 'success' or 'failure' of détente are largely determined by these differences of meaning'.[18]

On the one hand, from the American perspective, détente architects, such as Nixon and Kissinger, were likely to envisage détente as a new means toward the ultimate ends. By using negotiations, diplomacy, back channels, and so on, a strategy of détente aimed at the stabilisation of global order and the sustainability of US hegemonic power, in particular attempting to achieve a 'peace with honor' in the Vietnam War, with the USSR's embrace, and a new 'structure of peace' in global politics.[19]

On the other hand, the Soviet conception of détente was formulated as an extension of Leninist strategy of peaceful co-existence with the West, and, above all, a means of attaining the Soviet status as a truly equal superpower vis-à-vis the US. As the USSR had achieved its strategic nuclear parity, it strived for maintaining a status quo in the changing global correlation of forces through international agreements on arms control, crisis management, and East-West international trade. However, from the position of strength, Brezhnev initially considered the logic of détente as a cooperation with competition. That is, détente with the West could happen simultaneously with, and inextricably link to, a promotion of world revolution in the Third World. In his speech commemorating the forty-seventh anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1964, Brezhnev claimed that détente does not mean an end to 'the class struggle' or 'national liberation movement' in (neo)colonial situations. Rather, 'a situation of peaceful co-existence will enable the success of the liberation struggle and the achievement of the revolutionary tasks of

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[17] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Revised Edition (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994); Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). For a critical appraisal of the

Second Cold War, see Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso Books, 1986).
[18] Stevenson, *The Rise and Fall of Détente*, p. xiii.
[19] Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013).

peoples'.[20] By the end of the 1970s, a clash of ontologies and definitions from the beginning was a key shortcoming that rendered superpower détente a failure and a clash of tensions inevitable. However, both superpowers considered détente as an opportunity to advance their own interests in the Cold War politics. In sum, détente as a political concept means different things to different states and people at different time.

The Question of Periodisation

The second puzzle is when exactly détente happened. In general, the historiography agrees that the period of détente is an era of negotiations between superpowers during the late 1960s until 1979. The key turning points in this commonsensical détente included the opening to the People's Republic of China, and the American-Soviet rapprochement and its concomitant nuclear agreements. Some might extend the process of détente to include European détente, including the launch of West Germany's Ostpolitik, an improvement of East-West relations, and so forth.[21] However, some authors, such as Hanhimäki, extend the longevity of détente to cover the period between the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[22] Recent scholarship has suggested that the 'first détente' in the Cold War began in earnest after the death of Stalin in 1953.[23] In the Soviet Union, the post-Stalin elites led by Nikita Khrushchev, who at home promulgated an age of thaw, were keen for a rapprochement with the West (*razryadka napryazhennosti*), as evidenced at the Geneva summit conference of July 1955[24], whereas

[20] Raymond Garthoff, 'The Soviet Concept of Détente', in *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991: Classic and Contemporary Issues,* eds. Frederic J. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffman, and Robbin Laird (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 104.

[21] On European détente see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, 'Détente in Europe, 1962–1975', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War,* Vol. 2 Crises and Détente, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 198–218; John van Oudenaren, *Détente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); Kenneth Dyson, *European Détente: Case Studies of the Politics of East-West Relations* (London: Pinter, 1986); N. Piers Ludlow, ed., *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965–1973* (London: Routledge, 2009).

[22] See, for example, Antony Best, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Joseph A. Maiolo, and Kirsten E. Schulze, 'From Cold War to Détente, 1962-1979', in *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond,* 3rd Edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 285-310; Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013).

[23] See Richard D. Williamson, *First Steps toward Détente: American Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1963* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012).

[24] Vojtech Mastny, 'Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953-1962', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War,* Vol. 1 Origins, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 318; Ted Hopf, 'The Thaw Abroad, 1953-58', in *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) pp. 198-253; Aleksandr Fursenko, and Timothy J. Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2006). On the unintended repercussion of the Soviet 'first détente' on Eastern Europe, see also Jeremi Suri, 'The Promise and Failure of

the West was reluctant or even conspicuously skeptical. In some respects, Mike Bowker considers Brezhnev's détente in the 1970s as simply a "continuation of Khrushchev's thaw".[25] Similarly, R. Gerald Hughes provided a detailed account of the British policy of the rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the 1950s onwards, arguing that this was ambiguously juggling with a more nuanced position toward its ally West Germany.[26] The others have gone so far to trace the process of détente back into the 1920s, most notably at the Genoa Conference.[27] The specific periodisation of détente has been increasingly altered and deconstructed as a generalisable concept, applicable for any periods in which reduction of tension occurred, irrespective of the a priori conventional wisdom of the term.

The Question of Sources

The third, and very important, kind of puzzle is of which détente we are talking about (as well as whether or not, and how, these détentes related to each other). We can categorise three different types of détente, as follows. The first one is a superpower détente, which focuses mainly on a triangular diplomacy between the US, the Soviet Union, and China, and their bilateral relations.[28] One of the startling transformations is a Sino-American rapprochement, culminated in the historic opening to China in February 1972.[29] After the long secret diplomacy and back channels spearheaded by Henry Kissinger and his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai, many scholars such as Margaret MacMillan claimed that the détente with China seemed to be

"Developed Socialism": The Soviet "Thaw" and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-72", *Contemporary European History,* Vol. 15: No. 2 (May 2006): pp. 133-158.
[25] Mike Bowker, 'Brezhnev and Superpower Relations', in *Brezhnev Reconsidered,* eds. Edwin Bacon, and Mark Sandle (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 90.
[26] R. Gerald Hughes, *Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente, 1949-1967* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).
[27] See Stephen White, *The Origins of Détente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet-Western Relations, 1921-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
[28] Mike Bowker, and Phil Williams, *Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
[29] See Margaret MacMillan *Nixon in China: The Week That Changed the World* (New York: Random House,

2007); Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Fredrick Logevall, and Andrew Preston, eds., *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Chris Tudda, *A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969–1972* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012). From the Chinese perspective, see Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Yang Kuisong, 'The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American *Rapprochement*', *Cold War History,* Vol. 1: No. 1 (August 2000): pp. 21-52; Yang Kuisong, and Yafeng Xia, 'Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy toward the United States, 1969-1976', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 34: No. 2 (April 2010): pp. 395-423.

inevitable since the onset of the diplomatic rapprochement with China.[30]

However, this Sino-American détente was largely symbolic and a work in progress during the Cold War. On the contrary, at that time, the US-Soviet bilateral rapprochement was far more substantive than the former. Two superpowers launched a series of American-Soviet summit meetings, and simultaneously signed a dozen of bilateral agreements regarding the arms control, in particular the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties (SALT) in 1972, the Prevention of Nuclear War agreement in 1973, and a SALT II treaty in 1974. A crucial watershed was unquestionably President Nixon's trip to Moscow in May 1972.[31] Nevertheless, the US-Soviet détente was narrowly single-focused: that is, nuclear negotiations

The second type is a European détente. By the mid-1960s the Western European powers were increasingly interested in détente with the Eastern bloc, or the Warsaw Pact. For example, in 1966 two important European leaders, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson (in February) and French President Charles de Gaulle (in June), paid official visits to Moscow.[32] In turn, Italy invited Soviet president Nikolai Podgorny to Rome in early 1967. By 1969, the newly elected Chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt pursued an innovative strategy of Ostpolitik (Eastern policy), or what his advisor Egon Bahr called 'change through rapprochement', with the Soviet Union and East Germany, including the signing of the famous Moscow Treaty in August 1970, the Treaty on Quadripartite control of Berlin in 1971, and, most important, the Basic Treaty between two Germanys in 1972. Ostpolitik was accompanied by the process of increased exchanges and contacts in the East-West relations that paved the way to the conclusion of the Conference on Security and

[30] Margaret MacMillan, 'Nixon, Kissinger, and the Opening to China', in *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977*, eds. Fredrik Logevall, and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 107-125.

[31] David Reynolds, 'Moscow 1972: Brezhnev and Nixon', in *Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 207-261; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Revised Edition (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994); Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina

Press, 2007); Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986)* (New York: Random House, 1995); Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Adam B. Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

[32] On the British détente, see R. Gerald Hughes, *Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente, 1949-1967* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). On the French détente, see Frédéric Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe, De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).[33] Finally, the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed in August 1975, contained not only the recognition of the postwar European territorial settlement but also an innovative commitment to human rights, which in turn inexorably transformed the dynamism of the Cold War.[34] Recent scholarship has increasingly focused on the human-rights turn in the Cold War studies.[35] Unlike a superpower détente, European détente had a series of multilevel conferences, and covered a wide-range set of issues, in particular human rights. To an extent, this explains why the multilateral European détente lasted longer and was

more stable than a short-lived superpowers détente.

In the West, some literature also emphasise the role of individual leaders[36] as the architects of each and every détente, such as one of Nixon and Kissinger[37], Leonid Brezhnev[38], Willy Brandt[39], Charles de Gaulle[40], and so forth.

Finally, a Third World détente. Recent literature attempt to decenter and de-Westernise détente into a transnational or global détente. This détente was inseparably coupled with crises of the Cold War superpowers' rivalry as well as the decolonisation process.[41] In some cases, the

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[33] Michael J. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Arne Hofmann, *The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993). On the Eastern German détente, see Mary E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

[34] See Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[35] See Daniel J. Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[36] See Steven Casey, and Jonathan Wright, eds., *Mental Maps in the Era of Détente and the End of the Cold War, 1968-91* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

[37] See Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007); Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

[38] See Vladislav M. Zubok, 'Brezhnev and the Road to Détente, 1965-1972', in *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 192-226; Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

[39] Arne Hofmann, *The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

[40] See Christian Nünlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, *eds., Globalizing de Gaulle*: *International Perspectives* on *French Foreign Policies*, *1958-1969* (*Lanham*, *MD*: Rowman & Littlefield, *2010*); Andrew Moravcsik, 'Charles de Gaulle and Europe: The New Revisionism', *Journal of Cold War Studies,* Vol. 14: No. 1 (Winter 2012): pp. 53-77.

[41] On détente and the Third World conflicts in general, see Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Revolutions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge:

Third World countries, such as Thailand, started to make their own détente with communist powers as the Soviet Union and/ or China. However, above all, superpower and European détentes did not lead to any settlements or agreements about norms, or shared expectations about appropriate behaviors, in the Third World, which every so often complicated the relationship between the Third World countries and superpowers grand politics, and precipitated tensions and conflict in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. In brief, different kind of détente leads to different nature, characteristic, emphasis and set of issues.

The Motivations Question

The final puzzle is which factor drove the rise and decline of détente in global politics. To begin with, the explanations for the emergence of détente are complex and considerable, thereby it is extremely difficult to pin down sharply specific 'schools of thought' in détente studies. The article then goes through each and every perspective on détente one by one. With regard to superpower détente, Raymond Garthoff's *Détente and Confrontation* stands firm as, and remains, a classic in the historiography. It comprehensively covers the bilateral relationship between the US and the USSR, by mainly focusing on the pivotal moment of nuclear parity in the 1960s.[42] From the American perspective, the root causes of the rise of superpower détente vary. The chief among them is the quagmire and repercussion of the Vietnam War on the American politics and its relatively fading status in the international system. The 'Nixinger' strategy first and foremost wanted to extricate the US from the Vietnam War and, in doing so, necessitated Soviet support.[43] The second reason is the Sino-

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Cambridge University Press, 2005). On the Middle East, see Craig Daigle, *The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); Elena Calandri, Antonio Varsori, Daniele Caviglia, eds., *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012); Nigel J. Ashton, eds., *The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflicts and the Superpowers, 1967-73* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). On Africa, see Louise Woodroofe, *Buried in the Sands of Ogaden: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the Demise of Détente* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2013). On South Asia, see Gary J. Bass, *The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide* (New York: Knopf Publishing, 2013).

[42] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Revised Edition (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
[43] See, for example, Keith L. Nelson, *The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); William Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998); Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Soviet split since the 1960s.[44] The third reason is the emergence of European détente and its impact on American-Soviet bilateral relations. The fourth reason is the global social context of the late 1960s, in particular the rise of dissident movements in Europe and beyond.[45] In a recent scholarship, Hanhimäki provides a thorough and comprehensive overview of the rise and fall of America's détente: by covering aforementioned factors, his underlying argument is that détente, as an adjustment of means to fight the Cold War, happened largely due to a seemingly inevitable diminishing power and prestige of the US.[46] Changes in means, rather than in ultimate goals, were necessary for American foreign policy.

From the Chinese perspective, existing literature explained that what motivated Mao Zedong and his comrades is largely because of the strategic or geopolitical factor: namely,

the Soviet threat, as evidenced in the Sino-Soviet increasing tension and deterioration along their borders.[47] To put it differently, at the national security level, China pursued a reconciliation with the US as a deterrent against the Soviet threat. Based on newly released Chinese documents, Jian Chen, a leading scholar on China, succinctly asserted for a status-centered interpretation, thereby placing the Sino-American rapprochement within the domestic context of the declining status of Mao's continuous revolution. Also, this rapprochement considerably improved China's strategic status vis-à-vis the superpowers, gaining a position at the United Nations in October 1971.[48]

For the Soviet Union, the key motivations for the rise of détente can be understood as security (its strategic parity with the US), economic (stagnation and widening gap with the West) and China (Sino-Soviet split and its subsequent tensions on the borders during

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[44] See Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Sergey Radchenko, "The Sino-Soviet Split", in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War,* Vol. 2 Crises and Détente, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 349-372; Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Washington and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, 2009); Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

[45] See Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
[46] Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013).
[47] See John Garver, *China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).
[48] Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Chapter 9.

the 1960s) factors.[49] From the Soviet perspective, after the Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s, Brezhnev's policy of détente was partly motivated by fears that the Soviet Union would be isolated, and left to be encircled by both the NATO and China. However, it seems that from the equal status of nuclear superpower vis-à-vis the US, Brezhnev's posture and actions toward the US were inexorably driven as much by the desire to stabilise the superpower arms race. Among these factors, Vladislav Zubok argues that the most important one is Brezhnev's ideas, personal world-views, and leadership.[50] To sum up, every historiographical debate emphatically focuses on the 'why' question of motivations and factors that brought about the emergence of détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In International Relations (IR) Theories, realism is a predominant explanation for the rise of détente. Détente, and its concomitant rapprochement, is understood as the result of a shifting balance of power. For Realists, the ultimate aim of states is a struggle for survival, thereby sustaining the balance of power with other powers and preventing any potentially rising hegemon in the international system.[51] The US pursued a détente strategy for expedient reasons: in the late 1960s, the US was in a declining status compared to a relatively rising power of the Soviet Union, leading to the US decision to cooperate with China, due to the Sino-Soviet split, in order to curb the Soviet power, and, at the same time, leverage the 'China card' to put outright pressure on the Soviet Union in negotiating the détente process. Contra a realist paradigm, Evelyn Goh provided a constructivist appraisal of the changing discursive formation and representations of China in official American circles in ending the hostile estrangement: the existing literature, she claimed, has predominantly been occupied with explaining why but not how rapprochement happened. In her study, Goh rather identified and traced the changing perceptions and discourses of China, from a 'red menace' to a 'tacit ally', between 1961 and 1974. As she put it, 'In contrast to the existing literature, this constructivist,

[49] Mike Bowker, 'Brezhnev and Superpower Relations', in *Brezhnev Reconsidered,* eds. Edwin Bacon, and Mark Sandle (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), pp. 90-109.

[50] Vladislav M. Zubok, 'Brezhnev and the Road to Détente, 1965-1972', in *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 192-226

[51] See in general Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

discourse-based approach situates the prevailing *realpolitik* account of the rapprochement within the context of other ideas about reconciliation with China over a fifteen-year period'.[52] In IR Theories, while a realist explanation tends to focus on material changes in relative international power, which prompted strategic reevaluations in the tripolar powers, a constructivist understanding reassesses this détente from ideational and discursive factors, which mediated not only the materiality of power shifts but also the rethinking of perceptions, images and representations of other powers.

On the decline and fall of détente, there are at least three broad explanations, as follows. The first explanation is the orthodox or traditionalist view, ascertaining that Soviet expansionism and its concomitant aggressive strategy in the Third World were the main driving forces behind the collapse of détente. These aggressive Soviet motivations were culminated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which put a final end to a short moment of détente.[53] The second explanation is the clash of definitions. Already the most consequential from the outset, America and Soviet leaders had two different conceptions and interpretations of détente, which rendered the downfall unsurprisingly unavoidable.[54] The third explanation, a revisionist perspective, is at odds with the orthodox view. It stresses the essentially defensive motivations of the Soviet Union while emphasising the changing American perceptions of the Soviet Union and its policy in the Third World, the rise of the conservatism in the US as well as the lack of a domestic consensus in support of détente. As Odd Arne Westad suggests, the main factor in the rapid breakdown of détente was "the Carter administration's increasing assertiveness towards the Soviet Union".[55] In this explanation, it also reassesses Soviet motivations in the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, through newly declassified documents, and asserts that, in contrast to a long-standing traditionalist views that the invasion of Afghanistan was part of a larger

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[52] Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 9.

[53] Adam B. Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Richard Pipes, US-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War* (London and New York: Penguin Books, 2005).

[54] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Revised Edition (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994); Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

[55] The most comprehensive overall account is Odd Arne Westad, ed., *The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997).

Soviet expansionist strategy aimed at global dominance, the Soviet Union's objectives are significantly defensive, rather than offensive per excellence. Specifically, the USSR sought to restrain extremist elements of the Afghan communist party, who were undermining stability on the southern Soviet frontier.[56]

Conclusion: Détente as Restoration or Revolution?

Last but not least, a number of scholars have argued on the ultimate aim of détente, asking whether it is conservative or revolutionary. Almost all of the literature seems to contend that the architects of détente fundamentally aimed at stabilising the existing Cold War international system, rather than transcending or ending it. For the US in particular, this project and logic of détente, in Nixon's and Kissinger's views, was a struggle for American preponderance of power amidst its (perceptions of) relatively strategic decline.[57] Similarly the Soviet and Eastern German détente then pursued conservative goals, aiming at the recognition of the postwar territorial status quo in Europe. However, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was in large part geared toward the ultimate aim of German reunification. In other words, Brandt's recognition of two Germanys was the first stepping stone toward their reunion.[58]

Furthermore, there is also an ongoing debate about the relationship between détente and the end(ing) processes of the Cold War, asking whether they are causal or constitutive. On the one hand, most literature stresses détente as a very short recalibration and a fatal failure, which apparently had no any causal relations with the end of the Cold War. As John Lewis Gaddis succinctly put it, 'Détente … was not an end to cold war tensions but rather a temporary relaxation … [It is] a failure of [American] strategy'.[59] On the other hand, some literature envisions détente in terms of a constitutive role in shaping the possibilities of the endings of the Cold War, rather than a causal relations (if A, then B). In particular, détente has opened up the horizon of human security (at least in

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[56] David N. Gibbs, 'Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: A Declassified History', *Critical Asian Studies,* Vol. 38: No. 2 (2006), pp. 239-63; Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[57] Melvyn P. Leffler argued that this was and has been the ultimate goal of the US after the Second World War. See his *A Preponderance of Power: National Security,* *the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

[58] Mary E. Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009).

[59] John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Rise, Fall and Future of Détente', *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 62: No. 2 (Winter 1983/1984), pp. 354-355.

Europe) and rendered the East-West interconnectedness, especially in trade interdependence, possible and plausible.[60] As Jussi Hanhimäki sums up,

'[D]étente, rather than stabilising the international situation as many of its architects had hoped for, fundamentally altered the Cold War international system. Détente did not end the Cold War nor provide a clear road map towards 1989 (or 1991). But … détente was instrumental in setting in motion the many processes that ultimately caused the collapse of the international system that it was supposed to have stabilised.[61]

Thus far détente is a conservative project but it unintendedly and unexpectedly transfigured and transformed emancipatory consequences.

Despite its gradual increase in literature and its interestedness of the subject, détente studies is still the least researched area in the Cold War International History. Arguably, debates in historiography and theory, however, have continually contested on at least four aforementioned research puzzles, ranging from détente's ontological meanings, time frames, sources, and motivations. Albeit this vivaciously ongoing, despite emerging, debate, there remains research questions that are not yet asked, sources of détente that are not yet explored, and approaches that are not yet examined. It is an enormous gap in the Cold War international History and IR discipline that needs to be filled in the foreseeable future. In brief, *caveat emptor*!

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[60] See Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[61] Jussi M. Hanhimäki, 'Détente: A Three-way Discussion, Conservative Goals, Revolutionary Outcomes: The Paradox of Détente", *Cold War History,* Vol. 8: No. 4 (November 2008): p. 503.

What were Mao's motivations for intervention in the Korean War?

Ciaran Kovach

Chinese intervention in Korea in October 1950 continued a period of hideous violence and death in China's history. Between 1927 and 1949, around 21.5 to 27.5 million Chinese had died in the Second Sino-Japanese War and in the Chinese Civil War. Despite this terrible loss of life, exactly one year after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the establishment of an uneasy peace, Chinese troops were once again marching to war, now in Korea. This intervention would go on to claim between 180,000 and 400,000 Chinese lives (including that of Mao Zedong's own son), possibly even more and the whole while, the threat of nuclear annihilation hung over China. This terrible bloodshed, so soon after China's struggle for survival against Japan and their internal fratricidal conflict raises a key question, why? This essay will outline why Mao Zedong took the decision to intervene in Korea in 1950.

This essay will mostly focus on the realist, conventional political reasoning that drove Mao's decisions, however, it would be unwise not to also examine the ideological motivations that further motivated Mao's decision to intervene.

To begin, Mao's ideological world view must be examined in order to understand why he viewed factors surrounding his decision to intervene in Korea the way he did.

At the base level CCP analysed domestic and international political affairs within the conceptual framework of "contradictions" and the continual posing and resolving of contradictions in all things. Through distinguishing and rating important contradictions, China could indentify its principal opponents, political forces that could be relied upon for support and the strengths and weaknesses of its opponents and how to defeat them. Mao emphasized 'principle contradictions', the most pressing problems facing China at present. While hesitant to openly declare a 'principle contradiction' pre-1965, China did place emphasis on Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is believed to have been motivated by the fact that these regions had greater conflicting political and economic forces than other more stable parts of the world, making them more fertile ground for revolutionary

change. The fact that these regions possessed two-thirds of the world's population and valuable resources and markets led Mao to believed they would be an important 'frontline' against China's enemies.[62]

Mao dictated that the PRC's foreign policy should be based on Marxist internationalism, a ideology that demands support for the proletariat all over the world in their struggle against the bourgeoisie but on paper, rejects intervention and chauvinistic tactics by the state. This meant that China should support guerrilla liberation struggle but never 'export' revolution through direct military force. Mao believed that ultimately, in the distant future, through an irreversible historical trend, the international communist revolution would triumph.[63]

With regards to who Mao considered his enemies on the international stage, Mao adhered to Lenin's perspective of imperialism being "The highest stage of capitalism", making the capitalist 'imperialist' nations of the world his principle external enemies. Foremost amongst these nations in Mao's

mind was the United States. Mao viewed the USA as an aggressive imperial power who, unlike many of their imperial counterparts, had emerged from the Second World War much stronger, rather than weaker. Mao regarded the USA's ultimate goals to be the repression of the proletariat, dominance over the 'intermediate zone' and the ultimate destruction of the communist bloc.[64]

It is also possible that Mao's world view may have been influenced by older Chinese philosophies. Confucian philosophy places heavy emphasis on the 'father figure' and solidarity and harmony amongst the people.[65] Particularly notably with regards to Chinese attitudes towards fellow communist nations such as North Korea, Confucianism addresses 'Brotherhood' those of the same parents or teacher. It states that 'brothers' should adhere to certain roles depending on seniority, that brothers must help each other and that betrayal of brotherhood is a terrible crime.[66]

[62] Van Ness, P. *Revolution and Chinese foreign policy : Peking's support for wars of national liberation* (London ; Berkeley : University of California Press, 1970), p. 25-28.
[63] Mackerras, C and Fung, E. "Foreign relations, 1949-74," in *China: The Impact of Revolution,* ed Mackerras, C (London : Longman, 1976), p. 210-211.
[64] Van Ness, P. *Revolution and Chinese foreign policy : Peking's support for wars of national liberation* (London

; Berkeley : University of California Press, 1970), p. 30-32.
[65] Shin, C. *The spirit of Chinese foreign policy : a psychocultural view* (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), p. 39-41.
[66] Shin, C. *The spirit of Chinese foreign policy : a psychocultural view* (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), p. 44.

It has been noted that Chinese Confucian Marxists are not uncommon and that contradictions between Marxist materialism and Confucian idealism was not widely recognised. Four of Liu Shaoqi's five virtues were Confucian in nature and Mao adhered to Confucian tradition with regards to the function of education.[67]

Mao may have also been influenced by old Chinese attitudes towards Korea when China constituted the 'Middle Kingdom'. The traditional Chinese perceptive on relations with Korea was that theirs was a "teeth-to-lips" relationship. Without the Korean 'lips' to protect them, the Chinese 'teeth would be adversely affected.[68]

Having set the ideological context that Mao Zedong was working within, the reader should now better understand the motivations that fuelled the choices and calculations that Mao would make in the lead up to his intervention in Korea.

To truly understand Mao Zedong's motivations for intervening in Korea, an understanding of his ideology is not enough.

There are many realist political considerations that must be explored to gain an in-depth understanding of why Mao made the specific choices that he did with regards to Korea.

The first issue that must be explored is Chinese commitments to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Relations between the PRC and DPRK can be regarded as a 'Special Comradeship' due to the historically close ties that have existed between Chinese and Korean communists. President Kim Il-sung (a one time member of the CCP) and other Korean communists fought alongside the Chinese communists in the 1930s and 40s against the Japanese and would later allow the PLA to use North Korea as a strategic base during the Chinese Civil War.[69] It should also be noted that during the civil war period, political, economic and cultural exchanges took place along the Sino-Korean border alongside the military support, further solidifying the CCP-DPRK relationship.[70]

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[67] Shin, C. *The spirit of Chinese foreign policy : a psychocultural view* (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), p. 54-55.
[68] Ho Chung, J. *Between ally and partner: Korea-China relations and the United States* (New York : Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 15-16.
[69] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in

The Korean War in world history, ed. William Stueck. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 101-102.
[70] Cathcart, A and Kraus, C. "The Bonds of Brotherhood: New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950-1954," *Journal Of Cold War Studies*, Vol.13(3) (2011): p. 29.

Post-civil war, China and North Korea further solidified relations. The DPRK was one of the first to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC and the PRC embarked on a programme of repatriation of great numbers of Koreans who had fought in the PLA, sending great numbers of hardened veterans with technical expertise, many of whom were allowed to keep their weapons, to join the new KPA.[71] Indeed, this decision by Mao could be regarded as Mao issuing a green light to Kim Il-sung to begin his invasion of South Korea.[72]

It should also be noted that in a close consultation meeting with Kim Il (a member of the North Korean central committee) in 1949, Mao supported the DPRK in a number of ways. Firstly that he agreed in principle to the violent reunification of Korea by the DPRK, secondly he advised Kim on how to go about starting such a war, thirdly he promised to resupply KPA forces with Japanese ammo when needed and finally (and most significantly in the context of Chinese intervention in Korea) Mao agreed to military intervention in the event of a US-led Japanese intervention in Korea.[73]

Another area of alignment between Peking and Pyongyang pre-Chinese intervention was the refugee crisis that erupted with the turning of the tide of the war against North Korea. In August and September of 1950, massive US air power was increasingly prevalent, not only on the forward positions of the KPA, but also increasingly on the cities of North Korea in a brutal campaign of strategic bombing. This devastation of civilian areas led to a wave of Korean refugees crossing the Chinese border to escape the war. This concerned both the Chinese, who disliked the idea of having quasi-permanent North Korean consulates and enclaves along its border, and the North Koreans, who wished to end the uncontrolled outflow of refugees.[74] In order to alleviate the issue, the PRC agreed to a DPRK request to set up a DPRK consular office in Andong, a gateway for the vast majority of North Korean refugees.[75]

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[71] Cathcart, A and Kraus, C. "The Bonds of Brotherhood: New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950-1954," *Journal Of Cold War Studies*, Vol.13(3) (2011): p. 29-30.
[72] Jian, C. *Mao's China and the Cold war* (Chapel Hill : Universty of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 55.
[73] Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War* (Seoul : Korea Institute of Military History, 1997), p. 6-8.

[74] Cathcart, A and Kraus, C. "The Bonds of Brotherhood New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950-1954," *Journal Of Cold War Studies*, Vol.13(3) (2011): p. 33-34.
[75] Cathcart, A and Kraus, C. "The Bonds of Brotherhood New Evidence on Sino-North Korean Exchanges, 1950-1954," *Journal Of Cold War Studies*, Vol.13(3) (2011): p. 35-37.

While such measures proved to be ultimately of little use in alleviating the crisis, it demonstrated the close cooperation between the PRC and the DPRK.

It would be misleading to claim that PRC-DPRK relations were perfectly harmonious however. Mao felt that the war in Korea that Kim Il-sung craved would compromise his plans to liberate Taiwan. Kim Il-sung's intense Korean nationalism, combined with his desire to not appear too closely tied to the Chinese (in order to secure his own authority in Korea) made it impossible for Mao to fully trust Kim.[76] Ultimately however, Mao felt he could not betray the 'Special Comradeship' or "China's duty of proletariat internationalism" by withdrawing support from Kim.

The second issue regarding Chinese intervention in Korea is its commitments and relations with the USSR at the time. Mao was not the only communist leader concerned with the outcome of the Korean War, Joseph Stalin of the USSR was also closely involved with the war. Since 1945, Stalin feared the creation of a new pro-American Japanese militarism that would make use of the Korean Peninsula to attack the Asian mainland. Stalin wished to avoid US domination of the peninsula, but not in such a way that the USSR was drawn into direct conflict with the US.[77] In the run-up to the Korean War, Stalin consulted with Mao on the possible outcomes of Kim Il-sung's invasion,[78] asked Kim Il-sung to seek Chinese support for the invasion (which was given)[79] and signed the Sino-Soviet Alliance, another 'green light' to Kim to launch his invasion.[80]

When the war turned against the DPRK, Stalin turned to Mao, requesting that he send troops into Korea disguised as 'volunteers' in order to save the DPRK without direct Soviet intervention.[81]

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[76] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 103-104.

[77] Weathersby, K. " *Should We Fear This?": Stalin and the Danger of War with America*". Working paper No. 39. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002: p. 3.

[78] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 101.

[79] Weathersby, K. " Should We Fear This?": Stalin and the Danger of War with America". *Working paper No. 39*. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002: p. 12.

[80] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 101.

[81] Weathersby, K. " Should We Fear This?": Stalin and the Danger of War with America". *Working paper No. 39*. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002: p. 17.

Ultimately China did agree to intervene in Korea, in part due to direct pressure from Stalin on numerous CCP leaders[82] and the assumption that the USSR would honour the Sino-Soviet Alliance by providing military assistance for the intervention.[83] Ultimately, Stalin did provide limited military support in the form of planes, tanks and advisors for training the PLA, supply and service units, ammunition and eventually, Soviet air cover for Chinese bases and crossing points on the Yalu.[84]

Mao did not intervene in Korea fully intending for it to be an exercise in solidarity with the USSR however. Mao felt that he rescued the Eastern revolution in Korea in the face of Soviet hesitance and disconnection, it would give China heightened sense of moral superiority over its 'elder brother'.[85]

The third issue regarding Chinese intervention in Korea was the issue of Chinese territorial security. The disintegration of the DPRK and the advance of UN forces towards the Sino-Korean border presented a serious threat to China's territorial security. A reunified pro-American Korea could serve as launch pad for a future invasion of China that would directly strike China's industrial heartland in Manchuria.[86] The disintegration of the DPRK would rob China of a key buffer zone. Concern for China's north-eastern border was highlighted by the creation of the 260,000 strong Northeast Border Defense Army in July 1950,[87] before China had even decided to intervene in Korea.

It should also be noted that as of October 1950 China was not only concerned about its north-east border. The presence of the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait and the continued French presence in Indochina made Mao feel that the US was threatening China from multiple directions. Victory in Korea would mean that China would have to divide its forces less to defend its territory.[88]

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[82] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 108.

[83] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 107.

[84] Weathersby, K. " Should We Fear This?": Stalin and the Danger of War with America". *Working paper No.*

39. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002: p. 19-20.

[85] Jian, C. *Mao's China and the Cold war* (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 59.

[86] Jian, C. *Mao's China and the Cold war* (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 87.

[87] Jian, C. *Mao's China and the Cold war* (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 88.

[88] Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War* (Seoul : Korea Institute of Military History, 1997), p. 19.

The fourth issue regarding Chinese intervention in Korea were the specific political goals and opportunities Mao pursued by intervening in Korea as well as its political justifications for intervening. In the eyes of Mao Zedong, the Korean War was a crucial event with regards to China's political position in East Asia. In his 1949-1950 visit to Moscow, Mao had agreed with Stalin to divide the responsibility of expanding the communist revolution between them,[89] leaving Mao responsible of communising East Asia. The responsibility to forcibly communize Korea was to be shared between China and the DPRK.[90] The war in Korea represented for China a crucial test of their aspirations to export their own significant revolution in the spirit of Chinese ethnocentrism and universalism.[91] The Korean War presented a serious challenge to the western-dominated international structure in the Asian-Pacific region and that the founding of the PRC in 1949, followed by a united Korea under the DPRK, could see a new order emerge in East Asia.[92] A victory in Korea against the US and its allies would also promote the prestige and influence of the PRC on the international stage.[93]

US intervention in Korea may have also been fuelled by feelings of US provocation and encroachment. Reports of a US airstrikes inside Chinese territory between August and October outraged China.[94] Continuing US support for Taiwan also angered Mao. Nationalist troops still boasted air and naval superiority thanks to their US-made ships and planes and the deployment of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait at the outbreak of the Korean Crisis made the liberation of Taiwan (a long-standing aim of the PRC) impossible.[95]

An extremely important perspective on why China intervened in Korea is that of domestic politics. When the question was first raised as to whether Chinese troops should intervene in Korea, there was much domestic opposition in China, view such an action as

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[89] Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War* (Seoul : Korea Institute of Military History, 1997), p. 9.
[90] Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War* (Seoul : Korea Institute of Military History, 1997), p. 14
[91] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 95.
[92] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W.

(Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 106.
[93] Jian, C. *Mao's China and the Cold war* (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 59.
[94] Shin, C. *The spirit of Chinese foreign policy : a psychocultural view* (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1990), p. 174.
[95] Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War* (Seoul : Korea Institute of Military History, 1997), p. 21-22

immoral or dangerous.[96] This raises the question, how did Mao create the conditions where he could confidently intervene in Korea? Mao's solution to these domestic reservation over Korea was to launch the "Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea". This campaign was designed to stir up hatred amongst ordinary Chinese towards the US and preparing them for an inevitable conflict against their 'weakening' and long time political and economic abuser. At the same time, the CCP promoted a nationwide campaign to suppress "reactionaries and reactionary activities" to silence any remaining dissenters.[97] The conditions created by these campaigns, combined with Mao's wisdom and authority within the CCP leadership,[98] allowed him to intervene in October 1950.

These domestic issues and solutions did not purely relate to the facilitation of PRC foreign policy however. October 1950 marked the first anniversary of the PRC, a country that remained divided and devastated by many years of war. Mao felt that a successful intervention in Korea would enhance the revolutionary zeal of the people and solidify the CCP's position as China's new leader. With this newfound authority and public enthusiasm created by pre-intervention campaigns and the intervention itself, Mao believed this would serve as a base for his ambitions for economic development and social engineering.[99]

Before concluding, there is another interesting question regarding Chinese intervention in Korea, the role of US nuclear weapons on Mao's thinking. Why would Mao send troops (even ones disguised as volunteers) to fight the US military, who had a monopoly on weapons capable of terrifying destruction? This can be explained by Mao's rather dismissive attitude towards nuclear weapons.

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[96] Hajimu, M.
"The Korean War through the Prism of Chinese Society: Public Reactions and the Shaping of "Reality" in the Communist State, October-December 1950," *Journal Of Cold War Studies*, Vol.14 (2012): p. 8-10.
[97] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 107.

[98] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 109.
[99] Jian, C. "In the Name of Revolution: China's Road to the Korean War Revisited," in *The Korean War in world history*, ed. Stueck, W. (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 106.

Mao was believer that wars are decided by a country's people, not weapons. Mao also dismissed the idea that such weapons could decide a war as a product of "bourgeois world outlook and methodology" and should be dismissed.[100]

To conclude, Mao's motivations for intervening the Korean War were wide ranging in nature. Mao intervened to support his allies in the communist bloc, to protect Chinese territorial security, advance domestic goals and pursue political goals in foreign policy. These realist motivations of intervention were backed up by Mao's ideological views based on Marxist-Leninism and traditional Chinese attitudes and done in the face of numerous risks, including nuclear annihilation.

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[100] Ryan, M. *Chinese attitudes toward nuclear weapons : China and the United States during the Korean War* (Armonk N.Y. ; London : M.E.Sharpe, 1989), p. 15.

IT IS SOMETIMES SAID THAT GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NEVER TALK TO TERRORISTS. WHAT LIGHT DOES THE NORTHERN IRELAND EXPERIENCE CAST UPON THAT QUESTION?

Bohdana Kurylo

In 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin dismissed the possibility of negotiating with leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), claiming that there is no sense in talking to a terrorist organization. Meanwhile, as it later became known, secret negotiations to set conditions for the Oslo Accords agreement with the PLO leaders were, indeed, being conducted.[101] A similar case was the maintenance of a secret back-channel between the British government and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1972 and 1990.[102] These historical records exhibit that governments broke the taboo of talking to terrorists, both doing so even at times of the cruellest terrorist attacks. The reason for such a taboo is clear: 'Democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never

be rewarded for using it'.[103] However, the case of the Northern Ireland conflict sheds a different light on the issue, showing that negotiations with terrorists can be productive in maintaining peace. This essay will examine the issue, offering an explanation why and how the negotiations with terrorists succeeded in Northern Ireland.

The most common argument against negotiations between government and actors who use methods beneath democracy and diplomacy is their likelihood to give legitimacy to terrorism. Such negotiations are not only likely to ruin the continuous global attempts to outlaw terrorism; they can also establish an extremely undesirable precedent for the future.[104] Succumbing to terrorist manipulation, a government exposes its weakness and lack of authority, which can destabilize a country. Moreover, one victory achieved by terrorists might be enough to encourage such violent methods of achieving goals, leading to a domino effect and undermining actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Stating that "there will be no negotiations with terrorists of any kind', Ronald Reagan

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[101] Browne, J. and Dickson, E. '''We Don't Talk to Terrorists'': On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54:3 (2010) p. 380

[102] Bew, F. et. al. *Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country*, (London: Hurst and Company, 2009), p. 39
[103] Neumann, P. 'Negotiation with Terrorists', *Foreign Affairs,* 86 (2007) p. 128
[104] Ibid.

clearly demonstrated the common assumption that the best way to fight terrorism is to stop participating in it in order to erase any incentives for further attacks.[105]

Instead, governments can use methods such as internment, military repression and marginalization. However, the problem with them is that they are intended to punish terrorists, which in itself can worsen the situation by provoking further aggression from them. According to a research from the University of Denver and the University of Maryland that studied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between 1987 and 2004, governmental measures aimed at appeasing terrorists and responding to their more tangible demands is more effective in solving the issue.[106]

Surely, this does not always prove to work, differing from case to case. It is essential to consider terrorist motives and aims before starting negotiations. The distinction should be made between nihilistic terrorists, who achieve self-realisation through violence, often with religious or ideological aspirations, and terrorists, who use violence to achieve specific, often political, goals.[107] The second

category of terrorists usually represent beliefs and aims that have a long history of being neglected and suppressed and have the potential to compromise. The IRA and ETA are the primary examples of it: both have a long history of thought, promoting political beliefs of nationalism and separatism. In such cases, it was argued that a government could achieve peace by negotiating with them.[108]

Indeed, the Northern Ireland peace process is one of the few cases of progressive negotiations with terrorist organizations. When the Anglo-Irish Treaty established the partition of Ireland in 1921, the Irish War of Independence officially came to an end leaving six counties of Ulster with the United Kingdom as Northern Ireland. However, it did not stop the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from fighting for the overthrow of the British rule, using violence for achieving its aims. The Northern Ireland ethno-nationalist conflict involved Irish Republican Army (IRA), the pro-state loyalist paramilitary groups of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the 'regular' pro-state forces of the British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary, as well as ordinary citizens. Deaths of over than 3,600 people and

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[105] Koebler, J. 'Why Governments Should Negotiate with Terrorists'. Available at: http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/07/31/why-governments-should-negotiate-with-terrorists [Accessed 10 February 2014]

[106] Ibid.
[107] Neumann, 'Negotiation with Terrorists', p. 128
[108] Koebler, 'Why Governments Should Negotiate with Terrorists'

thousands injured were caused in a country of only 1.6 million inhabitants, as a result of the terrorist attacks from republican and loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces, with its beginnings being rooted in a civil rights march in Londonderry on 5 October 1968.[109] The end to violence came with the Downing Street Declaration, symbolizing the step forward to mutual peace.

One of the common explanations for the apparent success of the negotiations between the terrorists and the governments in the Northern Ireland case is a stalemate that led them to realize that the alternative to violence is more productive. The initial aims of Irish republicans and the British and Irish governments, the withdrawal of the British claim to Northern Ireland and the entire military defeat of the IRA respectively, were clearly unreachable. As Tony Blair's special adviser throughout the process, Jonathan Powell, claimed both sides 'knew that neither side could win, that it was possible the stalemate might continue indefinitely'.[110] Therefore, it is quite likely that ripeness for the peaceful resolution of the conflict was

based on a 'mutually hurting stalemate' basis.[111]

To implement the stalemate theory in practice, recognition of the lack of utility of continuing terrorism must be present. Combatants have to admit the potential benefits brought by peace, expressing it in the attempts to establish a dialogue.[112] This is what helps the government distinguish whether the negotiations with terrorists is justifiable. All sides in the Northern Ireland conflict were sufficiently aware that the peace was more beneficial than violence: although they would not achieve all that they wanted, the price for the continuation of the struggle was too great. Over the 30-year conflict, Northern Ireland had suffered human losses and lack of foreign investment; in perspective, the economy was to be affected with unemployment already being 16.8% in 1986.[113] The country still experiences the consequences of the conflict, mainly because of the inability to attract sufficient foreign investment for the strengthening of the private sector and intensifying economic growth. Besides, it was just a small minority who supported violence for political change,

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[109] McKittrick, D. and McVea, D. *Making Sense of the Troubles*, (London: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 179
[110] Tonge, J. et al. 'So Why did the Guns Fall Silent? How Interplay, not Stalemate, Explains the Northern Ireland Peace Process', *Irish Political Studies,* 26:1 (2011) p. 4

[111] Ibid., p. 6
[112] Ibid.
[113] HM Treasury, 'Rebalancing the Northern Ireland Economy', (London, HM Treasury, 2011), p. 10

whereas the majority of the citizens prioritized standard of living of the country.[114]

By the early 1990s, the British government had made considerable attempts to stop the violence in Northern Ireland. The agreement between the parties of unionism and nationalism, which became known as the Brooke-Mayhew talks, was one of such attempts. The rationale behind this strategy lay in the assumption that the agreement would appease the extremes and make terrorism baseless. However, the talks failed to reach their aim because of the absence of mutual trust, especially when the suspects about the secret cooperation between the SDLP leader and Sinn Fein appeared, which made unionists suspend the talks.[115]

 Searching for the solution, the government made a decision to shift its attitude from self-reliance to greater cooperation with Dublin. Nevertheless, the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, which established a cross-border Council of Ireland and the Northern Ireland Executive, and the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which gave the Irish government consultative rights across most issues concerning Northern Ireland, established cooperation, but still did not stop the

terrorism, becoming the most violent period in the conflict. More importantly, their efforts were likely to be futile due to their reliance on the principle of not talking to terrorists, thus, the governments shifted their policies to the idea of inclusion.[116] In brief, it seems that the symmetrical situation of standstill and understanding of the potential consequences of the conflict spread the desirability of the peace process among all the sides of the Northern Ireland conflict.

Nevertheless, although stalemate may create a foundation for a potential peace process, it is not enough to begin negotiations without a transformation in the terrorist thought. Re-evaluation within republicanism started as Sinn Fein was trying to replace the SDLP as the main nationalist party in the 1980s. Undoubtedly, it proved to be difficult to win support 'with the ballot paper in one hand and the Armallite in the other'.[117] It gave way to many debates within the movement, in which strategic adaptation to circumstances overcame military dogmatism. However, some argue that the change in thinking, first of all, came 'from below', from ordinary fighters.[118] That is why the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental cooperation alone was

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[114] Ibid.
[115] O'Kane, E. 'Anglo-Irish Relations and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: From Exclusion to Inclusion', *Contemporary British History,* 18:1 (2004) p. 80

[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid., p. 92
[118] Tonge et al., 'Why Did the Guns Fall Silent?', p. 9

useless for dealing with the terrorists. Not only did it neglect the cooperation with the terrorist organizations, it also neglected the fighters themselves, forgetting that they are the ones to who approach should be found. For this reason, it is crucial for terrorist organizations to have a high level of internal cohesion.

It is highly recommended that negotiations should only be started when it is clear that the internal consensus to cease violence has prevailed within the whole terrorist group. The Northern Ireland case was a risky endeavour since the leadership was quite decentralized. That is why there are still a lot of separate extremist attacks among happening annually in Northern Ireland.[119] Nonetheless, in the 1990s, the IRA had a better control over its rank and file than, for example, Al Qaeda. The government of the latter one has a limited operational function, mainly providing moral and ideological aspirations.

Finally, a great role in changing the terrorist attitude and peace development can be played by the back-channel negotiation, as it was in the Northern Ireland case. Choosing

the path of being flexible rather than steadfast, both British and Irish governments have been periodically talking to the IRA. According to Ed Moloney, an indirect link to the Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams, was already created by the Northern Ireland Secretary, Tom King, in 1986.[120] Such talks were kept in secret, whereas the governments, at first, denied their existence.

The efficiency of secret talks lay in two factors; first, the joint task shaped by secrecy gives the possibility of mutual understanding, solidarity and faster problem solving. Its long-term duration tests the attitude of both sides, confirming their willingness to compromise. Most importantly, perhaps, it creates trust and predictability of action, improving personal relationships of the negotiators. Even such seemingly unimportant factor as personal compatibility can sometimes play a significant role in persuading a peace.[121] Secondly, a secret dialogue puts its participants under the pressure of the secrecy, which makes them responsible for preventing internal opposition. For this reason, in South Africa and Northern Ireland, back-channel contacts were hidden from both the public and political opponents, as well as

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[119] Peatling, G. *The Failure of the Northern Ireland Peace Process*, (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2004), p. 132
[120] Craig, T. 'From Backdoors and Back Lanes to Backchannels', *Contemporary British History,* 26:1 (2012) p. 112

[121] Dochartaigh, N. 'Together in the Middle', *Journal of Peace Research*, 46 (2011) p. 770

from senior security force officials and government ministers. The fact of secrecy itself protects the process from possible external interference and disruption and makes it more efficient. In contrast, sides in open negotiations tend to be focused a lot more on the public approval, basing their actions on it. However, it is also argued that back-channel talks with terrorists produce narrowly based settlements that may be difficult to be implemented in practice because opponents may reject it. Moreover, it is also claimed that secrecy creates mistrust and does not have a wide public support.[122] However, the Northern Ireland case proved these claims wrong, as the back-channel communication did establish peace and did gain a lot of public support. Overall, back-channel communication 'permits negotiation on legitimacy without conceding on legitimacy', and is more productive than the absence of any kind of contact with terrorists.[123]

The decision to negotiate with the IRA was not made without any hesitation in the British government. Scepticism of the policy of inclusion was even among John Major's cabinet, mainly because there was a fear of worsening the relationships with the unionists, as well as the possibility of failure to persuade the terrorists to stop violence. Despite it, it is clear that the policy of marginalization was no longer practical. The Downing Street Declaration, signed on 15 December 1993, was a 'minor diplomatic masterpiece' that led the IRA from militarism to politics.[124] It also solved the problem of the loyalist paramilitary groups whose use of violence was a reaction to the IRA's campaign. It began to have little use for them, since the IRA agreed to cease-fire, which they perceived to be their victory, and their political objective of safeguarding the Union was achieved.[125]

Unfortunately, in cases such as Al Qaeda negotiations unlikely to be productive, as it does not give any signs to match the above-mentioned aspects when it might be successful. In contrast, Hamas, after winning the Palestinian parliamentary election in 2006, seems to be on the road to politics instead of terrorism, and may be worth negotiating with Israel. However, it is unlikely to be in the nearest future, as it still lacks internal consensus to end violence.[126] Overall, it is evident that there are no set criteria for

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[122] Ibid., p. 768

[123] Ibid., p. 778

[124] David Goodall in O'Kane 'Anglo-Irish Relations and the Northern Ireland Peace Process', p. 96

[125] Mitchell, D. 'Sticking to their Guns?', *Contemporary British History*, 24:3 (2010) p. 343

[126] Neumann, 'Negotiation with Terrorists', p. 130

when the government should negotiate with terrorists, as the answer strictly depends on each case. The only set principle that can be suggested is that talks with terrorists are highly undesirable when terrorists are not willing to act according to democratic rules.

As it can be seen, it is difficult to establish a particular strategy for dealing with terrorists. Governments generally tend to follow the principle of non-negotiation with terrorists. However, the Northern Ireland case shows that an alternative can sometimes solve the situation. Firstly, its actors were clearly 'rational' terrorists who used violence as 'instrumental' means to achieve their political aims. Secondly, the situation of stalemate led both sides to seek for a compromise, changing the republican mind-set. Finally, the positive influence of back-channel communication should not be underestimated. However, it is important to remember that the efficiency of these factors might differ on who the type of terrorists, the situation and even small seemingly unimportant factors such as personal compatibility between the negotiators.

How important is the notion of 'civilising mission' to our understanding of British Imperialism before 1939?
Thanapat Pekanan

The 'civilising mission' is a broad ideology that combines four main ideals; Enlightenment ideals, Christian / Evangelical ideas of pre-destination, racist ideas about white superiority and Liberalism. All these ideals have had a significant role in our understanding of British imperialism before 1939. Due to the limitations of this essay, I will focus on two of the most relevant and important aspects of the 'civilising mission': racism and Liberalism. This essay proceeds in three parts. The first section demonstrates how important racism was in influencing the understanding of British Imperialism by focusing on how the example of Africans substantiates the claim made about the perception that *"whites are more superior than others"*. In a following section, Liberalism will be the focal point of discussion. It is true that Liberalism was supposed to be absent as a tool of empire due to its widely believed presumptions - emancipation not colonisation, liberation not servitude, and equality not double standards (Bentley, 2001:619). However, in this essay, I will argue otherwise: how Liberalism had been used as a handmaiden of British Imperialism. In short, this essay will argue that the 'civilising mission' in the aspects of racism and Liberalism are very important to the understanding of British Imperialism before 1939.

The Importance of Race in the 'Civilising Mission' and How It Shaped the Understanding of British Imperialism

Race is the fulcrum of the 'civilising mission' and inextricably intertwined with the understanding of Imperialism in terms of it being the major incentive of Imperialism. To be more precise, race has both biological and social connotative meanings.[127] There are many ways to differentiate groups of people. Thus, race is *"one form of categorisation"*.[128] Race, in other words, is a self-enforcing interpretation which is entrenched in society as being *"a natural part of a social world"*.[129] The characteristics of race can be seen from having been united by common descent and

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[127] Garner, S. *Racisms*. (London: SAGE, 2009), pp.1-5

[128] Ibid
[129] Ibid

identified by skin colour.[130] What is commonly seen among the same group of people are their common bounds of practice in terms of *"shared language, history, culture or outlook".[131]*Undeniably, from the Western perspective, non-Europeans were perceived as the *"the others"* which, in turn, led to emotional attitudes: *"difference means inferiority".[132]* The idea of race was a widely held axiom that it was a biological proof of difference but is abhorred and rejected in the 21st century.[133] Later on, in the 19th century, race had developed as a tool of social science to indicate not only a variety of characteristics and types, but also levels of development.[134]

In essence, racism is a belief that denotes the superiority of some races over others, meaning that the inferior races need to be treated with different standards; be it *"the temperamental qualities, intelligence, capacity for work and the ability to create a valuable culture"*. [135] In addition, by the late 19th century, it became evident that Europeans, especially Aryans, were superior.[136] They were perceived as an

exemplary recognition of beauty, intelligence, physical strength, moral integrity and bravery. However, any other groups who were bereft of this civilisation as a consequence of cultural stagnation and development were regarded as savage. Equally important, as Johnson argues,

"Black skin was 'evidence' of being a 'human fossil' or 'infantile'. The absence of literature or technology was seen as evidence of ignorance. Rebellion or resistance to white rule, and therefore to civilisation, was used as proof of underdevelopment, impulsiveness and immaturity."[137]

The epitome of stereotyping of Africans countenances the aforementioned claim in which the Africans were treated differently due to the accusation of having no history and culture, judging by their unpalatable practices such as human sacrifice and cannibalism, *"politically decentralised, living in small villages, often naked, dominated by witchcraft, living in terror of their neighbours"*. [138]

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[130] Johnson, R. *British imperialism*. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.107-112.

[131] Ibid

[132] Hyam, R. *Britain's declining empire*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.38.

[133] Ibid
[134] Johnson, R. *British imperialism*. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.107
[135] Ibid
[136] Ibid pp. 109
[137] Ibid pp.109

[138] Ibid pp. 108

The 'civilising mission' as in the aspect of race is crucially important, and is of great relevance to the understanding of Imperialism in illuminating the true reason behind the invention of the term *"race"*. The factors that contributed to racism can be varied: from economic reasons to finding and controlling an underclass of slave labourers. [139] From this, it follows that the ultimate goal of imperialism in using racism as a reason to intervene is not about racial domination per se, but geopolitical security or commercial profit.[140] Hence, the purpose of racist states is ethnic survival as they feel insecure because of an alien other. [141] As a result, settler communities were prone to be more paranoid to the point that their racial prejudice is more prominent than that of politicians and officials in London owing to the fact that settlers were in closer contact with other races.[142] Simply put, insecurity

and fear were the true reason behind settler racial prejudice.

The Importance of Liberalism in the 'Civilising Mission' and How It Shaped the Understanding of British Imperialism

The schism of the definitions of Liberalism has always been at odds as to whether Imperialism had been buttressed or undermined by Liberalism.[143] However, it is undeniable that Liberalism is the mainstay of the zenith of Imperialism according literally to the term *"Liberal Imperialism"*, founded on assumed universal values, which focuses on insisting upon the enforcement of the rule of law and progress.[144] More specifically, the emphasis of rationality and autonomy which the Liberal ideas uphold contradicts with nearly all the principles of empire.[145] As such, it was by no means the underpinning tool of Imperialism.[146] Besides this, in most periods in the early 18th and 19th centuries,

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[139] Ibid pp. 107

[140] Hyam, R. *Britain's declining empire*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.39.

[141] Ibid p 29
[142] Ibid p 29
[143] Kumar, K. 'A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France by Jennifer Pitts Review', 28, The International History Review, (2006) p 395

[144] Pitts, J. *A turn to empire*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.1-10 and Cain, P.

Character, 'Ordered Liberty', and the Mission to Civilise: British Moral Justification of Empire, 1870–1914. 40, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, (2012). p.557.

[145] Kumar, K. 'A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France by Jennifer Pitts Review', 28, The International History Review, (2006) p 395
[146] Pitts, J. *A turn to empire*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.4

Liberalism was more inclined to have been embodied with Imperialism.[147] The justification for empire given in the 19th century was mainly the need for patience to realise a future in which the notion of future is expressed through the commitment to progress.[148]

Surprisingly, Liberal justification of the empire had been put forward and elaborated by all the great thinkers who were considered as democratic, be it John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, or Thomas Babington Macaulay. The essential legitimacy of the empire is the need to reconstruct political and commercial governance even though the means to do so was undemocratic, and representative structure was abstained.[149] What these philosophers all agreed upon is the recognition of Britain, as a parent, obliged to be benevolent towards India, who was considered as a child, in bestowing civilisation.[150] This idea of parental duty can be traced back from Liberal tradition which was *"Locke's characterisation of tutelage as a necessary stage through which children must*

be trained before they acquire the reason requisite for expressing contractual consent".[151]

The empire as drawn by the Liberals is a *"stranger"* who comes from *"elsewhere"* with new knowledge and instruments of progress, and who comes today and stays tomorrow but always remains from elsewhere".[152] The repercussion of this understanding influences how one sees the assumptions about *"individual and collective identity, religion and superstition, territoriality and cosmopolitanism, and, most broadly, civilisational progress and its stasis"* embedded to the common understanding which educates, represents, and rules people on this rational basis.[153] To put it simply, the analogy of British government leading the strings for people to be trained to walk by themselves was the claim that was compendiously constituted in imperial discourse.[154]

According to the discourse about *"stranger"*, the unfamiliarity of India substantiates the claims that Britain, as a stranger, came to be

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[147] Kumar, K. 'A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France by Jennifer Pitts Review', 28, The International History Review, (2006) p 395

[148] Mehta, U. *Liberalism and empire*. (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1999), p.30.

[149] Ibid p.2
[150] Ibid p.32
[151] Ibid p.32
[152] Ibid p.31
[153] Ibid p.31
[154] Mehta, U. *Liberalism and empire*. (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1999), p.32.

seen as a beholder who liberalised many aspects of Indian society, as it had been taken to be seriously considered as a normative concern. [155] Due to the failure of Liberal Imperialism which had been undermined by the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the Morant Bay crisis, and other instances; British philosophers, statesmen and administrators had to find excuses as to why the implementation of Liberalism had failed by pointing out the differences between British and other colonial subjects rather than noting the similarities.[156] Furthermore, Indian civilisation and culture had been blamed for being incompatible with Liberalism and in lieu should be controlled by an *"indirect rule"*.[157] On this basis, Cain further argues that;

"They (Mantena and other philosophers) reinforced this argument by predicting that if Britain abandoned India then the latter would dissolve into warring factions and that 'anarchy' was inevitable."[158]

As can be seen, the relationship of Liberalism as part of the 'civilising mission' had been interweaved with Imperialism in many respects. It shaped the understanding of how Liberalism played a pivotal role in justifying Imperialism in terms of reconstructing and modernising the structural systems of the conquered countries both politically and economically. However, thus far, once implementation resulted in what was not expected, the traditional structures were blamed as incompatible with liberal structures handed out by Britain. Most importantly, the reason to liberalise *"others"* reflected how British Imperialism used the justification that echoed the language of patronising, such as *"parents"* and *"child"*, towards the colonised countries. Ironically speaking, although Britain was a Liberal regime which acknowledged certain universal rights, it failed to recognise and allow those rights to be applied in practice to the colonised countries.[159] Such double standards were often supported, with the reason that colonised countries lacked reason and self-control or, to be blunt, were less human. Meanwhile, Britain as a civilised country could rule itself; it meant that other countries which had been ruled from afar must be labelled as

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[155] Ibid p.28

[156] Cain, P. Character, 'Ordered Liberty', and the Mission to Civilise: British Moral Justification of Empire, 1870–1914. 40, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, (2012). p.557-558

[157] Ibid p 558

[158] Ibid p 558

[159] Pomeranz, K. Empire & 'civilizing' missions, past & present. 134, 2005, *Daedalus*, p.34-45.

uncivilised in order to justify the action of ruling.[160]

Conclusion

The 'Civilising mission' is very important in our understanding of British Imperialism before 1939 as exemplified by the instances of Africa and India given in racism and Liberalism sections. Racism, on the one hand, illuminated the need to use the reason of race to show that whites are more superior which means that the conquered countries should be reconstructed by the civilisation of the whites. On the other hand, Liberalism had been used as a tool to support both ideological and technical aspects of Imperialism in that the traditional rule of the conquered countries were regarded as barbarian, uncivilised, and underdeveloped. Therefore, the British needed to liberalise certain structures of the conquered countries to the point where they were able to govern themselves.

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[160] Ibid p.36

Still Cordiale?

Paul Hagan

When Britain and France signed what became known as the 'Entente Cordiale' in 1904, it brought into being an era of mutual cooperation between two neighbours whose past had often made them the best of enemies. The partnership served and survived two World Wars, but when I examined it in its centenary year for this publication back in 2004, relations had frayed. The fog on the channel had been brought- about by disagreements over the Iraq war and French designs on building a counterweight to the US. However it would seem that in the years since the US-led invasion of Iraq, it would seem that the French have missed few opportunities to intervene in Middle East and beyond, undaunted by recent attacks in Paris. In contrast the UK hasn't been at the forefront of projecting its power, but when it did it was to support France. The Lancaster House treaties of 2010 seem to have formed a more concrete framework that seems to be holding, for now at least. What have been the factors to drive this and what challenges does it face?

Both countries saw a dramatic curtailment of their global influence in last century when superpower conflicts largely reduced their roles to bit-part players. As far as much of the popular history of this ancient relationship is concerned the interesting parts often end in 1956, when the failure of the Suez expedition marked a severance of imperial reach for both. Britain was often seen as playing second fiddle to the US, while France's aim became to seek to build Europe as a counterweight and springboard for its grandeur. It has been the relationship with the United States which often set them apart, as was evident in 2003, when differing approaches to the Iraq conflict put them at loggerheads. Accusations of cowboys, poodles and more famously 'cheese-eating surrender monkeys'[161] abounded. Since the departure from office of Bush, Chirac and Blair differences between the various countries have seemed less pronounced and the relationship between Britain and France has grown closer in particular in security terms.

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[161] A phrase originally used by a supposedly Scottish character in American comedy The Simpsons, it became a popular refrain in British and publications keen to suggest the French were weak or cowardly.

In the last ten years Anglo-French relations have moved from the cordial to the concrete. Eighteen after years since the two signed the agreement at Saint Malo, to work to create within the Europe *"the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces"* [162] the Lancaster House Treaties were signed by President Hollande and Prime Minister Cameron in November 2010. The scope of the treaties is vast covering military training, interoperability of equipment, nuclear stockpile stewardship and cooperation in other fields. They also include the ability to deploy a UK-French integrated carrier strike group (when the Royal Navy once again has carriers) incorporating assets owned by both countries. The treaties were an undoubted sign that both countries were willing to commit to working together.

The UK's most recent Strategic Defence and Security Review mentions France more times than any other ally apart from the US. [163] Meanwhile France's most recent defence White Paper in 2013, and similarly refers to the UK more times than Germany and more than

anyone except the US, commenting on *"the high level of mutual trust that has been established with our British allies."*[164] One of the consequences of the these treaties was realised last month when 5,000 British and French troops took part in Exercise Griffin Strike[165], the first such demonstration of the Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) envisaged in the treaties. This exercise follows-on from very real cooperation the two countries have used in the Libyan conflict, where Britain and France found themselves, uniquely, in the lead in an operation where the US pulled out of the combat at an early stage,[166] as well as more recently in Iraq and now in Syria in operations against the group known as *Daesh* (or Islamic State).

In terms of French policy there has been no let-up in Paris' desire to use force to protect its interest and assert itself militarily in areas of influence, to quote it's 2013 White Paper on defence, it continues to see itself as a "A European Power with global reach" suggesting a continuance of its own desire to walk tall in

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[162] Joint Declaration on European Defence Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998) Article 2.
[163] 22 times, as opposed to 39 for the US (Ibid)
[164] Page 22
file:///C:/Users/Paul/Downloads/White_paper_on_defe nse_2013.pdf
[165] Information widely carried by Ministries of defence http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/interarmees/exercice

s-interarmees/griffin-strike-2016/griffin-strike-2016-validation-du-concept-de-force-expeditionnaire-conjointe &
http://www.army.mod.uk/news/28518.aspx
[166] *Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation - RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report*, 22 September 2011

the world. This has been true for governments on both right (Sarkozy) and left (Hollande). Having rejoined NATO's integrated command structure France's recent record for foreign military interventions has matched anything the UK has done in recent decades, intervening notably Libya in 2011, Mali in 2013, the Central African Republic in 2014, Iraq in 2014, and as of 2015 in the conflict in Syria. Although some of these were limited in time and scope, *Operation Barkhane*, a long-term counter-insurgency operation has committed 3,000 French troops to a lasting counter-insurgency operation across five African states since 2014.[167] The opening of a new military base in the United Arab Emirates in 2009 allows for further force projection even beyond the traditional areas of North Africa and the Levant, giving its fleet better access to the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean, where along with the Royal Navy have been taking EU-sponsored action around the horn of Africa.

In contrast British foreign policy has become somewhat less ambitious in recent years, although allegations that the UK has 'effectively resigned as a world power'[168] seem

a little far-fetched. Whereas the UK was perceived by many in France and elsewhere in Europe as inherently bellicose during the years of Tony Blair's premiership, recent decades seem to have brought a lessening of the desire to intervene abroad. While it is difficult to out into exact terms any such change shrinking defence budgets do paint a picture of contraction. The British army is due to shrink to 80,000 and last year the UK is still the forthcoming 8-9% decrease in the UK military defence budget as compared to 2009 figures has led to, what one study called a 20-30% reduction in conventional capability. [169] However it does remain the fifth biggest military spender in the world, the second biggest spender in NATO after the US.

Foreign policy has rarely been centre-stage at any point during the premiership of either David Cameron or Gordon Brown and it was not a major issue during the two most recent British elections, suggesting a lack of appetite in public discourse about being seen as a power of world significance. The failure by Prime Minister Cameron to convince the House of Commons to sanction action on Syria in 2011 to some looked like a retreat from

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http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/sahel/dossier-de-presentation-de-l-operation-barkhane/operation-barkhane
[168] Fareed Zakaria, *Washington Post*, 21 May 2015
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/britain-

resigns-as-a-world-power/2015/05/21/d89606f8-fff1-11e4-805c-c3f407e5a9e9_story.html
[169] Ben Barry: Prospects for the United Kingdom's armed forces in 2015 and beyond, The Military Balance, IISS, 3 March 2015

global responsibilities. Coincidently the next day in Parliament there was a debate on why the Royal Navy had no aircraft carriers (Although two of greater size than previously used, are currently in construction).

British military intervention however did not end with the 2003 effort to remove Saddam Hussein. As mentioned the UK was one of the key advocates of the Libyan intervention in 2011, and provided considerable forces to the seven month operation. The Royal Air Force has been involved in operations against *Daesh* in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since December 2015. Where France has lead the UK always supported and occasionally followed, they provided aircraft and around 40 troops [170] for French intervention in Mali, offered support for French planes involved in operations in Iraq and Syria, which they have fully joined. For David Cameron gaining democratic support for Extending operations to Syria was partly made possible due to pressure to act after the attacks on Paris by the *Daesh* group and a direct appeal from Francois Hollande, leaving one to conclude, perhaps ironically that Britain had returned to war, thanks to France.

Having seemingly been able to demonstrate close cooperation in areas the Middle-East, the lack of agreement over the EU makes the alliance seem curious. However while Britain and France remain the main actors in any European defence configuration none of the recent progress in the security relationship is down to the EU. The lack of progress in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is another likely reason often cited for increased cooperation between the two states, this now coupled with a multiplication of near threats and continuing delays in CSDP seems to have served as a catalyst for cooperation. French government's continuing desire to embed its own security within a European Union framework over the last decade remains an objective so far largely unfulfilled. During its presidency of the European Union in 2008 one of France's stated objectives was a deepening of the security and defence aspects of the European Union, [171] something the British remain distinctly less enthusiastic on. The Lancaster House treaty is a bilateral one between the UK and France and does not have a formal link with the CSDP. It does not use the separate Lisbon Treaty's Permanent Structured Cooperation facility,

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[170] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-relationship-strong-in-mali-operation
[171] Speech by Sarkozy to the European Parliament, 16 December 2008.

http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/Speech-by-M-Nicolas-Sarkozy

nor involve the European Defence Agency. They have therefore been seen as a break on building the kind of EU-based defence projects that France had hoped for. Some French commentators have suggested that Lancaster House and its increased cooperation between the UK and Franc represented the triumph of necessity borne- of the inability to use Germany as a strategic partner in a military alliance given their continuing unwillingness to commit troops to military action. [172] In this sense it's a triumph more for the British approach to security.

What has often seen as a key reason for the renewed cooperation between the two is the desire to maintain a global presence, but the lessening of resources to do so, this has led to some to wryly dub the alliance as an "*entente frugale*" [173] The question then arises of whether or not it could survive further pressure from further defence cuts could then arise. The shrinking involvement of the US in European security issues has been a factor. US President Obama's, famed 'pivot towards Asia' has opened European eyes to the need to lessen their reliance upon Washington. A resurgent Russia and enduring conflicts on

their doorstep have never been far from Paris or London's attention in recent years. Meanwhile France's symbolic ally Germany has been handed increasing power by the European Union, though remains less than willing to match diplomatic or economic power with force.

For certain the result of the EU referendum on 23 June is likely to have longstanding consequences for the future of both countries, the UK in particular, and is likely to see fractious negotiations relating to agriculture, the single market, research and a number of other problematic issues as far as France is concerned. Whether or not this will affect the now close security relationship developing between the two remains to be seen. There have been robust denials of this from some quarters with the head of the Franco-British Council quotes as saying "This is a day-to-day, intense partnership that has never been affected by whatever French or British-bashing was going on in either country in the last five years" [174] Some French commentators have suggested that if Britain were to leave the EU then French attempts to embed security and defence within the EU structure would face

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[172] Claudia Mayor, quoted in *Le Figaro*, 16 February 2012.

[173] Philippe Leymarie, 4 novembre 2010, François Heisbourg, The Economist, 20 November 2014, Nick Robinson, BBC, 2 November 2010

[174] Quoted in *Politico*, 5 July 2016
http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-or-not-france-and-britain-deepen-military-alliance-lancaster-treaties-defense-david-cameron-nicolas-sarkozy/

less and less resistance, which could give the French military a more European character,[175] however one potential consequence could be that if Scotland were to secede from the UK as a result it would weaken all British conventional forces, including casting fresh doubt on any British nuclear deterrent. The other worry is that if the UK suffers economically as a result of leaving the EU the pressure its defence budget could be under could make France less willing to embed itself further.

In security terms a British withdrawal from the EU, ought not to affect British security policy too strongly but it has set-off alarm bells in Eastern European capitals as any weakening of the EU could be detrimental to their security which they see as a bulwark against an ever-aggressive Moscow. Poland and the Baltic states are worried about *Brexit*, pursued by a bear![176] There have been reports in Brussels in the week of writing that UK diplomats have been citing their commitment to NATO as an example of how they remain a trusted partner in Europe, certainly July's summit could be one of the most significant in the Alliance's recent history if the UK were to use it to remind its partners of their commitment. In these eras of

constrained budgets and American indifference and simmering tensions on the European periphery Britain and France have found much more to cooperate-on than not. The threat and use of Russian power on Europe (and NATO's) eastern flank as well as continuing areas of instability around the Mediterranean have meant that security issues cannot be ignored.

The result of the EU vote on 23 June might yet have significant consequences for the roughly 350,000 French people live in the UK, not to mention the approximately 400,000 Britons living in France, but the substance of that remains unknown. London is likely to remain in effect France's sixth biggest city [177] and the French in London will likely to continue being represented by an MP in the National Assembly.

Shortly after the terror attacks on Paris on the night of 13 November England and France's football teams played-out a match inconsequential in its result but rich in symbolism. The lyrics to *La Marseillaise* were plastered across big screens of London's Wembley stadium and English fans held-up a giant French flag while the second-in-line to

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[175] Heisbourg Ibid

[176] Paul Hagan, Slugger O'Toole, February 2016, http://sluggerotoole.com/2016/02/04/brexit-pursued-by-a-bear/

[177] Lucy Ash, BBC website, 30 May 2012 http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18234930

the throne led English fans in a stirring rendition of the French anthem. As an event of cross-channel solidarity it is perhaps more memorable than anything as a result of the Common Market, Eurovision or the Channel Tunnel. Today, as in 1904, both see threats than the old foe across the channel. *Vive l'entente,* for now at least!